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The thesis explores the reciprocal relationship between an artwork and the space of its 
reception. It proposes a distinctive position on spatiality and the virtual. The thesis is 
submitted in two parts: a written thesis (Part One), and a documentation of my own art 
practice (Part Two). 
The artwork that comprises the practice component is not that of a painter, and yet the 
sculptural installations I present allude to perspectival paintings. Utilising perspectival 
geometry, these site-responsive works engage the threshold between two and three-
dimensional representation in a way whereby implicit and actual beholder’s viewpoints 
are contrasted or fused.
The written thesis focuses on the reception of perspectival painting, rather than on my 
own artworks. Referencing analytical philosophical arguments on representational seeing, 
and the reception aesthetics of Wolfgang Kemp, it puts forward a distinctive position that 
contends that while the visual imagination does not deine depiction, it plays a pivotal 
role in supplementing perception in works where the spectator attends to and/or imagines 
away the threshold separating the real and ictive realms. After Merleau-Ponty, I call such 
an imaginative engagement seeing-with, which describes a particular use to which painting 
is put. In providing a strongly felt pictorial depth, I argue that such an implied pictorial 
space incorporates the space between painting and spectator position.
I investigate two categories of works where such imagining facilitates a distinctive access 
to the picture’s content: (i) paintings containing what Wollheim refers to as an ‘internal 
spectator’; and (ii) paintings integrated into their architectural settings, where the internal 
onlooker is fused with the external spectator. I highlight diferences aforded internal and 
external spectators: with the former, the viewer identiies with a spectator who already 
occupies an unrepresented extension of the ‘virtual’ space; with the latter, the beholder 
enters that part of the ictive world depicted as being in front of the picture surface, the 
work thus drawing the ‘real’ space of the spectator into its domain. 
This distinction mirrors two distinct types of visualization: where a scene is imagined 
as elsewhere, and where it is situated, juxtaposed with an existing reality. Imagination 
provides a reciprocity that replicates the experience of our bodily situatedness, in that it 
structures our implied spatial access to the depicted scene. In establishing a bodily frame 
of reference, it draws upon nonconceptual content. The thesis tests the philosophical 
argument against speciic paintings, including works that introduce a break from a situated 
relationship in order to depict the supernatural or the unconscious. 
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This thesis constitutes a heterogeneous mix of contemporary art practice, analytic 
philosophy of art and perspectival painting. Given that I studied architecture, rather than 
ÀQHDUWSKLORVRSK\RUDUWKLVWRU\WKHFRQWHQWRIWKHUHVHDUFKZLOOSHUKDSVEHVXUSULVLQJ
While I now practice as an artist, the concerns that underlie my art practice nevertheless 
UHÁHFWDQRQJRLQJGLDORJXHZLWKDUFKLWHFWXUDOVSDFH$QGLWLVWKLVORQJVWDQGLQJFRQFHUQ
with the relationship between an artwork and the space of its reception that is key to 
understanding the seemingly diverse nature of the material presented.
The artwork that forms the practice component of my submission is not that of a 
painter, and yet the works themselves allude to painting. More particularly, they allude 
to a certain kind of painting: perspectival works implying the presence of a spectator as 
part of their content. A philosophical consideration of the beholding of such works will 
constitute the larger part of the written thesis. My interest lies less with such paintings’ 
narrative or religious content, and more with how this content is structured by the implied 
spatial relationship between different parts of the painting and the viewer. Of course, 
this spatial relationship is not, in itself, ‘real’, in that painting presents two perspectives, 
that of the spectator and that of the implied spatial scene; as the Italian philosopher Paolo 
6SLQLFFL KDV VXJJHVWHG WKH ÀJXUDWLYH VSDFH RI SDLQWLQJ GRHV QRW UHDGLO\ LQWHJUDWH LWVHOI
with real space (2008).1 While the structuring of a work’s reception is a function that is 
already implicit to the work of art, the experience of pictorial depth on which it rests is in 
LWVHOIGHSHQGHQWXSRQDQLPDJLQDWLYHHQJDJHPHQWRQWKHSDUWRIWKHVSHFWDWRURQHWKDW
is prompted and licensed by the work, but requires the beholder’s imaginative consent. 
It is a concern with the spatial implications of this structuring role for imagination that 
distinguishes the theoretical position the thesis proposes.
$IWHU 0DXULFH 0HUOHDX3RQW\ , VKDOO FDOO VXFK D SURMHFWLYH HQJDJHPHQW seeing-with, 
a seeing according to the painting (1993c, p. 126). I do not consider such an experience 
of pictorial space as necessarily internal to the virtual world painting presents: I make a 
distinctive case that certain works imply (and, more strongly, anticipate) the presence of an 
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external spectator, the beholder of the picture. In so doing, I will draw distinctions between 
the imaginative engagements I argue are afforded internal and external spectators. 
As will already be apparent, my account therefore allocates considerable importance 
to the role of imagination in ‘pictorial seeing’, a term I take to have a wider remit than 
that of depiction. Nevertheless, I argue that the projection of the third dimension into the 
WZRGLPHQVLRQDO PDUNHG VXUIDFH LV DQFLOODU\ WR DQ H[SHULHQFHG UHVHPEODQFH LW LV QRW D
necessary condition for depiction, but a particular use to which pictures are put. It is also 
independent from any attention to the nature of the marked surface: how a painting utilizes 
the medium of paint.2 And yet, as Malcolm Budd notes, it is only with imagination that we 
gain a ‘vivid’ experience of pictorial depth, providing the work in question supports such 
an engagement (2004, p. 392). This vivid experience of pictorial depth is essential for the 
richer experience of pictorial perception considered in this thesis, in paintings implying a 
reciprocity between the work of art and its beholder. Two things follow, which tend not 
to be fully acknowledged in philosophical accounts of depiction. Firstly, pictorial depth is 
generally experienced as being relative not to a picture’s surface, but to a point of view, 
and therefore, I would argue, includes an experience of the space between the virtual space 
of the painting and the implied but unrepresented spectator position (whether or not this 
position is ‘occupied’). This inclusion of an awareness of the space between the represented 
VFHQHDQGZKDW5REHUW+RSNLQVWHUPVWKHGHSLFWLRQSRLQWSSLVHVVHQWLDO
for the kind of reciprocity I am proposing is a factor of works completed by the presence 
RIDYLHZHUZKHUHWKHH[WHUQDOEHKROGHULGHQWLÀHVZLWKWKHLPSOLHGEXWDEVHQWVSHFWDWRU
Secondly, different works construct this relationship in different ways, dependent upon 
whether the implied spectator is conceived as internal WR WKH ÀFWLYH VSDFH RI SDLQWLQJ
occupying an implied extension of the represented scene, or whether the work activates 
the ‘real’ space of the beholder, in a way whereby internal and external spectators either 
fuse, or (in some instances) clash. The latter engagements are not the full kinetic activation 
RIVFXOSWXUHLQWKHURXQGEXWLQYRNHDNLQGRIERGLO\UHDGLQHVVLWVHOIGHSHQGHQWXSRQD
special role for the imagination (both visual and bodily) in drawing an awareness of the 
surrounding architecture into the internal imaginative experience such paintings afford.
Given that the writing will focus on a philosophical position informed by examples 
largely drawn from Renaissance and Dutch genre painting, I feel some obligation to say 
something here about the relationship between the writing and the practice component 
catalogued in Part Two of the thesis. A connection to a very different kind of painting is 
VHOIHYLGHQWLQWKHVPDOOHURIWZRJURXSVRIZRUNVWKDW,SUHVHQW7KLVLVDVHULHVRIDUWZRUNV
that, to reverse the trajectory of Michael Fried’s disapproving comment on Donald Judd’s 
predilection for a certain kind of painting, comprise objects on the verge of becoming paintings.3 
The viewer adopts a stance that initially replicates the position taken up by a spectator in 
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front of a certain kind of Minimalist painting or sculpture. The pieces comprise continuous 
folded forms (in effect, unbroken ‘frames’), their outward manifestations registering as 
discrete blocks of monochrome colour. A more intimate stance is required to view narrow 
stepped passages that lead to spaces beyond. These concealed internal spaces exclude the 
external beholder, and can only be accessed through the imagination. The spectator must 
peer into these works’ hidden recesses in order to fully experience the artwork, and it is 
the establishing of two very different modes of viewing that connects such works to the 
philosophical argument presented by the thesis. 
I have referenced perspectival painting, particularly (though not exclusively) Italian 
Renaissance works, in a second body of work that integrates video projection and sculptural 
object. The connection here with painting is not intended as an illustrative one. Rather, 
what I take from painting is a shared concern with the conditions of spectatorship, and 
with notions of coexistent or duplicated realities. I problematize the perspectival structure 
RI ÀOP LQ UHODWLRQ WR WKUHHGLPHQVLRQDO VFXOSWXUDO REMHFWV 7KHVH LQVWDOODWLRQV DGGUHVV
WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ WKH UHSUHVHQWDWLRQDO VSDFH RI WKH PRYLQJ LPDJH ÀOPLF VSDFH
and the ‘space of reception’, the reality of the architectural space in which the projected 
LPDJH LV VHHQ%\ MX[WDSRVLQJ ÀOPLFDQG ¶UHDO· VSDFH WKH ZRUNVERWK GUDZDWWHQWLRQ WR
ZKLOHVLPXOWDQHRXVO\QHJDWLQJWKHSUHVHQFHRIWKHVFUHHQDVWZRGLPHQVLRQDOVXUIDFHDQG
projected reality.
My artwork is thus fundamental to the submission, and replicates many of the 
concerns addressed in the text with respect to perspectival paintings. The art practice 
is in itself considered a legitimate mode of ‘theoretical’ enquiry, in that it materializes 
ways of thinking about space: the theoretical component is embedded within text and art 
practice, and the interaction between these parallel but interrelated elements is central 
WR P\ FRQFHUQV 1HYHUWKHOHVV , ÀQG P\VHOI DW RGGV ZLWK WKH FRPPRQ SUHPLVH WKDW
contemporary art practice favours the conceptual or hermeneutic condition of the object 
rather than the direct experiential encounter. I contest the supposition that there needs to 
be such a polarization of the conceptual and the experiential. Artworks that explore the 
phenomenology of their reception can legitimately be seen as examples of practices that 
also engage particular ways of thinking; after all, as Richard Wollheim has noted, both 
perception and imagination are highly permeable to thought. 
It is also important for me that many of the theoretical propositions underlying the 
research into painting have genuinely emerged out of parallel concerns arising from my art 
practice. The sculptural installations I construct do not ‘illustrate’ a preconceived theoretical 
position, and while here framed by the thesis, are decidedly not to be experienced solely in 
this light. The work engages many concerns that fall outside of the remit of the thesis itself.4 
While such works are undoubtedly part of the research process (and within the context of 
the thesis must be considered as such), they are intended to be experienced as artworks, 
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rather than as research. 
As such, I have chosen not to write at great length about the works themselves, nor to 
¶LQWHUSUHW·WKHPIRUWKHEHQHÀWRIWKHUHDGHU,EHJLQHDFKFKDSWHUZLWKDVKRUWIURQWSLHFH
a description of one of the sculptural installations catalogued in Part Two. Each piece is 
chosen for its relevance to the theoretical concerns of the particular chapter. Art practice 
and text are thus juxtaposed. But, by and large, I leave it to the reader to make the necessary 
FRQQHFWLRQV,GRQRWUHÁHFWDWJUHDWOHQJWKRQWKHSUDFWLFHLWVHOI5DWKHUWKHDUWZRUNLV
left to stand on its own terms – a deliberate choice, as I am dubious about the strategy of 
placing one’s own work at the very centre of the written thesis.
The thesis is presented in two parts: a written thesis (Part One), and a comprehensive 
documentation of my own art practice (Part Two). The latter includes an attached DVD 
documenting work incorporating the moving image. 
In the Introduction, I set out my methodological position, referencing reception 
aesthetics, phenomenology and (crucially) analytic philosophy. In particular, I distinguish 
my position from semiotic accounts of representational seeing, where, to quote Wollheim, 
‘the grasp of representational meaning is fundamentally an interpretative, not a perceptual, 
activity’ (2001a, p. 15). While broadly supportive of aspects of Wollheim’s alternative notion 
of a criticism as retrieval, I ague that its ‘archaeological’ emphasis has a particular blind spot 
LQWKDWE\DQGODUJH LWH[FOXGHVWKHZRUN·VUHFHSWLRQIURPFRQWULEXWLQJWRLWVPHDQLQJ
bearing properties. The role imagination plays in an extended account of depiction can, I 
FRQWHQGPDNHJRRGVRPHWKLQJRIWKLVGHÀFLHQF\
The philosophical investigation into the respective spatial relationships implied 
EHWZHHQDUWZRUNDQGEHKROGHUZLOOIRUPPXFKRIWKHVXEVWDQFHRIWKHÀUVWWKUHHFKDSWHUV
,Q&KDSWHU2QH,DGGUHVV0HUOHDX3RQW\·VGLOHPPDRI ¶where the painting is’ (1993c, p. 
UHODWLQJWKLV WR WKH LVVXHRISDLQWLQJ·VGRXEOHDVSHFWZKHUHZHVHHERWKDPDUNHG
surface and an absent scene. In considering how the absent object enters into the experience, 
I engage with a number of analytic theories of depiction. I go on to argue a particular role 
for the imagination in an expanded account of representational seeing, a role in negotiating 
painting’s two perspectives – that of the absent scene, and that of an external beholder. 
,Q &KDSWHU 7ZR , TXHVWLRQ WKH DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW SDLQWLQJ DOZD\V SUHVHQWV D VHOI
contained world, isolated from the external beholder. While the vast majority of 
representational works have no implied spectator (other than generally being depicted 
IURPDPRUHRUOHVVVSHFLÀFSRLQWRIYLHZWKHLVVXHRIVHOIFRQWDLQPHQWKDVSDUWLFXODU
relevance to works where the presence of a beholder forms part of the work’s content. 
While acknowledging that some works do, indeed, engage a spectator internal to painting’s 
virtual world, I use Masaccio’s Trinity to claim that in other paintings, integrated into their 
architectural settings, the internal onlooker is fused with the external spectator. Here the 
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imaginative engagement is situated. I highlight differences afforded internal and external 
VSHFWDWRUVZLWKWKHIRUPHUWKHYLHZHULGHQWLÀHVZLWKDVSHFWDWRUZKRDOUHDG\RFFXSLHVDQ
unrepresented extension of the ‘virtual’ space; with the latter, the beholder enters that part 
RIWKHÀFWLYHZRUOGGHSLFWHGDVEHLQJin front of the picture surface, the work thus drawing 
the ‘real’ space of the spectator into its domain. This is particularly relevant to a type of 
ÀFWLYHFKDSHOWKDWXVHV¶LOOXVRU\·PHDQVQRWWRIRROWKHH\HDVLQtrompe l’oeil works, but as 
an imaginative prop, where different parts of the painting are allocated different levels of 
painted reality. 
,Q&KDSWHU7KUHH,UHIHUHQFH0HUOHDX3RQW\·VVLWXDWHGSHUFHSWLRQLQSDUWLFXODU,H[WHQG
6HDQ.HOO\·VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIZKDWKHWHUPV0HUOHDX3RQW\·V¶ERGLO\UHDGLQHVV·WR
the role imagination plays in painting. This is the way the viewer is ‘”potentially lodged 
in” the other points of view on the object’ (p. 100), a nonconceptual situatedness that is 
DQDORJRXVWR0HUOHDX3RQW\·VDFFRXQWRIWKHERG\·VPRWRULQWHQWLRQDOLW\,GUDZSDUDOOHOV
between such a proposition and Christopher Peacocke’s notion of a positioned scenario, used 
in relation to ‘nonconceptual representational contents’ (1992, ch. 3). Referencing Hopkins’s 
chapter on visualization in Picture, Image and Experience (1998, ch. 7), I argue that it is the 
shared perspectival nature of ordinary vision, visualization and seeing-in that affords such 
an imagined experience of depth in painting.
Chapter Four then applies the philosophical position in a more concrete way to particular 
paintings, referencing the rich tradition of art historical writing on spectatorship. I test 
my philosophical position against individual artworks and their art historical literature. I 
investigate works implying either external or internal spectators, and works that construct 
a tension between the two modes of viewing. In so doing, I critically reference a number 
of prominent art historical accounts that address a work’s reception as part of its semantic 
content.
In Chapter Five, I consider Velázquez’s  Las MeninasDSDLQWLQJVXIÀFLHQWO\FRPSOH[
in its relation between artwork and spectator to demand its own chapter. This is a work 
that blurs the boundaries between the modes of engagement considered in Chapter Four: 
ZKLOHLWSUHVHQWVSRVVLEOHLGHQWLÀFDWLRQVZLWKÀJXUHVUHSUHVHQWHGwithin the scene, it also 
references our physical arrival in front of the work. I argue that it might be considered as 
¶WZR·GLVWLQFWZRUNVDÀFWLRQDOSRUWUDLWRIWKHUR\DOFRXSOHDQGWKHYHU\JURXSSRUWUDLWWKDW
confronts us.
The preceding chapters prepare the ground for Chapter Six, the subject of which is 
closest to the original question the thesis set out to address. Here I maintain that early 
Renaissance painters faced a real problem as to how to depict visionary states within 
WKHXQLÀHGVSDFHRISHUVSHFWLYH6XFKunreal states demand further differentiation from 
WKHLPSOLHGFRQWLQXLW\RIWKHÀFWLRQDOVSDFHO\LQJEHKLQGDQGVRPHWLPHVLQIURQWRIWKH
picture plane. I identify a number of works which incorporate a break or gap from a situated 
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relationship between the pictorial space and the space of the viewer in order to represent 
the supernatural: a displacement that is nevertheless predicated for its experiential impact 
upon the suggestion of a spatial continuity between pictorial space and viewer. I argue that 
an imaginative engagement is essential for the effectiveness of such a device. I then develop 
the argument in relation to one strategy applicable to smaller works, where the implicit 
viewer is internal to the virtual world. I claim that a doorsien, a narrative device utilizing a 
VHFRQGDU\SLFWXUHZLWKLQDSLFWXUHKDVWKHSRWHQWLDOWREHPRGLÀHGWRSV\FKRORJLFDOHQGV
ZLWK9HUPHHULWLVDGDSWHGDVDPHDQVWRPDWHULDOL]HXQFRQVFLRXVVWDWHVRIPLQGRIDÀJXUH
within the work. 
,Q WKH ÀQDO FKDSWHU , UDLVH WKH TXHVWLRQ RI KRZ ZRUNV GHSLFWLQJ VXSHUQDWXUDO RU
unconscious states gain emotive content. In so doing, I critically evaluate Wollheim’s 
theory of artistic expression. While acknowledging problems with Wollheim’s account, I 
salvage elements of the theory to argue that certain works’ aligning of structure to religious 
content can invoke the intimation of processes of projection, introjection and sublimation.
In the Conclusion, I ask whether the argument constructed in relation to the beholding 
RISDLQWLQJVPLJKWKDYHUHOHYDQFHEH\RQGWKHFRQÀQHVRISHUVSHFWLYDOSDLQWLQJ,QVRGRLQJ
I reference Postminimalist and expanded cinema practices from the late 1960s and 1970s. 
Sceptical of drawing too direct parallels, I nevertheless acknowledge a similar concern 
in terms of the drawing of architectural space into the experience of an artwork, and in 
constructing different degrees of spatiotemporal reality. But how does the engagement 
of a spectator differ when she is a literal rather than implied presence? I argue that the 
XVHRI¶VLWXDWHG·YLGHRDQGÀOPLQVWDOODWLRQVLQWURGXFHVHOHPHQWVRIVSDWLDODQGWHPSRUDO
reciprocity that draw the spectator into the work’s content. Such works overlay time frames 
DQGMX[WDSRVHÀOPLFDQGUHDOVSDFH7KHVHDUHGHYLFHVWKDWDUHVLPLODUO\XWLOL]HGE\ZRUNV
presented in Part Two of the thesis.
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Introduction
1.
,Q WKLV WKHVLV , TXHVWLRQ WKH DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW SDLQWLQJ DOZD\V SUHVHQWV D VHOIHQFORVHG
world, ‘bracketed off’ from real space. Or more accurately, I question the assumption that 
the imaginative use to which representational painting is put must necessarily imply such 
DVSOLWEHWZHHQÀFWLYHVFHQHDQGHPERGLHGEHKROGHU,QVRGRLQJ,DGGUHVVGLVWLQFWLRQV
and tensions between the different imaginative engagements which I argue are afforded 
paintings1 implying an internal or external spectator: that is works where the beholder is 
considered as internal to the representational world of the artwork, against works that 
can be said to engage something of the ‘real’ space of an embodied spectator. Whereas 
ZLWKDQLQWHUQDOVSHFWDWRUWKHH[WHUQDOEHKROGHULGHQWLÀHVZLWKDQLPSOLHGVSHFWDWRUZKR
is intrinsic to the essentially closed structure of the work, paintings implying a role for 
an external spectator (that is, where the physical presence of a viewer is implicit to the 
painting’s content) engage the space of reception, drawing the surrounding architecture 
into the work’s content. While this may not be the kinetic activation of the beholder’s space 
that Susanne Langer (1953) insists is involved in the viewing of sculpture, the engagement 
such works imply nevertheless constitutes a special case demanding a particular role for 
imagination: such works are completed by the external presence of a spectator in such a 
way that the internal and external spectators fuse, in a way whereby the beholder draws 
an awareness of the work’s architectural context into the imaginative engagement with the 
painting.
In both variations, the relations between artwork and viewer originate in, and are 
instantiated by, the work itself. With the former, the engagement with the painting has 
an independence from its place of viewing, the work’s frame separating out a fragment 
of a prior reality; with the latter, the artwork addresses the boundary between the virtual 
space of the work and the beholder’s location, so that the work functions more directly 
within what Wolfgang Kemp terms its ‘conditions of access’ (1994, p. 366).2 Here, the frame 
LV LQWHJUDWHG LQWR WKH SDLQWLQJ·V KRVW DUFKLWHFWXUH EXW DOVR LQWR WKH ÀFWLRQDO UHDOP %XW
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it is important to note that such a relationship does not replicate our experience of ordinary 
visual space, in that this is an imaginary not illusory experience, regardless of the use of 
VRFDOOHG ¶LOOXVRU\· GHYLFHV , DP QRW WKHUHIRUH FODLPLQJ WKDW QRQLQIHUHQWLDO FRQWURO LV
present, precisely because distinctions between the painting’s different levels of reality 
are fundamental to the work’s meaning. This requires the beholder’s imaginative consent.
As such, my theoretical context can legitimately be seen as falling within territory 
characterized by Kemp as the ‘aesthetics of reception’ (1998).3$V.HPSQRWHVDGHÀQLQJ
premise of reception aesthetics is that ‘the function of beholding has already been 
incorporated into the work itself’ (p. 181). It is a Hegelian premise with which I agree, in 
so far as it is taken to mean that a work structures and anticipates the reciprocal encounter 
between an implicit spectator and artwork.4 However, I am reluctant to be too narrowly 
bound by the theoretical concerns of Rezeptionsästhetik. My reservation stems from an 
unease with its interpretative bias, an over emphasis on the ‘reading’ of signs. Thus, Kemp 
argues that the aesthetics of reception ‘has to discern the signs and means by which the 
work establishes contact with us’ (p. 183). He has in mind something like the ‘focusing’ 
gesture of the maid in Nicolaes Maes’s The EavesdropperÀJSDUWRIWKH&ROOHFWLRQRI
Harold Samuel, a painting that I will go on to argue creates a tension between rather than 
a merging of the engagements afforded an as yet unrealised notion of an internal spectator 
and the external viewer. 
Now my disagreement with Kemp is not in the discernment of such signs in itself, but 
rather the uses to which the interpretation is put. The maid’s overtly ‘theatrical’ gesture, 
where we are urged to be silent, might indeed be interpreted as an indexical sign,5 in that it 
UHDFKHVRXWIURPWKHÀFWLRQDOZRUOGRIWKHSDLQWLQJWRWKHZRUOGRIWKHH[WHUQDOEHKROGHU
as audience (in much the same way as a character in a play might, as an aside, directly 
address the audience). The indexicality of the sign follows from its prepositional nature: it 
refers to an assumed viewer in a way that is analogous to what Charles S. Pierce describes 
as ‘a situation relative to the observed, or assumed to be experientially known, place and 
attitude of the speaker relatively to that of the hearer’ (1985, p. 16). Indeed, Pierce, contrary 
to the use to which he is frequently put, emphasises the experiential nature of such indexical 
directions. He argues that ‘some indices are more or less detailed directions for what the 
hearer is to do in order to place himself in direct experiential or other connection with the 
thing meant’ (p. 15). And this is precisely what Maes’s gesture encourages the spectator to 
do. 
I also accept that aspects of such an engagement are conventionalised. To use Kemp’s 
terminology, such signs belong to the work’s ‘outer’ rather than ‘inner’ apparatus (1998, 
p. 191), in that they are there to be interpreted by the spectator of the picture, the viewer 
standing before the work. Spinicci has similarly referred to what he terms the ‘meta-iconic 
message’, in that the message is ‘aimed at the spectator from the painting, in a gesture that 
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seems to invite the viewer to comment on the scene, rather than play a part in it’ (2008). 
With Maes’s work, our role in interpreting the maid’s gesture is not that of a spectator as 
yet internal WRWKHÀFWLRQDOZRUOGDSDUWLFLSDQWZLWKLQWKHZRUN·VLQQHUQDUUDWLYHEXWDV
DQDXGLHQFHPHPEHUH[WHUQDOWRWKHÀFWLRQDQGZKRLVPDGHDZDUHRIWKHFRQFHLWEHKLQG
WKHSDLQWLQJ·VDSSHDOWRDQH[WHUQDOEHKROGHU7KHZRUNWKXVIRUHJURXQGVLWVRZQÀFWLRQDO
nature.
7KDW LW LV WKH H[WHUQDO VSHFWDWRU WKDW LV KHUH DGGUHVVHG LV PDGH FOHDU IURP WKH KDOI
drawn curtain (a familiar Dutch genre device), a trompe l’oeil version of the covers that 
once protected paintings in Dutch interiors.6 The curtain both encourages and delimits 
RXU SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LW HQWLFHV XV WR GUDZ LW RSHQ ZKLOH GHWDFKLQJ XV IURP WKH ÀFWLRQDO
space depicted ‘behind’. It introduces what Hanneke Grootenboer would refer to as a 
‘rhetorical dimension’, in that it establishes contradictory points of view that ‘at the level 
of referentiality are mutually exclusive’ (2005, p. 149). According to Grootenboer, such 
an example of a ‘double manifestation of perspective’ calls for an ‘allegorical mode of 
ORRNLQJ·EHFDXVH LWGUDZVDWWHQWLRQWRDZRUN·V WZRGLPHQVLRQDOLW\ ¶WKXVXQGHUPLQLQJ
perspective’s promise of depth’ (p. 165). 
So how does my position differ from Kemp’s? While I fully acknowledge the status of 
such signalling elements, and their prepositional role in establishing a work’s conditions of 
access, I want to emphasize their functional role in structuring an encounter between work 
and beholder. Kemp’s discursive emphasis, which focuses on the interpretation rather than 
the experience, underplays The Eavesdropper’s use of its different levels of painted reality. 
Maes’s use of the gesture and curtain might alternatively be understood as signs which 
Fig. 1    Nicolaes Maes: The Eavesdropper (1655), Collection of Harold Samuel, London. 
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IXQFWLRQDVLPDJLQDWLYHSURSVZKHUHE\ZHDUHLQYLWHGWRLPDJLQDWLYHO\UHÁHFWXSRQRXU
VSDWLDODQGSV\FKRORJLFDODFFHVVWRWKHYLUWXDOZRUOGWKHSDLQWLQJSUHVHQWVDQGXOWLPDWHO\
upon our effective exclusion. The semiotic function of the curtain cannot adequately account 
for our very real desire to imagine pulling it back in order to reveal more of the ‘painting’ 
it part conceals. The ‘thought’ this work provokes permeates the imaginative experience, 
and in turn impacts upon how we see the work when we revert from imagination to 
perception. The signs are imaginatively activated as a process whereby the contradictory 
viewpoints are experienced in the process of viewing, in a way that engages our spatial 
position directly in front of the work. 
Moreover, I will argue that in replicating a bodily frame of reference, works that 
imaginatively engage a spectator (and particularly an external VSHFWDWRUGUDZXSRQQRQ
FRQFHSWXDOFRQWHQWVRPHWKLQJGHQLHGLQDFFRXQWVZKHUHYLHZLQJLVODUJHO\FRQFHLYHGDVDQ
interpretive activity. The perception of distance cues is transformed into a nonconceptual 
engagement that is dependent upon shared frames of reference between ordinary vision, 
VHHLQJLQDQGYLVXDOL]DWLRQ
Ironically, Wolfgang Iser’s The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response (1978), a 
work so important to the development of Kemp’s project (Iversen 1993, p. 138), offers a 
phenomenological account of reading at odds with the privileging of the work as sign. For 
Iser, the reading process is ‘a dynamic interaction between text and reader’, whereby the 
text ‘can activate the individual reader’s faculties of perceiving and processing’ (p. 107). 
Indeed, Iser’s emphasis on the reader entangled in a situation constitutes what is more 
accurately described as a ‘theory of aesthetic response (Wirkungstheorie)’, rather than a 
theory of reception (Rezeptionstheorie) (p. x).7 Iser maintains ‘it is called aesthetic response 
because, although it is brought about by the text, it brings into play the imaginative and 
perceptive faculties of the reader, in order to make him adjust and even differentiate 
his own focus’ (p. x). This has obvious relevance to Maes’s painting. If the function of 
beholding has already been incorporated into the work of art, it is because the work 
structures an encounter with its beholder, the reciprocity it prompts being very much an 
imaginative and perceptual response by a viewer reacting to both marked surface and 
ÀFWLYHVFHQH,WLVWKHODWWHUWKDWFRQFHUQVWKLVWKHVLV$QGDV,VHUQRWHVVXFKDVWUXFWXULQJ
DYRLGVWKHVRFDOOHG¶DIIHFWLYHIDOODF\·8 where the work and its effect are confused, in that 
the concern of an aesthetics of response is ‘with the structure of the “performance” which 
precedes the effect’ (p. 27).
In constructing what might be termed an experiential, and, indeed, psychological version 
of reception aesthetics, sensitive to the role signs play in structuring the conditions of access, 
the thesis will focus on the particular role imagination plays in a work’s reception, and 
RQWKHUHFLSURFDOLQWHUDFWLRQHQJHQGHUHGEHWZHHQDUWZRUNDQGEHKROGHU$IWHU0HUOHDX
Ponty, I refer to this as a kind of seeing-with, a seeing ‘according to’ the painting (1993c, p. 
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126). It is a use to which pictures are put. I believe that imagination, and particularly ‘iconic’ 
imagination,9 is pivotal to the implied reciprocity between painted scene and beholder. As 
Spinicci has observed, this is not an objective spatial relation, but ‘an apparent spatiality in 
which – in the form dictated by the image – this relationship between the depicted scene and 
possible observer unfolds’ (2008). Crucially, the work is able to structure such an interaction 
only because imagination provides a vivid experience of pictorial depth, providing the work 
in question supports such an engagement. As such, I question Wollheim’s assumption that 
while an internal spectator offers a distinctive access through the role imagination plays 
in pictorial seeing, paintings that engage an external spectator can only do so through 
illusory means. 
Unlike Kendall Walton (1990), I am not here arguing that imagination grounds seeing-
in,10 an activity that I would contend is prior to seeing-with. Rather, imagination plays 
an ancillary but nonetheless important role in the beholding of many representational 
paintings: and particularly those completed by the presence (or, indeed, absence) of an 
implied spectator. As Spinicci puts it, ‘the imaginative dimension is called into play not 
by the concept of depiction as such, but only by the use we make of depictions when we 
are willing to take part in the game they propose’ (2008). Seeing-with is supplementary to 
an experienced resemblance,11 and plays little or no part in the recognitional aspects of 
depiction – what it is to see an absent object in a marked surface. But a theory of resemblance, 
with its risk of a referential bias, only gets us so far; not only does it fail to explain our 
enjoyment of representational diversity (the way SLFWXUHVUHSUHVHQW/RSHVSS
it cannot account for the interaction common to so many works that engage us spatially 
and psychologically. As such, while I do not here claim to present a comprehensive theory 
of pictorial representation, I develop what I believe to be a key aspect of an ‘expanded’ 
account of representational seeing: ‘expanded’, in that while I do not believe imagination 
is essential to what Budd refers to as the ‘unadorned experience’ of representational seeing 
(1992, p. 275), it is essential to the vivid experience of pictorial depth, and to the reciprocal 
HQJDJHPHQW WKDW DFFRPSDQLHV DQ LGHQWLÀFDWLRQ ZLWK WKH LPSOLHG VSHFWDWRU SRVLWLRQ12 
Seeing-with involves a perceptual shift in gear, where the perception of a marked surface is 
augmented by the imagination, within a framework set by (and anticipated by) the work. 
The thoughts and emotions this encounter engenders permeate subsequent perception, in 
a way that makes the engagement with the painting more replete.
2.
I situate my philosophical line of enquiry primarily within the tradition of analytic 
philosophy of art. As such, my position is at odds with much contemporary visual art 
theory, with its predilection for structuralism or poststructuralism in all their guises. But I 
do not limit my enquiry to analytic sources, in that I also reference the reception aesthetics 
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RI .HPS DQG WKH SKHQRPHQRORJ\ RI 0HUOHDX3RQW\ , GR QRW DWWHPSW D V\VWHPDWLF
reconciliation of these different frames of reference and styles of argument, nor do I attempt 
a survey of the relevant literature. Rather, I have allowed the argument itself to determine 
the points of reference on which the thesis draws. My interest lies with the pursuing of the 
argument rather than an interrogation of the diverse resources on which I draw.
The perceptual and experiential emphasis of many analytic and phenomenological 
theories of representational seeing is in marked contrast to the dominance of linguistic 
derived theories with their distinctive vocabularies.13 But I am also aware that the rather 
too casual dismissal of structuralist and poststructuralist theories can be at the expense of 
a genuine engagement with contemporary debates within the art school context I teach 
in: an environment where analytic approaches are all too seldom addressed. Moreover, in 
addressing theories of an artwork’s reception, I am forced to confront semiotic accounts 
that have rather staked out this territory as their own.14 
:DU\RIWKHFKDUJHRIWRRHDV\DGLVPLVVDOOHWPHEULHÁ\VHWRXWP\SRVLWLRQLQUHODWLRQ
to one of the more plausible semiotic accounts of painting. Outside of the analytic tradition, 
there is wide acceptance that paintings are ‘read’ rather than perceived. Despite the currency 
of this notion, a claim for the vulnerability of semiotic accounts is made by Wollheim, 
who argues that, unlike language, ‘in the relevant, or combinatory, sense, pictures lack 
VWUXFWXUH7KHUHLVQRQRQWULYLDOZD\RIVHJPHQWLQJSLFWXUHVZLWKRXWUHPDLQGHULQWRSDUWV
that can be categorized functionally, or according to the contribution they make to the 
meaning of the whole’ (2001a, p. 14). Wollheim’s target here is a family of theories that 
‘ground representation in a system of rules or conventions that link the pictorial surface, 
or parts of it, with things in the world’ (p. 14).15 
While I broadly agree with this in terms of recognitional aspects of painting, unlike 
Wollheim I believe that certain paintings do structure their conditions of access: and this 
is precisely a functional, rather than formal, categorization. But acknowledging a work’s 
prepositional structuring of the conditions of access is not the same as grounding depiction 
upon a system of rules or conventions that connect image to object, and can remain ancillary 
to an experienced resemblance. I would argue that perspective, combined with framing, 
has a particular role in structuring our implied spatial relationship to painting. Masaccio’s 
Trinity ÀJ  D ZRUN FHQWUDO WR P\ DUJXPHQW UHSUHVHQWV D UDUH SDUDGLJPDWLF VKLIW LQ
the history of reception, precisely because it engages a spectator position as part of the 
work’s semantic content. As we shall see, Trinity distinguishes between those parts of the 
painting implied as spatially in front of the fresco’s supporting surface, and those implied 
as behind: a categorical distinction that, contrary to Wollheim’s argument, is fundamental 
to the work’s meaning.
Now this might initially seem to have something in common with Hubert Damisch’s 
structuralist position, which argues for an alternative ‘semiological analysis that does not 
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Fig. 2    Masaccio: Trinity F6DQWD0DULD1RYHOOD)ORUHQFH
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set out by acknowledging its dependence upon the linguistic (phonetic) model’ (2002, p. 
14). In A Theory of /Cloud/ (2002) Damisch claims: 
Such an analysis cannot possibly proceed simply by a functional division of the painted surface into 
its constitutive parts, and then by breaking down these parts, in their turn, into the elements of which 
WKH\DUHFRPSRVHG2QWKHFRQWUDU\LWQHHGVWRFLUFXPYHQWWKHÁDWVXUIDFHXSRQZKLFKWKHLPDJH
is depicted in order to target the image’s texture and its depth as a painting, striving to recover the 
levels, or rather the registers, where superposition (or intermeshing) and regulated interplay – if not 
HQWDQJOHPHQW²GHÀQHWKHSLFWRULDOSURFHVVLQLWVVLJQLI\LQJPDWHULDOLW\S
,QGHHG,DJUHHZLWK'DPLVFKWKDWDIXQFWLRQDOUHODWLRQVKLSPXVWFLUFXPYHQWWKHWZR
dimensional surface, and address a picture’s depth as a painting. Damisch likewise assigns 
a particular epistemological status to perspective, in terms of its structuring of pictorial 
depth. And yet Damisch’s structuralist position is still heavily dependent upon theories of 
language taken from Émile Benveniste and Jacques Lacan, positing a subject position rather 
than an implied spectator as such. Now, analogies with language have their uses, as we 
have seen in an earlier note with regard to Wollheim’s characterisation of ‘iconic’ states; 
KRZHYHUWKHQRWLRQRIVXEMHFWLÀFDWLRQWHQGVWROLPLWKRZZHPLJKWH[SHULHQFHSDLQWLQJ·V
GHSWKDQGVSHFLÀFDOO\FXUWDLOVWKHNLQGRIH[SHULHQWLDOHQFRXQWHU,SURSRVHLVSURYLGHGE\
iconic imagination – an encounter between painting and an embodied viewer.
In The Origin of Perspective (1994), Damisch puts forward a complex argument that 
painting is a form of thinking. In claiming that perspective ‘functions’ as a model of thought, 
he proposes that it is perspective which structures a picture’s situatedness. Damisch argues 
that perspective is not a code, nor, in itself, a symbolic form;16 rather, ‘the formal apparatus 
put in place by the perspective paradigm is equivalent to that of a sentence, in that it assigns 
the subject a place within a previously established network that gives it meaning, while at 
the same time opening up the possibility of something like a statement in painting’ (p. 446). 
Perspective provides a formal apparatus replete with deictic references such as ‘here, there, 
and over there’ (p. 446).17 It is a spatial thinking: the subject is ‘always posited in relation to a 
“here” or “there”, accruing all the possibilities for movement from one position to another 
this entails’ (p. 53). 
However, it is a spatial thinking that is conceived within discursive limits, where the 
emphasis on a structure akin to a sentence assigns an implied subject position within a 
closed interpretive network.18 Crucially, it does not adequately distinguish between the 
kind of spatial access afforded a description and that afforded a painting. Thus while 
Damisch refers to ‘entering into the painting as if it were a “scene”’, whereby both ‘subject’ 
DQG WKH ¶RWKHU· DUH FRQFHLYHG DV ¶DOUHDG\ WKHUH· S  WKH ÁDW VXUIDFH RI SDLQWLQJ LV
ultimately only circumvented within the closed loop of the symbolic order, thus requiring 
no role for a spectator – whether conceived as internal or external to the work. This means 
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that the painting is ‘read’ rather than ‘experienced’, an essentially interpretive rather than 
perceptual activity.
Like Damisch, I also believe perspective, or more accurately perspective ‘combined 
with framing’ (Maynard 1996, p. 27),  structures a pictorial situatedness. This is, in part, 
undoubtedly conventional. Not in Erwin Panofsky’s sense of perspective as a symbolic 
form, nor Damisch’s notion of perspective as a signifying system; rather, perspective 
VWUXFWXUHVLWVFRQGLWLRQVRIDFFHVVWKURXJKWKHLQWHJUDWLRQRUQRQLQWHJUDWLRQRIERXQGLQJ
IUDPH DQGRU SURMHFWLRQ SODQH LQWR WKH LPSOLHG ÀJXUDWLYH VSDFH $V 6YHWODQD $OSHUV
notes, one might compare Italian picture frames, which resemble architectural elements 
such as window or door surrounds, with Dutch frames, that ‘resemble instead the frames 
on mirrors’ (1989, p. 42). One lends itself to a suggested continuity, the other a cutting into 
a prior reality. With perspectival representation, distance cues, such as foreshortening and 
occlusion, are readily transformed into an imaginative engagement that admits a strongly 
IHOWSLFWRULDOGHSWKDQHQJDJHPHQWWKDWLQFOXGHVDQLFRQLFLGHQWLÀFDWLRQZLWKWKHVSHFWDWRU
position relative to the virtual world of the painting. While analogies with language, such 
DV%HQYHQLVWH·V¶,<RX·SRODULW\SPLJKWVHUYHVRPHexplanatory use in terms of 
GLVWLQJXLVKLQJEHWZHHQUHODWLYHSRVLWLRQVRIEHKROGHUDQGÀFWLRQDOVSDFHWKHSUHSRVLWLRQDO
role imagination plays in experiencing pictorial depth affords something a description 
cannot, an implied spatial access to the scene. And, at least with certain works, this engages 
the ‘real’ space of the beholder in a way that draws upon nonconceptual content. 
3.
Damisch’s account nevertheless has much to recommend it, not least its recognition of 
perspective as an extraordinary cognitive achievement and paradigmatic shift (Iversen 
2005). I will go on to reference Damisch at a number of points, and in Chapter Six I refer 
to his A Theory of /Cloud/ (2002) in discussing the depiction of supernatural phenomena 
that lie ‘beyond’ perspectival representation. Semiotic accounts of painting that import 
linguistic terms such as denotation and connotation fare much worse, and fail to capture 
the distinctive phenomenology of pictorial representation. Denotation cannot explain how 
it is that we ‘see’ something within a marked surface. As Paul Crowther notes ‘denotation 
² LQ DOO LWV YDULHWLHV ² GRHV QRW GHÀQH SLFWRULDO UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ EXW LV UDWKHU RQH RI LWV
major uses’ (2002, p. 90).19,WLVDQRQSLFWRULDOIRUPRIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQWKDWSLFWXUHVXWLOL]H
$FFRXQWVUHOLDQWRQGHQRWDWLRQDQGFRQQRWDWLRQSURYHLQDGHTXDWHLQDQVZHULQJ0HUOHDX
Ponty’s question as to ‘where the painting is I am looking at’ (1993c, p. 126), which I pose 
in Chapter One, precisely because they jettison any such need for a ‘spatial’ engagement 
with the work.
What is not at issue here is the fact that many depictions do, indeed, employ signalling 
elements. Paintings represent in more ways than one, including the use of signs and symbols 
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that have to be interpreted. But this is different from claiming that what is distinctively 
pictorial about how pictures represent is their status as sign. Hopkins makes the distinction 
clear:
Many pictures from the religious art of the West represent the Holy Spirit by depicting a dove. I 
suggest that there is not one form of representation here, but two. The dove is depicted, but the Holy 
Spirit is represented in some other way. After all, the Spirit is only represented by virtue of the fact 
that the dove is, but the converse is not true. This suggests that the representation of the Holy Spirit 
is a far more complex, more derived phenomenon than the representation of the dove. Further, a 
description of the scene which mentioned a dove might represent the presence of the Holy Spirit 
in a similarly derived manner. This provides at least some reason for thinking that the description 
and the picture represent the Spirit in the same way, a way that will not therefore be distinctively 
pictorial. In contrast, they represent the dove in very different ways, and the difference is precisely 
that between pictorial and linguistic representation. (1998, p. 9)
As Budd notes, in such circumstances ‘what a picture represents on the basis of its 
pictorial content can exceed what it depicts’ (2004, p. 394). A work can gain content 
from wider associations outside of what is depicted in its marked surface, including 
H[WUDSLFWRULDOPHDQLQJV,QGHHGRIWHQVXFKDVVRFLDWLRQVDUHSURYLGHGE\WKHZRUN·VWLWOH
Wollheim’s chapter on ‘Painting, Textuality, and Borrowing’ in Painting as an Art (1987, 
ch. IV) describes how certain paintings gain textual meaning when a text enters the content 
of a painting (p. 187). As Wollheim acknowledges, such ‘propositional meaning’ might be 
VHHQWRFRQÁLFWZLWKKLVDUJXPHQWDERXWWKHGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQSLFWRULDODQGOLQJXLVWLF
meaning. And yet there is no inconsistency, in that ‘to maintain that pictorial and linguistic 
meaning are quite unlike is not to claim that a painting can never mean what a piece 
RI ODQJXDJHPHDQV· S7KH LPSRUWDQWGLVWLQFWLRQ LV WKDWZKLOHVXFKH[WUDSLFWRULDO
meanings require interpretation, depiction itself is ‘bound to the visual’, in that, to quote 
Hopkins, it ‘involves a special visual experience on the part of the viewer’ (1998, p. 15). 
It is this requirement to account for the visual aspects of depiction that ultimately rules 
out semiotic accounts from providing an adequate account of the pictorial aspects of 
representational seeing. And if indexical signs are used to structure our implied spatial 
relationship to painting, they do so because they function as prompts for an imaginative 
engagement that, in its reciprocity between work and beholder, far exceeds the notion of 
the ‘reading’ of signs.
4.
Some semiotic accounts are openly hostile to a role for perception. Despite arguing for 
a ‘visual’ semiotics, Norman Bryson’s Vision and Painting (1983) – a work I reference in 
&KDSWHU)RXUPDLQWDLQVWKDW(UQVW*RPEULFK·VDVVHUWLRQWKDWDSDLQWLQJLVDUHFRUGRID
perception is not only wrong, but ‘fundamentally wrong’ (p. xii). He argues that ‘it is not in 
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the contingent and undemonstrable mysteries of perception that realism forges the special 
relationship between denoted and connoted meaning … but in the contradiction installed 
by a univocal iconology, between the necessary and the gratuitous’ (p. 65). Bryson has in 
mind what he terms the excess of information presented by realist painting, beyond the 
requirements of denotation.20
In Bryson’s account, meaning is not to be ‘discovered in the painting’ but in the 
‘interaction of painting with social formation’ (p. 85). Here Bryson acknowledges a debt 
WR 5RODQG %DUWKHV·V UHDGHURULHQWHG QRWLRQ RI ¶7KH 'HDWK RI WKH $XWKRU·  LQ WKDW
meaning for Bryson accrues in the shifting relationship between the painting and its 
subsequent reception rather than the work of art. Consistent with its status as one of 
WKHÀUVWDWWHPSWVWRDSSO\UHFHSWLRQKLVWRU\Rezeptionsgeschichte) to painting, Vision and 
PaintingVKLIWVPHDQLQJIURPWKHZRUNLWVHOIWRLWVVXEMHFWRULHQWHGUHFHSWLRQPHDQLQJIRU
%U\VRQ EHFRPHV D ¶YDULDEOH WHUP ÁXFWXDWLQJ DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH ÁXFWXDWLRQV RI GLVFRXUVH·
(Bryson 1983, p. 85). And with Bryson’s frequent collaborator, Mieke Bal, every detail, 
KRZHYHU VHHPLQJO\ LQVLJQLÀFDQW EHFRPHV D VLJQ WR EH REVHVVLYHO\ LQWHUSUHWHG )RU %DO
the constantly shifting interpretant means that: ‘As soon as the mental image takes shape, 
it becomes a new sign, which will yield a new interpretant, and we are in the middle of 
a process of semiosis’ (1998, p. 75). Interpretation becomes an end in itself, rather than a 
means to experience the work.
The contrast with experiential accounts of depiction has particular relevance to the 
beholding RI SDLQWLQJV :H DUH KHUH IDFHG ZLWK FRQÁLFWLQJ SDUDGLJPV RQ WKH RQH KDQG
accounts where interpretation is a construction of meaning by the viewer, and on the other, 
DFFRXQWVRIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOVHHLQJWKDWGHPDQGDVSHFLÀFDOO\YLVXDOH[SHULHQFHLQRUGHU
to unlock meaning embedded in the work. This might be registered as a methodological 
GLYLGHEHWZHHQDQWLLQWHQWLRQDOLVWDFFRXQWVZKHUHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQLVDVVLJQHGWRDZRUN·V
reception, against ‘retrieval’ accounts, where meaning resides primarily in an internal arc 
between artist and artwork, and therefore involves necessary constraints. In ‘Criticism 
as Retrieval’ (1980c) and The Mind and its Depths (1993), Wollheim sets out just such an 
opposition. For Wollheim, meaning is also not to be found solely in the painting, although 
KH LGHQWLÀHV WKH ZRUN RI DUW ¶DV WKH SURSHU REMHFW RI FULWLFDO DWWHQWLRQ· F S 21 
Wollheim observes: ‘Where meaning is thought of as something to be discovered, the 
critical aim is Retrieval: where meaning is something to be constructed and imposed and 
(presumably) done so afresh from age to age, the critical aim is Revision’ (1993, p. 134). 
Importantly, for Wollheim a criticism as retrieval includes the creative process itself as part 
RIWKH¶PHDQLQJEHDULQJSURSHUWLHVRIWKHZRUN·FSS
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5.
The question arises as to the relationship between critical retrieval and the artist’s 
LQWHQWLRQ2QHRIWKHEHQHÀWVRIVKLIWLQJIRFXVRQWRWKHFUHDWLYHSURFHVVLVWKDWLWFDQDYRLG
extreme forms of intentionality, without denying that a painting is a product of intentional 
activity.22 As Carolyn Wilde has noted, Wollheim’s insistence on a psychological account 
to meaning in painting does ‘not need to assume that artistic intention is something 
separable from what is presented in the work’; moreover, nor should ‘any statement of 
the artist’s intentions, should they be presented independently from scrutiny of the work, 
KDYHDQ\RYHUULGLQJDXWKRULW\DERXWZKDWLVWREHVHHQLQLW·:LOGHSS
This is important in that we cannot know an artist’s actualLQWHQWLRQVHYHQZKHQZHKDYH
access to the artist’s own words. But this problem is alleviated if we distinguish between 
the creative process and the artist’s intention. Wollheim argues that the former is more 
inclusive than the latter, in that ‘the creative process includes the many background beliefs, 
conventions, and modes of artistic production against which the artist forms his intentions’; 
this is an inclusive list that includes ‘current aesthetic norms, innovations in the medium, 
UXOHVRIGHFRUXPLGHRORJLFDORUVFLHQWLÀFZRUOGSLFWXUHVFXUUHQWV\VWHPVRIV\PEROLVPRU
SURVRG\SK\VLRJQRPLFFRQYHQWLRQVDQGWKHVWDWHRIWUDGLWLRQ·FSS
 Moreover, the most important consequence of such a distinction for a criticism as 
retrieval directly follows: 
In recording an artist’s intention the critic must state it from the artist’s point of view or in terms 
to which the artist could give conscious or unconscious recognition. The critic must concur with 
the artist’s intentionality. But the reconstruction of the creative process is not in general similarly 
restrained. The critic must certainly respect the artist’s intentionality, but he does not have to concur 
ZLWKLW2QWKHFRQWUDU\KHLVMXVWLÀHGLQXVLQJERWKWKHRU\DQGKLQGVLJKWXQDYDLODEOHWRWKHDUWLVW
if thereby he can arrive at an account of what the artist was doing that is maximally explanatory ... 
Anachronism arises not when the critic characterizes the past in terms of his own day, but only when 
LQGRLQJVRKHIDOVLÀHVLW:ROOKHLPFS
The argument that we cannot claim absolute knowledge of the object of art history 
therefore misses the crucial point. When the process of understanding is seen as ‘essentially 
experiential’, even when there is a large gap between the perspective of the artist and 
of the interpreter, reinterpretation requires that we look again: ‘understanding a work of 
art is … understanding by acquaintance’ (Wollheim 1993, p. 142). We test our renewed 
understanding against the works themselves, in the light of our being an appropriate 
audience, in that we have put ourselves in the best possible position with respect to the 
work’s reception.
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6.
Now, while broadly sympathetic to Wollheim’s methodological arguments for a criticism 
as retrieval, I believe they have a particular blind spot. The emphasis on the archaeological 
analogy of retrieval means that Wollheim, by and large, excludes the work’s reception from 
LWVPHDQLQJEHDULQJSURSHUWLHVDQG\HW,VHHQRUHDVRQZK\DQH[SHULHQWLDODFFRXQWRIWKH
aesthetics of reception cannot be reconciled with a criticism as retrieval, if we consider 
what is being retrieved in the experience of a painting as a structured relationship between 
artwork and viewer that is implicit to the artwork. Importantly, an implicit observer need 
not rule out a ‘dialogic’ dimension: imagination can provide just such a dialogic relation, 
without falling into claims of beholder authorship. Wollheim does, in fact, allow one such 
possibility for a distinctive imaginative access to a work, but one that he limits to very 
VSHFLÀFSDLQWLQJV:ROOKHLPDUJXHV
,WRRÀQGDSODFHIRULPDJLQDWLRQLQP\DFFRXQWRIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOPHDQLQJEXWLWLVDSODFHWKDW
LVDQFLOODU\WRVHHLQJLQDQGLVUHOHYDQWRQO\WRFHUWDLQSDLQWLQJV7KHVHDUHSDLQWLQJVLQZKLFKWKH
suitable spectator is offered a distinctive form of access through the presence in the represented 
VSDFH²WKRXJKQRWLQWKDWSDUWRI LWZKLFKLVUHSUHVHQWHG²RIDÀJXUHZKRP,FDOO WKH6SHFWDWRU
in the Picture. The Spectator in the Picture has, amongst other things, a psychological repertoire: a 
repertoire of beliefs, desires, attitudes, responses. What then happens is that the suitable spectator, 
the suitable external spectator we might say, starts to identify with the internal spectator: that is, to 
imagine him centrally, or from the inside, interacting with the represented scene as the repertoire 
assigned to him allows or constrains him to. The net result will be that the external spectator will 
ÀQGKLPVHOILQDUHVLGXDOVWDWHDQDORJRXVWRWKDWRIWKHLQWHUQDOVSHFWDWRUDQGWKLVVWDWHZLOOLQWXUQ
LQÁXHQFHZKDWKHVHHVLQWKHSLFWXUHZKHQKHUHYHUWVIURPLPDJLQDWLRQWRSHUFHSWLRQDS
+HUH XQOLNH WKH YLHZHU RI 0DHV·V SDLQWLQJ ÀJ  WKH LPSOLFLW YLHZHU RFFXSLHV DQ
XQUHSUHVHQWHGH[WHQVLRQRIWKHÀFWLRQDOZRUOGRIWKHSDLQWLQJ7KHNH\SRLQWIRU:ROOKHLP
LV WKDW WKLV LPDJLQDWLYH HQJDJHPHQW LQÁXHQFHV ZKDW LV VHHQ LQ WKH SLFWXUH ² LW adds 
something unavailable to perception alone. As Wollheim notes elsewhere, such works 
have ‘a representational content in excess of what they represent’ (1987, 101), an excess 
that accrues from the reciprocal interaction that follows between internal spectator and 
depicted scene.
/HDYLQJDVLGHIRUQRZWKHLVVXHRIZKHWKHUWKHUHFDQEHPRUHRSHQHQGHGLQWHQWLRQV
RQWKHSDUWRIWKHDUWLVWLQLPDJLQLQJVXFKLQWHUQDOVSHFWDWRUV,ZDQWWREULHÁ\H[DPLQHWKH
implications of this representational excess: an excess that arises from a change in perceptual 
JHDUZKHUHSHUFHSWLRQLVVXSSOHPHQWHGE\LPDJLQDWLRQ,WIROORZVDQLGHQWLÀFDWLRQRQWKH
SDUWRIWKHH[WHUQDOEHKROGHUZLWKDÀJXUHRFFXS\LQJZKDW+RSNLQVWHUPVWKH¶GHSLFWLRQ
SRLQW·DSRLQW¶implicit in the picture’, which is to be distinguished from the place occupied 
E\DVSHFWDWRUVWDQGLQJIRULQVWDQFHZLWKLQDJDOOHU\VSDFHRUPXVHXPSS
Now I have already indicated that I will go on to argue that in certain works the position 
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of the internal and external spectators can merge: in such cases, the depiction point is 
integrated into the processional demands of the picture’s host architecture. But, likewise, 
OHDYLQJWKLV LVVXHDVLGHIRUQRZ LWVHHPVWRPHWKDWVXFKDQ LGHQWLÀFDWLRQZLWKDSRLQW
RIYLHZRIIHUVDUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOH[FHVVXQDYDLODEOHWRÀJXUDWLYHVFXOSWXUH7KLVGLUHFWO\
follows on from the fact that, as Hopkins has argued, sculpture presents no depiction point, 
no position (or multiple positions) implicit to the work (p. 166).23 Although sculpture can 
undoubtedly suggest the presence of implied spectators, perhaps by ‘inviting’ us to occupy 
DSRVLWLRQDVSDUWRIDÀJXUDWLYHJURXSZKHUHDQDSSURSULDWHO\YDFDQWSODFHKDVEHHQOHIWWR
occupy,24LWFDQQRWLQWKHPDQQHURISDLQWLQJSUHVHQWDVFHQHIURPRQHSDUWLFXODU point of 
view, ‘through the eyes of’ a protagonist who is implied but unrepresented.
Now, in that this aspect of representational seeing seems genuinely to distinguish 
SDLQWLQJ IURP UHSUHVHQWDWLRQDO VFXOSWXUH LW VHHPV WR PH RI VXFK VLJQLÀFDQFH WKDW ZH
might question the restriction of the role of imagination to such tightly constrained cases 
presented by Wollheim’s spectator in the picture. While only certain works imply an 
unrepresented internal presence, it is more widely through the imagination that we are 
DEOHWRVHHDÀFWLYHVFHQHDVLIIURPDSDUWLFXODU¶SRLQWRIYLHZ·,QGHHGRQHFDQDFFHSWWKDW
there is a difference in role, a ‘division of labour … between perception and imagination in 
our interaction with representational paintings’ (Wollheim 2001a, p. 26), and still argue for 
DZLGHQLQJRIWKHFULWHULDWRZKLFKVXFKDQHQJDJHPHQWPLJKWDSSO\$V:DOWRQMXVWLÀDEO\
asks of Wollheim’s position: 
Why cannot the viewer imagine seeing the depicted objects from a given perspective without having 
such a spectator to identify with? (2002, p. 30) 
Indeed, as Walton notes, given his ‘marvelously rich and perceptive explorations of 
pictorial representation’, it is perhaps surprising that Wollheim has so ‘little to say about 
the perspectives or points of view from which things are depicted’ (p. 29).
Wollheim’s objection would no doubt be to ask: What is gained by such imaginings, 
over and above that available to perception? While it might indeed be argued that 
SHUFHSWLRQXQDLGHGLVVXIÀFLHQWWRSURYLGHWKHQHFHVVDU\LQIRUPDWLRQDEHKROGHUUHTXLUHV
to comprehend the scene, the imagination provides an additional experienced reciprocity, 
but only if, as Spinicci remarks, we are prepared to ‘accept the game proposed by the 
image’ (2008). Crucially for my position, if imagination provides a vivid experience of 
pictorial depth, over and above the registering of distance cues, surely this must include 
the space between beholder and picture: it structures our implied conditions of access, and the 
LQWLPDF\RIRXUSUR[LPLW\WRÀJXUHVZLWKLQWKHÀFWLYHVFHQH7KLVQRWLRQRIDQH[SHULHQFHG
reciprocity, spatial and psychological, is at the very heart of my argument. As I will attempt 
WRVKRZWKLVUHFLSURFLW\FDQEHDIDFWRUHYHQZKHQWKHEHKROGHULGHQWLÀHVZLWKDGHSLFWLRQ
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point that is unoccupied. As we shall see, the absence of a viewer can have equal pictorial 
VLJQLÀFDQFHWRKHULPSOLHGSUHVHQFH7KHUHLVDGLUHFWSDUDOOHOKHUHZLWK,VHU·VDUJXPHQW
with respect to the implied reader of literature:
The concept of the implied reader is therefore a textual structure anticipating the presence of a 
UHFLSLHQWZLWKRXWQHFHVVDULO\GHÀQLQJKLPWKLVFRQFHSWSUHVWUXFWXUHVWKHUROHWREHDVVXPHGE\HDFK
recipient, and this holds true even when texts deliberately appear to ignore their possible recipient 
or actively exclude him. (1978, p. 34)
The thesis thus fuses the concept of the implicit observer, taken from reception 
DHVWKHWLFV ZLWK DQ DQDO\WLF GHULYHG WKHRU\ RI WKH VWUXFWXULQJ UROH RI WKH LPDJLQDWLRQ 
a theory itself founded upon the structuring possibilities of perspective combined with 
framing. While linguistic clues may play some part in understanding such relationships, 
this structuring is conceived not as a ‘subject position’, internal to the work’s symbolic 
order, but rather utilizes indexical signs as to our implied access as imaginative props: props 
that determine the nature of our spatial and psychological participation or exclusion. 
7.
,RIIHURQHÀQDOPHWKRGRORJLFDOQRWH7KLVLVnot an art historical study. While at a number of 
points I illustrate the theoretical ideas by examples of painting, these examples are drawn 
from a range of art historical periods, consistent with an emphasis on the phenomenology 
of the seeing of painting rather than art historical analysis. Such examples are not offered 
as comprehensive interpretations of individual works, but serve to clarify the general 
theoretical argument.25 One possible accusation that could therefore be made against 
my position is that of ahistoricism, a charge that has been made against both analytic 
philosophy and phenomenology. Indeed, I am substantially in agreement with the claim 
that many philosophical problems persist outside of narrow historical and cultural constructs. I 
do not aim at an historical account of painting – in all its positivist applications – nor its 
UHFHSWLRQDQDSSURDFKWKDWFKDUDFWHUL]HVRezeptionsgeschichte (reception history). Equally, 
it is not my intention, as with Michael Baxandall (1988), to construct a period gaze, and 
hence reconstruct a ‘real’ historical viewer. My interest is with the viewer implicit to the 
ZRUN7RDGDSW,VHUWKLVYLHZHULV¶DFRQVWUXFW·DQG¶LQQRZD\WREHLGHQWLÀHG·ZLWKDQ\
real viewer (p. 34).
<HW,DPQRWLQGLIIHUHQWWRLVVXHVRIFRQWH[W.HPSDUJXHVIRUDVHQVLWLYLW\WRZDUGV
the historical and cultural circumstances of the beholding of painting, while likewise 
differentiating Rezeptionsästhetik from those studies ‘devoted to the historical reception 
of art’ (1998, p. 181). Nevertheless, Kemp (and here we part company) distinguishes the 
aesthetics of reception from the ‘psychology of reception’, claiming that the latter ‘necessarily 
entails an ahistorical way of proceeding’, in that ‘this approach removes the process of 
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reception from the conditions of reception’ (p. 182). He has in mind Gombrich’s notion 
of the ‘beholder’s share’ (1977), but he might equally point to Wollheim’s psychological 
account in Painting as an Art (1987). However, in insisting on an experiential account that 
is psychological, does this necessarily imply such ahistoricism? A psychological account 
LQYROYLQJDUHFLSURFLW\DULVLQJIURPHPERGLHGSHUFHSWLRQGRHVQRWE\GHÀQLWLRQQHJDWH
a sensitivity toward the historical and cultural circumstances of its beholding. And here, 
sensitive to a work’s conditions of reception, I have tried, wherever possible, to draw upon 
my own experience of viewing the artworks referenced (with some minor exceptions), a 
number of which are still in their original architectural and institutional contexts. Given my 
concern with the conditions of reception, this aspect of the research has been a necessary 
but hugely enjoyable requirement, and reason enough to undertake a doctorate.
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The work comprises a metal structure 3230mm high, 830mm wide and 4710mm 
long. This structure is responsive to its site, but is not site-speciic. Two ilms are 
back-projected onto acrylic screens that enclose the object at either end, the framed 
construction housing the mechanisms of projection. The looped ilms record a 
woman walking through the space, ilmed from either end. The woman appears, and 
disappears, just as she enters and departs the raised corridor space, her presence 
contrasted with long periods where the projections appear as still images. The 
strong orthogonals of the structure form a kind of ‘perspective box’. Projected 
and spatial realities are thus duplicated, in that a ilmic space is overlaid onto its 
originating object. The projected images are cropped to the precise proportions 
of the acrylic screens, the vanishing points corresponding to an eye height of 
1615mm. The installation thus suggests two implicit viewpoints, correlating to the 
original camera positions. From here, reality and projected reality overlap. But 
this doubling-up is contradicted by the multiplicity of other possible viewpoints a 
spectator adopts towards the sculptural object. From  oblique viewpoints, the two-
dimensional reality of the screens is juxtaposed with the ‘real’ space behind. While 
evidently lat, the viewer tries to spatially resolve the projected space that now 
detaches itself from the three-dimensional space behind. The implied ilmic space 
compresses in relation to the three-dimensional reality of the containing metal 
structure.
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A Phenomenological Distinction?
7KHDQLPDOVSDLQWHGRQWKHZDOOVRI/DVFDX[DUHQRWWKHUHLQWKHVDPHZD\DVDUHWKHÀVVXUHVDQG
limestone formations. Nor are they elsewhere. Pushed forward here, held back there, supported by 
the wall’s mass they use so adroitly, they radiate about the wall without ever breaking their elusive 
PRRULQJV,ZRXOGEHKDUGSUHVVHGWRVD\where the painting is I am looking at. For I do not look at 
LWDVRQHORRNVDWDWKLQJÀ[LQJLWLQLWVSODFH0\JD]HZDQGHUVZLWKLQLWDVLQKDORVRI%HLQJ5DWKHU
WKDQVHHLQJLW,VHHDFFRUGLQJWRRUZLWKLW0HUOHDX3RQW\FS
1.
The above quotation from ‘Eye and Mind’ poetically captures some of the richness and 
complexity of the representational seeing distinct to pictures. The deceptively simple 
question of ‘whereWKHSDLQWLQJLV,DPORRNLQJDW·ZKLFK0HUOHDX3RQW\DGPLWVWREHLQJ
KDUGSUHVVHGWRDQVZHULVDQLQKHUHQWFRQFHUQRIWKHWKHVLV0RUHVSHFLÀFDOO\,DGGUHVVWKH
TXHVWLRQLQUHODWLRQWRWKHLPSOLHGVSHFWDWRUSRVLWLRQUHODWLYHWRWKHÀFWLRQDOZRUOGRIWKH
painting. What is it for a painting to be from a particular point of view, from a particular 
perspective? I will argue that different paintings structure this relationship between viewer 
and painting in different ways, with particular consequences for works where the implied 
presence of a beholder forms part of the painting’s content. 
0HUOHDX3RQW\·V TXHVWLRQ VXJJHVWV D SKHQRPHQRORJLFDO GLVWLQFWLRQ LQ WKH VHHLQJ RI
such an ‘absent’ scene from ordinary vision: what he refers to as a kind of seeing ‘according 
WR·RUVHHLQJ¶ZLWK·0HUOHDX3RQW\VWDWHVWKDWZHGRQRWORRNDWWKHGHSLFWHGVFHQHLQWKH
same way as we might look at the cracks in the wall’s surface. But what is the nature of 
this phenomenological distinction? The question of ‘where the painting is’ arises from a 
SDUWLFXODUIHDWXUHRISLFWRULDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQWKDW0HUOHDX3RQW\RQO\SDUWLDOO\DGGUHVVHV
that representational painting has two distinct perspectives, (i) the absent scene, essentially 
RIDWKUHHGLPHQVLRQDOZRUOGUHSUHVHQWHGE\DSLFWXUH·VWZRGLPHQVLRQDOPDUNHGVXUIDFH
and (ii) the external point of view of a spectator occupying ‘real’ space.1 Patrick Maynard 
refers to this feature of pictorial perception as ‘Seeing Double’ (1994).27KHGLIÀFXOW\ LQ
saying where the painting is directly follows from this doubling up: we see both a marked 
VXUIDFHDQGWKHÀFWLYHVFHQHEXWDVFHQHZKLFKH[FOXGHVWKHWKLUGGLPHQVLRQ$QG\HWZH
undoubtedly experience the scene as spatial, as having pictorial depth. 
,WPLJKWEHDUJXHGWKDW0HUOHDX3RQW\·VH[DPSOHRIWKHDQLPDOVDW/DVFDX[FRQIXVHV
the issue, in that we are not here talking about the ‘bounded image’ of the Western painting 
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WUDGLWLRQQRULQGHHGD¶ÁDW·VXUIDFH3 As Thomas Puttfarken notes, ‘the cave painters of the 
VWRQHDJHNQHZQHLWKHUDVPRRWKVXUIDFHRQZKLFKRQHGUDZVQRUDFOHDUO\GHÀQHGIRUPDW·
S7KHDQLPDOV·ÀJXUDOSUHVHQFHZDVXQGRXEWHGO\HQKDQFHGE\WKHÁLFNHULQJ
lighting, the darkness of the cave extending beyond the beholder’s angle of vision. This 
thesis, however, will focus on works incorporating what Meyer Schapiro refers to as the 
¶ODWH·LQYHQWLRQRIWKHIUDPHDV¶DÀQGLQJDQGIRFXVLQJGHYLFHSODFHGEHWZHHQWKHREVHUYHU
DQGWKHLPDJH·S$IUDPHGLPDJHHVWDEOLVKHVDVHOIFRQWDLQPHQWIRUWKHDEVHQW
VFHQHDVHSDUDWLRQWKDWVLJQLÀFDQWO\LPSDFWVXSRQWKHTXHVWLRQRI¶where the painting is’. 
As we shall see in the next chapter, in certain works the frame itself belongs to both the real 
world andWRWKHSDLQWLQJ·VÀFWLYHUHDOLW\WRWKHZRUN·VRXWHUDQGLQQHUDSSDUDWXV7KHVH
DUHZRUNVWKDWHVWDEOLVKDFRQFUHWHWLHWRWKHORFDWLRQRIWKHLPDJH%XW0HUOHDX3RQW\GRHV
well to remind us that, with the earliest paintings, it is their very unboundedness that 
secures a tie to their location – ‘elusive moorings’, which the images radiating about the 
wall never quite break.
2.
How is painting’s loss of depth overcome? Leaving aside the issue of trompe l’oeil works, 
I will put forward a case that argues that the loss is only really surmounted through the 
active role imagination plays in pictorial seeing.4 I will argue that there are, in fact, two 
SHUFHSWXDOVKLIWVLQYROYHGLQVHHLQJGRXEOHÀUVWO\ZKHUHZHUHFRJQL]HDQREMHFWDVKDYLQJ
WKUHHGLPHQVLRQDO SURSHUWLHV ZLWKLQ WKH SDWWHUQ RI D PDUNHG VXUIDFH ZKLFK UHTXLUHV
distinguishing an object from its ground, through either outline or occlusion shape;5 
secondly, where (in works that support such an engagement) we use this prior recognition 
to imagine the scene in a way that admits a strongly felt pictorial depth. I have termed 
WKHODWWHUHQJDJHPHQWDIWHU0HUOHDX3RQW\seeing-with, which I claim is an elaboration or 
augmentation of seeing-in rather than constitutive of it. Seeing-with describes a particular 
use of pictures. While imagination is not necessary to the registering of distance cues, such 
as occlusion or outline shape, overlapping, shading and foreshortening, it is essential to 
D¶YLYLG·H[SHULHQFHRISDLQWLQJ·VGHSWKZKLFK,FRQWHQGDQGWKLVLVQRWDQLQVLJQLÀFDQW
point) encompasses the distance between implied spectator and pictorial space. It is one 
WKLQJWRUHFRJQL]HREMHFWVDVKDYLQJWKUHHGLPHQVLRQDOSURSHUWLHVRUWKDWWKH\DUHGHSLFWHG
as spatially related in terms of being in front of or behind another object: it is quite another 
to utilize such a recognition in a way that registers our implied position relative to the 
YLUWXDOVSDFHSDLQWLQJSUHVHQWV6HHLQJLQKDVRQHSKHQRPHQRORJ\GLVWLQFWIURPRUGLQDU\
vision, seeing-with another, in that its phenomenology is that of an imaginative engagement 
licensed by the work, and requiring the spectator’s consent. Wollheim’s division of labour 
between perception and imagination is thus maintained.
$VVXFK0HUOHDX3RQW\·VTXHVWLRQRI¶where the painting is’ is only really intelligible 
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with respect to an imaginative or projective engagement with painting.6 Such a question 
makes little sense in terms of basic depiction, in that there is no spatial relation other than 
with the marked surface. My position echoes that of Budd, who in ‘How Pictures Look’ 
maintains that it is the ‘imaginative projection of the third dimension into the marks on 
the picture’s surface’ that provides a ‘vivid’ experience of pictorial depth, providing the 
work in question supports such a projection (2004, p. 392).7 However, I go further than 
Budd might countenance, in that I propose that in affording an intense experience of depth 
in realist painting, imagination also replicates something of the experience of our bodily 
VLWXDWHGQHVV LQ  DQG UHFLSURFLW\ ZLWK  WKH ZRUOG ,W GRHV VR QRW LQ D ZD\ WKDW PHUHO\
replicates a face-to-face situation. Rather, to adapt Iser’s argument in relation to literature, 
the viewer’s projections allows him to experience something ‘that would otherwise be 
precluded by his entanglement in the pragmatic world around him’ (1978, p. 167). It allows 
for sustained viewing, a process that unfolds in time. Pictures do not replicate reality, but 
transform it. This is in part a factor of painting’s suspension of time, a suspension of the 
moment of viewing – a presentness of beholding.8 But the imaginative projection that forms 
part of this sustained viewing also has phenomenological consequences beyond what is 
immediately seen in the picture, in that it implicitly raises the question of a work’s point of 
view.
In imagining a painting’s depth, the imagined distance (as opposed to the objective 
distance) is generally relative not to the surface plane or frame (although it is fundamental 
WRP\DUJXPHQWWKDWFHUWDLQYHU\VSHFLÀFZRUNVLQFRUSRUDWHWKHIUDPHDQGVXUIDFHLQWR
the imaginative project), but to a point of view: namely, the particular perspective that 
the painting presents, the point of view presented by a work’s depiction point. This is a 
position that lies ‘outside’ of the painted or drawn surface, but is nevertheless ‘implicit 
LQ WKHSLFWXUH· +RSNLQVSS ,WFDQQRWGLUHFWO\EHUHSUHVHQWHGZLWKLQ WKH
painting itself.97KHGLVWLQFWLYHQHVVRIP\SRVLWLRQGLUHFWO\IROORZV,DUJXHWKDW0HUOHDX
Ponty’s ambiguity of ‘where the painting is’ is replicated by an equivalent lack of assurance 
about our own wherenessDQDPELJXLW\WKDW,PDLQWDLQKDVSLFWRULDOVLJQLÀFDQFHLQWKDWLW
is utilized by certain painters in a way that draws the resulting uncertainty of experience 
into a work’s content. And with situated religious paintings, completed by the presence 
of a spectator, this uncertainty persists despite the engaging of the external, whereby the 
YLHZHULVVLWXDWHGZLWKKHUIHHWÀUPO\RQWKHJURXQGLQreal space, yet also elsewhere. Indeed, 
its persistence in the form of a graduated reality is vital to providing a necessary distance 
from God or Christ. This gradation from the sacred to the actual is, I contend, reliant on an 
LPDJLQDU\QRWLOOXVRU\HQJDJHPHQW3DUDGR[LFDOO\E\DVVHUWLQJDVHSDUDWLRQIURPWKH
illusory, by giving me work to do, the painter makes it possible for me to believe in the 
YHU\ÀFWLRQDOLW\RIWKHVFHQH,IDFH10
$QDORJRXV WR 0HUOHDX3RQW\·V FODLP WKDW GHSWK LV QRW DQ ¶REMHFWLYH· SURSHUW\ EXW
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something belonging to the perspective of a situated viewer (2002, p. 298), Walton argues 
that ‘it would be a mistake to identify the experience of seeing from a particular perspective 
with the properties of the thing one sees’ (Walton 2002, p. 29). Now the subjectivism of such 
an argument is open to question: as John Hyman cautions, occlusion shape and size are 
‘perfectly objective’ properties of the things one sees, so that ‘whatever a picture depicts, 
it depicts relative to an implicit line of sight’ (2006, p. 82).11 But even if we concede to the 
objectivist an objective basis to such relational properties, it is surely right to argue for a 
SLFWRULDOVLJQLÀFDQFH of ‘what it is for a depiction to be from one point of view rather than 
another, or as we sometimes put it, what it is to depict something as seen from a certain 
perspective’ (Walton 2002, p. 29). This is precisely the philosophical point I intend to draw 
out. The objectivist account fails to take into account how pictures manipulate their point of 
view in ways that support the work’s content: for instance, when we are shown something 
hidden to a protagonist within the pictorial space; alternatively, where something (or 
VRPHRQHDEVRUEVWKHDWWHQWLRQRIDÀJXUHZLWKLQWKHVFHQHEXWOLHV¶RIIVWDJH·RXWVLGHRI
WKHERXQGHGLPDJHRUZKHUHWKHSRLQWRIYLHZLVDQDORJRXVWRWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRIDÀJXUH
within the scene.12 
A work’s frame plays a particular role in structuring such a point of view. As 
Puttfarken argues, we should not regard a picture’s frame or format, nor its surface or 
SODQH¶DVEDUULHUVSURWHFWLQJD´KLJKHUUHDOLW\LQVLGHµIURPD´ORZHUUHDOLW\RXWVLGHµEXW
rather as a structure organizing the relationship between picture and viewer’ (2000, p. 20). 
,PSRUWDQWO\LQSHUVSHFWLYDOZRUNVWKHUHODWLRQRUQRQUHODWLRQEHWZHHQWKHIUDPHDQGWKH
depicted scene structures the imaginative relationship between a picture and viewer. It 
also structures a particular bodily frame of reference relative to a ‘line of sight’. And there 
is a fundamental difference in how such a frame of reference functions between works 
where the frame is part of the pictorial content, and where it is not.13
In order to realize this frame of reference, it is not always necessary (and with frescos 
is often physically impossible) to take up the precise position immediately opposite the 
work’s vanishing point. As Maynard argues, and many others have noted, perspective is 
accepting of ‘a wide variety of viewing positions’ (1996, p. 30). Nevertheless, with certain 
situated paintings, the representational excess afforded an imaginative engagement is 
given a greater intensity with the implied positioning of the viewer, who stands or (very 
likely) kneels before the work. 
7KHVLJQLÀFDQFHRILPDJLQDWLYHO\LGHQWLI\LQJZLWKDSRLQWRIYLHZKROGV,ZRXOGDUJXH
even when an implied viewpoint is ‘unoccupied’. Indeed, such imaginative projection is 
surely necessary in order to determine whether a painting implies a spectator or not. In some 
works the viewer’s imaginative input can be said to complete the work even when there is 
no such implied presence: the ‘felt’ absence of a beholder can be equivalent to an implied 
presence, such as is the case with Vermeer’s The Music LessonÀJ+HUHGHVSLWHVLJQV
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Fig. 3    Johannes Vermeer: The Music Lesson F+HU0DMHVW\4XHHQ(OL]DEHWK,,/RQGRQ
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RIWKHDUWLVW·VSUHVHQFHUHÁHFWHGLQWKHPLUURURQWKHUHDUZDOOÀJWKHSDLQWHUKLPVHOI
is absent, and the painting imparts a strongly felt absence that cannot disturb the palpable 
tension between the man and woman.14 This is a work that denies the presence of an 
LQWHUQDOVSHFWDWRUDQG\HWWKHYLHZSRLQWSUHVHQWHGLVQROHVVVLJQLÀFDQWLQWKDWLWDOORZVWKH
painting’s beholder to witness in the mirror the subtle twist of the woman’s body towards 
the man, with all its psychological implications (Snow 1994, p. 114).
The importance of taking the viewer’s position into account is registered by 
Puttfarken:
7KHERXQGHGLPDJHLVWKXVGHVFULEHGDVDWZRGLPHQVLRQDOVWUXFWXUHZKLFKVRPHKRZRUJDQL]HVRXU
YLVLRQRIDSLFWRULDOZRUOGEHKLQGLW<HWEHIRUHZHORRNDWZKDWLVEHKLQGWKHSLFWXUHZHPXVWJDLQ
a clearer view of what is in front of it. We must look not only at the relationships between boundary, 
surface and space behind, but also at the relationships of all tKUHHWRWKHYLHZHUWRWKHÀFWLYHVSDFH
EHKLQGWKHVXUIDFHZHPXVWDGGERWKÀFWLYHDQGUHDOVSDFHLQIURQWRILWEHWZHHQWKHSLFWXUHDQGWKH
viewer. (2000, p. 24)
,QGHHGWKDWÀFWLYHVSDFHHQFURDFKHVLQWRRXUUHDOLW\UDLVHVSUREOHPVZLWK3DQRIVN\·VPXFK
Fig. 4    Johannes Vermeer: The Music 
Lesson (detail).
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quoted claim that ‘the entire picture has been transformed … into a “window”’ (1991, p. 
27).15 The simile of ‘seeing through’ fails to account for the fact that so much of a work such 
as Masaccio’s TrinityÀJLVQRWLRQDOO\RQ¶RXU·VLGHRIWKHZDOO:KLOHDQXPEHURIDUW
historians have noted this, the theoretical implications are most clearly drawn by Maynard, 
ZKRDUJXHVWKDWWKHWKHRUHWLFDO¶PL[XSRISLFWRULDODQGWUDQVPLVVLRQSURMHFWLRQSODQHV·
OHDGVWRDFRQÁDWLRQRI¶SLFWXUHVZLWKWKHLUUHDORUK\SRWKHWLFDOSURMHFWLRQVXUIDFHV·S
27).16:KLOHWKLVFRQÁDWLRQFDQRFFXUDQGLQSDUWGRHVVRLQTrinity), Maynard notes that 
‘the history of depiction shows we can imagine depicted scenes (perspectival or not), in 
whole or in part, to be behind picture surfaces, also at those surfaces, in front of them – or 
in no spatial relationship to them’ (p. 27). This has particular relevance for Trinity, in that 
the space that we imaginatively enter is not that of the religious representation, but the 
space we ‘share’ with the donors and skeleton, depicted as being in front of the supporting 
wall. 
But as Kemp notes, ‘perspective achieves more than connecting the space of the beholder 
with the space of the painting’, in that it also ‘regulates the position of the recipient with 
regard to the inner communications; that is to say, the presentation of the painting with 
its demands on how it should be viewed’ (1998, p. 187). I would argue that this reciprocity 
follows from the fact that imagination replicates the experience of our bodily situatedness 
in two distinct but interrelated ways, which I have already indicated will be the subject of 
Chapters Two and Three. It structures our implied spatial access to the depicted scene, and 
²LQHVWDEOLVKLQJDERGLO\IUDPHRIUHIHUHQFHLWGUDZVXSRQQRQFRQFHSWXDOFRQWHQW
3.
Before expanding upon my account of the role of seeing-with in a work’s reception, some 
EULHI FRQVLGHUDWLRQ PXVW ÀUVW EH JLYHQ WR WKH FODLP RI D SKHQRPHQRORJLFDO GLVWLQFWLRQ
EHWZHHQUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOVHHLQJDQGRUGLQDU\YLVLRQVHHLQJ¶IDFHWRIDFH·:HKDYHVHHQ
that this is the dilemma of painting’s double aspect: as Budd puts it (1992, p. 264), ‘What is 
it to see one thing in another?’ 
In Picture, Image and Experience+RSNLQVDUJXHVWKDWVHHLQJLQGRHVLQGHHGKDYH
its own distinctive phenomenology, a special kind of experience that differs from seeing 
VRPHWKLQJ IDFHWRIDFH RU LQ YLVXDOL]DWLRQ 7KLV LV HYLGHQFHG E\ WKH IDFW WKDW WKHUH LV D
phenomenological shift when the marks of a patterned surface are seen as being ‘organized 
in a particular way’ (p. 16). Hopkins claims:
There seem to be two different experiences here, one preceding understanding the picture, the other 
accompanying it. The thought … is that every picture admits of an experience akin to this latter 
experience. Moreover, the idea is that this second sort of experience holds the key to depiction. If we 
can discover what is special about it, in particular how it differs from the ‘before’ experience, then, 
the thought runs, we can analyse picturing. (p. 15) 
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$VVXFK+RSNLQVSURSRVHVWKDWVHHLQJLQKDVWKHIROORZLQJIHDWXUHVLLWLQYROYHV·DQ
experience whose content somehow includes the picture’s object’; (ii) that unlike visualizing 
DQREMHFWVHHLQJLQUHWDLQV¶WKHDZDUHQHVVRIWKHPDUNHGVXUIDFHEHIRUHRQH·LLLVHHLQJLQ
‘is an integrated whole’, in that the experience is not fragmented into its constituent parts, 
and it ‘cannot be broken down into elements which could stand alone’, in that ‘if either the 
thought of the absent object or the awareness of the marked surface occurred in isolation, the 
phenomenology of each would be different’; (iv) it sustains the experience of the picture’s 
REMHFWLQDSUHFLVHZD\ZKHUHE\VHHLQJLQGHWHUPLQHV¶ZKDWHDFKSLFWXUHGHSLFWV·LQDZD\
whereby a picture of a horse ‘sustains an experience permeated by the thought of a horse’ 
SS1HYHUWKHOHVV+RSNLQVPDLQWDLQVWKDWWKHVHIHDWXUHVZKLOHJHQHUDOO\DFFHSWHG
E\DQ\FUHGLEOHH[SHULHQWLDODFFRXQWRIGHSLFWLRQDUHLQVXIÀFLHQWLQWKHPVHOYHVIRUDWKHRU\
of depiction: primarily because, as Hopkins suggests, they do not, alone, clarify ‘the nature 
of the involvement of the absent object in the experience’ (p. 17).
While offering no supporting arguments,17 or any attempt to distinguish between 
the various versions on offer, I believe that what we might refer to, after Budd, as the 
‘unadorned’ account of depiction is best explained by a theory of experienced resemblance 
DUHFRJQLWLRQWKDWLVprior to any subsequent elaboration. As Budd notes, ‘the only relevant 
sense in which a picture, seen as a depiction of its subject, can look like its subject is with 
UHVSHFWWRWKHWZRGLPHQVLRQDODVSHFWRIWKHVXEMHFW·VYLVXDODSSHDUDQFH·S,W
seems to me that an experienced resemblance is best placed to account for how an absent 
object enters into the experience of perceiving the painting, whether this is based upon 
DSHUFHLYHGLVRPRUSKLVPEHWZHHQD WZRGLPHQVLRQDOSDLQWLQJDQGDYLVXDOÀHOG%XGG
2004, or Peacocke 1987), or outline shape (Hopkins 1998). However, it is important to also 
register the limitations of such a resemblance theory.
Hyman’s objectivist account (2006) does just this. Based on occlusion shape, Hyman’s 
theory has much in common with the positions of Budd, Peacocke and Hopkins, but 
questions the notion of an ‘experienced’ resemblance.18 Hyman rejects the need to refer to 
‘the psychological effect the picture produces in a spectator’s mind’ (p. 73) on the grounds 
that it is bound to fail, because ‘if we conceive of a picture as an artifact that produces 
D GLVWLQFWLYH NLQG RI H[SHULHQFH ZH VKDOO ÀQG RXUVHOYHV XQDEOH WR GHÀQH WKLV NLQG RI
H[SHULHQFHH[FHSWDVVHHLQJDSLFWXUHDQGVHHLQJZKDWLWGHSLFWV·SS+HOLPLWV
his theory to objective properties of the objects depicted, properties that are independent 
of our experience of perceiving them. In so doing, he places strict limitations on the remit 
of any feasible theory of resemblance:
First, the defensible residue of the resemblance theory is not a comprehensive theory of pictorial art. 
Nothing beyond the basic representation of visible objects falls within its scope. Second, it is a theory 
RIGHSLFWLRQ,WSXUSRUWVWRGHÀQHWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHYLVLEOHREMHFWVGHSLFWHGDQGWKHPDUNV
and colors on a picture’s surface and not the relationship between these marks and colors and the 
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person, object, place, or event, if any, that is portrayed. Third, it is not a theory of pictorial perception. 
$QGÀQDOO\LWLVDOVRQRWDWKHRU\RIDUWLVWLFSHUFHSWLRQ)RULWGRHVQRWSXUSRUWWRGHÀQHHLWKHUWKH
kind of experience that occurs when we look at pictures and see what they represent or the kind of 
H[SHULHQFHDQDUWLVWQHHGVWRKDYHRUVKRXOGEHHQFRXUDJHGWRFXOWLYDWHSS
'R,DJUHHZLWKWKHVHOLPLWDWLRQV",DFFHSW+\PDQ·VÀUVWDQGVHFRQGSRLQWV*LYHQP\
HDUOLHUDUJXPHQWVWKHUHDVRQVVKRXOGDOUHDG\EHDSSDUHQW,DOVRDJUHHZLWKWKHÀQDOSRLQW
in that in so far as I understand Hyman’s use of the term, I believe artistic perception must 
incorporate an enriched account of representational seeing, that includes something of 
Wollheim’s notion of twofoldness and what I have termed seeing-with.19 But the advantage 
of a theory of experienced resemblance seems to me precisely its claim to be a theory of 
pictorial perception. 
+\PDQLVYHU\LQVLVWHQWWKDWKHGRHVQRWFODLPWRGHÀQHWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQDQ
occlusion shape and colour and the ‘person, object, place, or event, if any, that is portrayed’ 
S7KLVDFNQRZOHGJHVWKHUROHQRQSLFWRULDOIDFWRUVLQFOXGLQJWKHZRUN·VWLWOHFDQSOD\
LQGHÀQLQJVXFKDUHODWLRQVKLS%XWDWOHDVWSDUWRI+\PDQ·VUHDVRQLQJLVWKDWFHUWDLQREMHFWV
VKDUHRFFOXVLRQVKDSHV²DVWKHGXFNUDEELWÀJXUHGHPRQVWUDWHV$V$QWKRQ\6DYLOHQRWHV
in his ‘Critical Notice’ (2007) of Hyman’s book, the principles of whether ‘it is a rabbit’s 
ears or a duck’s bill, or both, or neither’ are ‘unlikely to be fully elucidated in terms that are 
Fig. 5    Rembrandt: Jan Six (1654), Foundation Six, Amsterdam. 
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other than mentalistic ones’, with the result that  for Hyman ‘the status of the notions that 
presuppose [such an idea] is left entirely open’ (p. 436).
Hyman’s negation of an ‘experienced’ resemblance therefore sets what I regard as an 
unnecessarily strict limit where philosophical analysis can go no further. This is revealed 
in a key passage that references Rembrandt’s Jan SixÀJZKHUHKHZULWHV
What is needed, in order to achieve a resolution, is a willingness to make concessions on both sides. 
The subjectivist will have to acknowledge that the occlusion shape principle and the other basic 
principles of pictorial art relate the surface and the content of a picture without referring to its 
psychological effect. And the advocate of the resemblance theory will have to concede that these 
VDPHSULQFLSOHVLQGLFDWHWKHOLPLWRIDQ\GHÀQLWLRQZHFRXOGJLYHRIWKHYLVLEOHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ
the marks on a picture’s surface and the objects they depict. They indicate this limit because they 
indicate how far the visible properties of an object in a picture that are expressly marked on the 
SLFWXUH·VVXUIDFHOHDYHLWVH[DFWFKDUDFWHUXQÀ[HG,WVRFFOXVLRQVKDSHLVÀ[HGEXWZKHWKHULWLVDSLHFH
of gold braid or a pile of books is not. (2006, p. 147)
%XW LI LQ WKHFDVHRIDPELJXRXVÀJXUHVRU IRUPVDVRSSRVHG WR WKH LGHQWLW\RI IRU
instance, a particular saint), the objective properties of the object are not, in themselves, 
VXIÀFLHQWWRVXVWDLQDGHÀQLWLYHUHFRJQLWLRQ WKHQVXUHO\WKHFRQWULEXWLRQRIWKHVXLWDEO\
TXDOLÀHGVSHFWDWRULVLQVXFKFDVHVIXQGDPHQWDOWRWKHFRUUHFWSHUFHSWLRQ7KHDUWLVWUHOLHV
on the viewer having the requisite knowledge to recognize such objects. Indeed, that the 
awareness of what a picture depicts is experiential, rather than a mere dispositional form of 
visual awareness (the capacity to recognize or interpret an object in the marked surface) is, 
as Budd notes, ‘seen most economically in the switching of awareness that can take place in 
WKHSHUFHSWLRQRIDPELJXRXVÀJXUHV·S:KDW+\PDQ·VDFFRXQWRPLWVLVZKDW
Wollheim usefully refers to as ‘the interlock between perception and cognition’ (1980c, p. 
134), where in this switching of awareness the concept permeates the perception so that 
‘experience and concept change not merely simultaneously but as one’ (1980b, p. 220). 
As Wollheim notes, the viewer’s ‘cognitive stock’ (i.e. knowledge, belief, and conceptual 
holding), whether gained through perception or from factors external to the work, affects 
how we see the painting.20 
Indeed, Alpers offers a useful example of how ambiguity is not merely a ‘problem’ for 
a philosophical account of representational seeing, but is fundamental to the richer process 
of artistic perception. In relation to the hand of the painter in Vermeer’s Artist in his Studio 
ÀJV$OSHUVZULWHV
:K\VXFKDQLOOGHÀQHGEORE"2QHFRXOGVD\WKDWWKHSDLQWHUKDVQRW\HWUHDOL]HGKLVKDQGLQWKH
double sense of not yet having fully perceived the object before his eyes as a hand and not yet 
having painted it as a hand. An experience of ambiguity is part of the process of perceiving. By 
pictorial ambiguity I refer to the possibility of the painter representing the perception of a thing, 
and representing it for viewers, in such a way as to encourage the mind to dwell on perceiving as a 
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Fig. 6    Johannes Vermeer: Artist in His Studio F.XQVWKLVWRULVFKHV0XVHXP9LHQQD
Fig. 7    Johannes Vermeer: Artist in His Studio (detail).
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process: the painter’s experience of an object as coming into its own, distinguishing itself from other 
things, taking shape. (2005, p. 27)21
This richer notion of perceiving as a process takes us beyond mere recognition. But it 
is nevertheless grounded upon the very need to incorporate subjective visual experience 
into a theory of resemblance. And this is the real concession the objectivist must make. To 
refuse to build this experiential aspect into a theory of resemblance is to limit the remit of 
the theory one step too far.
4.
If we accept a theory of experienced resemblance as providing the essential involvement 
of the absent object in the experience, then we can alleviate imagination from having to 
play any part in the recognitional aspects of depiction. This is the real problem underlying 
Walton’s account of representational seeing, in that he ties the perception of the marked 
surface and the imagining it prompts into a single phenomenological whole (1990, p. 
295).22 And yet, relieved of this commitment, Walton’s notion of painting functioning as 
SURSV LQ JDPHV RI PDNHEHOLHYH S  PLJKW UHDGLO\ EH LQFRUSRUDWHG LQWR DQ DFFRXQW
of representational seeing without the baggage of having to integrate recognitional (or 
FRQÀJXUDWLRQDODVSHFWVLQWRWKHPRGHO
+HUH LW LV ZRUWK EULHÁ\ FRQVLGHULQJ 0LFKDHO 3RGUR·V SRVLWLRQ ZKLFK OLNH :DOWRQ·V
DVVLJQVLPDJLQDWLRQDVLJQLÀFDQWUROHLQWKHNLQGRIVHHLQJDSSURSULDWHWRUHSUHVHQWDWLRQV
Podro, like Walton, asserts that the imagination is central to depiction. ‘We use the 
representation to imagine what we recognize in it’: not a free projection or association, 
but a kind of licensed projection where we represent the thing to ourselves in a way that 
is corroborated by what the depiction (or its tradition) affords (2001, p. 113). This has the 
great advantage in that, unlike Walton’s account, the imagination is not constitutive of the 
recognitional aspect itself. But while I agree with Podro that we can ‘use the representation 
to imagine what we recognize in it’, I do not believe that ‘this sense of function or purpose is 
DGHÀQLQJFRQGLWLRQRIGHSLFWLRQ·S3RGURIDLOVWRH[SODLQWKHYHU\DFWRIUHFRJQLWLRQ
that precedes the imaginative project. But as an expansion of the limited remit a theory 
of resemblance should set itself, then Podro’s position can, like Walton’s notion of the 
imaginative prop, be successfully incorporated into the richer account.
As such, for Podro what is important is how the marked surface and the content recruit 
each other ‘to make our awareness of the other more replete’ (p. 115). Podro argues:
Recognition is the starting point of an elaboration that does not simply return our experience to the 
prepictorial world but brings about a new system of relations in which the recognized subject is 
suspended and reconstituted. It is critically important and not only philosophically perspicacious to 
keep in mind the distinction between the functions of recognizing and representing, and given each 
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its place in an account of depiction, for depiction’s mode of representing makes something new for 
recognition. (2001, p. 116)
By distinguishing between a theory of depiction and a theory of pictorial art, we might 
better address Podro’s objection that recognition does not in itself characterise seeing a scene 
as a picture. Podro claims that ‘depiction is not a matter of some relation like resemblance 
between the material of representation and the subject matter that it represents: we use the 
RQHWRUHSUHVHQWWKHRWKHUZKHWKHUWRRXUVHOYHVRUWRRWKHUV·S<HWZHFDQFRQFHGH
that in its ‘unadorned’ state depiction might be just such a resemblance, while agreeing that 
WKLVLVDQLQVXIÀFLHQWGHWHUPLQDQWIRUUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDPRUHFRPSOH[SKHQRPHQRQWKDW
PLJKWDOVRLQYROYHH[WUDSLFWRULDOPHDQLQJVDQGIRUDUWLVWLFSHUFHSWLRQ,WLVZLWKWKLVULFKHU
experience that we can likewise acknowledge Podro’s claim that we see the ‘coincidence 
EHWZHHQÀJXUHDQGWKHFRUUHVSRQGLQJDUHDVRISDLQW·LQD¶PRUHUHSOHWHRUQXDQFHGZD\·
once recognized, and ‘by virtue of the subject that they represent’ (p. 115).
5.
We are now in a position to set out the key aspects of the imaginative engagement with 
SDLQWLQJWKDW,KDYHWHUPHGDIWHU0HUOHDX3RQW\seeing-with. I will go on to expand upon 
this argument in the following chapters. I have argued that: (i) seeing-with is ancillary 
WR UDWKHU WKDQ FRQVWLWXWLYH RI VHHLQJLQ DQG LV WKXV supplementary to an experienced 
resemblance; (ii) as such, it describes a particular use or function of painting, where we 
see according to the work with the beholder’s imaginative consent; (iii) it is independent 
of (though potentially might enhance) any aesthetic appreciation of twofoldness; (iv) 
seeing-with utilizes imagination to provide a ‘vivid’ experience of pictorial depth; (v) 
this imaginative engagement encompasses the distance between implied spectator and 
pictorial space, and hence our orientation towards the work. In the following chapters 
I will further argue that: (vi) seeing-with DOORZV RXU SUHVHQFH RU DEVHQFH DW WKH ÀFWLYH
scene to become part of a work’s content; (vii) seeing-with is dependent upon a work’s 
perspective, combined with framing, structuring our implied spatial access, and the means 
by which the picture surface is traversed; (viii) in providing an intense reciprocity with 
realist painting, seeing-with replicates the experience of our bodily situatedness through 
D VKDUHG IUDPH RI UHIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ RUGLQDU\ YLVLRQ VHHLQJLQ DQG YLVXDOL]DWLRQ WKXV
drawing upon nonconceptual content. 
6.
It is important to note that such an imaginative engagement is, contrary to Walton’s view, 
essentially active rather than passive, an activity that has to be sustained. This distinction is 
consistent with my argument that seeing-with is a use of painting. This is most obviously 
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DSSDUHQWZLWKUHJDUGWRDQLPDJLQDWLYHLGHQWLÀFDWLRQZLWKDQLPSOLHGVSHFWDWRU%XWZKDW
Budd terms the reversing ‘in our imagination the activity of the artist’ in order ‘to overcome 
the loss of the third dimension’ (2004, p. 392) is equally a directed form of imagination, 
subject to (if not completely controlled by) the will. I agree with Jerrold Levinson that 
imagining is ‘necessarily active or contributory’, although, like Levinson, I believe that it is 
‘not necessarily something one is aware of initiating, and not necessarily something under 
WKHFRPSOHWHFRQWURORIRQH·VZLOO·QSS
As such, seeing-with has something in common with Wittgenstein’s account of seeing 
an aspect. This is not an account of representational seeing, but raises analogous questions. 
:LWWJHQVWHLQIDPRXVO\XWLOL]HVWKHVRFDOOHGGXFNUDEELWÀJXUHLQRUGHUWRGLIIHUHQWLDWHWKH
‘“continuous seeing” of an aspect and the “dawning” of an aspect’ (2001, p. 166e). He notes 
WKDWLWLVTXLWHIHDVLEOHWKDWVRPHRQHPLJKWRQO\VHHWKHÀJXUHDVDSLFWXUHRIDUDEELW,Q
VXFKFLUFXPVWDQFHVZKHUHWKHSRWHQWLDODPELJXLW\RIWKHÀJXUHLVQRWQRWHGLWZRXOG
make little sense to refer to seeing the picture as a rabbit: as little sense as saying, on seeing 
a knife and fork, ‘“Now I am seeing this as a knife and fork”’ (p. 166e). Wittgenstein asks 
ZKDWFKDQJHVZKHQERWKÀJXUHV²UDEELWandGXFNDUHSHUFHLYHG"&OHDUO\VRPHWKLQJKDV
changed:
But what is different: my impression? my point of view? – Can I say? I describe the alteration like a 
perception; quite as if the object had altered before my eyes … The expression of a change of aspect 
is the expression of a new perception and at the same time of the perception’s being unchanged. (p. 
167e)
The experience of seeing an aspect is thus ‘half visual’ and ‘half thought’ (p. 168e), because 
unlike the perception that a leaf is green, seeing an aspect is, by distinction, subject to the 
will (p. 182e). Wittgenstein argues: ‘“Seeing as …” is not part of perception. And for that 
reason it is like seeing and again not like’ (p. 168e).23 As Wollheim argues after Wittgenstein, 
¶WKHFRQFHSWGRHVQRWVWDQGRXWVLGHWKHSHUFHSWLRQ·ESS
Wittgenstein applies this notion of seeing-as to the sudden ‘seeing’ of a likeness in a 
IDFHZKHUHE\WKHVDPHIDFH²ZKLFKKDVQRWFKDQJHGLVQHYHUWKHOHVVVHHQGLIIHUHQWO\WKLV
involves a different use of the word ‘see’ to that of a description ‘“What do you see there?” – “I 
see this”’ (2001, p. 165e). Wittgenstein’s position therefore involves what Budd characterizes 
as ‘an internal relation between the seen object and others’ (1992, p. 276), which has obvious 
potential in relation to the construction of a theory of pictorial experience. And while Budd 
regrets that ‘Wittgenstein does not characterize the nature of the internal relation that is 
perceived to hold between a depiction and what it depicts’ (p. 276), if we accept that an 
experienced resemblance provides just such an internal relation Wittgenstein’s account can 
more usefully be applied as a mechanism for how thoughts prompted by the spatial and 
psychological reciprocity provided by imagination might permeate subsequent perception. 
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:ROOKHLP·VREMHFWLRQWKDW¶VHHLQJDVGUDZVXSRQQRVSHFLDOSHUFHSWXDOFDSDFLW\RYHUDQG
above straightforward perception’ (1980b, p. 219) is therefore no longer an issue, in that 
painting’s distinct phenomenology is already accounted for by an experienced resemblance. 
Perhaps seeing-with might simply be thought of as a variation of Wittgenstein’s seeing-as, a 
YDULDWLRQVSHFLÀFDOO\XWLOL]LQJDEHKROGHU·VLPDJLQDWLYHFRQVHQW+HUHLDSHUFHSWLRQRID
marked surface provides an experienced resemblance that (ii) prompts an imaginative and 
psychological engagement that includes our implied spatial relation to the virtual scene, 
and (iii) this in turn leads to a more replete experience where the subsequent thoughts 
evoked fuse with the original perception, so that the marks – which have not altered – are 
now ‘seen’ differently. I would argue that much of the reciprocity we experience with a 
painting’s content follows from this interlock between perception, imagination, cognition 
DQGVXEVHTXHQWSHUFHSWLRQ ,WSURYLGHVZKDW0HUOHDX3RQW\UHIHUV WRDV ¶WKH LPDJLQDU\
texture of the real’ (1993c, p. 126).
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Monochrome Passage comprises two ‘paintings’ in two 
adjacent spaces, separated by a dividing wall. The work 
outwardly manifests as four blocks of monochrome 
colour, two of which are square (800mm x 800mm and 
240mm x 240mm) and two rectangular (800mm x 2400mm 
and 240mm x 720mm). These rigorously geometrical 
‘paintings’ are connected to each other by an internal 
stepped passage, just 80mm wide. The passage contains 
seven steps, each 80mm high and 240mm long; the height 
of this passage thus reduces from 800mm to 240mm. The 
positioning on the wall enables a viewer to peer from one 
space to the other, an activity that unwittingly draws the 
spectator into the work’s content. It is only through such an 
intimate stance, physically pressed against the wall, that 
the viewer grasps the spatial relationship between the 
two spaces. As such, what initially appears as separated 
artworks now registers as one continuous folded form, in 
efect an unbroken ‘frame’ belonging to both the work’s 
outer and inner apparatus. The rationality of the work’s 
outward proportions, which uses simple whole number 
proportions, is sharply contrasted with the essential 
irrationality of the passage, with its disconcerting 
ambiguity of scale and exclusion of the external beholder. 
The openings, lush with the wall, therefore constitute a 
sculptural equivalent of a projection plane, where two 
realities are juxtaposed. The work hovers between being 
a ‘painting’ (or two ‘paintings’) and a ‘sculptural object’, 
but one that is determined solely by its internal rather 
than external form. In so doing, it implies two distinct 
modes of viewing.
2
0
0
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The Case for an External Spectator
The study aspires to treat a problem belonging to aesthetics proper: namely an examination of the 
GLIIHUHQWGHJUHHVRIUHDOLW\HIIHFWLQWKHSLFWXUHVDQGWKHIDOVHDUFKLWHFWXUHRIWKHWLPHWKHLU¶GHJUHHV
of reality’ in other words. This graduation does not, of course, concern reality; it applies on the 
contrary to the total unreality characteristic of the forms and objects which the picture seeks to render 
credible. (Sandström 1963, p. 7)
1.
,Q¶3DLQWLQJ6FXOSWXUH6LJKWDQG7RXFK·+RSNLQVDUJXHVWKDW¶SDLQWLQJSUHVHQWVDVHOI
contained world, isolated from the space in which we, the viewers, view the canvas’ (2004, 
SS3DLQWLQJIRU+RSNLQVWKXVPDLQWDLQVDVKDUSGLYLGHEHWZHHQWKHVSDFHRI
representation and the ‘real’ space of the beholder; by contrast, the world sculpture presents 
is less complete, activating a ‘kinetic potential’ whereby the surrounding space is drawn into 
its domain (p. 166).1 These differences arise from the distinct ways we encounter the work 
of art. Whereas painting is inherently perspectival, in that it is depicted from a particular 
point of view, sculpture lacks perspective, ‘for it does not share the perspectival structure 
of vision, nor does it share that of touch’ (p. 164). Hopkins distinguishes what he terms the 
¶GHSLFWLRQSRLQW·DSRLQW¶implicit LQWKHSLFWXUH·IURPWKHSODFHRFFXSLHGE\DVSHFWDWRU
VWDQGLQJ IRU LQVWDQFH ZLWKLQ D JDOOHU\ VSDFH RU PXVHXP SS  &RQYHUVHO\ KH
argues that sculpture presents no such position (or multiple positions) implicit to the work, 
and thereby it ‘erodes’ painting’s sharp division between the world of representation and 
that of an embodied viewer (p. 166).
In arguing that painting presents such a ‘closed’ world, Hopkins’s view accords with 
Wollheim’s contention that the external spectator cannot become part of a work’s content 
(an agreement that withstands differences in their respective theories of depiction). As 
:ROOKHLPQRWHVWKHUHLVDWHQGHQF\LQPXFKDUWKLVWRULFDOZULWLQJWRFRQÁDWHWKHLQWHUQDO
DQGH[WHUQDOVSHFWDWRUWRIDOVHO\DVVXPHWKDWDSDLQWHGÀJXUHORRNLQJRXWZDUGLVQHFHVVDULO\
engaging the gaze of a stranger, the viewer of the picture (1987, p. 365). Wollheim introduces 
what he refers to as a ‘spectator in the picture’ in order to distinguish an internal spectator 
DVSHFWDWRUFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHVSDWLDODQGWHPSRUDOGHPDQGVRIWKHÀFWLYHVFHQHIURP
this external beholder (ch. III). As we saw earlier, the role of the internal spectator is to 
provide the spectator of the picture ‘a distinctive access to the content of the picture’, a 
content unavailable through perception alone (p. 129). We see the scene through the eyes of 
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another, who already inhabits the world the painting presents. Hopkins urges caution with 
respect to Wollheim’s overly restrictive demand that, in identifying with the spectator in the 
picture, the viewer must ‘centrally imagine’ the internal beholder (i.e. imagine her from the 
inside) as someone other than herself; 2 nevertheless, Hopkins’s notion of a depiction point 
implicit to the picture is broadly consistent with the imaginative engagement afforded 
Wollheim’s internal spectator. What is important for the current argument is that both 
philosophers hold that the implied viewpoint belongs to the virtual world of the painting rather 
than that of the painting’s beholder. The position occupied by the spectator in the picture is 
distinguished from that occupied by the spectator of the picture, ostensibly because the 
ODWWHUGRHVQRWEHORQJVSDWLDOO\RU WHPSRUDOO\ WR WKH ¶FORVHG·ÀFWLYHZRUOG WKHSDLQWLQJ
presents. 
7KLVSUHVHQWDWLRQRIDVHOIFRQWDLQHGZRUOGXQGRXEWHGO\FKDUDFWHUL]HVZRUNVLPSO\LQJ
an internal spectator. But do all paintings that imaginatively engage spectators necessarily 
present such a closed world? I will argue in this chapter that, at least with regards to a 
limited range of works, the presence the picture implies can indeed be that of an external 
beholder, the very beholder that Hopkins and Wollheim seemingly exclude. In such works, 
the spectator of the picture might be said to fuse with the spectator in the picture: the 
internal imagining is situated, in that it draws into the imaginative experience aspects 
RI WKH UHDO DUFKLWHFWXUDO VLWXDWLRQ WKH VSHFWDWRU ÀQGV KHUVHOI LQ ZKHUHE\ WKH ZRUNV DUH
completed by the embodied presence of such a viewer.3 Without collapsing the differences 
between painting and sculpture, especially with regards to a point of view, these paintings 
do something that Hopkins argues only sculpture is capable of doing: they draw the 
surrounding space into their domain. 
Now I concede to Hopkins that this is not the full activation of space typical of the 
viewing of sculpture.4 On the contrary, paintings address us frontally, unlike sculpture’s 
SUHVHQWDWLRQ RI D ZRUOG WKDW VXUURXQGV XV $QG \HW SHUVSHFWLYH WUDQVÀJXUHV WKLV
frontal presentation of depth into an experience that admits something of the world’s 
surroundedness. As David Summers notes, an ‘image on surface immediately assumes 
real spatial relations (size in relation to observers, manner of facing) but the inequality 
of image and surface also makes it possible to represent relations as relations, either on the 
surface itself (next to, above, equal to) or in virtual space (far, near, before, behind)’ (2003, 
p. 335). In certain works, I would argue that this foregrounding of spatial relations locates a 
spectator in such a way that a work’s implicit viewpoint fuses with the position we occupy 
in real space. Moreover, in so doing it allows our implied access, or denial of access, to 
constitute part of the work’s content. Paradoxically, in thus drawing an awareness of the 
surrounding architecture into what I stress is an imaginative experience, I argue that such 
paintings erode something of the sharp division between the world of representation and 
WKDWRIDQHPERGLHGYLHZHUZKLOHPDLQWDLQLQJDQHFHVVDU\JUDGDWLRQRIUHDOLW\$V0HUOHDX
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Ponty puts it in relation to the paintings at Lascaux, the work is neither wholly ‘there’ nor 
‘elsewhere’: an uncertainty that must also encompass the spectator position. The viewer 
is drawn into the work’s domain as a physical presence while at the same time external to 
it, kept at a distance. This constitutes a special case that, crucially, is only made possible 
through the imaginative engagement I have characterized as seeing-with.
2.
What is not at issue is that an implied viewer of the scene presented cannot be 
represented within the scene itself, precisely because such a viewpoint lies ‘outside’ of 
the representational scene. In the case of works implying an internal spectator, Wollheim 
claims that they have ‘a representational content in excess of what they represent’, an 
H[FHVVWKDWGHULYHVIURPDQLGHQWLÀFDWLRQWKDWSURYLGHVDUHFLSURFLW\ZLWKWKHÀFWLYHVFHQH
(1987, p. 101). In this chapter, I extend the notion of representational excess to works 
implying an external spectator, in that such works are completed by the presence of a 
beholder.5 
,ZRXOGIXUWKHUDUJXHIRUDZLGHUVLJQLÀFDQFHWRWKHIDFWWKDWSDLQWLQJSRVLWVWKLVDEVHQW
viewpoint regardless of whether this place is ‘occupied’. Certainly, as already noted, works 
where there is a ‘felt’ absence, such as Vermeer’s Music Lesson ÀJPLJKWDOVREHVDLG
to have a representational content that exceeds what they represent. The occupation (or 
not) of the depiction point may be relevant or irrelevant to the scene. Where relevant, the 
spectator may be acknowledged or unacknowledged, casually disregarded or consciously 
ignored. Clearly, not all works would gain representational content from such imagining: 
nevertheless, the imagination must, at the very least, play a role in determining what 
kind of spectator is implied. What I really want to question in this chapter, however, is 
ZKHWKHUWKLVVSDFHRIWKHLPSOLHGYLHZHU²+RSNLQV·VGHSLFWLRQSRLQWLVQHFHVVDULO\RQO\
intelligible as an extension of the virtual space of the depiction, or can it additionally engage 
the actual space in which the spectator stands? Is what Spinicci refers to as the ‘perceptive 
VSOLWEHWZHHQÀJXUDWLYHDQGUHDOVSDFH·RQHZKHUHWKHÀJXUDWLYHVSDFHPXVWUHPDLQ
closed (of course, in terms of its implied rather than objective spatiality)? 
3.
In ‘Sculpture and Space’, Hopkins concedes the possibility of some interaction between 
the depicted space and the space the viewer occupies. In particular, he acknowledges that 
in works such as Masaccio’s TrinityÀJFRQWLQXLW\LVVXJJHVWHGEHWZHHQWKHGHSLFWHG
space and the physical space of the church (2003, p. 289). But while the space of reception 
is here ‘experienced as organized a certain way, and it is so as a result of grasping the 
picture’s content’, Hopkins argues that ‘the organizing principle is not the potential for 
DFWLRQ·WKDW/DQJHUKDVLGHQWLÀHGLVSDUWLFXODUWRVFXOSWXUHS$QG\HWZKLOH,DP
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not arguing that Trinity activates the full kinetic potential of sculpture in the round, it 
nevertheless activates something of the space immediately in front of the work. As we shall 
see in the next chapter, this activation is not dependent upon our physical mobility as such, 
but a kind of implicit bodily readiness that draws upon our awareness of the real space in 
which we stand.
Hopkins suggests that the pictorial examples that come closest to the ‘Langer 
phenomenon … seem rather trivial achievements, somewhat as illusionistic triumphs are’ 
(p. 289). But is the implication of a spatial continuity necessarily illusionistic in intention, 
or can it be in the service of an imaginative projection, licensed by the work in a way that 
grants us a distinctive access to the content of the picture? 
Leaving aside any objection as to whether trompe l’oeil works, such as Mantegna’s Camera 
degli Sposi ÀJFDQEHGHVFULEHGDV¶WULYLDODFKLHYHPHQWV· LWZRXOGEHZURQJWRWUHDW
Trinity as primarily an illusionistic work, even though it is often misleadingly described 
as such.6 The argument is worth pursuing. Wollheim maintains that works that ‘trade on 
illusion’ require a ‘subversion of belief on the part of the spectator of the picture’ (1987, p. 
185). As Wollheim rightly argues, the ‘imagination and illusion are quite different’. Thus:
[T]here are pictures which could be unthinkingly be confused with those I have been talking about 
[i.e. works implying a spectator in the picture], and these generally do involve illusion to some 
Fig. 8    Mantegna: Camera degli Sposi (frescoed vault; c. 1465), Castello di San Giorgio, Mantua. 
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degree. These are pictures which do not ask us to identify with someone entering the represented 
VSDFHUDWKHUZHDUHH[SHFWHGWREHOLHYHRQWKHEDVLVRIZKDWZHVHHWKDWDUHSUHVHQWHGÀJXUHHQWHUV
our space. (p. 185)
Rather than requiring such a subversion of belief, I would contend that Trinity calls for 
an imaginative engagement whereby the beholder registers different parts of the picture 
as having different levels of reality. This is not to deny that Trinity presents features later 
adopted by trompe l’oeil works: it implies a spatial continuity by placing the vanishing point 
DWWKHYLHZHU·VH\HOHYHOGHSLFWLQJWKHÀJXUHVDVOLIHVL]HGDQGUHSHDWLQJWKHDUFKLWHFWXUDO
frame of the façade within the painted chapel itself. While these features establish the work’s 
ÀJXUDOSUHVHQFH LWZRXOGEHDPLVWDNHWR LQWHUSUHWWKHPDVLOOXVRU\WULFNV ,PSRUWDQWO\
Masaccio differentiates between painted realities in a way that accentuates the work’s 
religious content. He paints the patrons and the skeleton (a memento mori) as though they 
occupy our space (that is, the space of the external beholder), a space implied as being ‘in 
IURQWRI·WKHIUHVFR·VVXSSRUWLQJZDOOÀJ7KHLQWHUVHFWLRQLVFRQFHLYHGDVDWKUHVKROG
Fig. 9    Masaccio: Trinity GHWDLOF6DQWD0DULD1RYHOOD)ORUHQFH
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between two coexistent realities, the contemporary spatiotemporal reality of the spectator 
(which shares aspects of the painted ‘reality’), and that of the religious representation, 
the spiritual realm, lying ‘behind’ the physical reality of the wall’s surface. The painting 
requires an imaginative engagement consistent with the kind of reciprocity afforded an 
internal onlooker: ‘the function of beholding has already been incorporated into the work 
itself’ (Kemp 1998, p. 181). But this imaginative experience is overlaid onto the ‘real’ space 
in which the external beholder stands D VSDFH WKDW LV LQ LWVHOI VSHFLÀFDOO\ UHOLJLRXV LQGHHG
ceremonial. The work functions within what Kemp terms its ‘conditions of access’; as noted 
earlier, this includes ‘the contextual and institutional circumstances in which the work of art 
appears’ (1994, p. 366). That the implied viewer is an external beholder affords something 
an internal spectator cannot, an embodied awareness of the surrounding architecture, 
which is drawn into the work’s domain. At the same time, the very inaccessibility of the 
ÀFWLYHFKDSHOHQVXUHVWKDWFDUHLVWDNHQ¶WRSXWDEUDNHRQWKHREVHUYHU·VLOOXVLRQRIEHLQJ
present’; Masaccio ensures that ‘the gradation of reality is made in accordance with the 
logic of the picture’s content’ (Sandström 1963, p. 30). 
This manipulation of painted realities (or unrealities) is the subject of Sven Sandström’s 
sadly neglected Levels of Unreality (1963). Sandström argues that Renaissance artists ‘appear 
to have been clearly conscious of the possibilities inherent in a marked distinction between 
different parts of a picture, together with the complex interweaving of essentially disparate 
elements having different degrees of reality’ (p. 7). Crucially for the current argument, 
Trinity’s painted realities maintain a sharp divide between the parts of the space of 
representation that the viewer can enter, and the parts to which she is excluded – precisely 
the kind of distinction illusionistic works seek to overcome.7 The external viewer enters 
into the represented space as an implied presence, but only into that part to which she has 
been allocated a place: that part of the pictorial world that extends outwards to encompass 
the real space in which the spectator stands, or (more pertinently) kneels (individually, or 
as part of a group). 
7KLVLVQRWWKHWULYLDOSRLQWLWPLJKWÀUVWDSSHDU,WTXHVWLRQVDVVXPSWLRQVWKDWXQGHUOLH
WKH H[FHVVLYH HPSKDVLV IUHTXHQWO\ SODFHG RQ /HRQ %DWWLVWD $OEHUWL·V VRFDOOHG ¶ZLQGRZ
ÀJXUH·ZKHUHSHUVSHFWLYHLVFRQFHLYHGDV3DQRVIVN\XUJHVDVD¶ZLQGRZ·WKURXJKZKLFK
we see. I have already noted the theoretical implications of this in the previous chapter, 
with respect to the confusion of pictorial and projection planes. 
I believe we are now in a position to rebut David F. Martin’s claim, quoted by Hopkins, 
that ‘With a painting the space between us and the canvas is, ideally, an intangible bridge 
to the painting, for the most part not explicitly entering into our awareness of the painting’ 
(Martin 1976, p. 282, cited in Hopkins 2003, p. 277). The fact that with Trinity we are invited 
to imagine that so much of the painting exists in front of the projection plane suggests, to 
the contrary, that with such works the space between viewer and painting is activated, 
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DOEHLWZLWKLQVSHFLÀFFRQVWUDLQWV7KHDFWLYDWLRQRI WKLVVSDFHUHLQIRUFHVWKHIDFW WKDWZH
are directly implicated by the work: the inscription above the skeleton reads ‘I was once 
that which you are; and that which I am, you also shall be’.8 Mary’s ‘gesture towards her 
FUXFLÀHGVRQH[SOLFLWO\DGPRQLVKHVWKHVSHFWDWRUWRUHPHPEHUIRUZKRPWKHVDFULÀFHZDV
made’ (Spike 1996, p. 170). This is an unmediated address that draws upon the viewer’s 
own psychology. Drawn into the space of representation, the imaginative engagements 
afforded the internal and external spectators fuse into a single experience, one in which 
we are the recipients of the vision before us. Not through illusory means, but with the 
beholder’s imaginative consent, licensed by the work. And as Baxandall has shown, a 
ÀIWHHQWKFHQWXU\DXGLHQFHPXFKEHWWHUH[HUFLVHGLQYLVXDOL]DWLRQWHFKQLTXHVZRXOGEHIDU
more receptive to the notion of an imaginative engagement overlaid onto everyday reality 
SS
4.
To draw the threads of the argument together, my contention is that the imagination plays 
a decisive role in negotiating the spatial and psychological access to a work implying either 
an internal or external spectator. In both cases, it plays a supplementary role to perception. 
But the imaginative engagement differs with respect to the implied spectator position 
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Fig. 10     Johannes Vermeer: A Lady Writing a Letter F1DWLRQDO*DOOHU\RI$UW
Washington.
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UHODWLYHWRWKHÀFWLRQDOUHDOP:RUNVLPSO\LQJHLWKHUDQLQWHUQDORUH[WHUQDOVSHFWDWRUDUH
completed outside of the represented scene – in Alois Riegl’s terms, they have an external 
coherence (1999).9 In the former case, such as with Vermeer’s A Lady Writing a Letter ÀJ
in the National Gallery of Art, Washington, this space is an unrepresented extension of the 
‘virtual’ space of the painting; in the latter case, the virtual space itself is conceived as an 
extension of the ‘real’ space in which the spectator stands, but in a way that simultaneously 
draws attention to the projection plane as a threshold between coexistent realities. The 
GLIIHUHQFHLQWKLVVHQVHLVRQHRIGLUHFWLRQ%XWWKLVLVLQVXIÀFLHQWDVLWVWDQGVWKLVVDPH
distinction might alternatively be described in terms of an internal spectator who ‘enters’ 
the virtual space, against the notion of part of the virtual world enveloping the ‘real’ space 
of the beholder. In both instances, the depiction point belongs to the representational space 
of the painting, but with the latter the space of representation draws the surrounding 
architecture into its realm, and into the painting’s content.
My position here is consistent with Maynard’s observation that the reason ‘so many 
perspective pictures do seem to depict their subjects as lying spatially beyond their 
surfaces … may not be so much a phenomenon of perspective as it is one of perspective 
combined with framing·S,QDJUHHLQJZLWKWKLVSURSRVDO,DSSO\LWVSHFLÀFDOO\
to the relation of the implied spectator to pictorial space. The differences in imaginative 
engagements directly follow from the distinct ways such works construct the relationship 
EHWZHHQIUDPHSLFWXUHVXUIDFHDQGSURMHFWLRQSODQHDQGFRQVHTXHQWO\WKHUHODWLRQVKLS
EHWZHHQÀFWLYHVFHQHDQGLPSOLHGYLHZHU7KLVKDVERWKVSDWLDOand temporal implications. 
With works implying internal spectators, the projection plane is seldom registered, and 
the depicted scene, by and large, has no spatial relationship with its surface, or with its 
frame. In terms of the imaginative projection of depth, the picture surface is transparent. 
By contrast, in works implying external spectators the picture surface generally coincides 
with the projection plane, although frequently parts of the picture are depicted as being in 
front of the picture surface and frame; while we might imagine away the surface, we do not 
ORVHVLJKWRILWVSLFWRULDOVLJQLÀFDQFHLQVHSDUDWLQJOHYHOVRIunreality.
These differences arise from wider distinctions in picturing, and hence are applicable 
EH\RQGWKHQDUURZFRQÀQHVRISDLQWLQJVLPSO\LQJVSHFWDWRUVDVSDUWRIWKHLUFRQWHQW2QH
PLJKWUHDGLO\WKLQNRI+HLQULFK:|OIÁLQ·VFODVVLFIRUPDOLVWGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHWHFWRQLF
DQG DWHFWRQLF ZKHUH WKH ZRUN LV FRQVWUXFWHG MXVW ¶IRU WKLV IUDPH· DV D ¶VHOIFRQWDLQHG
entity’, appropriate for the ceremonial, against the notion of the ‘open’ composition, where 
¶WKHÀOOLQJKDVORVWWRXFKZLWKWKHIUDPH·S%XWZKDW,ZDQWWRDUJXHLQWKLV
thesis is that these alternative conceptions of framing have particular repercussions for 
how a spectator might be engaged. Works implying the presence of a spectator ‘up the 
VWDNHV·ZLWKLPSOLFDWLRQVQRWMXVWIRU0HUOHDX3RQW\·VTXHVWLRQRI¶where the painting is’, 
EXWWKHUHODWHGTXHVWLRQRIZKHUHWKHVSHFWDWRULVUHODWLYHWRWKHÀFWLYHVFHQH
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Further differences emerge between the respective engagements. Works implying an 
internal spectator are typically smaller paintings, and this issue of scale is not without 
VLJQLÀFDQFH 1R ORQJHU WLHG WR D SDUWLFXODU ORFDWLRQ WKH FRQWLQXXP EHWZHHQ SLFWRULDO
and spectator’s space is broken, and the viewer stands in a place other than the space 
RIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ7KHSUHH[LVWLQJZRUOGLQVLGHWKHIUDPHLVVHSDUDWHGRXWIURPWKHUHDO
world of the beholder, and continues beyond WKH IUDPH 7KH IUDPLQJ LV WKXV OHVV VHOI
contained: objects are abruptly cut into at the frame’s edges, and the positioning of the 
vanishing point is typically acentric. Such works have an inherent ambiguity as to where 
the ‘absent’ scene is: despite being painted from a particular point of view. The imaginative 
engagement lacks spatial or temporal markers relative to the viewer’s situation, precisely 
because the picture surface and frame do not exist for the spectator in the picture: she 
inhabits the virtual world of the painting, whereas the picture surface and frame belong 
to the world of the external beholder. In Kemp’s terms, they belong to ‘the outer and not 
the inner apparatus of the work of art’ (1998, p. 191). The spectator of the picture can either 
identify with a spectator in the picture, or imagine herself engaging with the scene; in both 
instances the engagement is from the point of view of someone who already inhabits the 
virtual world of the painting. 
By contrast, works designed for a particular architectural setting include a ‘concrete 
spatial tie to the location of the image’ (Savile 1992, p. 307). They are completed only by the 
physical presence of an embodied viewer, and as such engage a present tense (the ‘here’ 
and ‘now’), experienced LQ WKH ÀUVW SHUVRQ DQG UHHQDFWHG ZLWK HDFK QHZ DUULYDO 7KH\
ORFDWHWKHÀFWLYHVSDFHLQUHODWLRQWRWKHVSHFWDWRUE\GUDZLQJDWWHQWLRQWRWKHDUFKLWHFWXUDO
frame as a spatial and temporal marker. The imaginative engagement does not comprise 
DQ LGHQWLÀFDWLRQ ZLWK WKH DQWLFLSDWHG YLHZHU ZLWKLQ D VHOIFRQWDLQHG YLUWXDO ZRUOG EXW
one of imagining away the distinction between real and virtual, while at the same time 
registering a metaphysical divide. To quote Podro, ‘we are invited both to attend to and to 
LPDJLQHDZD\WKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQUHDODQGÀFWLYHWKHYHU\GLVWLQFWLRQSUHVXSSRVHGLQ
VHHLQJWKHSDLQWLQJDVDUHSUHVHQWDWLRQLQWKHÀUVWSODFH·S
In such works, the frame (whether painted or real) is conceived as belonging to the 
virtual world, as well as being part of the external spectator’s reality. (In Trinity, a more 
UDGLFDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQPLJKWEHWKDWWKHHQWLUHÀFWLRQDOFKDSHOIXQFWLRQVDVDframing device 
for the miraculous appearance of the Trinity – the frame extending deep into the pictorial 
space.) As such, in sharp contrast to the ambiguous sense of being elsewhere, the imagined 
engagement is situated, juxtaposed with a ‘real’ situation, whereby the internal and external 
beholders merge. 
$JDLQ VRPH FODULÀFDWLRQ LV FDOOHG IRU $QG KHUH ZH FDQ FDOO XSRQ +RSNLQV·V RZQ
argument with respect to sculpture, where he distinguishes a more ‘metaphysical’ sense 
in which ‘spaces may be the same, or different’, and the more everyday sense of ‘same 
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space’ (2003, p. 279). I have already alluded to such a distinction. Consistent with the way 
Hopkins applies the ‘everyday’ sense to sculpture, the spectator of Trinity shares the space 
of the painted reality in front of the projection plane. But we also share the space of the 
ÀFWLYHFKDSHOEH\RQG²LWLVLQWKLVVHQVHRI¶VDPHVSDFH·DQGRQHPLJKWDGG¶VDPHWLPH·
that we might claim the virtual space of the chapel as a continuation of the space of the 
church. However, Trinity preserves a metaphysical distinction between different parts of 
WKHÀFWLYHUHDOPDQGDOOLHV WKLVGLVWLQFWLRQWR LWVUHOLJLRXVFRQWHQW$V6DQGVWU|PQRWHV
¶WKHUHOLJLRXVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQGHPDQGVGLVWDQFH·S7KLVVWUXFWXULQJRIDFRQÁLFW
between everyday and metaphysical senses of how spaces may be continuous, or not, is 
VRPHWKLQJZKLOHQRWXQLTXHWRSDLQWLQJDVP\RZQZRUNZKLFKXWLOL]HVÀOPLOOXVWUDWHV
might nevertheless be said to distinguish the phenomenology of representational painting 
from that of representational sculpture.
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Mantle is a variation of Monochrome Passage, but unlike the earlier 
work Mantle has an outward manifestation as a plywood structure. 
This symmetrical structure, 4800mm long, is suspended from above, 
supported by two steel brackets. As with Monochrome Passage, 
internal stepped passages, 70mm wide, connect the space occupied 
by the spectator to two openings which receive and difuse light. 
Each passage contains seven steps, 70mm high and 210mm long.  The 
internal form is painted a uniform French grey, the external form left 
unpainted. The outward sculptural form is completely determined by 
the internal logic of the piece, rather than the demands of its object 
status. The work might thus be legitimately considered as a three-
dimensional painting: a painting which nevertheless envelops the 
viewer. The shift in scale between external object and interior space 
is even more marked than in Monochrome Passage, and it is di cult 
to equate the two. Enveloped by the suspended object as s/he peers 
into the work’s inner recesses, the spectator is both made aware of 
his or her physical presence, but also curiously disembodied by the 
imaginary engagement with the internal spaces. The experience is not 
just visual: the acoustics are transformed by the enclosing structure, 
which might almost be mistaken as some kind of rudimentary yet 
functional auditory device. 
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Seeing Depth and Nonconceptual Content
The imaginary is much nearer to, and much further away from, the actual – nearer because it is in 
my body as a diagram of the life of the actual, with all its pulp and carnal obverse exposed to view 
IRUWKHÀUVWWLPH«$QGWKHLPDJLQDU\LVPXFKIXUWKHUDZD\IURPWKHDFWXDOEHFDXVHWKHSDLQWLQJLV
an analogue or likeness only according to the body; because it does not offer the mind an occasion 
to rethink the constitutive relations to things, but rather it offers the gaze traces of vision, from the 
inside, in order that it may espouse them; it gives vision that which clothes it within, the imaginary 
WH[WXUHRIWKHUHDO0HUOHDX3RQW\FS
1.
I began Chapter One with the question of how we see depth in painting, in a representation 
WKDWE\GHÀQLWLRQH[FOXGHVWKHWKLUGGLPHQVLRQ)ROORZLQJ%XGG,DUJXHGWKDWDYLYLG
experience of pictorial depth requires an imaginative projection into the marked surface 
RI WKH GHSLFWLRQ 1RW D IUHHÁRDWLQJ SURMHFWLRQ EXW RQH VXSSRUWHG DQG OLFHQVHG E\ WKH
FRQWHQWVRIWKHSLFWXUH$IWHU0HUOHDX3RQW\,KDYHODEHOOHGWKLVHQJDJHPHQWseeing-with, 
a seeing according to the picture. In Chapter Two I extended this argument to address the 
different engagements afforded works implying internal and external spectators, and the 
role a work’s frame plays in structuring such an engagement. In this chapter I will expand 
this argument to include the role imagination plays in replicating our bodily situatedness 
in the world when we engage with paintings. Crucially, I will argue that it is imagination 
that allows our engagement to draw upon nonconceptual content. 
$QREYLRXVSODFH WREHJLQ VXFKDGLVFXVVLRQ LV WKH VLWXDWHGSHUFHSWLRQRI0HUOHDX
3RQW\%XWWKHUHLVDSUREOHPLQVRGRLQJLQWKDW0HUOHDX3RQW\GHQLHVDQDXWRQRPRXV
role for the beholder, rarely referencing ‘spectatorship’ in painting.1 This is, at least in part, 
a tendency to associate the term ‘spectator’ with a corresponding lack of involvement in a 
SRLQWRIYLHZS8QGHUWKHKHDY\LQÁXHQFHRI3DQRIVN\·VPerspective as Symbolic 
Form  0HUOHDX3RQW\ UHIHUV WR SHUVSHFWLYDO SDLQWLQJV DV UHPDLQLQJ DW D GLVWDQFH
and hence not involving a viewer (2004, p. 53). And yet there is an inherent contradiction 
LQ0HUOHDX3RQW\·VSRVLWLRQ$V%UHQGDQ3UHQGHYLOOHQRWHVWKHDQRPDO\LVWKDW0HUOHDX
Ponty was ‘at once a perspectivist and a philosophical critic of perspective’: hence ‘even the 
most schematic perspective construction posits the reciprocity of perceiver and perceived 
«DQGLQWKLVVHQVH0HUOHDX3RQW\EHORQJHGWRDWUDGLWLRQWKDWFRXOGSURSHUO\EHWHUPHG
perspectivalist’ (1999, p. 366). 
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Beyond such unease with the terminology, I believe that there are two primary reasons 
IRU WKLV VXUSULVLQJ RPLVVLRQ RI D UROH IRU WKH EHKROGHU 7KH ÀUVW LV D FRQVHTXHQFH RI DQ
LQFUHDVLQJO\ UDGLFDO QRQGXDOLVP ZKLFK UHIXVHV WR VHSDUDWH WKH VXEMHFW IURP WKH ZRUOG
that painting presents (Prendeville 1999, p. 366). $V&URZWKHUREVHUYHV¶0HUOHDX3RQW\·V
IXQGDPHQWDOSKLORVRSKLFDOSUHPLVHLVWKDWRXUEDVLFFRQWDFWZLWKWKHZRUOGLVSUHUHÁHFWLYH
We operate in and upon the world without making any explicitly conscious differentiation 
between ourselves as the subject of experience, and the world as the object of it’ (1993a, p. 
102). If our basic contact with the world is preconceptual in content, this nonconceptual 
component includes an awareness of our body’s positioning in space.
8QOLNH KLV FRQWHPSRUDU\ -HDQ3DXO 6DUWUH IRU ZKRP FRQVFLRXVQHVV LV FRQFHLYHG DV
EHLQJ¶WUDQVSDUHQW·WRLWVHOIIRU0HUOHDX3RQW\LWLVRSDTXH0RUHODQGS0HUOHDX
Ponty argues that ‘we cannot be transparent to ourselves’ because we are situated in the 
world – ‘ambiguity remains’ (2002, p. 444). If Sartre’s dualism prevents a phenomenological 
UHFRQFLOLDWLRQ RI REMHFW DQG VXEMHFW WKHQ DV /HR 5DXFK QRWHV ¶IRU 0HUOHDX3RQW\ WKH
UHFRQFLOLDWLRQLVQRWRQO\SRVVLEOH LW LVFRQVWDQWXELTXLWRXV·S0HUOHDX3RQW\
VLGHVWHSV(GPXQG+XVVHUO·VVXEMHFWREMHFWGLVWLQFWLRQE\¶UHIXVLQJWRLVRODWHFRQVFLRXVQHVV
from its world: he sees consciousness as already in its world’ (p. 2). Perception provides 
our primary relation to a world that consciousness already inhabits.
But how is this reciprocity captured by painting? And how does it address painting’s 
WZRSHUVSHFWLYHVWKDWRIWKHÀFWLYHVFHQHDQGWKDWRIWKHUHDOVSDFHRIWKHEHKROGHU"7KHUH
LV D QRWLFHDEOH VKLIW LQ 0HUOHDX3RQW\·V SKLORVRSK\ IURP DQ HDUOLHU SKHQRPHQRORJLFDO
approach to situated perception to the radical ontology of The Visible and the Invisible, where 
0HUOHDX3RQW\FODLPVWKDW¶WKHSUREOHPVSRVHGLQ>WKHPhenomenology of Perception (2002)] 
are insoluble because I start from the “consciousness” – “object” distinction’ (Working 
notes, 1968, p. 200). This shift runs the risk of introducing an ontological monism, with 
SDUWLFXODUFRQVHTXHQFHVIRU0HUOHDX3RQW\·VDFFRXQWRISDLQWLQJDV*DOHQ-RKQVRQQRWHV
‘such a monism would collapse the depth of the world, the distance between painter and 
thing and the movement of things’ (1993, p. 47). 
1HYHUWKHOHVV 0HUOHDX3RQW\ KDV DW KLV GLVSRVDO just the means to overcome such 
DQRQWRORJLFDOPRQLVP-RKQVRQPDNHVWKLVSRLQWZKHQKHFODLPVWKDW0HUOHDX3RQW\·V
introduction of the dual terms ‘reversibility’ and ‘Flesh’ puts a break on this perceptual 
monism, which ‘seems in danger of sedimenting and rigidifying into a more basic frozen 
monistic metaphysic’ (1993, p. 47). Johnson argues:
Flesh and reversibility are notions meant to express both envelopment and distance, the paradox of 
XQLW\DWDGLVWDQFHRUVDPHQHVVZLWKGLIIHUHQFHÀQGLQJDQHZRQWRORJLFDOZD\EHWZHHQPRQLVPDQG
GXDOLVPSS
0HUOHDX3RQW\ GHVFULEHV ÁHVK as neither matter (the objective body) nor mind (the 
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body thought): ‘To designate it, we should need the old term “element” … in the sense 
of a general thingPLGZD\EHWZHHQWKHVSDWLRWHPSRUDOLQGLYLGXDODQGWKHLGHDDVRUWRI
incarnate principle that brings a style of being wherever there is a fragment of being’ (1968, 
p. 139). Crucially, it describes a ‘lived body’, aware of its own reciprocal situatedness in 
the world: if I see, then another also sees me, as I too am possessed of the visible. This is 
an intuition he argues is readily understood and exploited by painters. Surrounded by the 
YLVLEOHWKHERG\ZKLFKERWKVHHVDQGLVVHHQLV¶DWKLQJDPRQJWKLQJV·¶PDGHRIWKHVDPH
stuff’, it is ‘caught up in the fabric of the world’ (1993c, p. 125). And yet while in the midst 
of the visible, ‘the body interposed is not a thing, an interstitial matter, a connective tissue, 
but a sensible for itself’S,QZKDW0HUOHDX3RQW\WHUPV¶UHYHUVLELOLW\·WKHWZR
¶VLGHV·RIWKHERG\WKHREMHFWLYHDQGSKHQRPHQDOERG\WKHERG\VHQVLEOHDQGWKHERG\
VHQWLHQWDUHQRWVLPSO\MX[WDSRVHGRQHDJDLQVWWKHRWKHUS5DWKHUWKH\FRQVWLWXWH
DUHFLSURFDO LQVHUWLRQDQ LQWHUWZLQLQJZKHUHWKH ¶VHHUDQGWKHYLVLEOHUHFLSURFDWHRQH
another and we no longer know which sees and which is seen’ (p. 139).
While this reciprocity is fundamental to his general account of situated perception, 
0HUOHDX3RQW\ IDLOV WR DSSO\ KLV QRWLRQ RI UHYHUVLELOLW\ WR WKH NLQG RI LPDJLQDWLYH
engagement I argue is afforded a situated viewer of painting as an external presence. For 
DOOKLVHPSKDVLVRQHPERGLHGSHUFHSWLRQ0HUOHDX3RQW\·VUDGLFDOQRQGXDOLVPXOWLPDWHO\
negates a painting’s beholder as a physical presence considered as separate from the work. 
This underlies his unease with perspectival representation, and its implication of a beholder 
position outside of the work. In proposing that ‘the painting is a “world” by opposition 
WRWKHXQLTXHDQG´UHDOµZRUOG·0HUOHDX3RQW\DUJXHVWKDWLWLV¶DQRUJDQL]HGHQVHPEOH
which is closed, but which, strangely, is representative of all the rest’ (Working notes, 1968, 
p. 223). This is the second of the two reasons I propose for his effective exclusion of the 
spectator. Bracketing off a section of reality, the ‘body’s situated negotiation of space’ 
(Prendeville 1999, p. 366) is already encapsulated by the inner framework of painting’s 
ZRUOG7KLVSUHUHÁHFWLYHRSHQQHVVXSRQWKHZRUOGLVFRQFHLYHGDVLQWHUQDOWRWKH¶VWUXFWXUH·
of painting conceived in terms of a symbolic or signifying order.20HUOHDX3RQW\·VVLWXDWHG
DQGHPERGLHGSHUFHSWLRQLVWKXVSUHÀJXUHGwithin the work. The viewer is already merged 
with this world: painting presents an undifferentiated mode of viewing where the viewer 
is not so much excluded (the viewer’s vision is, as it were, merged with that of the painter 
so that we see ‘according to’ the painting), as denied an autonomous, participatory role.3
This commitment to an essentially closed signifying order, as well as denying an 
autonomous role for the external beholder, arguably rules out the kind of imaginative 
engagement afforded by Wollheim’s internal spectator. As we saw earlier in relation to 
Damisch, the notion of an internal beholder is fundamentally different to that of an implied 
VXEMHFWSRVLWLRQ:KLOH0HUOHDX3RQW\·VODWHZULWLQJVWLHWKHLPDJLQDWLRQDQGWKHVHHLQJ
of painting very close indeed, it is his underexplained notion of a closed symbolic order, 
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LQKHULWHGIURP3DQRIVN\ZKLFKSUHYHQWV0HUOHDX3RQW\IURPFRQFHLYLQJRILPDJLQDWLRQ
DVIXOÀOOLQJDUROHQRWMXVWLQWHUPVRIWKHSDLQWHU·VYLVLRQEXWLQWKHUHFLSURFDOLQVHUWLRQ
between viewer and artwork. And yet, if we conceive of painting’s ‘structure’ not as 
analogous to language, but as a structuring of our spatial access to the virtual world of 
the painting (albeit with the viewer’s consent), then with certain works our positioning in 
space, as an implicit presence, can form part of the work’s content, with all the richness of 
0HUOHDX3RQW\·VQRWLRQRIWKHLPDJLQDU\WH[WXUHRIWKHUHDO
2.
0HUOHDX3RQW\·VQDVFHQWVWUXFWXUDOLVPLVGLIÀFXOWWRUHFRQFLOHZLWKKLVUDGLFDOHPSLULFLVP
where, to quote Thomas Baldwin, it is ‘our “bodily” intentionality which brings the 
possibility of meaning into our experience by ensuring that its content, the things presented 
in experience, are surrounded with references to the past and future, to other places and 
other things, to human possibilities and situations’ (2004, p. 10).4 ,W LV 0HUOHDX3RQW\·V
bodily intentionality, its orientation towards the world, that I now want to develop in 
UHODWLRQWRWKHVHHLQJRIGHSWK)RU0HUOHDX3RQW\WKHSUREOHPRIWKHVHHLQJRIGHSWKLV
that depth is not merely analogous to height or width seen as if from a different angle, 
EXW²DV¶WKHPRVW´H[LVWHQWLDOµRIDOOGLPHQVLRQV·²LWDOORZVXVDSUHUHÁHFWLYHH[SHULHQFH
of the world (2002, p. 298). It is not an ‘objective’ property, but something belonging to a 
situated viewer: depth ‘is not impressed upon the object itself, it quite clearly belongs to 
the perspective and not to things’ (p. 298).50HUOHDX3RQW\GHYHORSVWKLVSRLQWZKHQKH
states that while breadth can initially pass for a relationship between things ‘in which the 
perceiving subject is not implied’, depth ‘announces a certain indissoluble link between 
things and myself’ (p. 298). The latter claim stands even when we admit into the account 
objective properties such as occlusion shape.
)RU0HUOHDX3RQW\WKHHQLJPDRIWKHVHHLQJRIGHSWKLVWKDWREMHFWVHFOLSVHRQHDQRWKHU
in a way that establishes their mutuality of dependence: ‘everything is in the same place at 
the same time, a locality from which height, width and depth are abstracted, a voluminosity 
we express in a word when we say a thing is there’ (1993c, p. 140). This has implications 
IRUSDLQWLQJ)RU0HUOHDX3RQW\SLFWRULDOGHSWKLVQRWDFDVHRIPHUHO\VHHLQJDQLOOXVLRQ
RIGHSWKZKHUHFOHDUO\WKHUHLVQRQHRI ¶DGGLQJRQHPRUHGLPHQVLRQ·WRWKHÁDWFDQYDV
in order to present an illusion that replicates empirical vision (p. 141). Such an illusionist 
notion fails to capture our bodily situatedness. He argues that the picture is not a device 
‘borrowed from the real world in order to refer to prosaic things which are absent’ (p. 126): 
WKHVFHQHWKDWSDLQWLQJSUHVHQWVGRHVQRWEHORQJWRWKHZRUOGWKHLQLWVHOIDQ\PRUHWKDQ
an imagined object does. What this suggests is that it has its own phenomenology, distinct 
IURPIDFHWRIDFHVHHLQJ5DWKHUWKDQUHSOLFDWHHPSLULFDOYLVLRQ
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8OWLPDWHO\ WKH SDLQWLQJ UHODWHV WR QRWKLQJ DW DOO DPRQJ H[SHULHQFHG WKLQJV XQOHVV LW LV ÀUVW RI DOO
´DXWRÀJXUDWLYHµ,WLVDVSHFWDFOHRIVRPHWKLQJRQO\E\EHLQJD´VSHFWDFOHRIQRWKLQJµE\EUHDNLQJ
the “skin of things” to show how the things became things, how the world becomes world. (p. 141)
Crowther interprets ‘this characteristically cryptic passage’ as suggesting that for 
0HUOHDX3RQW\ ¶ZKDWDSDLQWLQJPDNHVYLVLEOHÀUVWDQGIRUHPRVWDUH the conditions of its 
own visibility’ (1993a, p. 111). Painting reveals how things disclose themselves, how things 
become visible, how ‘space unfolds from within’ (Prendeville 1999, p. 364). 
,Q VR GRLQJ 0HUOHDX3RQW\ EHOLHYHV WKDW FHUWDLQ SDLQWHUV VXFK DV &p]DQQH DUH
capable of revealing what he terms the transcendence of objects. In the Phenomenology 
of Perception, 0HUOHDX3RQW\FODLPVWKDWVHHLQJLQYROYHVDYLVXDODZDUHQHVVWKDWH[FHHGV
what is presented to the eyes from any particular point of view:
To see is to enter a universe of beings which display themselves, and they would not do this if they 
could not be hidden behind each other or behind me. In other words: to look at an object is to inhabit 
it, and from this habitation to grasp all things in terms of the aspect which they present to it. But in 
so far as I see those things too, they remain abodes open to my gaze, and, being potentially lodged 
in them, I already perceive from various angles the central object of my present vision. Thus every 
object is the mirror of all others. When I look at the lamp on my table, I attribute to it not only the 
qualities visible from where I am, but also those which the chimney, the walls, the table can ‘see’; but 
[the] back of my lamp is nothing but the face which it ‘shows’ to the chimney. I can therefore see an 
object in so far as objects form a system or a world, and in so far as each one treats the others round 
it as spectators of its hidden aspects and as guarantee of the permanence of those aspects. (2002, p. 
79)
2EYLRXVO\ 0HUOHDX3RQW\ LV QRW OLWHUDOO\ FODLPLQJ KHUH WKDW REMHFWV ¶VHH· 5DWKHU WKLV
‘positing of the object’ as transcendent is precisely because it ‘makes us go beyond the 
limits of our actual experience’ (p. 81). The seeing of an object transcends the limitations 
of our particular point of view, in that it incorporates the ‘visual’ experience of perceiving 
KLGGHQDVSHFWVRIWKHREMHFW7KLVQHHGVVRPHFODULÀFDWLRQ
3.
Perhaps the most persuasive attempt to get to grips with this elusive passage is Kelly’s 
¶6HHLQJ7KLQJVLQ0HUOHDX3RQW\·.HOO\DUJXHVWKDWIRU0HUOHDX3RQW\WKHH[SHULHQFH
of an object’s hidden side is not indeterminate because ‘we have not yet determined 
perceptually what its determinate features are’, but rather because perception itself is 
indeterminate ‘because it is essentially normative· SS  ,W LV QRW D FDVH RI VLPSO\
having yet to view the lamp from the point of view of the chimney, but that any point of 
view is made in relation to a ‘view from everywhere’, a notional (and hence impossible) 
view that serves as a norm against which any particular perspective stands (p. 95). Thus 
if the world is described by determinate data, with perception ‘we are constantly sensitive 
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not only to what we perceive but also, and essentially, to how well our experience measures 
up to … norms about how best to see the thing perceived’ (p. 97). Kelly argues that unlike 
+XVVHUO·VDFFRXQWRIWKLVSUREOHPZKHUHWKHIXOO\ÁHGJHGWKUHHGLPHQVLRQDOH[SHULHQFHRI
an object ‘comprises the sum of all the possible perspectives that I could have on it’ (p. 98),6 
IRU0HUOHDX3RQW\WKHH[SHULHQFHLVRQHZKHUH¶´,DOUHDG\SHUFHLYHµWKHKLGGHQVLGHRIWKH
object because I am “potentially lodged in” the background object that now stands behind 
WKHÀJXUH·S,QRUGHUWRPDNHVHQVHRIWKLVFODLP.HOO\PDNHVDQDQDORJ\WR0HUOHDX
3RQW\·VDFFRXQWRIPRWRULQWHQWLRQDOLW\WKHXQUHÁHFWLYHERGLO\DZDUHQHVVLQYROYHGLQIRU
instance, grasping an object such as a coffee mug (p. 99).7 Thus Kelly argues:
7KLVNLQGRIIXOOERGLO\UHDGLQHVVIRUVRPHWKLQJLVZKDW,EHOLHYH0HUOHDX3RQW\LVSRLQWLQJWRZKHQ
he says that I am now ‘potentially lodged in’ the other points of view on the object. It is not a matter 
of now having a determinate experience of what is seen from those points of view, any more than the 
PRWRULQWHQWLRQDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHPXJLVDPDWWHURIKDYLQJDGHWHUPLQDWHYLVXDOH[SHULHQFHRI
its features. Rather, it is a kind of bodily readiness to take up those points of view, a readiness that is 
reducible neither to a determinate cognitive understanding of what is seen in the view8 nor to a series 
RIPHUHO\UHÁH[LYHERGLO\PRYHPHQWVS
,I .HOO\ LV ULJKW WR LQWHUSUHW 0HUOHDX3RQW\·V SRVLWLRQ WKLV ZD\ WKHQ WKLV QRWLRQ RI
¶ERGLO\UHDGLQHVV·DOVRKDVLPSRUWDQWLPSOLFDWLRQVIRU0HUOHDX3RQW\·VDFFRXQWRISDLQWLQJ
Kelly argues that the problem of object transcendence ‘poses itself most forcefully when 
we acknowledge the phenomenological distinction between experiencing something as a 
PHUHWZRGLPHQVLRQDOIDoDGHDQGH[SHULHQFLQJLWDVDIXOOWKUHHGLPHQVLRQDOHQWLW\·S
+HXVHVWKHH[DPSOHRIKRZWKHH[SHULHQFHRISHUFHLYLQJDÀOPVHWPLJKWUDGLFDOO\FKDQJH
once it is exposed as a series of shallow façades, despite the fact that the information 
projected onto the retina remains the same. The experience will seem less replete, precisely 
because there are no hidden aspects to reveal. While Kelly does not relate this argument 
VSHFLÀFDOO\WRSDLQWLQJFOHDUO\LWKDVDEHDULQJRQWKHFXUUHQWDUJXPHQWLQWKDW0HUOHDX
3RQW\ LQVLVWV WKDW SDLQWLQJ FDSWXUHV D VHQVH RI REMHFW WUDQVFHQGHQFH GHQLHG WKH WZR
GLPHQVLRQDOÀOPVHW7KLVPLJKWDSSHDUWREHDQDQRPDO\DQGRQFHDJDLQUHWXUQVXVIXOO
circle to the question of how the loss of the third dimension is overcome in painting. How 
FDQDV0HUOHDX3RQW\FODLPVSDLQWLQJH[WHQGWRDOODVSHFWVRI%HLQJWKHGLVWLQFWLYHDVSHFW
of vision, ‘that to see is to have at a distance·SZKHQSDLQWLQJVSHFLÀFDOO\excludes 
the third dimension? 
&UXFLDOO\ LQ ¶(\HDQG0LQG·0HUOHDX3RQW\FODLPV WKDW ¶SDLQWLQJ LVDQDQDORJXHRU
likeness only according to the body’, whereby ‘it gives vision that which clothes it within, 
the imaginary texture of the real’ (1993c, p. 126). The relationship between imagination 
DQGWKHERG\LVKHOGWREHNH\8QOLNHWKHUROH0HUOHDX3RQW\DVVLJQVLPDJLQDWLRQLQWKH
Phenomenology of Perception  ZKHUH LQÁXHQFHG E\ 6DUWUH 9, imagination is 
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still characterized by its ‘essential poverty’, works such as ‘Eye and Mind’ (1993c) and 
The Visible and the Invisible (1968) come to a renewed understanding of the relationship 
between imagination and embodied perception: and, notably, imagination and painting. 
,IIRU0HUOHDX3RQW\ZH¶VHHDFFRUGLQJWRRUZLWK·WKHSDLQWHGLPDJHWKHQWKLVLVRQO\
because the imaginary ‘is in my body as a diagram of the life of the actual’ (1993c, p. 126). 
As a diagram of the life of the actual, it is the imagination, I would suggest, that replicates 
an experience of object transcendence in painting; imagination, grounded in the reciprocity 
of our bodily experience of the world through a shared bodily frame of reference, invokes 
DQRQFRQFHSWXDORUSUHUHÁHFWLYHERGLO\UHDGLQHVV
It is imagination’s role in replicating a bodily readiness toward the world that gives 
SDLQWLQJ WKH FDSDFLW\ WR FDSWXUH WKLQJV DW D GLVWDQFH LQ D IXOO\ WKUHHGLPHQVLRQDO ZD\
ZKDW0HUOHDX3RQW\UHIHUVWRDVD¶SUR[LPLW\WKURXJKGLVWDQFH·S7KLVSHUKDSV
FRPHV FORVHVW WR 0HUOHDX3RQW\·V QRWLRQ RI KRZ VSDFH XQIROGV LQ SDLQWLQJ IRU GHSWK
reveals not only how things envelop each other (the adding of one more dimension to 
the picture surface), but how such enveloping forms a ‘system’ or ‘world’, the content of 
which exceeds the limits of what painting represents. It is the role imagination plays in 
fully experiencing a potential to be lodged in the various possible viewpoints of the virtual 
VSDFHRISDLQWLQJWKDWSURYLGHVSDLQWLQJZLWKDWUDQVFHQGHQFHFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\0HUOHDX
3RQW\DV¶EHLQJDWDGLVWDQFH·:RUNLQJQRWHVS
,IZHUHOLHYH0HUOHDX3RQW\·VDFFRXQWIURPLWVFRPPLWPHQWWRDV\PEROLFRUGHUZH
can start to fully recognize something implicit but unregistered in his account: that situated 
SHUFHSWLRQDOVRSRVLWVDEHKROGHUVRPHWKLQJIXQGDPHQWDOWR0HUOHDX3RQW\·VDFFRXQWRI
RUGLQDU\SHUFHSWLRQZKHUHDVZHKDYHDOUHDG\QRWHGKHDUJXHVWKDWGHSWK¶DQQRXQFHV
a certain indissoluble link between things and myself’ (2002, p. 298). At least with certain 
works, we can then break through painting’s supposed closed world, not in a way that 
UHSOLFDWHVRUGLQDU\YLVLRQEXW LQDZD\WKDW²WKURXJKVXVWDLQHGYLHZLQJH[SORLWVRXU
bodily readiness towards the world. And it is crucial to my argument that it is this bodily 
readiness that is activated by works engaging the external beholder as part of their content. 
While this may not be the full kinetic potential of sculpture, it exceeds the mere ‘vivid’ 
experience of pictorial space. And in works where the internal and external spectators fuse, 
it draws upon an awareness of our positioning in ‘real’ space. 
4.
.HOO\·VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI0HUOHDX3RQW\·VSRVLWLRQFDQ,EHOLHYHUHÀQHDVLPLODUQRWLRQRI
WKHUROHRILPDJLQDWLRQLQSDLQWLQJPDGHE\&URZWKHU$VDSURPLQHQWDGYRFDWHRI0HUOHDX
Ponty’s philosophy, Crowther also holds ‘we inhere in the sensible’ (1993a, p. 1), and that the 
artwork ‘UHÁHFWV our mode of embodied inherence in the world’ (p. 7). Crowther argues that 
0HUOHDX3RQW\·VQRQFRQFHSWXDOFRQWDFWZLWKWKHZRUOG¶LQYROYHVDSULPRUGLDODZDUHQHVV
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RIRXUERG\·VSRVLWLRQLQJDQGLWVXQLW\DQDZDUHQHVVZKLFKDUWLFXODWHVWKHZRUOGLQWRDQ
intelligible schema’ (p. 103). It is a synaesthetic contact which does not distinguish between 
the visual and tactile (p. 107), and provides ‘a kind of ontological reference point … on the 
basis of which the body is able to orientate itself appropriately towards the world’ (p. 106). 
The concreteness of this ontological reciprocity is experienced through art. For Crowther, 
art is a process of constructing what he calls ‘sensuous manifolds’; in a ‘symbolically 
VLJQLÀFDQW·VHQVXRXVPDQLIROGLWLVWKH¶LQWHJUDOIXVLRQRIWKHVHQVXRXVDQGWKHFRQFHSWXDO
ZKLFKHQDEOHVDUWWRH[SUHVVVRPHWKLQJRIWKHGHSWKDQGULFKQHVVRIERG\KROGLQDZD\
which eludes modes of abstract thought’ (p. 5).
Now while I am unsure about aspects of the terminology, Crowther’s account does 
seem to capture something of the interlock between conceptual and nonconceptual 
orientations towards the work. Crowther also argues that imagination plays a pivotal role 
LQRXUH[SHULHQFHRISDLQWLQJ,QSDUWLFXODUKHDVVLJQVWKHLPDJLQDWLRQDVSHFLÀFUROHLQ
SHUVSHFWLYDO ZRUNV ,Q KLV FKDSWHU RQ ¶7KH 2EMHFWLYH 6LJQLÀFDQFH RI 3HUVSHFWLYH· LQ The 
Transhistorical Image (2002, ch. 3), Crowther notes that:
[O]n the one hand perspective articulates an objective order of relations, with which the viewing 
VXEMHFW LV FRQWLQXRXV EXW ZKLFK À[HV KLP RU KHU LQ D GHÀQLWH SRVLWLRQ 7KH VXEMHFW LV ORFDWHG DV
an element within a spatial system. The distance of objects from such an ideal viewer is rigidly 
articulated. On the other hand, however, perspective is at the same time a means whereby the viewer 
assimilates and controls space by articulating it in symbolic terms. It becomes thereby a kind of 
H[WHQVLRQRIWKHLPDJLQDWLRQ7KHYLHZHULVLQDVHQVHPHUJHGZLWKWKHZRUOGSS
,QSXWWLQJIRUZDUGDPRUHIDYRXUDEOHDSSUDLVDORI5HQDLVVDQFHSHUVSHFWLYHWKDQ0HUOHDX
Ponty, Crowther here recognises a distinction between a viewer ‘merged’ with the virtual 
world of painting and an ‘objective order of relations’, where the spectator is continuous 
with, but also distanced from, the spatial system of painting. 
)ROORZLQJ ERWK 3DQRIVN\ DQG 0HUOHDX3RQW\ &URZWKHU FRQVLGHUV SHUVSHFWLYH DV D
V\PEROLF IRUP&URZWKHUQRWHV WKDW WKH IDFW WKDWSHUVSHFWLYH LV ¶DUWLFXODWHG IURPD WZR
dimensional base explicitly characterizes it as an “image of” some possible kind of visual 
state of affairs other than itself’ (p. 55). It has, as we have already noted, a double aspect. 
Moreover, for Crowther perspective has a privileged role in terms of symbolic form in 
WKDW¶WRUHFRJQL]HDSLFWXUHDVDQLPDJHRIDVSHFLÀFNLQGRIWKLQJLQYROYHVDWDFLWUHIHUHQFH
of the thing depicted to a virtual counterpart of the latent schema that might surround 
an actual thing of that kind’ (p. 57). This implies a functional unity of time and space: a 
¶YLUWXDO VSDWLDO VWUXFWXUH· DQG ¶DXQLÀHGRUGHURI WHPSRUDO FRQWLQXLW\·ZKHUH FUXFLDOO\
‘for this explicit level to be reached, it is necessary that the thing be presented in relation 
to other things in a way that implies a continuous unfolding of possible viewpoints’ (p. 
7KLVLVDGLUHFWUHIHUHQFHWR0HUOHDX3RQW\·VREVHUYDWLRQWKDWWKHREMHFWRISHUFHSWLRQ
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LVD ¶WRWDOLW\RSHQWRDQKRUL]RQRIDQLQGHÀQLWHQXPEHURISHUVSHFWLYDOYLHZV·S
16). Thus, in relation to Antonello da Messina’s St Jerome ÀJ LQ/RQGRQ·V1DWLRQDO
Gallery, Crowther maintains:
One could view the saint, for example, from a position behind the left pillar of the door arch by 
moving into that position. From here one could construct an image with the saint viewed under a 
more frontal and elevated aspect. A movement further to the left would make the saint even more 
frontal, but now partially obscured by the large wooden cabinet. And so on and so on. Now the point 
is, that this virtual space is one which in imaginative terms we can traverse continuously by changing 
RXUVSDWLRWHPSRUDOSRVLWLRQ(DFKFKDQJHRIYLHZSRLQWZRXOGEHFRRUGLQDWHGZLWKWKHUHVW,WLVWKLV
unity of the spatiotemporal continuum that perspective is able to articulate in its projection from two 
dimensions. (2002, p. 58)10
7KHIUHHÁRDWLQJQDWXUHRIVXFKLPDJLQLQJVLVSHUKDSVSUREOHPDWLF%XWLIZHDFFHSW
.HOO\·V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI0HUOHDX3RQW\·VSRVLWLRQ WKHQZHPLJKWDFNQRZOHGJH WKDWZH
are already ‘potentially lodged in’ these other viewpoints; the role of imagination is not, 
necessarily, to move us into that position. Rather, imagination accesses our bodily readiness, 
in a way by which these alternative viewpoints can be said to be already perceived. They are 
Fig. 11    Antonello da Messina: St Jerome F1DWLRQDO*DOOHU\/RQGRQ
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LPSOLFLWZLWKLQWKHSDLQWHU·VSRLQWRIYLHZ0HUOHDX3RQW\FODLPVWKDWFHUWDLQSDLQWHUVDUH
able to capture this potentiality. But I would argue that painting also affords an imaginative 
engagement with a corresponding potential for a reciprocal insertion between viewer and 
artwork.
5.
, KDYH DUJXHG WKDW 0HUOHDX3RQW\·V TXHVWLRQ RI ¶where the painting is’ is only really 
intelligible with respect to an imaginative engagement with painting, and it is here that 
0HUOHDX3RQW\·V DFFRXQW FDQ RIIHU VRPHWKLQJ PRUH VXEVWDQWLDO WR WKH OLPLWHG QRWLRQ RI
imagination providing a ‘vivid’ experience of pictorial depth. If, as Budd suggests, the 
imagination is essential for the richer experience of pictorial depth, then I would contend 
WKDW LW LV DOVR HVVHQWLDO IRU WKH NLQG RI UHFLSURFLW\ 0HUOHDX3RQW\ DUJXHV LV LPSOLHG E\
painting. This reciprocity arises from a nonconceptual bodily awareness of depth, which, 
as we have seen, can encompass the possibility that we are already potentially lodged in 
alternative viewpoints; but equally, it might imply the kind of reciprocity of content that 
0HUOHDX3RQW\GRZQSOD\VZKHUHZHLQWHUDFWZLWKWKHSDLQWLQJ·VQDUUDWLYHFRQWHQWDVDQ
implied spectator. 
I am not here attempting a systematic UHFRQFLOLDWLRQ RI 0HUOHDX3RQW\·V RQWRORJLFDO
position with analytic derived accounts of depiction.11 Such a project would be problematic, 
not least given the radically different styles of argument. Nevertheless, there are clear 
SDUDOOHOVEHWZHHQDQDO\WLFDWWHPSWVWRFRQVWUXFWDERGLO\IUDPHRIUHIHUHQFHDQG0HUOHDX
Ponty’s notion that the spatiality of my body ‘is not, like that of external objects or like that 
of “spatial sensations”, a spatiality of position, but a spatiality of situation·SS
Peacocke’s A Study of Concepts (1992), for instance, uses the term positioned scenario in 
relation to ‘nonconceptual representational contents’ (p. 97), which he argues a perceptual 
concept must possess.12 While Peacocke’s scenario content is not given the ontological 
VLJQLÀFDQFHRI0HUOHDX3RQW\·VXVHRI¶SUHUHÁHFWLYH·ERWKSKLORVRSKHUVKROGWKDWSHUFHSWLRQ
KDVDQRQFRQFHSWXDOFRPSRQHQW,QDFOHDUHFKRRI0HUOHDX3RQW\3HDFRFNHDUJXHVWKDW
a positioned scenario draws upon the experience of the body as its frame of reference, 
a constant that has a direct parallel with (and constitutes a disposition towards) bodily 
actions (p. 94). This bodily frame of reference remains constant, regardless of location: it is 
part of a subject’s ‘building up a consistent representation of the world around him and his 
location in it’ (p. 91). Peacocke argues:
In supplying a subject with information about the location of things relative to bodily axes, perception 
supplies that nonconceptual information in a form immediately usable if the subject wants to move 
his body or some limb toward, from, or in some other spatial relation to what he perceives. (p. 93)13
One of the strengths of Peacocke’s theory is that it integrates spatial and temporal 
73
PDUNHUV3HDFRFNHGHÀQHVDSRVLWLRQHGVFHQDULRWKXV
A positioned scenario consists of a scenario, together with (1) an assignment to the labeled axes and 
origins of the scenario of real directions and places in the world that fall under the labels, and (2) 
an assigned time. For a particular perceptual experience, the real directions and places assigned at 
(1) are given by the application of the labels to the subject who has the experience. If the origin is 
labeled as the center of gravity of the body, the real place assigned to it is the center of gravity of the 
perceiver’s body, and so forth. (I oversimplify a little in aiming to capture the spirit of a position.) The 
time assigned at (2) is the time at which the perceptual experience occurs: perceptual experience has 
DSUHVHQWWHQVHFRQWHQW:HFDQWKHQVD\WKDWWKHFRQWHQWJLYHQE\WKHSRVLWLRQDOVFHQDULRLVFRUUHFW
if the scene at its assigned place falls under the scenario at the assigned time, when the scenario is 
SRVLWLRQHGWKHUHLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHDVVLJQHGGLUHFWLRQVSS
Peacocke notes that two advantages of his thesis are that (i) it captures a central aspect of 
YLVXDOH[SHULHQFHWKDW¶DQH[SHULHQFHFDQKDYHDÀQHUJUDLQHGFRQWHQWWKDQWKDWIRUPXODWHG
by using concepts possessed by the experiencer’ (p. 67),14 and (ii) a situated scenario allows 
for ‘overlapping contents of experience in different sense modalities’ (p. 69). Moreover, 
3HDFRFNHPDNHVWKHFUXFLDOSRLQWWKDW¶WKHIDFWWKDWDFRQFHSWLVXVHGLQÀ[LQJWKHVFHQDULR
does not entail that the concept itself is somehow a component of the representational 
content of the experience, nor that the concept must be possessed by the experiencer’ (p. 
68). This directly follows from the fact that the assignment of labelled axes is not ‘a purely 
notational or conventional matter’, but it ‘captures distinctions in the phenomenology of 
experience itself’ (p. 62). The positioned scenario is the content of the experience: ‘it is to be 
distinguished from any mental representation of the content’ (p. 65). A scenario is a ‘spatial 
type’, and Peacocke distinguishes a spatial type from a concept (p. 67).
Despite differences in the use of language, there is thus a direct parallel between 
Peacocke’s notion of a positioned scenario providing a bodily frame of reference used 
IRUVSDWLDOUHDVRQLQJDQGDFWLRQDQG0HUOHDX3RQW\·VDQFKRULQJRIDERG\LQWHUPVRID
‘situation’: where ‘it is clearly in action that the spatiality of our body is brought into being’ 
SVRWKDW¶WKHERG\LPDJHLVÀQDOO\DZD\RIVWDWLQJWKDWP\ERG\LVLQWKH
world’ (p. 115). Both emphasize the phenomenal body rather than a set of axes coordinates 
in objective space. And just as Peacocke makes a clear distinction between a positioned 
VFHQDULRDQGDQ\PHQWDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIVXFKDFRQWHQW0HUOHDX3RQW\QRWHV
The space in which normal imitation operates is not, as opposed to concrete space with its absolute 
locations, an ‘objective space’ or a ‘representative space’ based on an act of thought. It is already built 
into my bodily structure, and is its inseparable correlative … for us to be able to conceive space, it is 
LQWKHÀUVWSODFHQHFHVVDU\WKDWZHVKRXOGKDYHEHHQWKUXVWLQWRLWE\RXUERG\«·S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6.
+RZ GRHV WKH VLJQLÀFDQFH RI VXFK D ERGLO\ VWUXFWXUH RU IUDPH RI UHIHUHQFH LQSXW XSRQ
P\FDVHIRUDVSHFLÀFUROHIRUWKHLPDJLQDWLRQLQZKDW,KDYHWHUPHGseeing-with? I have 
argued that this role encompasses both our spatial and psychological access to a work. 
While supplementary to perception, it is necessary for the reciprocal relationship implied 
by works having an external coherence: works where the content is completed by the 
presence of a beholder, whether an internal or external spectator. The imagination is called 
upon because perception, unaided, is inadequate for experiencing such works, as their 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQDO FRQWHQW H[FHHGV ZKDW WKH\ UHSUHVHQW ZLWKLQ WKH ERXQGV RI WKH ÀFWLYH
scene. The imagination provides what the work cannot, directly, represent: the absent 
viewer. The reciprocity of seer/seen depends upon the viewer either identifying with an 
XQUHSUHVHQWHG ÀJXUH ZLWKLQ WKH ZRUN ZKHWKHU FRQFHLYHG LQ +RSNLQV·V RU :ROOKHLP·V
terms), or imaginatively experiencing the work LQWKHÀUVWSHUVRQfrom the perspective of the 
external beholder, fused with the internal spectator. These differences arise from distinct 
relationships between frame, projection plane, picture surface and scale.
I began the previous chapter by disputing Hopkins’s claim that painting must always 
SUHVHQWDVHOIFRQWDLQHGZRUOG$QG\HW+RSNLQV·VÀQDOFKDSWHURQYLVXDOL]DWLRQLQPicture, 
Image and ExperienceSURYLGHVDW OHDVWSDUWRIP\DUJXPHQW IRUGRLQJVR SS
200). Hopkins notes that there are overlaps between the contents of vision, visualizing, and 
VHHLQJLQ$OOWKUHHSUHVHQWXVZLWKREMHFWVWKDWDUHVLPLODUO\UHSUHVHQWHG¶LQDGLVWLQFWLYH
perspective’: they are all perspectival, in that there is always some point from which they 
are presented (p. 197). This shared perspective withstands the fact that with visualization 
this ‘point to which the object is orientated need not be very determinate at all’ (p. 171). 
This has parallels with Peacocke’s argument that not only can a positioned scenario 
provide a content for a fully perceptual experience, but it can equally give the content of 
nonperceptual experiences, although such cases ‘have to be elucidated by the relations in 
which they stand to the fully perceptual case’ (1992, p. 67). If visualization, like ordinary 
YLVLRQDQGVHHLQJLQLVHVVHQWLDOO\SHUVSHFWLYDOWKHQWKHUROH,DVVLJQLWLQUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDO
seeing is similarly elucidated by its relation to the fully perceptual case.
,QRUGHUWRPDNHVHQVHRIWKHGLVWLQFWLRQVEHWZHHQYLVLRQYLVXDOL]LQJDQGVHHLQJLQ
Hopkins introduces his own notion of a spatial ‘frame of reference’, which has obvious 
parallels with Peacocke’s scenario content. Hopkins argues that ‘vision supports a 
distinctive frame of reference on the space it represents’, a frame of reference which is 
deictic:
The notions nearer, farther, in front of and occluding allow us to identify positions along ‘lines of sight’, 
lines from the fulcral point to points in represented space. Other notions let us pick out such lines of 
sight, identifying them by their relations to others – right, left, up and down are examples. We might 
FDOOWKLVWKH¶VLJKWOLQH·IUDPHRIUHIHUHQFHSS
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*LYHQ WKDW YLVXDOL]DWLRQ VHHLQJLQ DQG YLVLRQ VKDUH D FRPPRQ PHDQV RI UHSUHVHQWLQJ
VSDFH +RSNLQV DUJXHV WKDW YLVXDOL]DWLRQ DQG VHHLQJLQ PXVW DOVR VKDUH WKLV GLVWLQFWLYH
frame of reference; they share the contents of vision, and ‘the structure within which it 
represents space’ (p. 184). But there are crucial distinctions. 
In vision, the frame of reference ‘controls action immediately’, whereas ‘the frame 
of reference on the imagined world, although again constituted by the sightline notions, 
never guides action in this way’ (p. 186). Hopkins claims that this explains part of their 
SKHQRPHQRORJLFDOGLIIHUHQFH7KHSHUVSHFWLYDO IUDPHRIVHHLQJLQFDQDOVRJXLGHDFWLRQ
VXFKDVZKHQZLWKRXWUHÁHFWLRQZHSRLQWWRZDUGVDÀJXUHZLWKLQWKHGHSLFWHGVSDFHS
%XWVHHLQJLQLVGLVWLQJXLVKHGIURPERWKYLVLRQDQGYLVXDOL]DWLRQLQWKDWLWSUHVHQWV
two perspectives, that of the painting as object and that of the depicted scene. As Hopkins 
QRWHV ¶DOWKRXJKVHHLQJLQGLVSOD\VWKHVDPHVRUWRISHUVSHFWLYHDVYLVXDOL]LQJ LWGLIIHUV
from it in exhibiting it, as it were, twice over’: in so doing, ‘it is a way of seeing something, 
the marked surface, while visualizing is not’ (p. 197).
:KLOH , DJUHH ZLWK DOO RI WKH DERYH ZLWK RQH TXDOLÀFDWLRQ LW IDLOV WR DGHTXDWHO\
address how the imagination can expand what can be experienced in a painting, in terms 
of an implied reciprocity between viewer and work that draws upon scenario content. 
This has particular relevance to the question as to ‘where the painting is I am looking at’. I 
have argued that the question has little relevance to the mere recognition of distance cues 
presented by the marked surface. It is only when, through an act of will, we transform such 
cues into an imagined third dimension that the question becomes pressing; in particular, 
it raises the related question of the spectator’s positioning relative to such an implied 
space. And here I would argue that my distinction between the imaginative engagements 
implied by the internal and external spectator mirrors an important distinction between 
two types of visualization: when objects are presented as absent or elsewhere, and instances 
when they are not. Most visualizing, while sharing vision’s frame of reference (in that it 
shares sightline notions), retains a considerable ambiguity or indeterminacy as to where the 
objects of the imagining are. This ambiguity is replicated by the imaginative engagement 
afforded an internal spectator or onlooker, when the marked surface ‘disappears’. While 
ZHFDQHIIHFWLYHO\SRLQWWRWKLQJVZLWKLQWKHGHSLFWHGVFHQHRXUORFDWLRQZLWKLQWKHVHOI
FRQWDLQHG YLUWXDO ZRUOG ODFNV VSHFLÀF VSDWLDO PDUNHUV DV WR KRZ VXFK GHSLFWHG REMHFWV
stand in relation to the spectator of the picture. The imaginative engagement draws upon 
our experience of scenario content relative to the fully perceptual case, independently from 
our actual location.
However, as Hopkins concedes, ‘at least some visualizing will exhibit precisely the 
IHDWXUH ZH DUH VXSSRVLQJ WR EH LQ SDUW GHÀQLWLYH RI VHHLQJ ² UHSUHVHQWLQJ VSDFH IURP
a point within it, myself as occupying that point, and, therefore, the space as before me’ 
Seeing Depth and Nonconceptual Content
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(1998, p. 185). Hopkins offers the example of when we close our eyes before an object 
and continue to imagine the same object in front of us. A more pertinent example might 
be a kind of situated visualizing that I am very familiar with. I frequently imagine my 
sculptural constructions as if before me, in the space of the gallery in which the work is to be 
LQVWDOOHG+HUHWKHYLVXDOL]DWLRQLVRYHUODLGRQWRDIDFHWRIDFHHQFRXQWHUZLWKDUHDOVSDFH
it is an imaginative experience where, walking and visualizing, I use my body as a kind of 
datum, to the extent that I am able to make very precise decisions about scale and relative 
position, something that is impossible to do when I imagine the installation remotely with 
my eyes shut. In such situated imaginings, visualization can guide action, albeit action 
that is mediated by the physical experience of the gallery space itself.15 It can guide action 
because there is an overlap of frames of reference, and of scenario content.
I would argue that this combination of seeing and visualizing is analogous to the 
kind of imagining involved when the internal and external beholders merge: where the 
imagining of pictorial depth is overlaid onto a ‘real’ situation, and we imagine away the 
GLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQÀFWLYHDQGUHDO+HUHRXUERGLHVDFWDVDGDWXPIRUWKHÀFWLRQDOVSDFH
both in terms of scale and orientation. The imagination permeates perception, to the extent 
that while it might not guide a full kinetic potential for action, in that painting presents 
its virtual space frontally, it nevertheless draws something of the surrounding space into 
WKHZRUN·VFRQWHQW,DPQRZLQDSRVLWLRQWRUHÀQHWKLVFODLP,DPQRWKHUHFODLPLQJWKDW
QRQLQIHUHQWLDOFRQWUROLVSUHVHQWWKLVLVDQLPDJLQDU\QRWDQLOOXVRU\H[SHULHQFHDQGLV
QRWGLFWDWHGE\WKHQHHGIRUDÀ[HGYLHZSRLQWEXWWKDWSDLQWLQJVcan be experienced in the 
light of such a kinetic potential: not in terms of activating our space as Langer (1953) argues 
is the case with sculpture, but through the role imagination plays in the potential to be lodged in 
other points of view. 
C
H
A
M
B
E
R
2
0
0
5
Chamber is a work constructed using white painted canvas stretchers, with the 
backs of the stretchers facing outwards towards the gallery space. This is not so 
much a reference to painting, as an intention to construct an enclosed structure 
that nevertheless admits a soft, difused light. The viewer is restricted to a very 
narrow entrance, 1800mm high and 600mm wide, the dimensions of which 
conine and locate the body. From this position, the viewer can look down at - 
but not descend - a strangely scale-less light of stairs, leading to the looded 
loor of the ‘chamber’ beyond, a space that is 3000 x 1200mm and 2000mm 
high. The structure houses a video projector, framing the projection onto the 
rear wall of a looped ilm, where a back-lit wall slowly recedes into the distance 
until it fades into pure light. The ilm is cropped so that the vanishing point 
of the ilm corresponds to the viewer’s eye-height: the projected space thus 
appears to extend the dimensions of the physical space itself. However, the 
illusion is contradicted by the projection’s relection in the water-illed loor, 
which both reveals its status as a two-dimensional image, and opens up a 
second vanishing point which continues the descent of the steps. Chamber thus 
presents two vanishing points. While locating a viewer as a physical presence, it 
presents a space which cannot be entered. 
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Two Modes of Situated Relationship
Paintings address us, and they do so in part through creating uncertainty; our engagement with 
them involves a continuous adjustment as we scan them for suggestions on how to proceed and for 
FRQÀUPDWLRQRUGLVFRQÀUPDWLRQRIRXUUHVSRQVH3RGURSYLL
1.
In the opening three chapters, I set out a philosophical argument for an expanded role 
for the imagination in how we might negotiate painting’s two perspectives. Crucially, in 
Chapter Two I argued a particular role for the imagination in works implying an external 
coherence. Such works are completed by the imagined presence (or sometimes a ‘felt’ 
absence) of a spectator, whether this beholder is conceived as internal to the painting’s 
ÀFWLRQDOZRUOGRUZKHUHWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOVSDFHH[WHQGVRXWZDUGVWRHQFRPSDVVWKH
real space in which the external spectator stands. Whereas the imaginative engagement 
provided by an internal spectator renders the picture plane transparent, in works integrated 
into their architectural contexts the frame and supporting wall function as spatial and 
temporal markers that register our location in front of the work. I have argued that in both 
instances the beholder is an implicit presence: to again use Kemp’s phrase, ‘the function of 
beholding has already been incorporated into the work itself’ (1998, p. 181). My position is 
FORVHWR3RGURZKRDUJXHVWKDWWKHVHDUHZRUNVZKHUH¶ZHIHHOWKHÀWEHWZHHQRXUSRVLWLRQ
DQGWKHSLFWXUHDÀWWKDWHQDEOHVXVWRLQFOXGHRXURULHQWDWLRQLQLPDJLQLQJWKHVXEMHFW·
(1998, p. 64). As noted in the previous chapter, this orientation arises from (and is made 
PRUHUHSOHWHE\VKDUHGIUDPHVRIUHIHUHQFHEHWZHHQYLVLRQVHHLQJLQDQGYLVXDOL]DWLRQ
,QWKLVFKDSWHU,DLPWRFRQFUHWL]HWKHDUJXPHQWWKURXJKVSHFLÀFH[DPSOHVRIDUWZRUNV
In so doing, I draw upon a rich seam of art historical writing on painting and spectatorship. 
The aim is not to survey such writing, but to test the philosophical position against 
individual artworks and aspects of their art historical literature. I will focus the discussion 
upon examples predominantly drawn from two types of works: (i) Italian Renaissance 
altarpieces, integrated into their architectural contexts; and (ii) Dutch genre paintings, 
that alternately register or deny the presence of an internal spectator. In so doing, I also 
address some works that construct a tension between (rather than merging of) the modes 
of engagement implied by internal and external beholders. 
My intention is to describe two distinct modes of spectatorship, what Kemp refers 
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to as conditions of appearance or conditions of accessS7RFRRSW3RGURLQWRP\
DUJXPHQWZLWKWKHÀUVWPRGH¶WKHSOD\EHWZHHQWKHRULHQWDWLRQWRWKHVXUIDFHDQGWRWKH
subject might be thought to be dependent on an architectural setting determining the real 
spatial relation to the viewer’ (1998, p. 64). By contrast, works implying internal spectators 
DUHPRUHRSHQHQGHGLQWHUPVRI WKHLUVLWXDWHGUHFHSWLRQ WKH\DUHQRW WLHGWRDVSHFLÀF
location, although they do structure an implied relationship to a beholder, but one that 
LVLQWHUQDOWRWKHLUYLUWXDOZRUOG8QOLNHWKHÀUVWW\SHRIUHODWLRQVKLSWKHEHKROGHULVQRW
situated by extrinsic conditions.1 
I do not claim these situated relationships as overarching art historical ‘categories’, and 
the examples I employ are by no means representative of all works implying such spectators. 
Nor do I intend to imply that the shift from external to internal spectatorship represents a 
stylistic ‘progression’. The relationships I describe are best seen as tendencies, and as such 
they cut across art historical periods; they are ‘functional’ dispositions rather than ‘formal’ 
categories, in that, through perspective and framing, they structure a relationship between 
viewer and painting, rather than constitute formal attributes of the work itself. Having 
VDLG WKLV WKH\ VKDUH IHDWXUHV RI ZLGHU ¶IRUPDO· FDWHJRULHV VXFK DV :|OIÁLQ·V GLVWLQFWLRQ
between the tectonic and a-tectonic (1950, ch. III). They also correlate to aspects of the classic 
distinction between Italian and Northern painting.2 While I am not making any great claim 
for originality in terms of describing the relationships, I believe I frame the distinction in an 
RULJLQDOZD\E\GHÀQLQJWKHPIXQFWLRQDOO\DFFRUGLQJWRWKHLUGLIIHUHQWFRQGLWLRQVRIDFFHVV
and by highlighting the role that the imagination plays in structuring their reception, in 
what I have termed a seeing-with.
2.
I summarise below key attributes typical of works that engage an external beholder through 
an integration of the painting into its architectural context. Giovanni Bellini’s San Zaccaria 
AltarpieceÀJPLJKWVHUYHE\ZD\RIH[DPSOH3
(a) Such works are integrated into their spatial setting, typically by incorporating the 
ZRUN·VIUDPHZKHWKHUSDLQWHGRUWKUHHGLPHQVLRQDOLQWRERWKWKHÀFWLRQDOZRUOG
and the architectural schema of the church. 
E 7KH ZRUN LV FRQFHLYHG DV D VHOIFRQWDLQHG HQWLW\ W\SLFDOO\ DQ ¶LOOXVRU\· FKDSHO
spatially and temporally consistent with its setting, rather than representing a 
prior world that continues beyond the frame.4
(c) Approached processionally, the paintings are locked into their institutional 
contexts, with all the corresponding ‘ritual behaviour’ that accompanies such a 
conventionalised setting. The space the viewer occupies is thus already VDQFWLÀHG
differentiated from ordinary, everyday space; the viewer is thus primed by certain 
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Fig. 12    Giovanni Bellini: Virgin and Child Enthroned with Saints (San 
Zaccaria Altarpiece) (1505), San Zaccaria, Venice.
expectations as to the work’s content.
G 6XFKZRUNVJHQHUDOO\FRQWDLQDPHGLDWLQJÀJXUHVZKRGLUHFWO\DFNQRZOHGJHV
WKHSUHVHQFHRIWKHVSHFWDWRUPRUHVSHFLÀFDOO\WKHexternal beholder) by a gesture, 
or ‘look’.5 (In Bellini’s altarpiece it is the musical angel, sat at the feet of Mary and 
Christ, who holds our gaze.)
(e) The scale of the representational space is consistent with, and taken from, the 
bodily scale of the viewer, imparting a strong sense of physical presence. 
(f) The vanishing point (or, more precisely, the centric point)6 is placed at approximately 
the viewer’s eye level, and the painting coheres around a position directly opposite 
this point.
(g) Elements of the painting encroach upon the spectator’s space, painted as if they are 
‘in front of’ the fresco or panel’s supporting surface. (While this is not the case with 
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WKH%HOOLQLWKHWKUHHGLPHQVLRQDOQDWXUHRIWKHVWRQHIUDPHSURGXFHVDQHTXLYDOHQW
suggestion of spatial continuity.)
(h) The intersection is conceived as coincident with the supporting wall/panel, 
FRQVWLWXWLQJDWKUHVKROG²VLJQDOOHGE\WKHIUDPHEHWZHHQFRH[LVWHQWUHDOPV$V
Rona Goffen notes in relation to Masaccio’s Trinity ÀJ¶WKHIUDPHLVXQGHUVWRRG
ERWK DV WKH WHUPLQXV RI WKH ÀFWLYH DUFKLWHFWXUH DQG DOVR DV WKH SRLQW RU SODQH
where the two worlds, sacred and mundane, meet and coincide’ (1986, p. 40).
(i) Despite establishing a spatial continuity, the siting of the work (often with a low 
FHQWULF SRLQW UHODWLYH WR WKH ÀJXUHV SODFHV OLPLWV RQ RXU LPSOLHG SDUWLFLSDWLRQ
respecting the separation of spiritual and earthly realms.
3.
Bryson’s Vision and Painting (1983) offers a similar distinction between what he regards 
DV WKH ÀUVW $OEHUWLDQ DQG VHFRQG FXOPLQDWRU\ HSRFKV RI SHUVSHFWLYH FK  7KHUH LV
an overlap between Bryson’s categories and the situated relationships I describe, despite 
differences in our respective interpretation of these distinct modes of viewing. Bryson 
UHIHUVWRZRUNVIURPWKHÀUVWHSRFKRISHUVSHFWLYHDVadvertent (i.e. ‘fully aware of an unseen 
witness’), where ‘the body of the viewer is positioned processionally’ (p. 111). Bryson uses 
Masaccio’s Trinity as an example, a work that I have already noted as fundamental to my 
own position. He observes in Trinity many of the aspects that I have argued are particular 
WR ZRUNV IXOO\ LQWHJUDWHG LQWR WKHLU DUFKLWHFWXUDO FRQWH[W L WKH UHSUHVHQWHG ÀJXUHV DUH
OLIHVL]HLLWKHYDQLVKLQJSRLQWLVDWH\HOHYHOLLLWKHSDLQWLQJFRKHUHVDURXQGWKLVSRLQW
(iv) the implied ground plan of the painted space is continuous with that of the spectator’s 
VSDFHDQGYWKHYDQLVKLQJSRLQWLVSODFHG¶XQQDWXUDOO\·ORZUHODWLYHWRWKHÀJXUHVZLWKLQ
the work, so that the scale, while lifelike, seems nevertheless monumental (p. 108). Bryson 
notes:
These spatial effects assume the viewing subject as an actual bodily presence, reacting to scale within 
the image as though to the scale of normal experience: the vocative address of the image is directly 
somatic. (p. 108)
<HWIRU%U\VRQWKLVSK\VLFDOHPERGLPHQWRIDYLHZHULQWKHÀUVWHSRFKRISHUVSHFWLYH
is a curious anomaly, the failure to resolve the theoretical implications of Albertian 
perspective. Bryson maintains that Alberti’s conception of the viewing subject is already 
Cartesian ‘in its reduction of the space of painting to dimensionless punctuality’ (p. 104).7 
He thus argues: 
There can be little doubt that in its theoretical form, as presented by De Pictura, this is indeed the 
reduction Alberti intends: the eye of the viewer is to take up a position in relation to the scene that is 
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identical to the position originally occupied by the painter, as though both painter and viewer looked 
WKURXJKWKHVDPHYLHZÀQGHURQWRDZRUOGXQLÀHGVSDWLDOO\DURXQGWKHFHQWULFUD\WKHOLQHUXQQLQJ
IURPYLHZSRLQWWRYDQLVKLQJSRLQW<HWFXULRXVO\WKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIDSXQFWXDODQGGLVHPERGLHG
subject is precisely what painting organised around a single vanishing point fails to achieve. (p. 
104)
That Trinity produces an embodied beholder is an anomaly only if one accepts Bryson’s 
excessive emphasis on the theoretical implications of the apex of Alberti’s visual pyramid, 
a point in space corresponding to a kind of disembodied eye. I do not have space to fully 
DGGUHVVWKLVLVVXHEXW,ZLOOEULHÁ\VHWRXWFHUWDLQGLIIHUHQFHVLQDSSURDFK)ROORZLQJ-DPHV
Ackerman (1991a), I believe it is the conception of the picture as an intersection of the visual 
S\UDPLGWKDWUHSUHVHQWV$OEHUWL·VNH\WKHRUHWLFDOLQVLJKWUDWKHUWKDQWKHQRWLRQRIDÀ[HG
point, a ‘dimensionless punctuality’, located in the eye.8 It is the correlation of intersection 
and picture surface in works such as Trinity that offers the possibility of structuring a 
relationship between work and an external spectator. This is an important distinction, in 
that while perspective, combined with framing, locates a spectator, it does not necessarily 
do so with the kind of precision implied by Bryson. As James Elkins notes, ‘we have grown 
accustomed to thinking of the center of projection as a thing that can be constructed from 
the painting, “swung out” from the distance point so it hangs in the air like a marker at the 
end of a thread’; and yet this was not how the Renaissance conceived this point: rather, ‘for 
the Renaissance workers, the principal point was in the painting, even if some knew what 
LWVLJQLÀHGLQVSDFH·(ONLQVS
Given what Puttfarken refers to as the ‘permanency of aspect’, the ‘unchangeable 
relationship of all parts of the picture to each other’, the position we adopt relative to 
the painting allows for considerable deviation from the position immediately opposite the 
centric ray (2000, p. 22).9 For works integrated into their architectural contexts, what is 
more important than the beholder taking up the precise position of the painting’s depiction 
point is the correlation of intersection with the painting’s supporting wall or panel – in 
such a way that there is a correspondence between the parts of the picture we are allowed 
to ‘enter’, depicted as being in front of the intersection, and the physical presence of the 
ZDOOZKLFKGHÀQHVWKHOLPLWRIRXUSDUWLFLSDWLRQ)DUIURPDQDQRPDO\WKLVVWUXFWXULQJRI
a bodily presence is implicit to such a situated perspectival construction; Masaccio’s great 
insight is to utilize this metaphysical divide in a way that dramatizes the work’s religious 
content, differentiating between what is depicted as being in front of or behind the picture 
plane. 
4.
This structuring of the spectator’s implied access is a major concern of two of the key works 
RQ5HQDLVVDQFHVSHFWDWRUVKLS6DQGVWU|P·VLevels of Unreality (1963) and John Shearman’s 
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Only Connect … (1992). Sandström distinguishes his position from formalist accounts such 
DV:|OIÁLQ·VE\VWDWLQJWKDWWKH¶FRQFHSWV´GHJUHHVRIUHDOLW\µDQG´SODQHVRIUHDOLW\µDUH
here set in relation with the functions of a work of art, instead of being associated with 
the enduring properties or qualities of the painting’ (1963, p. 10). As such, my own position 
closely follows Sandström’s example.10 For Sandström, what is important is the ‘interplay 
of forms’, which is itself dependent upon the functions such forms have been assigned in 
the relationship between the picture and spectator (p. 10). To repeat a quote used earlier: 
The artists of the Renaissance appear to have been clearly conscious of the possibilities inherent in a 
marked distinction between different parts of a picture, together with the complex interweaving of 
essentially disparate elements having different degrees of reality, and the confrontation between on 
the one hand the picture in its several parts, and on the other the highly concrete reality of the space 
in which the observer stands. (p. 7)
Of course, in addressing a work’s ‘degrees of reality’, the ‘graduation does not, of 
course, concern reality’, rather ‘the total unreality characteristic of the forms and objects 
which the picture seeks to render credible’ (p. 7). This manipulating of levels of unreality 
is particularly acute with mural painting, a situated pictorial art where the normally 
irreconcilable ‘space of a painting’ and the ‘space of architecture’ are often directly 
juxtaposed: where the threshold separating the ‘real’ and the ‘unreal’ quite naturally 
becomes part of a work’s content (p. 16). Sandström observes that: 
By locating his pictures at a certain depth inside the surface of the wall, the artist can cause the 
objective pictorial space in front of the depicted scene itself to have the effect of being a direct 
FRQWLQXDWLRQRIWKHUHDOURRPLQZKLFKWKHREVHUYHULVVWDQGLQJ,QWKLVZD\WKHRQO\ÀUPIURQWLHU
EHWZHHQWKHVSKHUHRIUHDOLW\DQGWKDWRIÀFWLRQLVDEROLVKHG²RIFRXUVHZLWKWKHREVHUYHU·VVDQFWLRQ
– and by means of rigidly established proportions and relationships, the artist can set to work 
building up an illusory reality, in which shapes and forms seem sometimes to protrude into real 
space, sometimes to exist in a continuation of this beyond the surface of the wall. (p. 22)
,Q D UHÀQHPHQW RI 6DQGVWU|P·V SRVLWLRQ , KDYH EHHQ DUJXLQJ WKDW WKH LPSRUWDQW
TXDOLÀFDWLRQ RI WKH ¶REVHUYHU·V VDQFWLRQ· PLJKW EH EHWWHU XQGHUVWRRG LQ WHUPV RI DQ
imaginative rather than illusory engagement: an imaginative consent. I believe that the 
intention of such works, far from denyingWKHWKUHVKROGEHWZHHQUHDODQGXQUHDOLVWRFRRSW
it into the painting’s semantic content. Spatial continuity is both implied and negated. As we 
have seen with Trinity, barriers are often raised to our implied participation: as Sandström 
perceptively argues, an implied ‘transition does not mean the abolition of the boundary 
between two spatial spheres; it demands on the contrary the appearance of some obstacle 
in the boundary, thus drawing attention to the latter’s existence’ (p. 68). 
Sandström’s theories of Renaissance spectatorship are subsequently taken up by 
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Shearman’s Only Connect ... (1992). The arguments around ‘A Shared Space’ (ch. 2) are the 
most reception aesthetically orientated in the book, and the most relevant to the current 
argument.11 Adapting the grammatical term transitive, Shearman proposes the notion of a 
transitive work as a painting (or sculpture) that is ‘completed only by the presence of the 
spectator in the narrative’ (p. 33). These are works that engage a beholder as a participant 
or witness: ‘the viewer is located in the event, and the described action is transitive, 
completed outside itself in another focus in a shared space’ (p. 39). Shearman goes on to 
give a rich series of examples of the ways in which Renaissance paintings and sculpture 
engage an external viewer within their narrative content, not all of which necessarily imply 
a direct spatialFRQWLQXLW\+RZHYHULWLV6KHDUPDQ·VQRWLRQRIDVKDUHGVSDFHDVD¶ÀFWLRQ
RIDFRQWLQXXPEHWZHHQWKHSDLQWHGVSDFHDQGWKHUHDORUPRUHVSHFLÀFDOO\OLPLQDOVSDFH·
(p. 59) that directly impacts upon the relationship between artwork and viewer I am here 
describing.12 It is on the assumption of such a shared space that ‘depends the effectiveness 
of the psychological charge and the engagement’ of transitive works (p. 59).
Shearman, not surprisingly, uses the example of Masaccio’s Trinity. That so much of the 
painting is notionally on ‘our’ side of the wall acknowledges an unprecedented ‘illusion’ 
where the spectator’s viewpoint is ‘locked into the architecture of the church and related 
to the spectator’s address’ (p. 66). From this conceptual moment ‘the Trinity’s spectator 
is embraced in the systematic relationship of illusion and church space’ in a way that the 
relationship ‘is accommodated to him and his natural experience of the space in which 
the fresco stands’ (p. 66).13 While I again have reservations about the illusory emphasis, 
Shearman’s position – like that of Sandström’s – clearly provides art historical support for 
my philosophical position on the role for an external spectator.
5.
Shearman openly acknowledges that his notion of the transitive work, where the narrative 
action within the work is completed in another focus outside of the work, is an adaptation 
of Riegl’s concept of inner and outer unity (Shearman 1992, p. 36 and p. 59). The reference 
LVXQVXUSULVLQJDVLWLVZLWK5LHJOWKDW¶WKHEHKROGHU·VLQYROYHPHQW·LVÀUVWIRUPDOLVHGLQWR
an ‘aesthetics of reception’ (Kemp 1999, p. 11). 
Riegl develops his distinction between ‘internal coherence’ and ‘external coherence’ in 
relation to Dutch group portraiture from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (1999), 
EXWDVFDWHJRULHVWKH\KDYHVLJQLÀFDQFHEH\RQGVXFKZRUNV3DLQWLQJVGHVFULEHGDVKDYLQJ
a ‘closed internal coherence’ (die geschlossene innere Einheit) are founded on the reciprocity 
of pictorial elements contained within the picture. As Kemp notes: 
Riegl’s criterion of ‘internal coherence’ thus demands absolute reciprocity, the involvement of all 
WKH FKDUDFWHUV LQ D VLQJOH DFWLRQ DQG D XQLÀHG IRUPDO WUHDWPHQW RI WKH FRQQHFWLQJ SV\FKRORJLFDO
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DQGSK\VLFDOIXQFWLRQVRIWKHÀJXUHV7KHUHVXOWLVDQXQFRPSURPLVLQJFRPSRVLWLRQWKDWEXLOGVQR
bridges to the viewer: the painting appears complete in itself. (1999, p. 13)
By contrast, works having an ‘external coherence’ (die äußere Einheit) are completed only by 
the presence of a spectator, and establish a rapport with the viewer. As Kemp summarises 
Riegl’s argument, this constitutes ‘a form of painting that later manifests its dependence on 
WKHYLHZHUHYHQPRUHFOHDUO\E\KDYLQJWKHÀJXUHVUHODWHGLUHFWO\WRKLPRUKHUE\PHDQV
of eye contact, gesture, and movement’ (Kemp 1999, p. 13). 
Importantly, Riegl believes that certain painters combine both: he argues that 
5HPEUDQGW ¶PXVW KDYH UHDOL]HG HDUO\ RQ LQ KLV FDUHHU WKDW FRPSOHWH DQG ZHOOGHÀQHG
H[WHUQDOFRKHUHQFH²PHDQLQJWKHFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHYLHZHUDQGWKHÀJXUHVGHSLFWHG
in the painting – depends on an already resolved internal coherence – meaning a 
VXERUGLQDWHUHODWLRQVKLSDPRQJWKHÀJXUHVSRUWUD\HG· S7KLVDFFRUGLQJ WR
Riegl, is what Rembrandt learnt from the Italians. The two engagements are therefore not 
mutually exclusive.
Riegl argues that Italian Renaissance art achieves a consistent internal coherence by the 
beginning of the sixteenth century, ‘even though the solution was keenly anticipated a full 
hundred years earlier’ (p. 77). This introduces an unprecedented psychological dimension 
WRWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHÀJXUHVLQYROYHGLQDVLQJOHQDUUDWLYHDFWLRQ7KXV5LHJO
observes:
7KHÀJXUHVLQD5HQDLVVDQFHSDLQWLQJ«VKRZWKDWWKH\DUHDFXWHO\DZDUHRILQWHUDFWLQJZLWKHDFK
other. That is to say, there is assumed to be a viewing subject present who expects the objective 
ÀJXUHVLQWKHSDLQWLQJWRFRDOHVFHLQWRDXQLÀHGZKROH&RQVHTXHQWO\HYHU\WKLQJLVHOLPLQDWHGWKDW
PLJKWGLVWXUEWKHLPSUHVVLRQRIXQLW\7KLVLVZK\,WDOLDQ5HQDLVVDQFHÀJXUHVFRQYH\PXFKPRUH
strongly than their antique counterparts a sense of the psychological functions that connect the 
ÀJXUHVGHSLFWHGWKDWLVHPRWLRQDQGHVSHFLDOO\DWWHQWLYHQHVVS
Riegl contrasts such a sense of attentiveness to the alternative conception of external 
FRKHUHQFH W\SLFDO RI HDUO\ +ROODQGLVK SDLQWLQJ ZKHUH VXERUGLQDWLRQ RI ÀJXUHV WR WKH
dominant narrative action is avoided, and ‘coordination’ becomes the organising principle 
LQDZD\ZKHUHÀJXUHVLVRODWLRQIURPRQHDQRWKHULVPDGHDSSDUHQWS
Is Riegl’s historical argument borne out by the relevant Renaissance works? The 
question is worth pursuing at some length, and will serve to frame the examples I now 
employ. Certainly there is a noticeable shift throughout quattrocento Italian art towards 
a greater reciprocity of gestures and looks. We need only compare three altarpieces 
considered by Shearman’s Only Connect (1992) to register this development. In Trinity, 
SDLQWHG LQ  WKH ÀJXUHV DUH VHOIDEVRUEHG and relatively isolated, with only Mary’s 
gesture towards Christ directly acknowledging our presence. By around 1480, Giovanni 
Bellini’s San Giobbe AltarpieceÀJPDUNVDVLJQLÀFDQWH[WHQVLRQRIWKH¶FRQYHUVDWLRQDO·
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Fig. 13    Giovanni Bellini: Madonna Enthroned and Saints (San Giobbe Altarpiece) (c. 1480), 
Galleria dell’ Accademia, Venice.
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Fig. 14    Photomontage reconstruction of Giovanni Bellini’s San Giobbe Altarpiece, in its stone frame 
within San Giobbe (reproduced from Shearman 1992, p. 96).
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demands of the Sacra conversazione. As Shearman notes:
Remembering always that our name for the type has no reality in the period, we may nonetheless 
focus on the artistic invention that led eventually to a name being sought for it. And the fundamental 
shift that concerns us came earlier (between Taddeo di Bartolo, Masaccio, and Fillipo Lippi), when by 
VORZGHJUHHVWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ0DGRQQDDQGVDLQWVZDVUHFDVWLQWRDXQLW\GHÀQHGDWRQFHDV
VSDWLDOVHQWLHQWDQGVRFLDOLQDZRUGDFRPPXQLW\ZRUOGOLNHEXWQRWZRUOGO\SS
Bellini’s altarpiece, like Trinity, is a painting where the beholder is invited to imagine 
that she was looking as if into a real chapel. It exhibits all the attributes I noted earlier of 
DZRUNIXOO\LQWHJUDWHGLQWRLWVDUFKLWHFWXUDOFRQWH[WDORZYLHZSRLQWUHODWLYHWRWKHOLIH
VL]HÀJXUHVZLWKDFHQWULFSRLQWDWDSSUR[LPDWHO\H\HKHLJKWDURXQGZKLFKWKHSDLQWLQJ
coheres, thus suggesting an implied continuity between the pictorial and viewer’s space. 
The San Giobbe Altarpiece has transformed Masaccio’s painted architectural frame into a 
real stone one. Although the altarpiece has been unfortunately removed from its still extant 
surround in the church of San Giobbe, a photomontage gives some idea of the impact the 
SDLQWLQJZRXOGKDYHKDGZLWKLQLWVRULJLQDOFRQWH[WÀJ
7KHQLWFDQEHVHHQWKDWWKLVFKDSHOWKLVIXQFWLRQLQJXQLWHUHFWHGSDUWO\DVSDLQWHGÀFWLRQSDUWO\DV
real stone frame (its entrance arch), and partly as stone altar, against the right wall of San Giobbe, is 
a surrogate for the architectural chapels concurrently being built out from the left wall. (Shearman 
1992, p. 95)
7KLVLQWHJUDWLRQRIWKHUHDOIUDPHDQGSDLQWHGÀFWLRQFUHDWHVDQHYHQPRUHSHUVXDVLYH
suggestion of continuity than that offered by Masaccio, further blurring the distinctions 
between architecture, sculpture and painting. Unlike Trinity, which is located within the 
Gothic Santa Maria Novella (and is thus stylistically distinguished from its host building), 
Bellini’s painted chapel is fully integrated into the architectural schema for the church, one 
of the earliest examples of Renaissance architecture in Venice. 
Shearman highlights another subtle distinction from Masaccio’s Trinity:
As you stand before the altar of the Trinity, the ground level of the space described above is slightly 
DERYHH\HOHYHOVRWKDW\RXFDQQRWVHHWKHÁRRUDQGWKHQHDUHVWHGJHEHJLQVWRFXWZKDW\RXFDQ
VHHRIWKHIHHWRIWKHÀJXUHVZLWKLQQRWLRQDOO\VWDQGLQJEDFNIURPWKDWHGJH7KHEDVHOLQHRIWKH
San Giobbe Altarpiece is fractionally below eye level, so that the saints’ feet are seen on an extremely 
IRUHVKRUWHQHGWLOHGÁRRU7KHVHDUHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVRIWKHVDPHORJLFRIVLJKWDQGLQRQHVHQVHWKH\
do not need to be packaged in more elaborate terms than that. But it is worth pursuing the point that 
the occlusion of the one and the barely visible horizon of the other, which derive from that logic, are 
very characteristic of Donatello’s way of thinking. In the San Giobbe Altarpiece … the rigorous logic of 
VLJKWWHVWLÀHVWRWKDWFRQVFLRXVPRGHRIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQSUHGLFDWHGRQWKHa priori acknowledgement 
of the spectator’s presence. (p. 97)
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7KLVGLIIHUHQFHLVVLJQLÀFDQWLQWKDWIRUDOOWKHLUVLPLODULWLHVWKHSDLQWLQJVHVWDEOLVKDVHQVH
of shared space to different ends. While Shearman rightly remarks on the unprecedented 
¶SV\FKRORJLFDO DFFHVVLELOLW\· RI WKH ÀJXUH JURXS LQ %HOOLQL Sacra conversazione (p. 98), he 
unfortunately does not expand on the psychological implications of the occlusion of the 
horizon in Trinity. The difference is worth pursuing. In the Bellini it is Saint Francis who 
¶ZKLOHGLVSOD\LQJ&KULVWOLNHKLVVWLJPDWDVHHPVLQWKHVDPHJHVWXUHWRLQYLWHXVWRDSSURDFK
this Throne of Grace’ (Shearman 1992, p. 98); if ‘Saint Francis addresses a spectator directly 
in front of the altar’, then by contrast the Virgin ‘seems to turn with welcoming gesture 
toward others approaching from behind us on our right, from the entrance to the nave of 
San Giobbe’ (p. 100). This complex engaging of the spectator within the very architecture 
RIWKHFKXUFKHPSKDVL]HVERWKWKHLQWHOOHFWXDODQGSV\FKRORJLFDODFFHVVLELOLW\RIWKHÀJXUH
group in the San Giobbe Altarpiece. In Riegl’s terms, there is a greater internal unity than 
in the Masaccio – a unity which is extended to include a spectator conceived as part of a 
community. 
This inclusive unity is very different to the revelatory impact of the Trinity, an impact 
(as we shall see) that is predicated on Masaccio’s deliberate ambiguity as to the location 
of the Trinity within the scene, and the restrictions thus placed on our participation. If, in 
the Bellini, Saint Francis both displays his stigmata and welcomes us into the community, 
when Mary acknowledges our presence in Trinity her gesture is directed to each and 
every beholder. The spatial continuum of the Bellini provides the spectator with an 
unprecedented access to a community that is ‘worldlike but not worldly’, whereas Trinity 
maintains a sharper divide between two coexistent realms; the address is directed very 
much to an individuated beholder (even if that beholder is part of a congregation). If 
Bellini’s altarpiece engages a more complex set of narrative devices, its internal unity is 
gained, as Riegl predicts, at the relative loss of its direct address to the spectator.
<HWWKHXQLW\RIWKHSan Giobbe AltarpieceLVFHUWDLQO\QRWFRPSOHWH7KHÀJXUHVDUHVWLOO
characterized by a sense of isolation from each other, and from the spectator. This is a 
somewhat attenuated Sacra conversazione, in that few, if any, of the gazes actually meet. 
Saint Francis does not look at the viewer, but to a position to our left, while each character 
seems to stare into space: including the Christ child who stares at a position located some 
distance above the beholder’s head. The protagonists are each absorbed by their inner 
thoughts: the painting, while psychologically accessible, is also turned inward.  
By the 1520s, however, in a work such as Titian’s Pesaro Altarpiece ÀJWKHXQLW\
of narrative action and reciprocity of gestures and looks is fully complete. As Shearman 
QRWHVRI WKH)UDULSDLQWLQJ ¶WKHDFWLYDWLRQRI WKHÀJXUHJURXSLVH[WHQGHGPXFKIXUWKHU
than in Bellini’s – so far, indeed, as to include symbolic and historical narrative’ (1992, p. 
99). But the extraordinary innovations of Titian’s work push the altarpiece type we have 
been discussing to the very limit.
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Fig. 15    Titian: Pesaro Altarpiece 60DULD*ORULRVDGHL)UDUL9HQLFH
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Unlike Trinity, the donors of the Pesaro family no longer occupy ‘our’ space, but are 
(not altogetherVXFFHVVIXOO\LQFRUSRUDWHGLQWRWKHYLUWXDOVSDFHRIWKHÀFWLYHZRUOGEHKLQG
the picture surface.14 Bishop Jacopo Pesaro, who kneels ‘at the steps of the Virgin’s throne’, 
LVDFFRPSDQLHGE\ÀJXUHVLQWHJUDOWRWKHQDUUDWLYHDFWLRQ¶DZDUULRUKROGLQJWKHÁDJRIWKH
SDSDOÁHHWDQGE\WZRFDSWLYHVRQHD7XUNWKHRWKHUD0RRU·6KHDUPDQS7KH
strong diagonal emphasis sets up an internal dynamic crucial to the narrative content:
The bishop commemorates his victory over the Turks, as admiral of the papal forces, as Santa Maura 
LQ&\SUXVLQDQGEHFDXVHLWZDVDSDSDODQGQRWD9HQHWLDQYLFWRU\KHNQHHOVÀUVWDQGUDWKHU
pointedly at Saint Peter’s feet. (p. 100)
Unlike Bellini’s altarpiece, which is fully integrated into the architecture of San 
*LREEHKHUHWKHÀFWLRQDODUFKLWHFWXUHLVQRORQJHUDQREYLRXVH[WHQVLRQRILWVKRVW5RQD
Goffen claims that ‘rather than establishing an illusionistic continuity between the actual 
DQGÀFWLRQDO VSDFHVRI FKXUFKDQGSLFWXUH7LWLDQ LQVLVWHGRQDGLVMXQFWLRQEHWZHHQ WKH
two realms’ (1986, p. 112). Nevertheless, there is still an acknowledgment from where the 
spectator has arrived. Approaching the work obliquely from the nave, as the viewer passes 
from the third to the fourth bay on the left: 
He then sees, as it were complacently, empirically, and guided by memory, what the historian of 
altarpieces sees with so much surprise, which is that Titian has turned the group of Madonna and 
saints, together with the podium and the steps of her throne, toward the main entrance of the church. 
(Shearman 1992, p. 99)
Not only has Titian rotated the scene towards the entrance: as Puttfarken observes, Titian 
aligns the altarpiece with his own Assumption over the high altar, a work framed by the 
HDUOLHUFKRLUVFUHHQDQGLQVRGRLQJUHLQYHQWVWKHSacra conversazione by rotating it ninety 
degrees. While if might initially appear that the Pesaro Altarpiece radically abandons ‘the 
format of centralized bilateral symmetry’ (p. 137), in fact, as Peter Humfrey notes, ‘In a 
VHQVHZKDW7LWLDQ LV VKRZLQJXV LVD%HOOLQHVTXHÀJXUHJURXSYLHZHG IURPDQREOLTXH
angle rather than frontally’ (1993, p. 188; cited in Puttfarken 2000, p. 144).15
What are the consequences of this radical rotation? Shearman argues against the 
notion that ‘the picture looks best, or was ever meant primarily to be seen, from forty or 
sixty degrees to the left of the normal axis, but was meant to be seen from dead in front’ 
(1992, p. 99). This somewhat misrepresents the Puttfarken argument to which it refers; 
while Puttfarken argues that the physically oblique approach suggested by the acentric 
SHUVSHFWLYH ¶KHOSV WR FRQÀUP DQG KHLJKWHQ WKH SUHVHQFH RI WKH ODUJH DQG DSSURSULDWHO\
IRUHVKRUWHQHGVDFUHGÀJXUHV· S KHalso recognizes that the work presents a 
frontal view. Indeed, I would argue that the work implies two ’ideal’ viewing positions, 
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one consistent with the acentric vanishing point, and one with the centralizing frame 
ZKLFKKDVVRPHZKDWORVWWRXFKZLWKWKHÀFWLRQDOVSDFH2IFRXUVHLQUHDOLW\WKHVSHFWDWRU
will adopt many shifting positions toward the painting: it should be stressed that these are 
positions implicit within the work. 
Puttfarken notes that in earlier versions of the painting,16 the section of wall on the right 
supported a barrel vault, a scheme that would have heightened the acentric perspective 
FRQVWUXFWLRQSS+HQRWHVKRZVXEVHTXHQWYHUVLRQVOHVVHQWKHLPSDFWZLWK
the two vast columns acting as ‘a solution to Titian’s problem of reconciling the frontal view 
RIWKHGRQRUVZLWKWKHREOLTXHYLHZRIWKHVDFUHGÀJXUHVDQGWKHLUSHUVSHFWLYH²FROXPQV
LQSDUWLFXODUZLWKRXWIRUHVKRUWHQHGFDSLWDOVÀWHDVLO\LQWRERWKYLHZV·S:KLOHWKLV
is undoubtedly true, I believe the oblique view also offers something that Puttfarken does 
not comment upon, though it would appear to support his argument: from this position 
DQGIURPQRRWKHUQRWRQO\DUHWKHÀFWLRQDOFROXPQV¶DFRKHUHQWSDUWRIWKHSHUVSHFWLYH
construction’ (p. 147), but they are seen as being consistent with, even a continuation of, the 
great columns of the Frari’s nave.17 
This directional emphasis, which references the memory of our arrival, is balanced 
by another complex movement, again completed outsideRI WKHÀFWLYHVSDFH7KH&KULVW
Child turns to Saint Francis, whose gesture commends the Pesaro family to the Madonna. 
As Shearman notes, the Child ‘lifts the Virgin’s veil, apparently a playful gesture but at 
the same time an intimation of the symbolic role of the mantle of the Madonna of Mercy, 
as if to take them under her protection, too’ (1992, p. 101). This complex movement is 
completed by the youngest family member, Niccolò Pesaro, who turns to acknowledge our 
presence, a presence directly in front of the work. This is a ‘welcome offered by a child to 
the mortal congregation’ (Goffen 1986, p. 114).
While we are therefore certainly not excluded as a presence, I would argue that ours is 
a more peripheral (if still important) role than that implied by the direct revelatory address 
of Trinity. Our imaginative engagement is that of an acknowledged onlooker rather than 
D GLUHFW SDUWLFLSDQW 7KH H[DPSOH RI 7LWLDQ·V DOWDUSLHFH PLJKW VWDQGLQ IRU PDQ\ RWKHUV
that follow, where, as Riegl suggests, a more complex internal unity has supplemented, 
if not replaced, an earlier external coherence. In the Titian, the donors play active roles 
as intermediaries integrated into the work’s narrative. Whereas the patrons in Trinity are 
FRQÀQHGWRRXUHPSLULFDOVSDFHH[FOXGHGIURPWKHVSDFHRIWKH7ULQLW\EH\RQGLQWKHPesaro 
Altarpiece Bishop Jacopo Pesaro is being presented to the Virgin (as in votive images), and 
is thus incorporated into the inner narrative. This is no longer our revelation. While we are 
not excluded as such, the work is dictated to a far greater extent by the internal logic of its 
narrative. 
While the Pesaro Altarpiece FRQIRUPVWRPDQ\DVSHFWVRIWKHÀUVWRIP\WZRPRGHVRI
situated relationships, the work’s (relative) independence from its host architecture, and 
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the more peripheral involvement of the external spectator, places it at the mode’s limits. 
The loss of spatial continuity, implied by the acentric perspective, suggests a blurring of the 
engagement afforded an internal or external spectator. While it still can be said to activate 
our physical space in terms of registering our direction of arrival, in Riegl’s terms the work’s 
external coherence is dependent upon (or at least mediated by) a highly resolved internal 
coherence. What this fails to register, however, is the accompanying shift from an implied 
external spectator, directly addressed as a physical presence or witness standing within the 
DFWXDOVSDFHRIWKHFKXUFKWRZDUGVDQLGHQWLÀFDWLRQZLWKDQLQWHUQDOVSHFWDWRULQWHUQDOWR
the virtual space of the painting, and absorbed into the complexity of the work’s narrative 
content. In a sense, the role of the Bishop is a precursor of the internal spectator (or, rather, 
an attenuated version of the internal spectator); while he is represented within the painted 
scene, we imaginatively identify with his position as an equivalent to the kneeling position 
we might have formerly have adopted as an external spectator in front of a Bellini Sacra 
conversazione. And yet we are simultaneously engaged by the young Niccolò Pesaro. 
The Titian stands at the cusp of two different modes of engagement. The compromise 
is registered in the not altogether convincing integration of the donors into the work’s 
ÀFWLYHVSDFH%LVKRS-DFRSR3HVDURZKLOHLQWHJUDWHGLQWRWKHZRUN·VQDUUDWLYHWKURXJKDQ
H[FKDQJHRIJODQFHVLVVWLOOSDLQWHGIURQWDOO\LQSURÀOHDVWDWLFFRXQWHUSDUWWRWKHWZLVWLQJ
WKUHHGLPHQVLRQDOLW\ RI WKH PDLQ SURWDJRQLVWV 7KH IURQW ÀJXUH RI WKH IDPLO\ JURXS RQ
WKH ULJKW $QWRQLR 3HVDUR OLNHZLVH IHHOV LVRODWHG KLV LQWHJUDWLRQ LQWR WKH ÀFWLYH VSDFH
incomplete. The two primary donors thus hover between being integrated into the narrative, 
and anachronistic relics of an earlier (but by no means inferior) Florentine tradition where 
the patrons belong to ‘our’ world, the real space of the church. If I am right to contend that 
Riegl fails to adequately distinguish between the different kind of engagements afforded 
by internal and external spectators, to which I will return, then I would offer the Pesaro 
Altarpiece as evidence of Titian’s extraordinary inventive but ultimately compromised 
attempt to reconcile the two.
6.
7KHÀQDODOWDUSLHFH,FRQVLGHUDJDLQFUHDWHVDWHQVLRQEHWZHHQDQLPSOLHGVSDWLDOFRQWLQXLW\
and a rather extraordinary spatial separation. Giovanni Bellini’s San Crisostomo Altarpiece 
(St Jerome with SS Christopher and Louis of Toulouse ÀJ  LV WKH SDLQWLQJ ZLWK ZKLFK
Wollheim chose to conclude Painting as an Art (1987). The painted architecture implies a 
strongly felt continuity between the space of the front two saints and that of the church; 
in a tacit acknowledgement of this fact, Wollheim refers to an ‘architecturalization of a 
ODUJH]RQHRIWKHSDLQWLQJ·ZKHUHE\WKHÁDQNLQJVDLQWVDUHLQDUHFLSURFDOUROHZLWKWKH
DUFKLWHFWXUHS%\FRQWUDVWWKHORFDWLRQRI6W-HURPHGHSLFWHGZLWKLQWKHZLOGHUQHVV
lacks spatiotemporal markers relative to the viewer. Wollheim notes how this ‘assimilation 
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Fig. 16    Giovanni Bellini: St Jerome with SS Christopher and Louis of Toulouse (1513), San Giovanno 
Crisostomo, Venice.
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RIWKHWZRÁDQNLQJVDLQWVWRDUFKLWHFWXUDOPHPEHUVRIDVWUXFWXUDOVRUW·WKHQ¶FROOXGHVZLWK
a powerful Belliniesque, here carried to new lengths: the compression of space’ (p. 354). In a 
wonderful observation, borne out by my own experience in front of the painting, Wollheim 
notes how that part of the painting behind the enclosing wall, the section containing St 
Jerome, ‘eases itself forward’ (p. 354). 
But Wollheim rather surprisingly fails to mention Bellini’s innovative use of late 
afternoon light to suggest a spatial continuity (perhaps because it threatens Wollheim’s 
QRWLRQRISDLQWLQJSUHVHQWLQJDVHOIFRQWDLQHGZRUOG$WWKLVWLPHRIGD\WKHOLJKWHQWHULQJ
the chapel, from the window immediately to the right of the painting, is consistent with the 
SDLQWHGOLJKWDQGUHDOO\GRHVVHHPWRFDVWWKHSDLQWHGVKDGRZVWKDWUHLQIRUFHWKHÀJXUDO
SUHVHQFH RI WKH WZR ÁDQNLQJ VDLQWV 7KLV LV SDUWLFXODUO\ QRWLFHDEOH ZLWK WKH YHUWLFDO
shadow cast by St Christopher’s staff, a feature that supports Wollheim’s notion of the 
work’s architecturalization. And yet, simultaneously, the warm light unites the three 
saints, ‘in spite of their isolation’, in ‘a shared contemplative mood’ (Goffen 1989, p. 
186). It is an astonishing reconciliation of two very distinct relationships, one reinforcing 
a spatiotemporal continuity that insists upon the ‘here and now’, one insisting upon a 
disjunction between realms.
7.
(DUOLHU LQ WKLV FKDSWHU , QRWHG D VLPLODULW\ EHWZHHQ %U\VRQ·V ÀUVW $OEHUWLDQ HSRFK RI
perspective, and the kind of relationship between artwork and beholder implied by an 
external spectator. The relationship I now describe has something in common with Bryson’s 
notion of the second (culminatory) epoch of perspective (1983, ch. 5). According to Bryson, 
these works are inadvertent: ‘the spectator is an unexpected presence’ and ‘nothing in 
WKHVFHQHDUUDQJHVLWVHOIDURXQG>WKHYLHZHU·V@DFWRILQVSHFWLRQ·S8QOLNHWKHÀUVW
relationship, the viewer is excluded as a direct ‘physical’ presence. As Bryson argues of 
Vermeer’s The Artist in his Studio ÀJ
The perception is presented to the viewer to examine from his own position – he is not being invited 
WRPRYHXSWRDYLHZÀQGHURUVWHSLQVLGHWKHSHUFHSWLRQWKHUHLVDQDV\PPHWU\EHWZHHQWKHRULJLQDO
perception, recorded in the image, and the act of viewing. Trompe l’oeil is in fact renounced: the bond 
with the viewer’s physique is broken, and the viewing subject is now proposed and assumed as a 
QRWLRQDOSRLQWDQRQHPSLULFDO*D]HS
Now despite apparent similarities to my position, I would contest a number of aspects 
of Bryson’s argument. While the scene Vermeer presents may not cohere around the 
beholder in the manner of Masaccio, I would argue that Bryson fails to register that this 
second mode of viewing represents not so much a subjective advance as a fundamentally 
new notion of the nature of the viewer: a beholder who is now conceived as internal to 
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the virtual world.18 Bryson’s proposition that ‘the spectator is an unexpected presence’ 
VKRXOG EH UHFRQÀJXUHG WR UHDG WKH external spectator is an unexpected presence. While 
with the Vermeer the bond with the viewer’s physique is undoubtedly broken, the work 
QHYHUWKHOHVVGRHVQRWSUHFOXGHDSUHVHQFH LQWHUQDO WR LWVZRUOG7KLV LVGHVSLWH WKHVHOI
VXIÀFLHQF\ RI WKH VFHQH DQG WKH GHSLFWHG DUWLVW·V HYLGHQW DEVRUSWLRQ LQ KLV DFWLYLW\ $V
Edward Snow writes:
[I]nstead of  rejecting us by coolly insisting on our visibility, the painting now peels back its tapestry 
DVLIIRURXUEHQHÀWDQGHYHQSURYLGHVDFKDLUIRURXULQYLVLEOHSUHVHQFHZLWKLQWKLVVHOIVXUURXQGHG
scene – in a place that is reserved for us as viewer, not someone still driven by a nostalgia for 
vicarious participation. (1994, p. 141)
1RZZHSHUKDSVQHHGWRGHÀQH6QRZ·VQRWLRQRI¶DSODFHWKDWLVUHVHUYHGIRUXVas viewer’; 
WKHSRWHQWLDOYLHZIURPWKHFKDLULVFOHDUO\GLIIHUHQWIURPWKDWDIIRUGHGE\DQLGHQWLÀFDWLRQ
with a viewer occupying the work’s depiction point. Nevertheless, if the work does not 
directly imply a spectator in the picture in Wollheim’s strict terms, I believe that Snow is 
right to suggest that what it does do is invite, as it were, the external beholder to identify 
with an unrepresented internal spectator who might, contrary to Bryson, potentially step 
inside the perception. Not that part depicted as being in front of the picture surface, but into 
the virtual world itself.
+DYLQJ VDLG WKLV E\ QR PHDQV DOO VHYHQWHHQWKFHQWXU\ 'XWFK ZRUNV H[FOXGH WKH
external beholder. Rembrandt’s The Syndics ÀJRUThe Anatomy Lesson of Dr. Tulp ÀJ
Fig. 17    Rembrandt: The Syndics (1662), Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.
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18), for instance, might legitimately be seen as engaging an external spectator. Puttfarken 
has emphasized how the sense of presence in The Syndics is HVWDEOLVKHGWKURXJKOLIHVL]H
scale and the ‘psychologically charged and undeniably communicative glance out of the 
SLFWXUHE\DOO WKHÀJXUHV· S'HVSLWHWKHIDFW WKDW WKHVHZRUNVDUHQRWVWULFWO\
integrated into their architectural contexts in the manner of Italian altarpieces, they are 
FRPPLVVLRQHG IRU VSHFLÀF ORFDWLRQV DQG IRU DQWLFLSDWHG YLHZHUV ,QGHHG 5LHJO·V The 
Dutch Group Portrait (1999) catalogues a number of works that have an external coherence 
completed by the presence of what might be referred to as an external beholder, but one 
who is increasingly invited to engage with the internal scene. As noted earlier, Riegl argues 
that Rembrandt founds his external coherence on a fully resolved inner unity, dependent 
upon subordination (p. 253). Riegl regards the animated physical gestures of the earlier 
The Anatomy Lesson of Dr Tulp as introducing too strong a sense of ‘the psychological 
expressions of will and emotion’ for the demands of a group portrait (p. 258). But with The 
Syndics, the solution to the problem of group portraiture has, for Riegl, been found, in that 
¶WKHÀJXUHVFKDUJHGZLWKHVWDEOLVKLQJLQWHUQDOFRKHUHQFHDUHWKHVDPHRQHVUHVSRQVLEOHIRU
H[WHUQDOFRKHUHQFHZKLFKLVQRZSHUIHFWO\VSHFLÀFLQWLPHDQGVSDFH·S,WGHSLFWVD
single moment of time that is instigated by the viewer’s physical arrival at the scene.
Christiane Hertel notes of The Syndics: ‘the gentleman on the left is already in the 
process of getting up to greet me, speak to me, or accept the message or refreshments I 
Fig. 18    Rembrandt: The Anatomy Lesson of Dr Tulp (1632), Mauritshuis, The Hague.
99
bring on a tray. Any one of these possibilities is already part of the painting’s story, in 
that Rembrandt has included the man’s reaction to the interruption’ (1996, p. 54). Now, 
JLYHQWKHDSSDUHQWFRPSOH[LW\RIWKHHPRWLRQVRIWKHÀJXUHVWKDWDGGUHVVXVLWLVKLJKO\
unlikely that the interruption is one of refreshments. Indeed, the work has encouraged 
endless anecdotal speculation as to the nature of the exchange.19 And yet it is certainly the 
case that compared to our somewhat peripheral role as bystander in the Anatomy Lesson, in 
The Syndics we play a far more active role in initiating such a response. 
With both works, Rembrandt extends what Riegl would describe as a commonality to 
include the viewer as an implied yet external presence. Contrary to Wollheim’s argument 
in Painting as an Art SSZKHUHKHFODLPVWKHLPSOLHGYLHZHURIVXFKZRUNV
as a spectator in the picture, the reactive responses of the ‘unrepresented spectator in their 
midst’ (p. 181) is anticipated by these paintings’ institutional contexts. The spectator’s 
SV\FKRORJLFDOUHSHUWRLUHLVGHWHUPLQHGDWOHDVWLQSDUWE\WKHVSHFLÀFLW\RIWKHLURULJLQDO
contexts. With The Syndics, this was the Staalhof, where the Staalmeesters of the Clothmaker’s 
Guild met. That Riegl fails to distinguish between internal and external beholders perhaps 
follows on from his exclusive focus on such commissioned group portraits, painted for 
VSHFLÀF VLWHV DQG DXGLHQFHV ZKHUH UROHV RI LQWHUQDO DQG H[WHUQDO VSHFWDWRUV LQHYLWDEO\
PHUJH<HWKHGRHVUHJLVWHUDGLVWLQFWLYHVKLIWLQWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQZRUNDQGYLHZHU
which he argues represents a shift from subordination to coordination. In a key passage 
with respect to Frans Hals’s The Regents of Saint Elizabeth’s HospitalÀJ5LHJOZULWHVRI
WKHQHHGWRSV\FKRORJLFDOO\DQDO\VHHDFKÀJXUH
Fig. 19    Frans Hals: The Regents of Saint Elizaboeth’s Hospital (1641), City Museum, Haarlem.
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As a result of this intense process that viewing subjects are expected to undergo and that makes 
demands on their whole conscious experience, they become so intimately implicated in the inner 
workings of the scene, so deeply invested, so to speak, in the reality of what is happening there, 
that what began as an external incident becomes an inner experience. In short, this is the pictorial 
FRQFHSWLRQRIWKHJHQUHSDLQWLQJRIVHYHQWHHQWKFHQWXU\+ROODQG«>WKDWKDV@RXWJURZQWKHGHYLFH
RIKDYLQJÀJXUHVGLUHFWO\DGGUHVVWKHYLHZHU7KHDUWLVWVHVSRXVLQJWKLVEUDQGRISLFWRULDOFRQFHSWLRQ
no longer thought it necessary to make a special effort to draw the viewer’s attention to the existence 
of the viewing subject outside the objective world of the painting. (1999, p. 344)
 
Despite the now questionable implication of artistic progress, this wonderfully insightful 
passage charts a decisive shift towards an internalisation of the experience of viewing. 
In Vermeer’s A Girl Interrupted at her Music ÀJ  WKH LQVWLWXWLRQDOO\ DQWLFLSDWHG
interruption of The Syndics is transformed into an interruption which is now undoubtedly 
entirely internal to the scene. As Hertel notes: ‘The reception of genre paintings bears witness 
that in them painting and its contemplation have lost their commonality, have become two 
private activities dissociated from a common history and a public culture’ (1996, p. 54). 
There is a shift toward what Puttfarken terms easel painting. But before exploring the 
nature of this shift for the implied spectator, I raise a fundamental distinction that is rarely 
acknowledged. The distinction is between: (i) works such as Trinity and The Syndics, where 
the external viewer as an anticipated presence within an institutional context has been 
drawn, as it were, into the inner world of the painting (in the former retaining an awareness 
of the surrounding architecture); and (ii) works where the viewing subject, while directly 
Fig. 20    Gerard Dou: Self-Portrait with Book and Pipe (c. 1650), Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.
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addressed, remains resolutely outsideRIWKHÀFWLRQDOZRUOGSDLQWLQJSUHVHQWVDV5LHJOSXWV
it, ‘outside the objective world of the painting’ (p. 344).
If we now return to Maes’s London The Eavesdropper ÀJWKLVLVDZRUNWKDWZHPLJKW
recall engages the beholder of the painting rather than an implied presence in the painting, 
setting up precise limits to our implied participation through the use of the painted curtain. 
:LWK0DHV·VZRUN WKLV HQJDJHPHQW LV FRQÀUPHGE\ WKHSUHVHQFHRIZKDW/RXLV0DULQ
ZRXOGUHIHUWRDVD¶ÀJXUHRIWKHIUDPH·SDQLQWHUQDOÀJXUHDOLJQHGZLWKWKH
work’s boundary, who ‘theatrically’ draws our attention to the narrative content.20 This 
work creates a tension between the two modes of imaginative engagement, and embraces a 
trompe l’oeil element as an integral aspect of the imaginative experience. A similar example 
is presented by Gerard Dou’s Self-Portrait with Book and Pipe ÀJDZRUNZKLFKOLNHZLVH
incorporates a trompe l’oeil curtain. Here the uncertainty between the ‘illusory’ status of the 
FXUWDLQDQGWKHÀFWLYHVSDFHEH\RQGLVUHLQIRUFHGE\WKHSUHVHQFHRIWKHDUWLVWDXWKRURI
the conceit, within the scene. The curtain, again painted as if in front of the picture plane, 
entices the external spectator to pull it back further in order to reveal more of the ‘painting 
ZLWKLQDSDLQWLQJ·7KHFXUWDLQLQVLVWVXSRQWKHYHU\ÁDWQHVVRIWKHSLFWXUHLWSDUW¶FRQFHDOV·
To repeat an argument made earlier, this direct appeal to our participation is not, I believe, 
necessarily dependent upon us being ‘fooled’, but upon our imaginative engagement as 
DQH[WHUQDOVSHFWDWRUZKRVHVSDFHKDVEHHQHQJDJHGZLWKLQOLPLWVGHÀQHGDQGVWUXFWXUHG
E\WKHZRUN7KHVFHQH ¶EHKLQG· LVH[SHULHQFHGYHU\GLIIHUHQWO\6PDOOHU WKDQ OLIHVL]HG
)LJ-HDQ%DSWLVWH6LPpRQ&KDUGLQThe House of Cards (c. 1737), National Gallery of Art, 
Washington.
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LW SUHVHQWV WKH ÀFWLRQ RI WKH DUWLVW OHDQLQJ LQWR ¶RXU· VSDFH IURP DQ DUFKHG QLFKH %XW
while the strong shadows cast by the painter and his precariously balanced book imply 
an encroachment into the space of the viewer, this typical trompe l’oeil device (unlike the 
drape) no longer encroaches upon the ‘real’ space of the external beholder (it lies ‘behind’ 
the curtain), but is presented as an extension of the virtual space of the inner painting. The 
ZRUNVHWVXSDSHUFHSWXDODQGLPDJLQDWLYHFRQÁLFWDVWKHYLHZHUVKLIWVEHWZHHQWZRPRGHV
of implied spectatorship that are ultimately irreconcilable.21 
)ULHG ZRXOG ZLWK VRPH MXVWLÀFDWLRQ GHVLJQDWH VXFK D UHODWLRQ WR WKH EHKROGHU DV
theatrical. But in granting Fried this designation, I want to again stress that it is a relation 
that is quite distinct from works such as Masaccio’s Trinity or Bellini’s San Giobbe 
AltarpieceGHVSLWHWKHVLPLODUUROHDOORFDWHGWR0DU\RU6W)UDQFLVDV¶ÀJXUHVRIWKHIUDPH·
implicating us within the scene presented. These paintings ally their structure to content 
in a way whereby the internal and external spectators fuse, without ever losing sight of 
WKHVLJQLÀFDQFHRIWKHSLFWXUH·VVXUIDFHDVWKUHVKROG%\FRQWUDVWZLWK0DHV·VDQG'RX·V
works not only do these roles refuse to merge, but – quite to the contrary – they are meant 
to be experienced as mutually exclusive: in denying painting’s depth, they draw attention 
Fig. 22    Gerard ter Borch: Curiosity (c. 1660), 7KH0HWURSROLWDQ0XVHXPRI$UW1HZ<RUN.
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WRWKHÀFWLRQDOQDWXUHRIWKHVFHQHDQGWRRXUHIIHFWLYHH[FOXVLRQ,WZRXOGVHHPWKDWZH
are required to distinguish not only between internal and external spectators, but between 
divergent roles for the external beholder.
We are now in a position to begin to clarify an important aspect of the argument. 
If, as Margaret Iversen notes, ‘the most innovative aspect of the Dutch Group Portrait is 
undoubtedly the explicit theoretical formulation of a kind of composition that presents 
only part of what constitutes its totality and, so to speak, reaches out to the spectator to 
complete the scene’ (1993, p. 127), then we need to (i) acknowledge that this role can be 
performed by either internal or external beholders, and (ii) distinguish between those 
external beholders who, while drawing the experience of the surrounding architecture into 
the imaginative engagement, are nevertheless merged with the implied internal spectator, 
and external beholders engaged precisely as external presences.
The latter distinction has particular relevance to Fried’s position. In Absorption and 
Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot)ULHGUHFRUGVKRZLQPLGHLJKWHHQWK
FHQWXU\)UDQFHWKHSUHVHQFHRIDEHKROGHULVÀUVWWKHRULVHGDVEHLQJSUREOHPDWLFS
7KXV)ULHGZULWHVRIJHQUHZRUNVVXFKDVWKRVHE\&KDUGLQÀJ
>7@KHSHUVXDVLYHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIDEVRUSWLRQHQWDLOHGHYRNLQJWKHSHUIHFWREOLYLRXVQHVVRIDÀJXUH
RUJURXSRIÀJXUHVWRHYHU\WKLQJEXWWKHREMHFWVRIWKHLUDEVRUSWLRQ7KHVHREMHFWVGLGQRWLQFOXGH
WKHEHKROGHUVWDQGLQJEHIRUHWKHSDLQWLQJ+HQFHWKHÀJXUHRUÀJXUHVKDGWRVHHPREOLYLRXVWRWKH
beholder’s presence if the illusion of absorption was to be sustained. (p. 66)
Fried has been rightly criticised by Wollheim for failing to distinguish here between the 
H[WHUQDODQGWKHLQWHUQDOVSHFWDWRUSS$VZHKDYHQRWHGWKHGHSLFWLRQSRLQW
is internal to the virtual world of the painting – it does not correspond with the beholder 
standing before the painting, unless it has been integrated into the host architecture. But 
we need to now further distinguish between divergent roles for the external beholder. 
Some external spectators are drawn into the virtual world painting presents as participants, 
while retaining both an awareness of the metaphysical distinction implied by a picture’s 
surface, and of their positioning in real space. Others, more passively, are external to the 
world of painting presented as ÀFWLRQ
/HWXVFRPSDUHWZRJHQUHZRUNVZKHUHDÀJXUHZLWKLQWKHVFHQHGLUHFWO\DGGUHVVHVD
spectator. Gerard ter Borch’s Curiosity (as Peter C. Sutton notes, a later eighteenth century 
¶DQHFGRWDOL]LQJWLWOH·SSUHVHQWVWKUHHÀJXUHVSOXVDQHTXDOO\¶FXULRXV·VSDQLHO
ÀJ7KHZRPDQRQWKHULJKW¶OHDQVRYHUWKHOHWWHUZULWHU·VVKRXOGHU·VRPXFKVRWKDW
‘her irrepressible interest in the letter writer’s response to the unsealed missive prompts 
her to lean precariously over the chairback’ (Sutton 1984, p. 149). I would contend that the 
HOHJDQWO\DWWLUHGZRPDQRQWKHOHIWORRNLQJRXWZDUGHQJDJHVQRWDQXQUHSUHVHQWHGÀJXUH
internal to the work, but the curiosity of a beholder external to the scene. As an onlooker (a 
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GLUHFWFRXQWHUSDUWRIWKHÀJXUHVWUDLQLQJIRUZDUGZLWKLQWKHÀFWLRQZHDUH¶LQYLWHG·E\WKH
PHGLDWLQJÀJXUHRQWKHOHIWWRVSHFXODWHDVWRWKHFRQWHQWRIWKHOHWWHUWKXVFRPSOHWLQJWKH
work’s narrative, not as an intrinsic participant but as an addressed (external) audience. 
:KLOHWKLVZRUNRPLWV0DHV·VSDLQWHGFXUWDLQWKHPHGLDWLQJÀJXUHFRQWLQXHVWRSOD\PXFK
the same role as the maid in the London Eavesdropper. We are simultaneously engaged but 
H[FOXGHGWKHZRUN¶VWDJHG·IRURXUEHQHÀWGUDZLQJDWWHQWLRQWRLWVÀFWLRQDODQGHVVHQWLDOO\
anecdotal nature.
By contrast, and despite the striking similarity of subject matter, Vermeer’s A Lady 
Writing a LetterÀJWUDQVIRUPVWHU%RUFK·VDQHFGRWDOFXULRVLW\LQWRDSV\FKRORJLFDOO\
intense reciprocity between the woman interrupted and an unrepresented presence: a 
presence who is internal to the virtual world of the painting. With great skill, this presence 
is acknowledged as someone who is familiar, perhaps even intimate with the woman. 
Here, the gender of the implied (as opposed to external) beholder arguably becomes an 
issue. The subtlety of this reciprocal contact, and the heightening of its psychological effect, 
is gained by identifying with the unrepresented presence within the work, a reciprocity 
over and above what is gained by perception unaided. Regardless of stylistic differences 
between the works, there is a gulf between the remoteness of ter Borch’s staged scene 
and the restrained intimacy of the Vermeer.22 If the former relation might legitimately 
be described as theatrical, this is decidedly not the case with the latter, despite its direct 
engagement of a beholder.23
Fig. 23    Johannes Vermeer: A Girl Interrupted at her 
Music F7KH)ULFN&ROOHFWLRQ1HZ<RUN
Fig. 24    Johannes Vermeer: The Love Letter F
Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.
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8.
The genre works now being discussed are typically smaller, more intimate works on 
panel or canvas, where the continuum between the pictorial space and the spectator’s 
space is broken, and the viewer stands in a space other than the space of representation. As 
Puttfarken has shown in ‘Scale and Presence’ (2000, ch. 5), this issue of scale is not without 
VLJQLÀFDQFH 6XFK ZRUNV DUH QR ORQJHU LQWHJUDWHG LQWR WKHLU DUFKLWHFWXUDO VXUURXQGLQJV
rather, the virtual world inside the frame has been separated out from the real world of the 
EHKROGHU7KHIUDPLQJSUHVHQWLQJDZRUOGLVRODWHGIURPWKDWRIWKHEHKROGHULVOHVVVHOI
contained, in the sense that, as in contemporary photographs, objects are often abruptly cut 
into at the picture’s edges, and the positioning of the vanishing point is seemingly arbitrary. 
7KHUH LV QRW WKH SURFHVVLRQDO GHPDQGV RI ,WDOLDQ DOWDUSLHFHV 7KH SUHH[LVWLQJ ÀFWLRQDO
world continues beyond the bounding frame; this world is temporally removed from the 
conditions of the spectator (although we can access this world through an imaginative 
LGHQWLÀFDWLRQ$V$OSHUVQRWHVWKLVLV¶DSULRUZRUOGVHHQ·SS
In an important insight, Wolfgang Kemp contends that ‘the behavior of the beholder 
is also decisively stimulated by the way in which the artistic scene or action is depicted, in 
its cropping, its details, its fragments’ (1998, p. 188). This is true of many genre works, but 
is particularly so of paintings implying an internal spectator as part of their content. Kemp 
DUJXHVWKDWWKHQRWLRQRISDLQWLQJFRQFHLYHGDVDIUDJPHQWKDVRQO\LQWHQVLÀHGVLQFHWKH
seventeenth century, when painters became interested in the possibilities of such a ‘radical 
cutting into a presumed preexistent reality’ (p. 188). But this also has consequences beyond 
internal spectatorship. Kemp goes on to argue:
Though completing the incompleted might be one way of beholding a painting, it remains the case 
WKDWHYHU\DUWLVWLFDFWLYLW\HQWDLOVGUDZLQJDERUGHUDQGGHÀQLQJLWVHOIE\ZKDWLWKDVH[FOXGHG,IWKH
selection of the painted ‘fragment’ is recognized as an intersubjective strategy, then so too must be the 
FODVVLÀFDWLRQRIWKHUHDOPRIWKHYLVLEOHDFFRUGLQJWRFDWHJRULHVVXFKDVH[SRVLWLRQYHUVXVREVWUXFWLRQ
accessibility versus inaccessibility. This process depends on whether objects are demonstrably 
revealed to or hidden from their beholder, whether they let themselves be observed or deliberately 
elude visibility, just like everything that exists outside the boundaries of the painting. (p. 188)
7KLV VXJJHVWV WKDW ZH SHUKDSV VKRXOG QRW GUDZ WRR GHÀQLWLYH D OLQH EHWZHHQ WKH
VLJQLÀFDQFH RI ZRUNV HQJDJLQJ DQ LQWHUQDO VSHFWDWRU DQG WKRVH WKDW DUH FRPSOHWHG E\
other, related means. Vermeer is particularly pertinent to this argument, in that he creates 
a subtle range of works where internal beholders are directly or indirectly acknowledged, 
ignored, denied as a presence, or simply unregistered. This is not an all or nothing affair.
We have already noted how such a presence is directly acknowledged in A Lady 
Writing a LetterÀJDQGWKHSRWHQWLDOWRHQWHUWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOVSDFH implied but 
unacknowledged in The Artist in his Studio ÀJ2XULQWUXVLRQLVUHJLVWHUHGZLWKVRPH
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Fig. 25    Johannes Vermeer: Soldier and Laughing Girl 
F7KH)ULFN&ROOHFWLRQ1HZ<RUN
Fig. 26    Johannes Vermeer: Guitar Player (c. 1672), 
Kenwood House, Lord Iveagh Bequest, London.
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embarrassment in A Girl Interrupted at her Music ÀJZKLOHLWJRHVFRPSOHWHO\XQQRWLFHG
in The Love LetterÀJ,QDZRUNVXFKDVSoldier and Laughing GirlÀJRXUSUHVHQFH
is effectively excluded by the posture taken up by the man in the foreground (in contrast 
to the woman’s apparent openness). In the Kenwood Guitar PlayerÀJRXUSUHVHQFHLV
ignored despite our very proximity, the women rapturously caught up in an exchange with 
DÀJXUHORFDWHGRIIVFHQHDQGWRRXUOHIW24 Frustration, perhaps even jealousy, ensues.  
Fried documents one absorptive strategy that both Vermeer and Chardin employ to 
VXJJHVWWKHREOLYLRXVQHVVRIWKHGHSLFWHGÀJXUHWRDQ\WKLQJRWKHUWKDQWKHREMHFWRIWKHLU
internal absorption:  
But Chardin’s genre paintings, like Vermeer before him, go much further than that. By a technical feat 
ZKLFKYLUWXDOO\GHÀHVDQDO\VLV²WKRXJKRQHZULWHUKDVUHPDUNHGKHOSIXOO\RQ&KDUGLQ·VFKDUDFWHULVWLF
choice of ‘a natural pause in the action which, we feel, will recommence a moment later’ [Châtelet 
1964, p. 204] – they come close to translating literal duration, the actual passage of time as one stands 
before the canvas, into a purely pictorial effect: as if the very stability and unchangingness of the 
painted image are perceived by the beholder not as material properties that could not be otherwise 
but as manifestations of an absorptive state – the image’s absorption in itself, so to speak – that only 
KDSSHQVWRVXEVLVWSS
We might think of quite a number of Vermeer paintings that capture such a pause in time, 
such as A Woman in Blue Reading a Letter ÀJRUA Woman Holding a Balance ÀJ
3HUKDSV WKLV UHÁHFWV9HUPHHU·VRZQGHWDFKPHQW DGHWDFKPHQW WKDWSHUVLVWVGHVSLWHRU
even because of, an unprecedented intimacy). As Gowing writes:
Fig. 27    Johannes Vermeer: A Woman in Blue Reading a 
Letter F5LMNVPXVHXP$PVWHUGDP
Fig. 28    Johannes Vermeer: A Woman Holding a Balance 
F1DWLRQDO*DOOHU\RI$UW:DVKLQJWRQ
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(\HVQHYHUPHHW LQ9HUPHHUDFWLRQ LV VWLOOHG7KHUH LVQRVSHHFK WKHVHDOPRVWXQPRYLQJÀJXUHV
communicate by letter or on the keyboards of virginals. It is as if they were meditating on the barriers 
ZKLFKOLHEHWZHHQWKHP:HPD\IDQF\WKDWWKHLUUHODWLRQVUHÁHFWDQRWKHUEHWZHHQWKHPDQGWKHLU
painter. (1997, p. 26) 25
 
1HYHUWKHOHVVFRQWUDU\WRWKHWKUXVWRI)ULHG·VEULOOLDQWEXWRQHVLGHG'LGHURWLDQSRVLWLRQ
on the exclusion of the beholder, Vermeer alternates between highly differentiated strategies 
that either engage or negate the viewer as a presence. This differentiation is consistent with 
the demands of each painting. What is interesting to note here, and is acknowledged by 
both Fried and Wollheim, is that the claims ‘to the effect that the spectator of the picture 
could have been part of the content of the picture’ arise in relation to the efforts of the artist 
WR ¶H[FOXGH KLP· DV D SUHVHQFH :ROOKHLP  S  ,W VHHPV WKDW IDU IURP GHÀQLQJ
mutually exclusive strategies, the one implies the possibility of the other.
With this in mind, let us return to a work referred to earlier, Vermeer’s The Music 
Lesson ÀJ*RZLQJ·VREVHUYDWLRQDERXW9HUPHHU·VGHWDFKPHQWZDVQHYHU WUXHU WKDQ
with this work, manifest in the psychologically charged distance that separates the man 
and woman. The even greater distance between the couple and the work’s depiction point 
is accentuated by Vermeer’s familiar barriers, such as the table, chair and discarded viola da 
gamba. Snow refers to the works ‘cavernous space’, and of ‘a charged interval not directly 
bridged’ (1994, p. 104). And yet he argues that the work realises ‘the sense of intimate 
access to the human content of the scene, not only in spite of but as a function of the remote 
perspective that suspends life in images’ (p. 112). 
The complexity of these relations is focused by the role Vermeer assigns the mirror 
ÀJDGHYLFHWKDWGUDZVXVLQWRWKHVFHQH·VUHFLSURFLW\GHVSLWHRXUYHU\UHDOVHQVHRI
exclusion, manifest as a felt absence. Thus Snow writes:
But to leave the central relationship here would be to ignore the part played by the mirror, which 
mediates along with the virginal, and causes the image to portray something different from the 
pathos of abject or unrequited love. The man may be depicted as isolated in his desire, gazing with 
feelings he keeps secret at a woman he assumes to be his object, and who in turn conspires to seem 
so, equally isolated herself by keeping her awareness of his gazing to herself … But the mirror 
FRQVWUXFWVDGLIIHUHQWUHODWLRQVKLS5HÁHFWHGLQLWWKHZRPDQEHFRPHVDviewer, gazing unseen across 
one threshold toward a man who gazes similarly across another threshold toward her real presence. 
(p. 114)
,Q WKH PLUURU WKH UHÁHFWLRQ RI WKH ZRPDQ LV VXEWO\ PDQLSXODWHG E\ 9HUPHHU WR
emphasize an implied twist already apparent in her head and neck: the mirrored woman 
turns noticeably towards the man. In a key observation, Snow goes on to suggest that the 
mirror ‘reads more convincingly as a projection of her inner, otherwise unexpressed aspect 
– of what she might be thinking, of how she would like to gaze – than as a straightforward 
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UHÁHFWLRQRIKHUORRN·S$QGLWLVWKHH[WUHPHDQJOLQJRIWKHPLUURUDZD\IURPWKH
wall, made apparent by Philip Steadman’s reconstructions of the painting (2001, ch. 5), 
which allows Vermeer to reveal the woman’s look.26 And yet it is also the angled mirror 
that doubles up to reveal signs of Vermeer’s activities as a painter – it acknowledges our 
viewpoint while negating any suggestion of an actual presence (Vermeer’s, or that of an 
internal viewer). Our ‘palpable’ absence is compensated by a privileged access to the 
woman’s inner world, what Puttfarken would refer to as a rewarded position. Our physical 
presence is replaced by an unprecedented psychological reciprocity, independent of our 
DFWXDOSUHVHQFH7KLVLPDJLQDWLYHLGHQWLÀFDWLRQZLWKWKHZRPDQSURYLGHGE\WKHPLUURU
LVDVXUURJDWHIRUWKHNLQGRILPDJLQDWLYHLGHQWLÀFDWLRQZHDUHRIIHUHGE\RWKHU9HUPHHUV
as an internal spectator, a spectator in the painting.
Two Modes of Situated Relationship
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3 Conduit is a site-speciic work that was installed at the M2 Gallery in Peckham, 
London. The gallery comprises of a square recessed opening set into the front 
of a building designed by Quay 2c architects. Conduit places a lat metal plate, 
900mm2, immediately behind the glass of the window opening, into which a thin, 
horizontal slot is deeply recessed. The slanting sides create a false perspective with 
an asymmetrically placed ‘vanishing point’. The work constitutes the equivalent 
of an ‘Albertian window’, the steel plate corresponding to an intersection. At the 
rear of this slotted space is a looped video image of a diminutive igure, framed 
by the space but di cult to place in depth. The prone igure is static, the only 
movement being the regular rhythm of his breath. Viewable for the twenty-four 
hours the gallery is open, he seemingly shares the immediate time-frame of the 
viewer while being suspended in time. Overlaid onto this very public encounter 
of the igure is the viewer’s own relection, and the complex relections of the 
street. These are apparent even during the day, the steel plate efectively 
transforming much of the opening into a mirror. Yet as the viewer presses her 
nose to the glass, the street recedes and another, seemingly imaginary space 
opens up. Removed from ‘real’ space, this space is devoid of visual clues as to 
depth or scale, a displaced space onto which the viewer is invited to project her 
own response to the encounter with the distant igure.
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Las Meninas
A kind of reciprocity, then: as if we on this side of the canvas and the nine characters in it were too 
closely engaged with each other to be segregated by the divide of the picture plane. (Leo Steinberg 
1981, p. 50)
1.
Since Michel Foucault’s widely referenced account of the painting in The Order of Things 
SS9HOi]TXH]·VLas Meninas ÀJKDVFRQWLQXHGWRUDLVHFRPSOH[LVVXHV
about the nature of its particular point of view7KHZRUNKDVDSUHHPLQHQFHLQSKLORVRSKLFDO
GHEDWHVDERXWUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDQGVSHFWDWRUVKLS,QGHHGWKLVSUHHPLQHQFHLVVXFKWKDWLWLV
now almost obligatory to offer some kind of apology for adding to the already substantial 
literature on this single work. As Elkins notes in his book Why are our Pictures Puzzles? the 
literature on Las MeninasFRQWLQXHV¶WRVSLUDOZLWKUHDGLQJVEXLOGLQJRQFRXQWHUUHDGLQJV·
(1999, p. 40).1(ONLQVFLWHV:-70LWFKHOOZKRKDVFDOOHGWKHSDLQWLQJD¶PHWDPHWDSLFWXUH·
EHFDXVHLWLV¶DQHQGOHVVO\IDVFLQDWLQJODE\ULQWKRIUHÁHFWLRQVRQWKHUHODWLRQVRISDLQWLQJ
painter, model, and beholder’ (Mitchell 1994, p. 58; cited in Elkins 1999, p. 40). Elkins himself 
offers few answers to the question he raises, other than to note how ‘we are inescapably 
attracted to pictures that appear as puzzles, and unaccountably uninterested in clear 
meanings and manifest solutions’ (1999, p. 258). Perhaps an emphasis on ‘interpretation’ 
rather than the ‘experience’ of the work is part of the problem, inherent to the very notion 
RI WKH DQDORJ\ RI WKH ¶UHDGLQJ· RI SDLQWLQJV $OWKRXJK DV -RKQ 0RIÀWW VXJJHVWV WKLV LV
XQGRXEWHGO\DZRUNWKDWSURSRVHVWKHQRWLRQRISDLQWLQJDV¶LGHD·SSLWLV
also a work that builds the experience of arrival into its semantic content.
Despite such misgivings about adding to the literature, it would seem remiss of 
me to omit from my consideration such a work, not least because its inclusion offers 
an opportunity to test the arguments about the structuring role for imagination against 
D VRFDOOHG ¶GLIÀFXOW· ZRUN ,QGHHG Las Meninas has particular relevance here precisely 
because it might be seen to problematize the engagement afforded internal and external 
VSHFWDWRUV$V$OSHUVQRWHVWKH¶VL]HRIWKHÀJXUHVLVDPDWFKIRURXURZQ·S
and in this respect it has something in common with Dutch group portraits, such as 
Rembrandt’s The Syndics ÀJ,QGHHGZKLOHQRWUHIHUUHGWRE\5LHJOLQKLVGHÀQLWLYH
account of group portraiture, Iversen observes ‘it could be regarded as a demonstration 
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Fig. 29    Velázquez: Las Meninas (1656), Museo del Prado, Madrid.
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piece of his principles of coordination and external coherence’ (1993, p. 142). As we shall 
see, it likewise has an anticipated audience.
Las Meninas is, of course, a group portrait,2 at the centre of which is the Infanta 
Margarita, attended by two maids of honour (the meninas of the work’s title). As such, the 
work offers few ambiguities. But it is also a painting about visual representation: a concern 
manifest in Velázquez’s own conspicuous presence as artist within the depicted scene, 
looking outwards towards the implied viewer. In Foucault’s terms, it is a ‘representation 
as it were, of Classical representation’ (1974, p. 16). But Foucault’s account also famously 
HPSKDVLVHVWKDWLQ¶WKHGHÀQLWLRQRIWKHVSDFHLWRSHQVXSWRXV·WKHUHLVDQHVVHQWLDOYRLG
‘The very subject … has been elided’ (p. 16). Put simply, there is an absence of the very 
ÀJXUHVWKHJURXSKDYHDWOHDVWLQWHUPVRIWKHÀFWLRQSUHVHQWHGRVWHQVLEO\EHHQJDWKHUHG
IRU7KHUR\DOFRXSOHDSSHDURQO\DVDEOXUUHGSUHVHQFHLQWKHUHÁHFWLRQZLWKLQWKHPLUURU
SODFHGFHQWUDOO\RQWKHUHDUZDOO¶DUHÁHFWLRQWKDWVKRZVXVTXLWHVLPSO\DQGLQVKDGRZ
what all those in the foreground are looking at’ (p. 15). As such, the mirror refers back to the 
device of Jan van Eyck’s $UQROÀQL:HGGLQJÀJVDZRUN9HOi]TXH]ZRXOGFHUWDLQO\
have been familiar with, given that it then formed part of the Spanish royal collection. 
But as Foucault notes, and unlike its precedent, the mirror ‘shows us nothing of what 
is represented in the picture itself’ (p. 7): it has a strange detachment, while nevertheless 
being central to the composition, and to the work’s meaning. It is, of course, ‘the reverse 
of the great canvas represented on the left’, displaying ‘in full face what the canvas, by its 
position, is hiding from us’ (p. 10).3 Placed symmetrically around the painting’s central 
axis, it is mirrored by that other rectangle of light within the gloom, the open doorway 
‘which forms an opening, like the mirror itself, in the far wall of the room’ (p. 10). This 
introduces a further complexity, in that the doorway contains a visitor silhouetted against 
the bright light, poised ‘like a pendulum’ between coming and going (p. 11). What is the 
UROHSOD\HGE\WKLVÀJXUHORFDWHGRXWVLGHRIWKHVWXGLRORRNLQJLQXQUHJLVWHUHGE\DQ\RI
its protagonists?   
Foucault suggests that the work presents surrogates, either side of the mirror, for 
further absences that he maintains are fundamental to the picture, that of the artist and 
spectator:
That space where the King and his wife hold sway belongs equally well to the artist and to 
the spectator: in the depths of the mirror there could also appear – there ought to appear – the 
DQRQ\PRXVIDFHRIWKHSDVVHUE\DQGWKDWRI9HOi]TXH])RUWKHIXQFWLRQRIWKDWUHÁHFWLRQLVWRGUDZ
into the interior of the picture what is intimately foreign to it: the gaze which has organized it and 
the gaze for which it is displayed. But because they are present within the picture, to the right and 
left, the artist and visitor cannot be given a place in the mirror. (p. 15) 
Iversen suggests that for Foucault ‘these absences are a structural part of the classical 
Las Meninas
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HSLVWHPH·LQWKDW¶WKHVXEMHFWZKRFODVVLÀHVDQGRUGHUVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVFDQQRWEHDPRQJVW
the represented things: man is not a possible object of knowledge. For Foucault, Las Meninas 
allegorizes this situation’ (1993, p. 144). As such, Iversen suggests that:
Far from being a painting that acknowledges the spectator/artist’s constitutive function, then, 
Foucault’s Las Meninas DFWXDOO\VKRUWFLUFXLWVFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKDWSRVLWLRQ,WLVSDLQWLQJ·VHTXLYDOHQW
RI%HQYHQLVWH·VKLVWRULFDOXWWHUDQFH<HWLWPXVWEHVLJQLÀFDQWWKDW)RXFDXOWVKRXOGKDYHFKRVHQWKLV
painting that poses so insistently the question of the viewing subject. (p. 144)
By painting himself into a composition that shows its subject only indirectly, Velázquez 
achieves a precarious ‘sleight of hand’, an allegorical equivalent of a ‘classical episteme 
conjuring trick’ (p. 145). For Foucault it is with the elided subject that ‘representation, freed 
ÀQDOO\IURPWKHUHODWLRQWKDWZDVLPSHGLQJLWFDQRIIHULWVHOIDVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQLQLWVSXUH
form’ (1974, p. 16).
Not unsympathetic to Foucault’s argument, John Searle focuses his account of the 
painting (1980) more narrowly on the status of the mirror with respect to the displaced 
DUWLVW DQGVSHFWDWRU ÀJ 6HDUOH LQWHUSUHWV WKHVHDEVHQFHVDVDQXQVROYDEOHSDUDGR[
in that ‘the problem with Las Meninas is that it has all the eyemarks of classical illusionist 
painting but it cannot be made consistent with these axioms’ (p. 483). Thus Searle maintains 
that the work is unprecedented in that ‘we see the picture not from the point of view of the 
artist but from that of another spectator who also happens to be one of the subjects of the 
picture’ (p. 483). Now it is clear that van Eyck’s $UQROÀQL:HGGLQJ, in offering us the view 
of one of the painted witnesses to the marriage, also does just this.4 But, more importantly, 
is the claim that the painting presents a paradox well founded? 
In an attempt to rule out just such a paradox, Snyder and Cohen point out a mistake 
common to both Foucault and Searle’s accounts, in their assumption that the work’s 
vanishing point corresponds to the mirror position. It is in fact located within the open 
GRRUZD\WKHUHIRUHPDNLQJLWLPSRVVLEOHDFFRUGLQJWRWKHODZVRIUHÁHFWLRQIRUWKHPLUURU
WRUHÁHFWWKHUR\DOFRXSOHIURPWKHZRUN·VLPSOLFLWSRLQWRIYLHZSS5DWKHU
6Q\GHUDQG&RKHQFODLPWKDW¶WKHUHÁHFWLRQPXVWRULJLQDWHURXJKO\IURPWKHFHQWUDOUHJLRQ
of the canvas upon which Velázquez shows himself at work’ (p. 441), the implication being 
WKDW WKH PLUURU WKXV UHÁHFWV D VHFWLRQ RI WKH UR\DO GRXEOH SRUWUDLW5 In arguing that the 
UHÁHFWLRQLVWKDWRIWKHXQVHHQSDLQWLQJ6Q\GHULQDODWHUSDSHUVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHPLUURU
is in fact ‘the mirror of majesty’: an ideal or ‘exemplary image of Philip IV and María Ana, 
an image whose counterpart cannot be seen in the persons of the king and queen’ (1985, p. 
559). Snyder claims this as a visual trope that would have been immediately recognized 
by Philip himself. While the work is undoubtedly a representation about representation, its 
central paradox is therefore lost. And if, as Alpers’s claims in her account of the painting, 
‘ambiguity remains’ (1983, p. 42, n. 10), then this misses the point in that ‘ambiguity is not a 
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condition of paradox’ (Snyder 1985, p. 567, n. 11). Searle’s paradox, as Snyder rightly notes, 
LVQRWDPHUHRGGLW\EXWD¶ORJLFDOFORVXUH·DQGKHQFH¶VHOIUHIHUHQWLDO·S$FFRUGLQJ
to Searle, the artist and spectator cannot occupy the work’s point of view because it is 
already occupied by Philip IV and María Ana: the painting presents the king and queen’s 
particular perspective, not that of Velázquez or the viewer. By removing this supposed 
logical impossibility, Snyder and Cohen claim to remove the paradox. 
2.
Now it seems to me that all three philosophical accounts thus far considered are, for all their 
UHVSHFWLYHLQVLJKWVÁDZHGE\WKHLUIDLOXUHWRGLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQWKHUROHVRILQWHUQDODQG
external beholders. It is just such a consideration that I bring to this work. Regardless of the 
positioning of vanishing points, Searle’s and Foucault’s notion that the prior occupation 
of the depiction point of Las Meninas is in itself necessarily paradoxical would suggest 
that allLQWHUQDOVSHFWDWRUVDUHWKHUHIRUHE\GHÀQLWLRQSDUDGR[LFDO7KLVLVQRQVHQVLFDO$V
we have noted, the implied internal spectator occupies an unrepresented extension of the 
ÀFWLRQDOZRUOGRIWKHSDLQWLQJ%\FRQWUDVW9HOi]TXH]WKDWLVWKHSDLQWHURILas Meninas, 
not the depicted royal portraitist) stands (or rather stood) in his studio (or, as we shall see, 
in an adjacent space); the spectator of the picture now stands within the gallery space of 
the Prado (though this was not always the case). Snyder and Cohen do not challenge the 
erroneous assumption underlying this confusion of internal and external spectators, but 
Fig. 30    Velázquez: Las Meninas (detail).
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merely seek to rule out a nonexistent paradox by challenging the correct placement of the 
work’s vanishing point.
This has an immediate bearing on three questions Snyder raises somewhat sceptically 
in relation to Foucault and Searle’s assumption that there is something unorthodox about 
the perspectival structure of Las Meninas: (i) ‘Does [perspective] function in some way that 
it is essential to our understanding of the painting?’; (ii) ‘Must an interpreter of the painting 
address the particular point of view that establishes it?’; (iii) ‘More to the point, must 
an interpreter be concerned with the consequences of the work’s perspective structure?’ 
(Snyder 1985, p. 543). For Snyder, Foucault and Searle’s error in locating the vanishing 
SRLQWLQYDOLGDWHVWKHLUDUJXPHQWVDQGUHQGHUVWKHVHTXHVWLRQODUJHO\VXSHUÁXRXVWRWKH
work’s meaning. And yet we can accept Snyder and Cohen’s correction while maintaining 
DQDIÀUPDWLYHDQVZHU WRDOO WKUHHTXHVWLRQV*LYHQWKHUROH ,KDYHDVVLJQHGSHUVSHFWLYH
(combined with framing) in structuring our imaginative encounter with artworks, my 
position will not be too surprising. Indeed, I believe Velázquez is perfectly well aware of 
WKHVLJQLÀFDQFHRIKLVRZQSHUVSHFWLYDOVOHLJKWRIKDQGDVLVDFNQRZOHGJHGE\6Q\GHUDQG
Cohen, who do not dispute the possibility that Velázquez might have indeed intended it to 
LQLWLDOO\DSSHDUWKDWWKHPLUURUUHÁHFWHGWKHNLQJDQGTXHHQGLUHFWO\7KH\DOVRDFFHSWWKH
proposition that the painting indicates ‘the presence of the king and queen, in person, in the area 
just before the picture plane’ (p. 443), arguing that the royal presence is still the most plausible 
explanation for the outward glances.
In fact, the importance of the perspective is arguably more of an issue in Snyder and 
Cohen’s account than it is in Searle’s and Foucault’s. The relative freedom of position we 
have in front of a physical work, relative to the work’s implicit point of view, might explain 
the deliberate confusion with the mirror; and Snyder here makes a perceptive point when 
he notes how Velázquez paints the reverse of the slanted canvas in a way that obscures 
the left wall: ‘Had Velázquez provided even a small part of the wall on the left, it would 
have been immediately obvious that the viewpoint of the picture is well to the right of the 
mirror’ (p. 553). The resulting discrepancy, while not constituting a paradox as such, is 
deliberately calculated. As Damisch notes: 
In this sense [of Foucault’s metaphorical use of perspective] Foucault is perfectly right to see the 
mirror as the painting’s ‘center,’ though … its imaginary center … If there is any representation in 
SDLQWLQJWKHFRQÀJXUDWLRQRILas Meninas reveals it to consist of a calculated discrepancy between 
a painting’s geometric organization and its imaginary structure. It is this that Foucault’s critics have 
IDLOHGWRVHHDVDUHVXOWRIWKHLUKDYLQJDGKHUHGWRDVWULFWO\RSWLFDOFRQYHQWLRQDOGHÀQLWLRQRIWKH
perspective paradigm. (1994, p. 438) 
That ambiguity is built into the work’s imaginary structure is key in reminding us that 
the work is not something to be ‘solved’ through detective work, but to be experienced in 
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its very ambiguities. In fact, as Leo Steinberg suggests, there are three centres, or imaginary 
centres, which keep shifting: the Infanta, marking the midline of the painting, the vanishing 
point located in the far doorway, and the mirror, placed on the rooms central axis: ‘the 
canvas as a physical object, the perspectival geometry, and the depicted chamber’ (1981, 
p. 51). 
Having said this, the painting’s wider geometry is clearly relevant. And here Snyder 
makes, I believe, a fundamental error of his own in that he maintains that the king and 
queen stand, on axis, immediately to the right of Velázquez’s canvas ‘looking straight into 
the mirror’ (Snyder 1985, p. 553). This is simply not possible, assuming (as both Snyder 
and Cohen undoubtedly do) that the painting is perspectivally ‘correct’.6 Snyder’s own 
UHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKHZRUN·VSHUVSHFWLYHSÀJGHPRQVWUDWHVWKDWWKHSDLQWLQJRQ
ZKLFK9HOi]TXH]ZRUNVVWUDGGOHVWKHURRP·VFHQWUDOD[LVÀJ7 María Ana, if not both 
ÀJXUHVZRXOGWKHUHIRUHKDYHWREHWXFNHGbehind the depicted canvas.
7KHURRPLQZKLFKWKHVFHQHLVVWDJHGZKLOHGHVWUR\HGE\ÀUHLQFDQEHLGHQWLÀHG
ZLWKVRPHFHUWDLQW\IURPJURXQGSODQVDQGIURPFRQWHPSRUDU\DFFRXQWV-RKQ0RIÀWW·V
meticulous reconstructions of the ground plan in the Alcázar Palace and of the painting 
LWVHOI  S  ÀJV  UHYHDO WZR VLJQLÀFDQW IDFWV ÀJV  8 Firstly, the 
RYHUZKHOPLQJOLNHOLKRRGLVWKDWWKHUR\DOFRXSOHVWRRGRIFRXUVHLQWHUPVRIWKHÀFWLRQ
presented) directly opposite the work’s vanishing point, as both Foucault and Searle 
assume for mistaken reasons. Secondly, the viewpoint of Las Meninas, Velázquez’s point of 
conception, lies outside of the main space, suggesting that the view was framed by an open 
Fig. 31    Velázquez: Las Meninas, diagram of perspective construction, according to Snyder (1985).
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doorway.97KHOLNHOLKRRGLVWKDWIRUWKHÀFWLRQDOUR\DOSRUWUDLWWKHNLQJDQGTXHHQVWRRG
at the threshold of, or somewhat behind this opening. As such, it makes direct reference 
back to van Eyck’s location of the two painted witnesses, standing in an open doorway. 
While an objection might be made that, unlike with van Eyck’s work, there is no way of 
FRQÀUPLQJWKLVZLWKLQWKHZRUNLWVHOIZLWKRXWSULRUNQRZOHGJHRIWKHURRPLas Meninas 
SURYLGHVDFOXHLQWKHUHÁHFWHGUHGFXUWDLQLQWKHPLUURUDQHFKRRIWKHFXUWDLQSXOOHGEDFN
E\WKHÀJXUHVWDQGLQJRQWKHVWDLUV0RUHLPSRUWDQWO\ERWK-RQDWKDQ%URZQDQG0RIÀWW
reveal that Las Meninas was originally painted to be KXQJLQWKH¶H[HFXWLYHRIÀFH·RI3KLOLS
IV (the Pieza del Despacho de Verano), a room in the Torre Dorada immediately above the 
URRPLQZKLFKLWZDVSDLQWHGRUDWOHDVWSDLQWHGIURP%URZQS0RIÀWWS
7KLVÁRRUUHSOLFDWHGWKHSUHFLVHVSDWLDODUUDQJHPHQWRIWKDWEHORZVRWKDWVWDQGLQJ
ORRNLQJ DW WKH SDLQWLQJ LQ LWV RULJLQDO ORFDWLRQ ÀJ  LW ZRXOG KDYH EHHQ SRVVLEOH WR
)LJ5HFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKHJURXQGSODQLQWKH$OFi]DU3DODFHDFFRUGLQJWR-RKQ0RIÀWW
S ÀJGUDZQE\0DULD0DUFKHWWL%)$7KHXSSHUSODQVKRZVWKHÀUVWÁRRUZLWKWKH
Pieza del Despacho de Verano (F), where the work was originally hung; the lower plan shows  
WKHJURXQGÁRRULQFOXGLQJWKHPieza Principal (L), the room in which Las Meninas is staged,  
and the adjacent room in the Torre Dorada (N) from where it was painted from.
Fig. 33    Velázquez: Las MeninasUHFRQVWUXFWLRQRISDLQWLQJE\-RKQ0RIÀWWSÀJ
diagram and calculations by Terry L. Fox, BFA).
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then turn 180 degrees to look at almost the same spatial arrangement as depicted by the 
work itself. As Brown suggests, ‘despite its size, Las Meninas was regarded at the time of 
its creation as a private picture addressed to an audience of one, Philip IV’ (p. 259). The 
internal spectator correlates with the principal audience. 
,I DV , VXVSHFW WKH QRWLRQ RI DUULYDO LV NH\ WKHQ WKH SURSRVLWLRQ WKDW WKHVH ÀJXUHV
eagerly await an arrival in the guise of either the king or queen is made more feasible by 
the adjacent room theory, in that the royal couple can now appear from the beholder’s side 
of the painting at the open doorway. This would be consistent with either of the competing 
interpretations of the maid Isobel’s posture: as a ‘curtsey’ (Steinberg 1981, p. 53); or as a 
‘leaning over to reduce parallax’, the better to see the arrival of the king and queen (Searle 
1980, p. 484). It is also consistent with the fact that as yet not all the protagonists have 
noticed the royal presence. Moreover, Brown’s claim that the audience was none other 
than the king himself avoids the not insubstantial issues of decorum in terms of a spatial 
DQGSV\FKRORJLFDOLGHQWLÀFDWLRQZLWKWKHSRVLWLRQRFFXSLHGE\3KLOLS,9²WKLVZDVQRWD
ZRUNRULJLQDOO\GHVWLQHGIRUDSXEOLFJDOOHU\EXWIRUWKH.LQJ·VSULYDWHRIÀFH+RZHYHU
the painting can accommodate other viewers. As Brown notes:
If this conclusion is correct, then it follows that the focal point of the picture was the king who 
¶LQWHUUXSWHG· WKH ÀJXUHV LQ Las Meninas whenever he entered KLV VXPPHU RIÀFH 7KH LPSOLFLW
assumption of his presence is recorded not only in the poses and expressions of the characters in the 
SLFWXUHEXWDOVRLQWKHPLUURUUHÁHFWLRQ6RPHGLDJUDPVRIWKHSHUVSHFWLYHORFDWHWKHVRXUFHRIWKH
UHÁHFWLRQRXWVLGHWKHSLFWXUHZKLOHRWKHUVLGHQWLI\LWZLWKWKHODUJHFDQYDVVWDQGLQJEHIRUHWKHDUWLVW
This discrepancy can probably be attributed to the fact that Velázquez’ instinctive use of perspective 
deliberately accommodates both possibilities. The purpose of the mirror is to insinuate the presence 
of the king (and queen) in the atelier. If the king were present in person before the picture, he could 
VHH DV LW ZHUH KLV RZQ UHÁHFWLRQ LQ WKH PLUURU ,I DEVHQW WKH SLFWXUH ZRXOG EH XQGHUVWRRG DV D
SRUWUDLWRIWKHLQIDQWDDQGKHUUHWLQXHZKLOHWKHPLUURULPDJHZRXOGEHDWWULEXWHGWRWKHUHÁHFWLRQ
from the easel, as did Palomino [see earlier note]. In either case, the presence of the king proved once 
DQGIRUDOOWKDWSDLQWLQJZDVWKHQREOHVWRIDUWVSS
But I would like to propose another complementary interpretation. While consistent 
ZLWK%URZQ·VDQG0RIÀWW·VDFFRXQWVWKLVSURSRVDORYHUFRPHVWKHapparent paradox, which 
now returns, that when the king himself is not present in person before the work, the 
implied presence of the royal couple at the work’s depiction point (or perhaps slightly in 
IURQWRI LWZLWKLQWKHRSHQGRRUZD\REVFXUHVWKHYHU\ÀFWLRQDOYLHZZHDUHSUHVHQWHG
with. We should note that this paradox does not arise (as Searle’s argument would suggest) 
from an internal spectatorship as such, but from the inappropriateness of any intended 
LGHQWLÀFDWLRQZLWKWKHNLQJRUTXHHQ0\SURSRVDOLVIRXQGHGXSRQWKHSUHPLVHLPSOLHG
but not fully elucidated by Brown’s account above, that there is no reason to assume that 
LQ WKH ÀFWLRQDO VFHQH SUHVHQWHG E\ Las Meninas the royal couple need be present at the 
PRPHQW WKH SDLQWLQJ GHSLFWV ,I WKH UHÁHFWLRQ LQ WKH PLUURU LV not that of the king and 
Las Meninas
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queen, but the painting on which Velázquez works, then they really might be absent as the 
elided subject. 
But then whose view, if any, is thus presented? As Steinberg states, we certainly do not 
feel excluded; but are we still, as he suggests, ‘part of the family, party to the event’ (1981, p. 
48)? Well, Steinberg’s speculation as to whether we have ‘just walked in to interrupt them’ 
(p. 50) is alternatively explained if we identify ourselves not with the remote and distant 
royal couple, but with the palace steward who would surely have preceded them, in order 
to announce their imminent arrival. This intriguing possibility would directly ‘mirror’, 
DORQJDQD[LVIURPYLHZSRLQWWRYDQLVKLQJSRLQWWKHSUHVHQFHDQGDFWLRQVRIWKHÀJXUHLQ
the far doorway, who we know to be another 9HOi]TXH]GRQ-RVp1LHWRVWHZDUGWRWKH
4XHHQ2QHRIKLVUROHVZDVSUHFLVHO\WRRSHQWKHGRRUVIRUWKHNLQJDQGTXHHQ3HUKDSV
LQ WKLV LGHQWLÀFDWLRQ ZLWK D FRUUHVSRQGLQJ ÀJXUH XQDPELJXRXVO\ within the work, we 
likewise pull back a curtain to prepare for Philip IV and María Ana’s eagerly awaited 
DUULYDO 7KLV ZRXOG SURYLGH DQ LQWHUQDO VSHFWDWRU HQWLUHO\ FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH ÀFWLRQ
presented, meeting any objection about prevailing decorum. Paralleling the otherwise 
FXULRXV SUHVHQFH RI WKH ÀJXUH LQ WKH IDU GRRUZD\ LW RIIHUV D FRQVLGHUDEO\ OHVV RQHURXV
psychological repertoire for viewers other than the king to identify with.
But I also believe we can identify with a spectator internal to the other painting: not 
WKHÀFWLRQDOSDLQWLQJRIWKHUR\DOSRUWUDLWZKLFKZHVHHRQO\LQWKHPLUURUDVWKHreverse 
(in two senses) of the depicted canvas, but to the group portrait that confronts us, posed 
and organized by Velázquez. Despite his presence within the work, perhaps Velázquez 
is inviting us to identify with his position painting the very work before us. (Of course, 
Velázquez’s responsibilities with respect to the royal painting collection would have made 
him a frequent spectator of the work.) If the painted ‘visitor’, located at the work’s vanishing 
point, mirrors a steward arriving, he might also be said to mirror Velázquez himself. Not 
RQO\GRWKH\VKDUHDQDPHEXWDV'DPLVFKQRWHVWKLVÀJXUHDOVRVHHPVWRPLPLFWKHYHU\
SRVWXUHRIDQDUWLVWS%URZQ·VDQG0RIÀWW·VDGMDFHQWURRPWKHRULHVZRXOGDGG
weight to Damisch’s notion of a mirroring along this access between viewpoint, the work’s 
point of conception, and vanishing point (though whether this refers back to the origin of 
perspective, as Damisch suggests, is questionable). Velázquez, the painter of Las Meninas, 
is likewise positioned behind a threshold, looking in. If the other Velázquez is likened to the 
spectator position in one painting, he is also linked to the point of origin of the other. If, 
DV)RXFDXOWREVHUYHVWKHZKROHSDLQWLQJOLNH9HOi]TXH]·VVWDQFHEUXVKKHOGPLGDLULV
itself, suspended (1974, p. 3), then perhaps we are asked to identify, from its point of origin, 
with the suspended encounter that painting provides. 
,QWULJXLQJO\HDFKRI)RXFDXOW·VDEVHQFHVNLQJDQGTXHHQDUWLVWDQGVSHFWDWRUDUH
thus provided a possible place, through spectatorships internal to the two respective 
works presented: that of the painting of the royal portrait and that of the staging of Las 
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Meninas LWVHOI)DUIURPH[FOXGLQJXVZKLOHWKHZRUNPD\RIIHUDYHU\VSHFLÀF¶LQWHUQDO·
spectatorship limited to the king (or queen), it also offers other potential spectators with 
which to identify with, unrepresented counterparts to Foucault’s surrogates depicted 
either side of the elided subjects presented by the mirror. Not a paradox as such, in that 
each encounter has its own consistent internal logic, but a choice of potential imaginative 
LGHQWLÀFDWLRQV
And here it is worth noting that, regardless of competing interpretations, the role of 
LPDJLQDWLRQLVIXQGDPHQWDOWRWKHUHFLSURFLW\LPSOLHGE\DOORIWKHVHSRVVLEOHLGHQWLÀFDWLRQV
moreover, while these encounters are undoubtedly internal to the work, structured by the 
work’s framing and perspective, the genius of Velázquez (and at least one of the reasons 
this is such a great work) is that they are given added psychological charge by the viewer’s 
own physical sense of arrival and engagement in front of the work (the same device used 
by Rembrandt’s The Syndics). While not integrated into its architectural context in quite the 
sense of Trinity, the work (especially in its original location) draws upon our positioning 
in space relative to the virtual world it presents. It has a processional dimension, not as 
Brown suggests in terms of its iconography or interpretation, but in terms of an experiential 
ground. And as Steinberg suggests, it presents an encounter where we experience:
A kind of reciprocity, then: as if we on this side of the canvas and the nine characters in it were too 
closely engaged with each other to be segregated by the divide of the picture plane. Something we 
bring to the picture – the very effectiveness of our presence – ricochets from the picture, provokes 
DQLPPHGLDWHUHVSRQVHDUHÁH[RIPXWXDOÀ[DWLRQHYLGHQWLQWKHJODQFHVH[FKDQJHGWKHJODQFHVZH
receive and return. (1981, p. 50)10
3.
,IDVERWK%URZQDQG0RIÀWWVXJJHVWWKLVLVDZRUNWKDWFODLPVSDLQWLQJDV¶DOHJLWLPDWH
form of knowledge’ (Brown 1978, p. 109), where ‘painting is the demonstration of a 
PHQWDOFRQFHSWRU´LGHDµ·0RIÀWWSWKHQLWGRHVVRLQDZD\WKDWLQFRUSRUDWHV
WKHSUHVHQFHRIDQ LQGLYLGXDWHGYLHZHU LQWR LWVVHPDQWLFFRQWHQW ,GHDDQGUHFLSURFLW\ 
GHSHQGHQWXSRQDQ LPDJLQDWLYH LGHQWLÀFDWLRQ IXVH7KHQRWLRQRI two paintings might 
be reconciled with Alpers’s proposal that the work describes two modes of engagement, 
though I would question her claim that they are presented in a ‘fundamentally unresolvable 
way’ (1983, p. 37). Rather, they offer parallel, but not incompatible, ways of experiencing 
the work – different ‘uses’ of the work as imaginative prop. 
Alpers contention is that Las MeninasFRQVWLWXWHV ¶DFRQÁDWLRQRI WKHQRUWKHUQPRGH
(the world prior to us made visible) and the southern mode (we prior to the world and 
commanding its presence)’ (1989, p. 70). Following, Puttfarken’s point about scale, noted 
earlier, I would argue that such differences are perhaps less to do with geographical 
boundaries (despite some correlation) and more to do with the divergent notions of internal 
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and external spectatorship I have been presenting. If Las Meninas can be said to embody 
two modes of engagement, it is because it is in fact two distinct works. 7KHÀFWLRQDOQDUUDWLYH
RIWKHSDLQWLQJRIDUR\DOSRUWUDLWSUHVHQWVDVHOIFRQWDLQHGZRUOGWKDWLVDPELJXRXVRQO\
in the sense that we imaginatively access this world through two logically consistent but 
FRPSHWLQJLQWHUQDOLGHQWLÀFDWLRQVRQHDLPHGDWWKHNLQJRQHDWRWKHUYLVLWRUVWRWKHZRUN
Here the artist is, as Alpers suggests, ‘accounted for … within that world’ (1983, p. 37). But 
LIZHWDNHWKHZRUNWREHDQLGHQWLÀFDWLRQZLWKWKHSDLQWHURIWKHJURXSSRUWUDLWUHYHDOHG
as an event ‘staged’ by Velázquez, then the commanding of the presence in Las Meninas is 
DGLUHFWLGHQWLÀFDWLRQQRWZLWK9HOi]TXH]·VSRVLWLRQin the work, but in front of it. Here, as 
Alpers suggests, ‘the artist presumes himself to stand with the viewer before the pictured 
world in both a physical and epistemological sense’ (p. 37). 
$QG WKHUH LV DQ LQJHQLRXV ÀQDO WZLVW LQ WKDW ZKLOH WKH ZRUN GRHV QRW GUDZ WKH
surrounding architecture into its domain in the manner of Trinity, there is a kind of fusion 
LQERWKLGHQWLÀFDWLRQVEHWZHHQLQWHUQDODQGH[WHUQDOVSHFWDWRUV:KLOHHQWLUHO\FRQVLVWHQW
with Wollheim’s arguments for a spectator in the picture, the work’s double manifestation 
also provides something of the direct physical encounter I have described with Trinity. In 
one mode, it draws the viewer’s physical experience of arrival into the imagined encounter: 
whether that viewer is the king or some other spectator. In the other mode, while we 
imaginatively identify with Velázquez’s position in a way that is internal to the world 
it presents, we also identify with the artist in a way that draws on our physical presence 
not only in terms of ‘commanding’ the staged scene as ‘idea’, but in terms of our presence 
before the picture as physical, and sublimely tactile, object.
A shallow steel tray, 840 x 280mm, is supported by a simple metal 
construction. The table-like structure is very low, just 280mm high. The 
tray is illed with a thin 12mm layer of water, which is not immediately 
apparent upon entering the space.  A prone igure, ilmed from 
above, is projected onto the tray’s milky-white acrylic lining. Placed 
within a darkened space, the viewer looks down onto this low table 
and diminutive igure, unaware of the presence of the water due to 
the strength of the projected light. The igure’s only movement is 
revealed by the slight rise and fall of his chest. Like a child’s chair, the 
object is curiously sized: neither a full-sized table nor scaled model. 
In a darkened space, the efect is of looking down at the object from 
a considerable height. Installed in a room with a timber loor, the 
table structure is highly susceptible to movement, causing the water 
it contains to vibrate as someone approaches the work. A shadowy, 
relection of the projected igure (almost impossible to photograph) 
is cast onto the gallery ceiling, across which wave-forms reveal both 
a spectator’s presence and the water into which the acrylic sheet is 
submerged. Unlike the source of the relection, this igure is life-sized. 
The relection registers as an ‘out of body’ spectral presence, hovering 
above the head of the viewer. S
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A Displacement Device
The problems, both technical and theoretical, posed by the depiction of an apparition or a miraculous 
DVFHQVLRQDQDHULDOWUDQVSRUWDWLRQRUHYHQDFHOHVWLDOJDWKHULQJRQDWZRGLPHQVLRQDOSODVWLFVFUHHQ²
those problems are by no means secondary or subsidiary in relation to the enterprise that, according 
to a strongly established tradition, epitomizes the Renaissance’s contribution to the development 
of Western art and civilization: namely, the institution of the system for representing space that is 
known as linear perspective. (Damisch 2002, p. 82)
1.
In the Ecstasy of St Francis ÀJ1 from the Upper Church of the Basilica of San Francesco, 
Assisi, the Saint, enveloped by cloud, hovers between the heavenly and earthly realms. As 
Damisch notes in his A Theory of /Cloud/, the ‘cloud introduces a break into the fabric of 
dramatic and theatrical relations: it removes the saint from the common space and makes 
transcendence appear as an antithesis in a representation conceived in strictly “human” 
terms’ (2002, p. 101). Cloud is used as a signifying element within a pictorial structure that 
LVFKDUDFWHULVHGE\DVKDOORZQHVVRIVSDFHZKDW3DQRIVN\UHIHUVWRDVDQDJJUHJDWHVSDFH
(1991, p. 63). It is the signifying role of cloud that establishes the separation of supernatural 
DQG PXQGDQH UHDOPV *LYHQ WKDW WKH YLHZHU·V SRVLWLRQ UHPDLQV ODUJHO\ XQGHÀQHG WKLV
separation does not as yet impact upon the beholder’s implied relationship to the virtual 
VSDFHRIWKHSDLQWLQJ'DPLVFKDUJXHVWKDW¶)URPWKHPRWLIRIFORXGGHQRWHGE\DVLJQLÀHU
made “in its image”) one moves, again with no break in continuity, to the theme (the 
miraculous vision, the opening up to divine space)’ (2002, p. 20). As with Giotto’s Ascension 
ÀJ IURPWKH$UHQD&KDSHO LQ3DGXD LW LVWKHPRWLIRIFORXGWKDWKHUHUHVROYHVWKH
HVVHQWLDOO\WZRGLPHQVLRQDOGLYLVLRQRIWKHSLFWXUHLQWRGLIIHUHQWUHDOPV
The integration of the supernatural element into a shallow pictorial space is thus 
realized primarily through symbolic means. But perspectival representation introduces its 
RZQGLIÀFXOWLHVZLWKUHVSHFWWRGHSLFWLQJWKHVXSHUQDWXUDO$V*RIIHQQRWHV¶1DWXUDOLVP
or Realism is not necessarily suited to the supernatural themes of Christian art’ (1998a, p.2). 
With the shift from a late medieval aggregate space to the ‘systematic’ space of perspective, 
painters faced a real problem in how the supernatural might be plausibly depicted within 
WKHODWWHU·VXQLÀHGVSDWLDOORJLF2 As we have noted, it is a logic that includes the implied 
location of the viewer relative to the pictorial space. While such positioning is a factor 
with some late Giotto works,3 the viewer is not located with any kind of precision. But 
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Fig. 34    Ecstasy of St Francis F8SSHU&KXUFK%DVLOLFDRI6DQ)UDQFHVFR$VVLVL
Fig. 35    Giotto: Ascension F$UHQD&KDSHO3DGXD
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IRU WKRVH SHUVSHFWLYDO ZRUNV HVWDEOLVKLQJ D VSDWLDO FRQWLQXLW\ EHWZHHQ UHDO DQG ÀFWLYH
space, the implied presence of the beholder has a fundamental impact upon strategies for 
representing the miraculous within such an implied continuum and spatial proximity.
As Damisch demonstrates, the use of signifying elements to depict the miraculous 
persists throughout the Renaissance and into the Baroque. But from Masaccio onwards, 
WKLVLVVXSSOHPHQWHGE\QHZVSDWLDOVWUDWHJLHVGHSOR\LQJVSHFLÀFDOO\SHUVSHFWLYDOPHDQV
to depict the supernatural realm. These complement, and sometimes supersede, earlier 
models. It is fundamental to my argument that, unlike the Giotto model, these spatial 
strategies are dependent for their effect upon the kind of imaginative engagement I have 
termed seeing-with, in terms of (i) providing a vivid experience of pictorial depth, and (ii) 
facilitating a reciprocity between scene and beholder that draws upon nonconceptual 
FRQWHQW0DQ\RIWKHH[DPSOHV,WKHUHIRUHGUDZXSRQLQWKLVFKDSWHUFRQVWLWXWHDVSHFLÀF
application of the engagement afforded by the imagination, in that the distancing devices 
they utilize in turn depend upon an implied proximity and spatial uncertainty. 
2.
Masolino’s Foundation of Santa Maria Maggiore ÀJ  RIIHUV ZKDW QRZ VHHPV D UDWKHU
amusing early attempt to subject the vaporous element of cloud to the foreshortening 
characteristic of perspective; yet the painting still relies on a combination of aureole and 
cloud, ‘read’ as signs, to effect the required separation of earthly and heavenly realms.4 This 
Fig. 36    Masolino: Foundation of Santa Maria Maggiore 
F0XVHR1D]LRQDOHGL&DSRGLPRQWH1DSOHV
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VHSDUDWLRQLVSULPDULO\UHJLVWHUHGLQWHUPVRIWKHHVVHQWLDOO\WZRGLPHQVLRQDORUJDQLVDWLRQ
of the picture surface, rather than in terms of pictorial depth.5 The same is essentially true 
IRU0DQWHJQD·V8IÀ]LResurrection ÀJZKHUHGHVSLWHWKHJUHDWHUDSSDUHQWUHDOLVPWKH
enclosing hills limit the work’s implied depth. Mantegna sharply distinguishes between the 
stylised clouds, which bear the weight of Christ, and the realistically rendered atmospheric 
clouds of the work’s background. The former, along with the cherubim, delineate an 
enclosed mandorla, establishing the requisite separation.
Giovanni Bellini, by contrast, makes no such distinction in his later version of the 
Resurrection ÀJ  IURP WKH *HPlOGHJDOHULH %HUOLQ DEDQGRQLQJ VW\OLVHG FORXGV
Christ, while loosely associated with the naturalistic clouds in the background, rather 
disconcertingly ascends, defying gravity. He has no visible means of support. The disquiet 
IROORZV IURP WKH LPSOLFDWLRQ WKDW &KULVW ÁRDWV LQ DQ XQGLIIHUHQWLDWHG VSDFH FORXG as 
Fig. 37    Mantagna: Resurrection 
F*DOOHULDGHJOL8IÀ]L
Florence.
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sign, no longer functions as support or spatial marker (in much the same way that Bellini 
relinquishes the need for Christ’s halo). And yet His position introduces a new ambiguity, 
in that perspectival cues to Christ’s location are withheld. As Goffen notes of this work, 
‘Christ is not – cannot be – delimited by spatial boundaries’ (1989, p. 143). Bellini’s radical 
model is taken up by Titian in his Brescia Polyptych of the Resurrection ÀJDOWKRXJK
here the close cropping of the image alleviates much of the apparent strangeness of Christ’s 
ascent.
Contrary to Masolino’s attempt to do so, it is the fact that FORXGGHÀHVSHUVSHFWLYDOPHDQV
to represent it that allows it to persist as ‘a constructional ploy … to introduce a divine 
group or symbol into a perspective construction’ (Damisch 2002, p. 42). For Damisch, cloud 
serves the role of perspective’s ‘necessary counterpart’ (p. 82). Indeed, cloud – combined 
ZLWKGLYLQH OLJKW SOD\VDSLYRWDO UROH LQ%DURTXHFHLOLQJSDLQWLQJ$V:|OIÁLQDUJXHV
Fig. 38    Giovanni Bellini: Resurrection F*HPlOGHJDOHULH%HUOLQ
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such painting reveals ‘a completely new FRQFHSWLRQRIVSDFHGLUHFWHGWRZDUGVLQÀQLW\: form is 
dissolved in favour of the magic spell of light – the highest manifestation of the painterly’ 
(1964, p. 64). 
Correggio’s Assumption of the Virgin ÀJPLJKWVHUYHE\ZD\RIH[DPSOH+HUHWKH
octagonal domed ring, part of the real architecture of Parma Cathedral, opens up onto a 
YLUWXDOVSDFHWKDWLQFRQWUDVWWRWKHVSDFHWKHYLHZHURFFXSLHVLVXQERXQGHGRULQÀQLWH
DQ DPRUSKRXV RU QHEXORXV ¶FHOHVWLDO· VSDFH WKDW DEDQGRQV DUFKLWHFWXUDO GHÀQLWLRQ DQG
SHUVSHFWLYDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ7KHUHLVDUDGLFDODV\PPHWU\EHWZHHQWKHÀFWLYHDQGYLHZLQJ
space, although the work still orientates itself towards an ‘instinctive’ viewpoint, a position 
that Shearman observes is ‘at the bottom of the steps’ that cross the nave just prior to the 
western supporting arch (1992, p. 186). The threshold between realms is seen as one that 
calls into question the very reality of the supporting architecture. As Damisch notes:
The solution associated with Correggio amounts to a negation: of the building itself, and even of the 
fact that it is a closed space. This effect is created on a key part of its overarching cover, by a decor 
conceived in such a way as to ‘pierce’ the stone fabric and create a fake opening onto a sky that is 
itself painted in trompe l’oeil. (2002, p. 1)
And yet the work is dependent for its experiential impact upon the very architecture it 
seeks to negate. The viewer (that is the external beholder) is situated by the processional 
Fig. 39    Titian: Polyptych of the Resurrection, Santi Nazaro e Celso, Brescia.
131
Fig. 40    Correggio: Assumption of the Virgin 
3DUPD&DWKHGUDO
Fig. 41    Correggio: Vision of St John 
6DQ*LRYDQQL(YDQJHOLVWD
Parma.
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demands of the physical building, and the painting draws this religious architecture into 
its content.
As such, to repeat an earlier argument, I believe it is a mistake to assume that 
Correggio’s intent is purely, or even primarily one of illusion; rather, while undoubtedly 
utilizing illusory devices, such paintings draw upon the imaginative consent of the viewer, 
whereby the spatial schemata is allied to the works’ religious content. This is illustrated by 
Correggio’s The Vision of Saint John ÀJZKLFKVLPLODUO\FUHDWHVDÀFWLWLRXVRSHQLQJRQWR
a celestial realm. As Shearman observes, two viewing positions are implied: a position in 
WKHQDYHRI6DQ*LRYDQQL(YDQJHOLVWD3DUPDZKHUH&KULVW²LQ+LVVHFRQGFRPLQJ²ÁRDWV
in a way that is consistent with the heavenly perspective, the viewer a direct recipient of the 
YLVLRQDQGDVHFRQGSRVLWLRQÀJZKLFKLVUHVHUYHGIRUWKH%HQHGLFWLQHVLQWKHFKRLU
Fig. 42    Correggio: Vision of St John (detail).
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a viewpoint from which Saint John, obscured by the overhanging cornice from the nave, 
is revealed as the original recipient of the vision, in a less emotionally charged but more 
LQWHOOHFWXDOO\GHPDQGLQJH[SHULHQFHRIWKHVFHQHSS7KLVLQWHJUDWLRQLQWR
the ceremonial functioning of the architecture acknowledges differentiated viewers, belying 
the notion of a work that is simply to be experienced as a trompe l’oeil.6
3.
If, as Damisch suggests, cloudUHPDLQV¶DNH\WHUPLQWKHÀJXUDWLYHYRFDEXODU\RI&RUUHJJLR·
then it is a theme that, ‘contradicts the very idea of outline and delineation and through 
its relative insubstantiality constitutes a negation of the solidity, permanence, and identity 
WKDWGHÀQHshape’ (2002, p. 15).7<HWZKLOHWKHVLJQDOOLQJUROHRIFORXGLVUHWDLQHG,ZRXOG
argue that the spatial impact of Correggio’s ceiling paintings is dependent upon situating 
a spectator within an architectural context that framesWKHÀFWLWLRXVFHOHVWLDOVSDFH:KLOH
cloud functions as the very antithesis of perspectival construction, the affect follows 
from Correggio’s successful integration of the threshold between realms into both host 
DUFKLWHFWXUHDQGÀFWLRQDOVSDFHLQWRWKHSDLQWLQJ·VLQQHUDQGRXWHUDSSDUDWXV$V6KHDUPDQ
notes, with Correggio’s Assumption of the Virgin ‘the assertion of the continuum between the 
spectator’s space and the pictorial space, through the visible bodily Assumption from one 
to the other, is the most complete statement possible of the transitive relationship between 
dome and viewer’ (1992, p. 188). This is entirely consistent with the type of relationship 
that I have argued is afforded by works implying an external spectator as part of their 
content.8 This imaginative engagement, which draws in the spectator’s awareness of the 
surrounding architecture, is key to the emotional affect of the dramatic rupture of such a 
VLWXDWHGUHODWLRQVKLS WKDW WKHÀFWLWLRXVRSHQLQJRQWR WKHFHOHVWLDO UHDOPUHSUHVHQWV7KLV
is not the mere ‘reading’ of signs, but a dynamic interaction EHWZHHQÀFWLRQDOVSDFHKRVW
architecture, and an embodied viewer.
4.
The strategy adopted by ceiling painters can also, of course, be applied to the upper 
sections of wall painting. In so doing, Pintoricchio’s Bufalini Chapel applies two contrasting 
strategies to the representation of the supernatural within the same space: one using 
primarily symbolic means, one applying a spatial strategy that is dependent for its effect 
upon locating the viewer in real space. The comparison proves useful for the distinctions I 
am drawing in this chapter. 
The chapel is a space onto which Pintoricchio overlays an unprecedented false 
DUFKLWHFWXUH D SDLQWHG DUFKLWHFWXUH WKDW XQLÀHV D YDULHW\ RI GLIIHUHQW DSSURDFKHV WR
constructing a relationship between pictorial space and beholder. As Sandström notes of 
Pintoricchio’s design of the chapel:
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Fig. 43    Pintoricchio: San Bernardino in Glory 
Bufalini Chapel, Santa Maria in Aracoeli, Rome.
Fig. 44    Pintoricchio: :HVW:DOO, Bufalini Chapel, Santa Maria in Aracoeli, Rome.
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$ERYHDOOKHDEROLVKHG WKHERXQGDU\FRPPRQXQWLOKLV WLPHEHWZHHQ WKHÀJXUDWLYHDQGPHUHO\
decorative parts of a picture, without thereby causing a weakening of the structure of his painting. 
7KHSULQFLSDOPHWKRGIRUKLVLQWHJUDWLRQ²ZKLFKSHUPLWVRIDQROHVVFRPSOHWHFODVVLÀFDWLRQRIWKH
main sections of the decoration – is the conscious use of different degrees of reality in different parts 
of the picture, and an interaction between different planes of reality. (1963, p. 42)
 
Marilyn Lavin, referencing Sandström’s account, claims Pintoricchio’s approach as 
¶DPDMRUGHSDUWXUH LQ WKHÀHOGRIPXUDOGLVSRVLWLRQ·E\ZKLFKWKHSDLQWHGSLODVWHUVDUH
PRYHGIRUZDUG¶WRWKHVXUIDFHRIWKHÀHOG·WKHUHE\¶WUDQVIRUPLQJWKHPLQWRDIUDPHIRU
the whole area’ (1990, p. 215). She refers to the resultant ‘opening up of the pictorial 
format’ as ‘the “Expanded Field”’, arguing that ‘its implications for the expression of new 
complexities in religious devotion, as well as penetration into new depths of psychological 
experience, were to characterize cycle painting for the next two decades’ (p. 215).
My concern here is not with developments in narrative cycles, but with the contrasting 
DSSURDFKHVWRWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKHFHOHVWLDOUHDOPRIIHUHGE\WKHULJKWKDQGDQGDOWDU
walls of the chapel. On the altar wall, San Bernardino in Glory ÀJSUHVHQWVDXQLÀHG
image that refers back to earlier models for incorporating the celestial realm; despite the 
painted frame, there is little sense of a spatial continuity, or of any great pictorial depth. 
Flanked by two Franciscan saints, San Bernardino ‘displays his book and points to Christ, 
ZKRDSSHDUVDERYHLQDPDQGRUOD·SS%RWKPDQGRUODDQGVXSSRUWLQJFORXGV
VLJQLI\WKHLUUROHZKLOHWKHSDLQWLQJGLYLGHVLQWRWZRGLVWLQFWVHFWLRQVWKHWRSKDOIRIZKLFK
is ‘thus not narrative but devotional’ (p. 218). As Sandström notes, this upper section of the 
picture ‘appears as a vision, both in relation to the three saints below and their landscape, 
and in relation to the observer’ (1963, p. 73). Lacking real spatial depth, it nevertheless has ‘a 
reality of its own’, whereby the vertical division stresses ‘the boundary, or the incongruity, 
between the real spatial sphere of human existence and that of the vision’ (p. 73). 
%\ FRQWUDVW RQ WKH ULJKW ZDOO ÀJ  3LQWRULFFKLR LQWHJUDWHV D UHDO ZLQGRZ WKH
source of everyday light that enters the chapel, into the ‘illusionistic’ painted architecture, 
GUDPDWLFDOO\EOXUULQJWKHERXQGDULHVEHWZHHQWKHÀFWLYHDQGUHDO:KLOHWKHORZHUSDQHOV
make no attempt to construct a relationship with the beholder, Pintoricchio incorporates 
two painted windows, with ‘perspectivized jambs that rest illusionistically on the painted 
cornice’ (Lavin 1990, p. 217). These false windows ‘open’ onto a heavenly realm beyond. 
The suggestion is that this realm continues behind the real window, transforming the light 
that enters the chapel into a celestial light. As with Trinity, elements, such as the peacock 
are painted as though they intrude into our space. But the most important incursion 
happens through the left of the two painted windows, where God the Father (surrounded 
E\FKHUXELPGUDPDWLFDOO\¶HQWHUV·IURPWKHVXSHUQDWXUDOÀFWLYHUHDOPLQWRWKHYHU\VSDFH
of the chapel itself. As in the later Correggio ceilings, the beholder’s experience of the real 
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space is drawn into the experience of the divine presence, supplementing the symbolic 
devices. In sharp contrast to the primarily signifying means utilized by the altar wall, here 
SHUVSHFWLYDODQGVSDWLDOPHDQVFRPELQHZLWKWKHVSHFWDWRU·VVDQFWLRQWRIUDPHVXFKD
presence, and the celestial realm from which God emerges. And it is an experience that 
UHVWVXSRQWKHRYHUOD\LQJRIDÀFWLRQDODUFKLWHFWXUHRQWRWKHVSDFHRIWKHFKDSHO
5.
In previous chapters we have noted how Masaccio’s Trinity ÀJVWUXFWXUHVDPHWDSK\VLFDO
GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ GLIIHUHQW SDUWV RI WKH ÀFWLYH UHDOP DQG DOOLHV WKLV GLVWLQFWLRQ WR LWV
religious content. Trinity, however, includes a further gradation in reality, which is noted 
ÀUVWE\-RKQ:KLWHDQGLVSLFNHGXSXSRQE\DPRQJRWKHUV%U\VRQ
If the religious representation ‘behind’ the picture surface is itself differentiated from 
the viewer’s reality, the Trinity (which exists outside of time) involves a further ambiguity as 
WRLWVSODFHPHQWLQVSDFHÀJDQGFRQIRUPVWRDYLHZLQJSRVLWLRQORFDWHGIDUDERYHRXU
heads, ‘in a zone the body of the viewer cannot occupy’ (Bryson 1983, p. 108). Bryson refers to 
WKLVDVD¶SRVW$OEHUWLDQSRLQW·D¶WKHRUHWLFDOSXQFWXP·ZKLFKFRQWUDVWVZLWKWKHHPSLULFDO
SHUVSHFWLYHRIWKHÀUVWYDQLVKLQJSRLQW9 White, by contrast, explains it away pragmatically 
DV0DVDFFLR·VUHIXVDOWRH[FHVVLYHO\IRUHVKRUWHQWKHÀJXUHVRI&KULVWDQG*RGSS
,ZRXOGDUJXHKRZHYHUWKDWLWLVDQDVWRQLVKLQJFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQRIWKHYHU\
real problem that I have been arguing faced early Renaissance painters, and constitutes 
D GLVWLQFW PRGH IRU GHSLFWLQJ WKH VXSHUQDWXUDO ZLWKLQ WKH XQLÀHG VSDFH RI SHUVSHFWLYH
Allowing the cultic presence an independence from spatiotemporal markers that locate 
the external beholder, Masaccio devises a fundamentally new method for implying a 
necessary distance within an unprecedented proximity: a proximity which directly results from 
the activating of the beholder’s space. The ‘visionary’ impact of such a spatial and temporal 
displacement refers back to earlier traditions of Christian art, while also registering the 
effectiveness of new perspectival means to relate the virtual space of the painting to the 
actual church architecture. It offers a spatial metaphor to match the symbolic message of 
the representation of the Trinity.
,GRQRWFODLPWREHWKHÀUVWWRQRWHWKLVEXW,EHOLHYHWKHUROHRIseeing-with LQWHQVLÀHV
WKHVLJQLÀFDQFHRI0DVDFFLR·VVWUDWHJ\$V*RIIHQKDVREVHUYHG
Removed from time, the Trinity is also removed from space, and despite Masaccio’s dazzling 
perspectival illusion (or rather because of it) one cannot say with certainty where God the Father 
DFWXDOO\VWDQGVZLWKKLVFUXFLÀHG6RQ,QRWKHUZRUGV WKHUH LVQRSUHFLVHDQVZHUWRWKHTXHVWLRQ
‘Where exactly is the Trinity in Masaccio’s Trinity"·DSS
It is only by integrating the work’s frame into its architectural context, and into both 
LWV LQQHU DQG RXWHU DSSDUDWXV WKDW WKH LQKHUHQW GLIÀFXOW\ LQ VD\LQJ ¶where the painting 
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is’ can be applied to a discrete fragment of the painting associated with the Trinity. This 
ambiguity exploits an anomaly of perspective: that while it can locate with precision an 
object in pictorial space, it can also withhold the necessary cues required to reconstruct 
this position. (We have already noted this in relation to Bellini’s Resurrection.) This is why 
attempts to reconstruct the space of Trinity miss the point.10 As Goffen notes: ‘Certainly, 
this spatial imprecision is purposeful, and its purpose is to place the Trinity beyond spatial 
limits and constraints, literally immeasurable, ultimately and profoundly mysterious’ 
(p. 23). It is therefore no coincidence that, as noted earlier, Trinity occludes its horizon. 
It is the deliberate withholding of the vital information necessary to locate the Trinity in 
space, combined with the insistent frontal depiction of Christ and God, that introduces the 
required ambiguity of positioning in space – a device entirely dependent upon an otherwise 
Fig. 45    Masaccio: Trinity (detail), Santa Maria Novella, Florence. 
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strongly felt spatial continuum, and a situated beholder. The Trinity thus occupies another 
realm, another reality: an impact that is particularly apparent from a kneeling position, 
from a height that (particularly for a contemporary viewer) removes us from our normal 
spatial relation to painting.
In contrast to the use of cloud as sign, this is a solution that uses means entirely 
internal to the system of perspective in order to depict states beyond perspectival means 
of representation$VDEUHDN IURPWKHVRFDOOHG ¶PDWKHPDWLFDOVSDFH·RISHUVSHFWLYH DQG
yet not inconsistent with its internal logic), it constitutes a spatial equivalent to the role 
Damisch argues cloud plays, as perspective’s ‘necessary counterpart’. A discrete space is 
opened up within the painting, a visionary ‘gap’ in reality (the ‘unrepresentable’). Such a 
displacement is dependent for its impact upon the implication of an inviolable, sacred or 
GUHDPOLNHVSDFHWRZKLFKZHDUHH[FOXGHGERWKVSDWLDOO\DQGWHPSRUDOO\7KLVLPSDFWLQ
turn, is dependent upon the kind of situated relationship and implied continuity described 
in the previous chapters. In other words, the impact of such a spatial displacement is 
predicated upon the imaginative (rather than illusory) engagement of an external beholder, 
an embodied presence where the internal and external spectators fuse, blurring the boundaries 
EHWZHHQ UHDO DQG ÀFWLYH LQQHU DQG RXWHU UHDOLW\ ,I WKLV VLWXDWLQJ RI D YLHZHU LV ODUJHO\
achieved through a work’s framing, combined with perspective, then the subsequent 
spatial ambiguity follows from the concealment of the very means by which perspectival 
depth is implied, and by a corresponding rupture between such a displaced space and the 
work’s bounding frame.
6.
Some other examples might now help concretize the argument. Perhaps the most extreme 
construction of a secondary viewpoint is Andrea del Castagno’s The Trinity Appearing to 
St Jerome ÀJWKHWRSVHFWLRQRIZKLFKLQFOXGHVDQH[WUDRUGLQDU\YLHZRIWKH7ULQLW\
as if seen from above, from Heaven itself. The impact of the Corboli Chapel painting 
ZRXOGKDYHSHUKDSVEHHQHYHQJUHDWHUZLWKRXW WKH WZRFKLOGVHUDSKLPD ODWHDGGLWLRQ
that, according to Frederick Hartt, ‘were added a secco and have partially peeled away’ 
(1987, p. 267). Hartt surmises that ‘possibly the clergy were offended by the audacity of 
Castagno’s foreshortened Trinity and required this addition’ (p. 267). And yet while this 
might arguably appear as a more radical departure from a consistent perspective than 
Masaccio’s Trinity, this later work nevertheless utilizes new perspectival means in a 
way that is more obviously consistent with earlier models in terms of the work’s surface 
disposition. Unlike the Masaccio, it does not directly engage our implied participation. 
However, as Podro notes, ‘the embedding of one perspective within another’ does again 
register ‘divine intervention’ (1998, p. 49). 
Mantegna’s AssumptionÀJLQ3DGXDLVPRUHGLUHFWO\UHODWHGWR0DVDFFLR·VPRGHO
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This has a centric point placed approximately at eye level,11 at a height just below the 
platform on which the saints stand. ‘Our’ space is infringed by the arm of the apostle, who 
embraces the column on the left; the frame is thus integrated into both the work’s inner 
and outer reality. Like the earthbound saints, we gaze up at the vision of the Virgin, who 
VHHPLQJO\ ÁRDWV WRZDUGV RXU VSDFH DV VKH DVFHQGV WRZDUGV KHDYHQ ZKLOH RFFXS\LQJ D
space behind the painted architectural frame. Unlike Trinity, here we can verify the exact 
location of the second ‘vanishing point’, as it is indicated by the orthogonals of the column 
capitals, which conspicuously contradict those of the column bases. It is also playfully 
Fig. 46    Andrea del Castagno: The Trinity Appearing 
to St Jerome (c. 1455), Corboli Chapel, SS Annunciata, 
Florence. 
Fig. 47    Mantegna: Assumption
Overtari Chapel, Chiesa degli Eremitani, Padua. 
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indicated by the two diagonally placed putti. Mary occupies a space that is impossible to 
locate in depth, consistent with her role as an intermediary between heaven and earth.12 
In a sense, the last vestiges of cloud on which she stands, and the cherubim that frame her 
(forming a mandorla), are now partially, if not entirely, redundant as signs. While their 
role is certainly not superseded, it is allied to a spatial metaphor unimaginable without the 
discovery of a consistent perspective.
In Piero della Francesca’s Sansepolcro ResurrectionÀJWKHFHQWULFSRLQWLQGLFDWHG
by the work’s frame is about a foot below the sloping ground on which the soldiers sleep, 
and a foot or so above the viewer’s eye level.137KHOLIHVL]HGVROGLHUVDVOHHSRQVORSLQJ
ground, conform to this viewpoint, painted with great care as if from below. But as in 
Masaccio’s Trinity, White notes how Christ, here in his Resurrection, is depicted frontally 
Fig. 48    Piero della Francesca: Resurrection (c. 1460), Museo Civico, Sansepolcro. 
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²¶WKHUHLVQRIRUHVKRUWHQLQJLQWKHERG\RUWKHKHDGRIWKHÀJXUHRI&KULVW·S
White observes that ‘the viewpoint is laid aside as unimportant by the very artist who, 
IRU WKHÀUVW WLPHSURGXFHGD WKRURXJKJRLQJH[SRVLWLRQRI WKHFRQVWUXFWLRQDOSUREOHPV
LQYROYHGLQWKHULJLGDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHODZVRIDUWLÀFLDOSHUVSHFWLYH·S<HW,ZRXOG
argue that this is not a case of a diminishing of the importance of viewpoint; on the contrary, 
the registering of a deliberate break in mathematical perspective is entirely consistent with 
the idea of establishing a necessary distance within such an implied continuity. Field is 
surely right to suggest that ‘on the theological level one can no doubt make a good case 
for taking Christ, risen from the dead, as belonging to an order of reality different from 
that of the everyday world inhabited by the soldiers and by the spectator’; however, I 
FDQQRW DJUHH ZLWK )LHOG WKDW WKLV UHSUHVHQWV ¶D UDWKHU OLWHUDOPLQGHG LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ· RI
VXFKDWKHRORJLFDOWUXWKSS2QWKHFRQWUDU\WKHVXEWOHHIIHFWLVQRWDWDOO
immediately apparent. The impact is most noticeably felt in the fact that while Christ’s eyes 
meet ours, they somehow pass through us. He again occupies a different realm, a gap in 
ordinary spatial experience. 
The Resurrection thus divides into two clear zones, that of Christ and that of the 
sleeping guards. The background landscape symbolically registers the miraculous event 
E\GHSLFWLQJWKHWUHHVWRWKHOHIWKDQGVLGHZLWKRXWOHDYHVDQGWKHWUHHVWRWKHULJKWKDQG
side in full leaf. Spatial and symbolic means for registering the miraculous thus combine; 
the means by which they impact upon the viewer, however, fundamentally differs. While 
the former requires our imaginative engagement, the latter is ‘read’ as sign.
7.
If the notion of a secondary viewpoint is thus taken up by a number of Italian Renaissance 
works, perhaps not coincidentally by artists that might be said to have had a particular 
interest in perspectival construction, then it is also adapted (in a typically innovative way) by 
a Northern artist known for his exploitation of perspective distortion.14 In The Dead Christ 
in the TombÀJ%DVHO+DQV+ROEHLQSDLQWVDOLIHVL]HG&KULVWVRUHDOLVWLFDOO\GHDGWKDW
Fig. 49    Hans Holbein: The Dead Christ in the Tomb gIIHQWOLFKH.XQVWVDPPOXQJ%DVHO
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LWLVGLIÀFXOWWRUHFRQFLOHWKHHPDFLDWHGFRUSVHZLWK&KULVW·VLPPLQHQW5HVXUUHFWLRQ15 Julia 
Kristeva notes that:
7KHPDUW\U·VIDFHEHDUVWKHH[SUHVVLRQRIDKRSHOHVVJULHIWKHHPSW\VWDUHWKHVKDUSOLQHGSURÀOH
WKHGXOOEOXHJUHHQFRPSOH[LRQDUHWKRVHRIDPDQZKRLVWUXO\GHDGRI&KULVWIRUVDNHQE\WKH)DWKHU
(‘My God, my God, why have you deserted me?’) and without the promise of Resurrection. (1989, 
p. 110)
In contrast to works considered thus far, this is a body starkly presented to the viewer, as 
if in a morgue. Unlike Mantegna’s equally poignant Dead Christ ÀJLQWKH3LQDFRWHFD
0LODQWKHÀJXUHLVGHFLGHGO\DORQH16 Kristeva argues that ‘it is perhaps that isolation – an 
act of composition – that endows the painting with its major melancholy burden’ (p. 112). 
Certainly, the extraordinary elongated proportions of the work increase the foreboding: 
‘The tombstone weighs down on the upper portion of the painting, which is merely twelve 
LQFKHV KLJK DQG LQWHQVLÀHV WKH IHHOLQJ RI SHUPDQHQW GHDWK WKLV FRUSVH VKDOO QHYHU ULVH
again’ (Kristeva 1989, p. 110).
$ QXPEHU RI REVHUYHUV KDYH QRWHG WKDW WKH ERG\ DSSHDUV DW LWV PRVW IXOO\ WKUHH
dimensional when viewed obliquely from the left, and from slightly below.17 The oblique 
viewpoint reveals the corporeality of Christ, and brings the ‘illusionistic’ qualities of the 
painting to the fore. From such a position, the unrelenting realism is so astounding that 
Fig. 50    Mantegna: Dead Christ F3LQDFRWHFDGL%UHUD0LODQ
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one might readily imagine that this is the dead body of Christ, humanitas Christi, strongly 
OLWIURPDORZVRXUFHRIOLJKWIURPWKHULJKWWKHSODFHPHQWRIWKHEHQWEDFNKHDGFUHDWLQJ
dramatic (and ‘terrible’) highlights and shadows. Palpably present in human form, we 
nevertheless cannot reach out to touch the dead Christ from this marginalized vantage 
point; we are thus separated from the body, which is inaccessible despite its very realism 
and suggestion of immediate presence.18 
<HW , EHOLHYH WKH SDLQWLQJ LV DOVR PHDQW WR EH VHHQ IURQWDOO\ FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH
vanishing point, the placement of which (as far as I am aware) seems to have received 
QRFULWLFDODWWHQWLRQ*LYHQ WKH ODFNRIRUWKRJRQDOV WKHFOXHV IRUÀ[LQJ WKLVSRVLWLRQDUH
VFDQWEXWDUHQRWLQVLJQLÀFDQWWKH\LQFOXGHWKHYHU\PDUNVE\ZKLFK+ROEHLQVLJQDOVKLV
presence as witness, the initials HH and the date MDXXII, painted as though incised into 
the side of the tomb. That this point of origin is not accidental is indicated by the fact that 
&KULVWSRLQWVGLUHFWO\DWLWZLWK+LVH[WHQGHGPLGGOHÀQJHUZKLFKH[WHQGVLQWR¶RXU·VSDFH
(This position is consistent with the folds of the cloth on which Christ is placed.) Even 
more strongly than with Masaccio’s TrinityZHDUHUHPLQGHGE\WKHSRLQWLQJÀQJHUIRU
ZKRPWKHVDFULÀFHZDVPDGH%XWKHUHFRQVLVWHQWZLWKLWV3URWHVWDQWFRQWH[WWKHUHLVQR
LQWHUPHGLDU\LQWKHÀJXUHRIWKH9LUJLQ$V.ULVWHYDQRWHV
Christ’s dereliction is here at its worst: forsaken by the Father, he is apart from all of us. Unless 
Holbein, whose mind, pungent as it was, does not appear to have lead him across the threshold of 
atheism, wanted to include us, humans, foreigners, spectators that we are, forthrightly in this crucial 
moment of Christ’s life. With no intermediary, suggestion, or indoctrination, whether pictorial or 
theological, other than our ability to imagine death, we are led to collapse in the horror of the caesura 
constituted by death or to dream of an invisible beyond. (p. 113)
And yet it is our ability to imagine death that is key to the notion of identifying with 
Christ’s suffering. Kristeva persuasively argues that the beholder is led to identify with 
Christ in human form:
2QWKHEDVLVRIWKDWLGHQWLÀFDWLRQRQHWKDWLVDGPLWWHGO\WRRDQWKURSRORJLFDODQGSV\FKRORJLFDOIURP
the point of view of a strict theology, man is nevertheless provided with a powerful symbolic device 
that allows him to experience death and resurrection even in his physical body, thanks to the strength 
RILPDJLQDU\LGHQWLÀFDWLRQ²DQGRILWVDFWXDOHIIHFWV²ZLWKWKHDEVROXWH6XEMHFW&KULVWS19 
,VKDOOUHWXUQWRWKHLVVXHRILGHQWLÀFDWLRQLQWKHÀQDOFKDSWHU,ILQDQXQSUHFHGHQWHG
way, we are here asked to identify with the reality of Christ’s suffering, then the picture also 
RIIHUVVRPHKRSHRIUHGHPSWLRQ7KHOHIWKDQGVLGHUHWXUQRIWKHQLFKHLVFXULRXVO\DEVHQW
which again is surprisingly unremarked upon. While this is perhaps consistent with the 
notion of an oblique viewpoint (from where the return of the niche would not be seen),20 
the missing return to the recess shatters the implication of the tomb as a continuation of the 
viewer’s space; and it does so in a very deliberate way. Seen straight on, from a position 
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slightly to the right of the centre of the niche, consistent with the vanishing point, the 
spatial cohesion of the tomb untangles and we are left with a sense of Christ released from 
our mathematical space and the ravages of time played out upon his body. The apparent 
GHSWKRIWKHWRPERIWKHULJKWKDQGVLGHRIWKHSDLQWLQJLVFRQWUDGLFWHGE\WKHFRPSUHVVLRQ
RIVSDFHRIWKHOHIWKDQGVLGHXQOLNHWKHLQVLVWHQWWKUHHGLPHQVLRQDOLW\RIWKHREOLTXHYLHZ
as the rear wall of the niche aligns itself to the painted surface, Christ inches forward from 
KLVFRQÀQLQJWRPE
8.
The examples developed thus far in this chapter address works implying the presence of 
an external spectator, and are very much dependent for their effect on the physical presence 
of such a beholder. But are there equivalent perspectival strategies for representing the 
Fig. 51    Piero della Francesca: The Dream of Constantine, The Story of the True Cross 6DQ
Francesco, Arrezo. 
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supernatural or unconscious for works implying no such spectator, or where the viewer is 
LQWHUQDOWRWKHÀFWLRQDOZRUOG"+HUHWKHUHLVQRVSDWLDOFRQWLQXLW\ZLWKWKHH[WHUQDOVSHFWDWRU
Rather, if a spectator is implied, then we are invited, as it were, to step into the virtual space 
of the painting. Consequently, any spatial displacement must therefore be internal to this 
ÀFWLRQDOUHDOPDQGGRHVQRWLPSDFWXSRQWKHUHDOVSDFHWKHYLHZHURFFXSLHV2WKHUPHDQV
are required to suggest coexistent realms.
One strategy that emerges is to convert part of a work into the content of a dream. 
Piero della Francesca’s Dream of Constantine ÀJIURPThe Story of the True Cross in San 
Francesco, Arrezo, does just this. The folds of the tent have been pulled back to reveal the 
sleeping Constantine, while the guards are oblivious to both the angel, who dramatically 
enters into the pictorial space, and the dream light emanating from the cross he holds. 
While our presence is not implied, we are given privileged access to the content of the 
dream.  Wollheim has similarly argued that with certain works the painting – ‘or, perhaps 
EHWWHUVRPHSDUWRIWKHSDLQWLQJ·PLJKWEHFRQYHUWHGLQWRWKHFRQWHQWRIDUHYHULH
p. 336).21+HXVHVWKHH[DPSOHRIFHUWDLQRI%HOOLQL·V0DGRQQDDQG&KLOGSDLQWLQJVÀJ
where the landscape is ‘experienced as the content of a shared reverie’ between mother and 
infant (p. 336). Unmentioned by Wollheim, I would contend that the Dream of Constantine 
is an unambiguous example of what he refers to as ‘an attenuated version of the spectator 
in the picture’, attenuated because he is represented in the picture, and ‘only some part of 
the picture can be thought of as corresponding to his vision’ (p. 336). 
Another strategy is to associate a section of the work with the materialization of 
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Fig. 52    Giovanni Bellini: Madonna of the Meadow F1DWLRQDO*DOOHU\/RQGRQ
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DWWULEXWHVRIDÀJXUHZLWKLQWKHVFHQH,Q3LHUR·VVPDOOSDQHOIURP8UELQRWKHMadonna di 
Senigallia ÀJDGRRUZD\OHDGVWRDQHPSW\URRPEH\RQGWKHURRPLWVHOIEHFRPLQJ
DQ¶RWKHUZRUOGO\·DWWULEXWHRIWKHDQJHOIUDPHGE\WKHRSHQLQJ7KHEHDXWLIXOO\UHQGHUHG
shaft of light illuminates dust in the room, materializing into a ‘natural’ halo. Neither the 
Madonna, with downcast eyes, nor the Christ Child, who looks beyond us, return our gaze: 
RQO\WKHOHIWKDQGDQJHOGLUHFWO\DFNQRZOHGJHVXVDVWKRXJKZHKDYHSHUKDSVHQWHUHGWKH
ÀFWLRQDOVSDFHDQGLIQRWDGLUHFWSDUWLFLSDQWDUHZLWQHVVWRWKLVPLUDFXORXVYLVLWDWLRQ
$ VLPLODU LGHQWLÀFDWLRQ RI ÀJXUH DQG VSDFH GLVWLQJXLVKHV VRPH RI )UD $QJHOLFR
Annunciations. In Fra Angelico’s Cortona AnnunciationÀJDQRSHQGRRUZD\IUDPHV
Gabriel’s halo, the red curtain surrounding the bed ingeniously mimicking and extending 
his wings. As with the Madonna di Senigallia, WKHURRPEH\RQGZLWKLWVKLJKO\UHÁHFWLYH
ÁRRUEHFRPHVDPDWHULDOL]DWLRQRIWKHP\VWLFDOSUHVHQFHRIWKHDQJHO
Fig. 53    Piero della Francesca: Madonna di Senigallia F*DOOHULD1D]LRQDOHGHOOH0DUFKH
Urbino. 
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Combining both strategies, Vermeer’s early painting Girl Asleep ÀJ  LQ WKH
Metropolitan Museum of Art, invites us to project the contents of a shared reverie onto an 
empty room. The painting thus utilizes a doorsien, a VHFRQGDU\SLFWXUHZLWKLQDSLFWXUH
which Martha Hollander describes as a narrative or rhetorical device, primarily in relation 
to Dutch genre painting. Interestingly, and consistent with my argument, Hollander also 
traces the use of a doorsien back to the earlier model of the representation of different realms 
in relation to the miraculous. She argues that: 
In the late fourteenth century conventions were devised for representing two levels of reality: 
supernatural beings would appear in clouds or circles of light to distinguish them from mortals, or 
‘speech bubbles’ would isolate special utterances from their speakers. Such devices violate the rules 
RIRPLWWLQJZKDWLVLQYLVLEOHDQGDUHDWRGGVZLWKWKHXQLI\LQJIRUFHRIRQHSRLQWSHUVSHFWLYH
p. 23)
While there are a number of ways to construct such a doorsien, Vermeer utilizes a 
doorkijkje  WKH 'XWFK WHUP IRU D SHUVSHFWLYDO YLHZ WKURXJK D GRRUZD\ RU RSHQLQJ LQWR
a neighbouring space.22 Such devices are recurrent features of Dutch genre painting, 
although the psychological aspects are typically allied to a work’s narrative or rhetorical 
content. Georgina Cole has argued that ‘doors constitute the representational limits of the 
Fig. 54   Fra Angelico: Annunciation F0XVHR'LRFHVDQR&RUWRQD
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interior, and consequently function in these works as the architectural medium through 
which domestic space is constructed and interpreted’ (2006, p. 18). One might think of the 
tension between the pull of the outside and that of domestic security and nurturing in one 
of Peter de Hooch’s genre paintings, where perspective, combined with the use of open 
doorways, orchestrates the painting into coexistent (and often gendered) social spaces, 
public and private life. 
It is useful to compare Girl Asleep with Nicholaes Maes’s The Idle Servant ÀJ 
both painted around 1657 and both depicting women asleep. The catalogue of the 1696 
DXFWLRQ RI WZHQW\RQH 9HUPHHU SDLQWLQJV GHVFULEHV WKH IRUPHU DV ¶$ GUXQNHQ VOHHSLQJ
maid at a table’ (Blankert 1981, p. 22). The moralising tone is obvious, drunkenness being 
contrasted with temperance and moderation. And indeed, in The Idle Servant Maes goes to 
considerable lengths to ensure that we ‘read’ the painting’s moral message. The woman 
asleep is obviously a maid, and the consequences of her ‘idleness’ are clearly depicted 
Fig. 55    Johannes Vermeer: Girl Asleep F0HWURSROLWDQ0XVHXPRI$UW1HZ<RUN
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²IURPWKHFKDRVRIFRRNLQJXWHQVLOVRQWKHÁRRUWRWKHFDWFDXJKWLQWKHDFWRIVWHDOLQJ
the dinner. The didactic intent is reinforced by the housewife, whose smile and gesture 
presents her idle maidservant to the audience. And the theatrical term is here appropriate, 
for while the curtain of Maes’s London The Eavesdropper ÀJLVQRORQJHUSUHVHQWLWLVWR
the external viewer that is here addressed.
Both scenes employ a doorkijkje, but to very different ends. Maes uses this device to 
reinforce the painting’s narrative content, while Vermeer gives it an enhanced psychological 
GLPHQVLRQ8QOLNH0DHV·VZRUNWKHLPSOLHGSUHVHQFHLVLQWHUQDOQRWH[WHUQDOWRWKHÀFWLYH
world. The table and chair establish the spectator in the picture’s implied distance from 
the sleeping woman. Behind her, a half opened door offers us a glimpse into a lobby with 
a mysterious room beyond. In Maes’s Idle Servant, the open door establishes the respective 
realms of servant and housewife. In the Vermeer, the open door sets up a ‘charged’ threshold 
where ‘whatever haunts the girl asleep also haunts us as well’ (Snow 1994, p. 58).
This was not always the case, for the room beyond was not always ruled by absence. 
A Displacement Device
Fig. 56    Nicolaes Maes: The Idle Servant (c. 1657), National 
Gallery, London.
Fig. 57    Johannes Vermeer: Girl Asleep ;UD\GHWDLO7KH
0HWURSROLWDQ0XVHXPRI$UW1HZ<RUN6QRZS
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;UD\VLQGLFDWHLWZDVRQFHLQKDELWHGE\DPDQZHDULQJDKDWZDWFKHGE\DGRJVWDQGLQJ
LQ WKH SDUWLDOO\ RSHQHGGRRUZD\ ÀJ  LQ PXFK WKH ZD\ WKDW WKH GRJ IXQFWLRQVDVD
transitional device in de Hooch’s Woman Lacing her Bodice ÀJ,QWKLVHDUOLHUYHUVLRQRI
Vermeer’s painting, the dog marks the transition between (and connects) the two different 
realms. It plays a transitional and anecdotal role in connecting the interior and exterior 
realms of the woman and man.23 That this variation of the painting hinted at a sexual 
theme is indicated by its similarity in content to de Hooch’s numerous ‘merry company’ 
themes.24
Both the shadowy male presence and the doorkijkje suggest an erotic reading. Other 
clues are offered, such as the cropped painting hanging over the woman, which has been 
LGHQWLÀHGDV&XSLGXQPDVNHG%XW9HUPHHUUHPRYHVERWKPDQDQGGRJLQDQDFWZKLFK
,DPFRQYLQFHGLVRIJUHDWVLJQLÀFDQFHIRUWKHIXWXUHGLUHFWLRQRIKLVZRUN:LWKRXWWKHLU
physical presence, other readings are possible. The room beyond can now ‘be read as an 
H[WHQVLRQRIWKHJLUO·VUHYHULHDPHWDSKRUIRUKHUKDOIRSHQQHVVRUWKHGHVWLQDWLRQWRZDUG
ZKLFKRXURZQSURMHFWHGYLHZLQJWHQGV·6QRZS:HDUHJLYHQDFFHVVWRWKHVXE
conscious world of the sleeper. As Gowing writes:
Fig. 58   Pieter de Hooch: Woman Lacing her Bodice beside a Cradle *HPlOGHJDOHULH%HUOLQ
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Sleep is revealed as the dropping of a mask, uncovering the fantasy which is the sleeper’s secret, a 
fantasy, we may guess, of love. (1997, p. 51)
While the painting depicts an unconscious rather than supernatural phenomenon, it 
incorporates a similar gap in ordinary perception. Here sublimation becomes integral to 
the work. Pictorial space is no longer primarily a narrative space, but a destination for the 
sublimated desires of its inhabitant, and of the beholder. And as Snow adds:
[T]he feeling is equally strong that the girl and her reverie exist to materialize that threshold, and 
that it addresses the viewer’s desire at a more primordial level than she does. And the composition 
as a whole leaves deliberately unresolved whether the door is the background of grief or of desire, 
whether it opens on a renunciation of sexuality or as its promise, its ‘beyond’. (1994, p. 61)25
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Plenum #2 is a site-responsive rather than site-speciic piece. It was irst 
shown in Germany, for a solo exhibition at Galerie Sebastianskapelle, 
a converted chapel which allowed for a view of the piece from a high 
vantage point. It has subsequently been shown at Chelsea’s Triangle 
Space. Plenum #2 comprises two elements: a low steel table, 800 x 
2400 x 150mm deep, and an elongated projected image. The open-
ended metal construction (which conceals a video projector) frames the 
projection of an empty niche, seemingly recessed into the gallery wall. 
The materiality of the slab-like table contrasts with the ephemeral nature 
of the projection, which fades and returns throughout the day as the 
light changes. Designed for spaces that admit some natural light, this is 
a projection piece that rejects the notion of the black-box. Periodically, 
a breathing igure (the artist) slowly materialises within the niche, only 
to gradually disappear again. The work thus alternates between igural 
presence and absence. The geometry of the projection, seldom an issue 
in video art, asserts itself in a very particular way: the viewer can never 
occupy the point of origin of the projection, which lies immediately above 
the table; the virtual space of the ilm, with its pronounced perspectival 
box, never quite coheres into a fully-formed illusion.
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On Projection and Sublimation
The pictorial space of great painting repels and envelops us. We may feel trapped and lost in the 
LQÀQLWHDWWKHVDPHWLPH(KUHQ]ZHLJS
1.
Many of the works I considered in the previous chapter incorporate what amounts 
to a distancing or displacement device in order to depict the supernatural or the 
unconscious. These devices are features of works that otherwise situate a viewer through 
an imaginative engagement, either as an internal or external spectator. They establish a 
NLQGRI LQYLRODELOLW\D ¶JDS·ZLWKLQSHUFHSWLRQDVSDFH WKDW LV LPSOLHGDVEHLQJoutside 
RI QRUPDO VSDWLRWHPSRUDO UHODWLRQV , LGHQWLÀHG WKUHH SRWHQWLDO VWUDWHJLHV IRU GHSLFWLQJ
WKH VXSHUQDWXUDO RU WKH XQFRQVFLRXV ZLWKLQ WKH XQLÀHG ORJLF RI SHUVSHFWLYDO VSDFH
7KHVH VWUDWHJLHV DUH QRW VSHFLÀFDOO\ GHSHQGHQW XSRQ DOWKRXJK WKH\ PLJKW LQFRUSRUDWH
or enhance) symbolic elements. However, they do use indexical signs as props in an 
imaginative engagement that determines a work’s conditions of access. With works that 
activate the space of the external beholder, this gap might alternatively be instituted by 
PHDQVRILWKHVXJJHVWLRQRIDQRSHQLQJRQWRDQDPRUSKRXVVSDFHWKDWGHÀHVGHOLQHDWLRQ
or (ii) a secondary viewpoint contradicting the work’s principal vanishing point. The 
former selectively abandons perspectival representation; the latter creates a deliberately 
¶QRQPDWKHPDWLFDO·SODFHPHQWRIDÀJXUHRUÀJXUHJURXSZLWKLQDQRWKHUZLVH¶UDWLRQDOO\·
constructed pictorial space. By contrast, in works engaging a spectator in the picture – 
ZKHWKHUDFNQRZOHGJHGGHQLHGRUZKHUHWKHUHLVD¶IHOW·DEVHQFHDJDSLVRSHQHGXSE\
(iii) the use of a psychologically ‘charged’ internal threshold onto a discrete space that is 
metaphorized. With such works, part of the picture is transformed into the content of a 
VKDUHGUHYHULHDQLQWHUPHGLDWHRUWUDQVLWLRQDOVSDFHFRQQHFWLQJDÀJXUHZLWKLQWKHZRUN
to the beholder. 
I have argued that the experiencing of these respective distancing devices is dependent 
XSRQ D SDUWLFXODU NLQG RI SLFWRULDO VHHLQJ ZKHUH VHHLQJLQ LV VXSSOHPHQWHG E\ LFRQLF
imagination. An imaginative engagement is necessary precisely because the affective aspect 
of such a ‘gap’ in perception is dependent not upon the disinterested ‘reading’ of signs, 
but the implication of a spatial proximity that is felt, and a continuity that is then broken: 
a gap that is experienced rather than decoded as a sign. Moreover, this gap is experienced 
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in a way that is constitutive of the work’s meaning. Seeing-with provides the necessary vivid 
experience of pictorial space on which such reciprocity depends. It provides an experiential 
point of view, typical of centred LFRQLFPHQWDOVWDWHV0RUHRYHUZLWKWKHÀUVWWZRVWUDWHJLHV
(and arguably, to a lesser extent, the third), seeing-with replicates the experience of our 
bodily situatedness in the real world in that it structures our implied spatial access in a 
way that draws upon nonconceptual content.  
$W WKLV SRLQW DQG IRU WKH ÀUVW WLPH LQ WKH WKHVLV , LQWURGXFH WKH QRWLRQ RI DUWLVWLF
expression. What follows is, I must confess, largely speculative, but hopefully not without 
merit. I want to suggest that such displaced spaces, in their implication of the timelessness 
characteristic of the unconscious, are receptive to processes that intimate psychological 
projection, introjection and sublimation; and this, at least in part, explains their powerful 
emotive affect and metaphorizing potential. 
Of course, such emotive potential cannot be isolated from these paintings’ 
predominantly religious content. A requisite set of beliefs and desires forms part of the 
substantial cognitive stock the suitable spectator must bring to such works. And yet I 
would argue that these works structure the spatial ‘performance’ in a way that heightens 
their affect by an ingenious alignment of structure to content: an alignment of subject matter 
and VSDWLDOVWUXFWXUH%\VWUXFWXUH,UHIHUVSHFLÀFDOO\WRWKHVWUXFWXULQJRILPSOLHGSLFWRULDO
space relative to the viewer. And to repeat a point made earlier, the concern here is ‘with 
the structure of the “performance” which precedes the effect’ (Iser 1978, p. 27).
Without collapsing the differences between the respective strategies outlined above, the 
argument I propose is that such a displacement device functions as a conduit, or container, 
for projective properties; these are properties of the work of art, but invoke corresponding 
emotions that colour subsequent perception. This expressive perception intimates a history 
RULJLQDWLQJ LQ SURFHVVHV RI SURMHFWLRQ EXW DOVR LQWURMHFWLRQ DQG VXEOLPDWLRQ  SURFHVVHV
particularly apposite for such work’s subject matter. It should be stressed that while these 
projective properties are properties of the artwork, they are not placed there by the artist 
through any ‘concept’ of projection.1 The projective properties of such spaces arise indirectly, 
out of mechanisms for establishing distance within the implied spatial continuity provided 
by perspective (combined with framing). But in noting the essentially functional role such 
mechanisms play within a perspectival structure that situates a beholder in relation to 
WKHÀFWLYHVSDFHWKLVLVQRWWRDUJXHWKDWDUWLVWVHPSOR\LQJVXFKGHYLFHVZHUHLQGLIIHUHQW
or oblivious to their psychological effect. Indeed, as spectators of their own work, this 
impact would have been noted even if artists lacked the cognitive means to describe such 
an experience.
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2.
Now, as may well be apparent, this is an account that owes much to Wollheim’s theory of 
artistic expression,2 but differs from Wollheim’s position in a number of important respects. 
Wollheim supplies a key concept which is central to the notion of how such displacement 
devices gain emotive content:3 namely correspondence, the mechanism by which Wollheim 
argues a work (or, indeed, a part of nature, such as a landscape) might acquire expressive 
content. This is a relation between an artefact and an emotion which the artwork is capable 
RILQYRNLQJE\YLUWXHRIKRZLWORRNV:ROOKHLPLGHQWLÀHVcorrespondence as the mechanism 
by which an internal psychological state is transferred from the viewer to the work of 
art, a correspondence between a work and an internal condition dependent upon the 
‘expressive perception’ of projective properties. ‘Correspondences are formed in projection, 
and projectionLVDSURFHVVLQZKLFKHPRWLRQVRUIHHOLQJVÁRZIURPXVWRZKDWZHSHUFHLYH·
(Wollheim 1987, p. 82).
What is distinctive about projective properties? Wollheim claims that the answer 
is that ‘they are properties that we identify through experiences’ that have a ‘special 
complexity’:
There are two aspects to this experience which accounts for its complexity. For, on the one hand, 
though the experience is a perceptual experience, it is not a wholly perceptual experience. It is a 
partly affective experience, but the affect that attaches to the experience is not affect directed towards 
the property itself. It is affect directed towards older or more dominant objects. When a fearful  object 
strikes fear into an observer, as it does, it is not fear of that object. On the other hand, the experience 
reveals or intimates a history. It is not so much that each individual experience intimates narrowly 
its own KLVWRU\WKDWLVWUXHRQO\RIWKHIRUPDWLYHH[SHULHQFHVLQWKHOLIHKLVWRU\RIWKHSHUVRQ:KDW
later experiences do is to intimate how the sort of experience they exemplify comes about. Such 
experiences occur originally in the aftermath of projection, and the fact that later experiences intimate 
this origin, and do so even when they do not themselves originate this way, is the reason why I call 
them experiences of ‘projective’ properties. (1991, p. 56)
As Podro notes, and what is not always fully acknowledged, is that Wollheim thus 
founds his conception of expressiveness ‘upon the internal continuity of mental life’, 
whereby ‘early processes of projection affect our later capacity to form relationships with 
other people and even the way the inanimate world takes on qualities of mood and feeling’ 
(2004, p. 218). These processes evolve into a dispositional pattern; Wollheim claims that 
‘as the psychology matures, projection becomes more orderly, and those parts of the 
HQYLURQPHQWXSRQZKLFKIHHOLQJVDUHSURMHFWHGDUHQRZVHOHFWHGEHFDXVHRIWKHLUDIÀQLW\
to those feelings’ (1993, p. 152). 
7KUHH IDFWRUV HPHUJH IURP :ROOKHLP·V DFFRXQW ZKLFK , EULHÁ\ VXPPDULVH )LUVWO\
expressive perception is a form of seeing, one permeated or coloured by an affective 
experience. Secondly, expressive perception rests upon ‘complex’ projection, a process 
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philosophically distinguished from projection in its more rudimentary, ‘simple’ form 
WKDWLVSURMHFWHGRXWZDUGVRQWRD¶ÀJXUH·LQWKHHQYLURQPHQWLQWKDWFRPSOH[SURMHFWLRQ
GHVFULEHV¶DZD\RIH[SHULHQFLQJWKHH[WHUQDOZRUOG·SS$V:ROOKHLPQRWHV
‘with complex projection, projection is onto some natural part of the environment, or 
something which does not, and is not held to, possess a psychology’ (1991, p. 58). Unlike 
simple projection, the property of the environment experienced is not the same as the 
property projected, ‘but something that corresponds to it’ (Wollheim 1984, p. 214). It is a 
form of projection that metaphorizes something without a psychology: if I am touched by 
PHODQFKRO\RQ¶ORRNLQJRXWRYHUDQHVWXDU\DQGWKHVDOWPDUVKHV·RUORRNLQJDW&RQVWDEOH·V
Hadleigh Castle, ‘which depicts a landscape with much this character’, then ‘I respond 
by judging the scene itself to be melancholy – that is metaphorically melancholy’ (p. 
215).4 Thirdly, Wollheim argues that expressive perception of an artwork does not require 
someone to be in the immediate throes or aftermath of an act of projection, but that the 
artwork be perceived as ‘being of a piece with’ an emotional state felt by the projector 
SS&RUUHVSRQGHQFHVDUH¶JURXQGHGLQWUDLQVRIDVVRFLDWLRQDQGLWLVWKHVH
associations that function as the background against which correspondence is perceived’ 
(Wollheim 1999, p. 79).
Furthermore, with respect to an artwork rather than a part of nature, it expresses 
a condition by corresponding to a perceptible property that it has ‘intentionally’: ‘the 
property is due to the intentions of the artist’ (p. 62). Here correspondences are made, not 
found (Wollheim 1993, p. 155), and hence are subject to a standard of correctness dependent 
upon ‘the achievement, not just the intention’ of the artist (1984, p. 215).
3.
Wollheim’s theory has been most effectively challenged by Budd (2001), who is sceptical 
of the notion of projection grounding expressive perception. Part of Budd’s criticism 
focuses on a supposed weakness exposed by Wollheim’s abandonment of the untenable 
position, seemingly presented in ‘The Sheep and the Ceremony’ (1993: originally 1979), 
that expressive perception occurs immediately as a result of ‘the projection of the subject’s 
inner emotional state (or, rather, a constellation of such states) onto the object of perception’ 
(Budd 2001, p. 104).5 Budd argues that:
In the absence of a compelling argument for the claim that projection of an external item as matching 
a psychological condition is possible only because and in virtue of prior projection, the recognition of 
projection as an essential constituent of the analysis of expression is entirely dependent upon the 
intimation thesis. In sum: The rejection of the idea that the activity of projection must take place in 
or immediately prior to expressive perception, and the failure to eliminate the possibility that the 
perception of correspondence might be rooted, not just in projection, but in some other, independent 
psychological phenomenon, requires the introduction of the intimation thesis to bind perception to 
projection. (p. 105)
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Now the problem here for Budd is at least in part one of a lack of supporting 
arguments, a ‘programmatic’ charge that Wollheim readily concedes (2001b, p. 255). But 
Budd also has a more fundamental problem with the affective aspects of Wollheim’s 
account. Budd argues that ‘if the affective aspect of the distinctive experience of a projective 
property is not an actual feeling of the emotion expressed, what is this affective element 
and how can it fuse with the perception and colour what is seen?’ (2001, p. 108) 
If many of Budd’s criticisms hold, is there anything that can be salvaged from 
Wollheim’s position? I do not attempt to mount a comprehensive defence of Wollheim’s 
theory, nor do I pretend to be in a position to make good its programmatic nature. Indeed, 
I would concede to Budd that there might very well be other independent psychological 
phenomena involved in the perception of correspondence, not least given Wollheim’s 
claim that intention ‘must be understood so as to include thoughts, beliefs, memories’ as 
well as ‘emotions and feelings’ (1987, p. 86). But I do not believe we therefore have to 
entirely abandon Wollheim’s theory. We should start by acknowledging, as Podro has 
argued, that there is a complex interaction between individual projection and a shared 
culture:
Here we should surely interpolate that once the process of such projection onto the world has become 
habitual, our world is permeated with such expressive potential. This, surely, is not the product only 
of our individual projections but of our shared culture; however, we could only participate in this 
culture if we had ourselves engaged in such projection; we could not simply have learned it up. 
(2004, p. 219)
Podro argues, after Wollheim, that from an early age we see the world as emotionally 
coloured through projecting ‘such mental states onto external objects’, but we also ‘carry 
DZD\ZLWKXVVRPHPHPRU\RIWKRVHHDUO\SURMHFWLRQVQRWQHFHVVDULO\VSHFLÀFSURMHFWLRQV
but at least the generalized sense of making them’ (p. 219). But if through this habituation 
of projection ’phantasy discharges itself into the world’ (Wollheim 1984, p. 154), it does so 
in the context of a shared cultural experience.
Secondly, I would argue that the primary weakness of Wollheim’s position is not the 
intimation thesis as such, but his failure to tie such intimation solely to projection. But 
granting this, I do not see why Budd assumes that with the intimation thesis the experience 
of an artwork felt as ‘being of a piece with’ an emotional state of the perceiver is not a 
genuine instance of an emotion invoked. As Wollheim argues:
[T]he corresponding emotion, once invoked, should not stand apart from the perception through 
which it in invoked. It should not be a mere association to what is perceived. The emotion should 
ÁRRGLQRQWKHSHUFHSWLRQ,QH[SUHVVLYHSHUFHSWLRQLWLVQRWHQRXJKWKDWZKDWLVSHUFHLYHGLQYRNHV
the corresponding emotion: the emotion must affect how we perceive what we perceive. Expressed 
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emotion and perception fuse. (1987, p. 82)
 
And here I believe arguments taken from Wollheim’s The Thread of Life (1984) and On the 
Emotions (1999) can help clarify the nature of the affective part of an intimation of not just 
projection, but a broader set of processes by which phantasy discharges itself.
 Crucially, Wollheim claims that emotions are mental dispositions; that this is so ‘is 
something that the vocabulary of emotions can easily obscure’, in that ‘we use the same 
words to refer to the emotions themselves and to the mental states in which the emotions 
manifest themselves’ (p. 9). The argument involves the interaction (and particularly causal 
relation) between an underlying mental disposition and an occurent mental state; it requires 
the distinguishing of occurrent phantasies (as mental states) and dispositional phantasies 
SS
Projection, like introjection, is a ‘psychic mechanism’ (1984, p. 120). An immediate 
act of complex projection, as a mental activity (p. 34), activates a mental state (p. 33), a 
physiognomic perception of part of the environment; but it also brings about a mental 
disposition. As Wollheim notes, ‘dispositions have histories’ (p. 34).6 Expressive perception 
is a process where dispositions manifest themselves in ‘iconic mental states’ (p. 120), 
which perpetrate not the original act of projection, but a history whereby a correspondence 
develops between a part of the environment and feelings which it invokes. Wollheim 
asks:
What restrictions are placed upon the type or types of mental state in which a disposition may 
manifest itself? And the answer is that a disposition manifests itself in, and only in, those mental 
states which typically further, or contribute to furthering, its role. For a mental state to manifest a 
PHQWDOGLVSRVLWLRQWKHW\SH>RI@PHQWDOVWDWHRIZKLFKLWLVDWRNHQPXVWKDYHDFDXVDOHIÀFDF\WKDW
FRLQFLGHVZLWKWKHUROHRIWKHGLVSRVLWLRQ:KHQFDXVDOHIÀFDF\DQGUROHWKXVFRLQFLGH,VKDOOVD\WKDW
mental state and mental disposition concur. Concurrence is the core of manifestation. (p. 54)
But as I understand Wollheim’s complex position, a concurrence is not, in itself, the 
manifestation of an affective mental state. For Wollheim, ‘manifestation is not concurrence’ 
(p. 54). Rather: 
Manifestation is a causal relation, in that a disposition causes, or helps to cause, the mental states that 
manifest it. But the causality in manifestation follows the lines of concurrence. When a disposition is 
manifested by a mental state, it causes a mental state that concurs with it, and it causes that mental 
state because of the concurrence. (p. 54)
 
In relation to artistic expression, where there is a correspondence between an artwork and 
a disposition it invokes, the mere perception of this correspondence is not, in itself, an 
expressive perception. The intimation of a dispositional history PXVW KDYH FDXVDO HIÀFDF\ 
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ZLWK UHVSHFW WR D PDQLIHVWDWLRQ RI D PHQWDO VWDWH ZKHUH WKH DIIHFW ÁRRGV LQ RQ WKH
perception. Budd is therefore not entirely fair when he claims that Wollheim does not 
attempt to ‘make clear why the perception of correspondence should be made possible 
only through an affect attached to, integrated into, the perception‘, and correspondingly 
‘how exactly the affect manages to transform a perception of something in the environment 
into one in which the item is seen to correspond to the psychological state the affect 
H[HPSOLÀHV·SQ7KHFRUUHVSRQGHQFHLVQRWDPHUHDVVRFLDWLRQEXWPXVW
have a causal relation to an expressive perception. That a disposition manifests in a mental 
state is consistent with the role emotions generally play in the mental life of an individual; 
that the emotion colours the subsequent perception is, I would argue, analogous with 
Wittgenstein’s notion of how a concept permeates perception in the seeing of an aspect, 
such as when we recognize in the face of an old friend their younger self (2001, 165 e). 
:ROOKHLP WKXV DUJXHV WKDW ² E\ DQG ODUJH ² ¶PHQWDO GLVSRVLWLRQV IXOÀO WKHLU UROH
indirectly’ (1984, p. 55). The resulting mental state has psychic force, and hence psychic 
function, by way of the disposition. So in the case of correspondence, an expressive 
perception does not have to be immediately preceded by an act of projection; rather, the 
H[SUHVVLYHSHUFHSWLRQRZHVLWVFDXVDOHIÀFDF\WRLWVSKHQRPHQRORJ\DSKHQRPHQRORJ\WKDW
‘expresses that disposition’ (p. 56). This is its affective aspect. It expresses a disposition that 
intimates a history. The causal chain from originating perception to expressive perception 
SDVVHV WKURXJKDPHGLDWLQJGLVSRVLWLRQWKDWÀOWHUVRUFRORXUV WKHH[WHUQDOSHUFHSWLRQRI
the artwork, and expresses the corresponding emotion.7 However, this causal chain does 
not bind a dispositional history solely to projection. Other psychic mechanisms might 
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legitimately seem to play a part. Moreover, Wollheim’s account fails to encompass the 
reciprocity we have with artworks, a reciprocity largely provided by the imagination. 
6SLQLFFLUHIHUVWRWKLVRSHQLQJXSRIÀJXUDWLYHVSDFHDV¶WKHspace of resonance of the image’, 
in that it is a ‘space that can be crossed only by virtue of the play of imagination’ (2008). In an 
expressive engagement with a work such as Rembrandt’s Self-Portrait ÀJZHLQWHUSUHW
the externalised physiognomic features of Rembrandt’s face in much the same way as we 
ZRXOG LQDQRUGLQDU\ IDFHWRIDFHHQFRXQWHU DOEHLW LQDPRUHVXVWDLQHGPDQQHU0RUH
RYHU LQ LGHQWLI\LQJ ZLWK 5HPEUDQGW·V VHOIUHÁHFWLYH HQFRXQWHU ZLWK KLV RZQ LPDJH LQ
WKHPLUURUZHGUDZXSRQRXURZQH[SHULHQFHVRIHQFRXQWHULQJRXUUHÁHFWHGVHOYHV%\
excluding such encounters from his account of artistic expression, Wollheim cannot claim 
WRKDYHSURYLGHGDFRPSOHWHWKHRU\RIDUWLVWLFH[SUHVVLRQ1HYHUWKHOHVV,ÀQGLWKDUGWR
believe that projection, in its origins from earliest childhood, does not, at the very least, 
play a part in evolving such dispositions, albeit mediated by a shared culture.8 
4.
If Wollheim imagines this perception of projective properties being applied to the work 
DVDZKROHZKDW,KDYHLGHQWLÀHGLQWKLVFKDSWHULVUDWKHUGLIIHUHQWDQGPRUHPRGHVWD
discrete space within a work that focuses this ‘intimation’ of projection, which channels the 
emotional engagement of the spectator in a way that makes pictorial space a conduit for the 
psychological engagement with the work. Crucially for my argument, and differentiating 
it from Wollheim’s general account of artistic expression, I claim that with the works 
I have been considering it is the matching of structure to content that heightens such 
work’s latent emotionality. The engagement is psychologically charged through the use of 
spatial metaphors, realized through a vivid experience of pictorial depth. This, in turn, is 
dependent upon a work’s structuring of the beholder’s implied spatial and psychological 
access made possible by iconic imagination. This imaginative engagement is centred, and 
is both internal to and implicit within the representation. As we have seen, this centred 
LPDJLQLQJ LV D IHDWXUH RI VSHFLÀF ZRUNV LPSO\LQJ DQ LQWHUQDO VSHFWDWRU RU ZKHUH WKH
internal and external spectators fuse. 
If we trace the roots of Wollheim’s use of projection back to the Kleinian psychoanalysis 
on which it draws, it is evident that the notion of an object or container that receives 
projection has a very real resonance in psychoanalytical theory.9 Moreover, this notion of a 
work that structures its own reception makes it particularly receptive to such intimations 
of projection, and draws upon what Melanie Klein emphasizes as the structuring role of 
SKDQWDV\SSDVWUXFWXULQJWKDWLVVRPDWLFLQRULJLQ7KHVHZRUNVVWUXFWXUH
their own reception in ways analogous to the problematic relationship between self and 
reality. 
Psychoanalytical metaphors for mental space abound. However, the metaphoric 
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nature of the terminology can be deceptive. W. R. Bion’s ‘container’ (1984) is, as Hanna 
Segal notes, ‘an internal mental space formed by the introjection of a breast capable of 
FRQWDLQLQJWKHLQIDQW·VSURMHFWLYHLGHQWLÀFDWLRQVDQGJLYLQJWKHPPHDQLQJ·S7KH
kind of space I have been discussing, as a container or ‘conduit’ for projective properties, 
is not an internal mental space (the properties belong to the work of art), although it does 
invoke an internalisation of part of the artwork. It activates internal states, through the 
LQWLPDWLRQRIGLVSRVLWLRQVWKDWKDYHDFDXVDOHIÀFDF\/LNH'RQDOG:LQQLFRWW·V¶SRWHQWLDO·
or ‘transitional space’ (1951, 1988, 1991), it is to be contrasted with both an inner world and 
a purely external reality. Winnicott’s potential space is a neutral space between mother 
and child (and later between the individual and the environment), which he conceives 
of as an intermediate area of experience which ‘throughout life is retained in the intense 
H[SHULHQFLQJWKDWEHORQJVWRWKHDUWVDQGWRUHOLJLRQ·S,WLV¶DUHVWLQJSODFHIRU
the individual engaged in the perpetual human task of keeping inner and outer reality 
separate yet interrelated’ (p. 2). I believe that the virtuality of pictorial art, and particularly 
of the displaced spaces being discussed, is particularly suitable for problematizing this 
reciprocal relation between inner and outer reality.  
Winnicott’s sense of a space where cultural and religious experiences emerge, and where 
merging and separation coexist, is highly attractive for my argument. But differences also 
emerge. For Winnicott, the use of the term transitional ‘represents the infant’s transition 
from a state of being merged with the mother to a state of being in relation to the mother 
DVVRPHWKLQJRXWVLGHDQGVHSDUDWH· SS ,W LVQRWWKHREMHFWRUVSDFHWKDW LV
WUDQVLWLRQDO DQG  OLNH %LRQ·V FRQWDLQHU ² WKH WHUP ¶VSDFH· LV DJDLQ XVHG PHWDSKRULFDOO\
UDWKHUWKDQGHQRWLQJDVSHFLÀFDOO\spatialIXQFWLRQ<HWLWLVSUHFLVHO\WKHLQWHUPHGLDU\UROH
of pictorial space, when allied to a perspectival construction of different levels of reality (or 
unreality), which is at issue with the displacement devices I have been considering. Such 
devices draw upon an internal state of a viewer in a way that focuses the psychological 
experience of the work as a whole, through a correspondence between an emotion invoked 
and projective properties that are not so much perceived as properties of the contained or 
discrete space, but as properties arising from the implied, yet uncertain,  spatial relationship 
structured between such space and the beholder. These are spaces that cannot be ‘entered’, 
even for an implied internal spectator. Such spaces mediate between the supernatural or 
unconscious content of the artwork and its reception: a reception where the spectator is 
both internal to the artwork and excluded as a presence. Here the experience draws upon 
a mental disposition in a way which operates at the level of reverie, or various ‘visionary’ 
VWDWHVVWDWHVWKDWDUHRIFRXUVHKLJKO\DSSURSULDWHWRWKHZRUN·VUHOLJLRXVRUQDUUDWLYH
content. It is the mediating potential of such spaces that focuses our emotional engagement 
with the artwork. This is dependent upon a gap or displacement within an otherwise situated 
UHODWLRQVKLSDUHODWLRQVKLSHVWDEOLVKHGHLWKHUWKURXJKDQLPSOLHGFRQWLQXLW\RIUHDOÀFWLYH
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space or through the transparency offered by a spectator in the picture. 
A Kleinian analysis of the role of religion might help illuminate some of the issues 
here, because as we have noted these works align structure to content in a very particular 
way. This structure not only correlates with the theological requirement for distance 
insisted upon by the religious representation, but with the structural dynamics of Kleinian 
developmental positions (a correlation that might go some way to explaining such 
ZRUNV VWURQJ HPRWLYH LPSDFW XSRQ QRQEHOLHYHUV $FFRUGLQJ WR 6 ( )RUVWHU DQG '
L. Carveth, ‘Klein’s understanding of phantasy and her emphasis on object relations 
permit an understanding of God as an internal object’ (1999), and it is precisely such an 
internalisation that these works invoke. Moreover, it is the potential of such spaces to 
evoke the timelessness characteristic of the unconscious (Freud’s primary processes) that 
is key. That Klein’s developmental stages persist throughout life as positions is important, 
in that religion (and religious imagery) can take on both undifferentiated modes of the 
SDUDQRLGVFKL]RLG SRVLWLRQ and the more mature depressive form that introduces a gap 
between image and object – a gap that I would argue is exploited by the ‘mature’ experience of a 
religious artwork. 
,WLVWKHSURMHFWLYHLQWURMHFWLYHDQGVXEOLPDWRU\SRWHQWLDORIUHOLJLRQDQGVSHFLÀFDOO\
religious imagery) that is of concern here, particularly in relation to such displacement 
devices. And here we might note distinctions between the various displacement devices so 
far described. Correggio’s ceiling paintings open up onto an undifferentiated and boundless 
space, a celestial repository for all that is felt to be good. While the spectator is decidedly 
HDUWKERXQGVKHSURMHFWVRQWRDQGLGHQWLÀHVZLWKDQDOOHQYHORSLQJWUDQVFHQGHQWDOVSDFH
where inside and outside merge, where boundaries dissolve. These works are thus more 
obviously consistent with earlier undifferentiated processes of projection and introjection. 
$QG\HWWKHZRUNVDOVRFRQWDLQPHGLDWLQJÀJXUHVWKH9LUJLQLQWKH&DWKHGUDO·VAssumption 
ÀJ  DQG &KULVW LQ WKH Vision of Saint John ÀJ  ² LQWURGXFLQJ D PRUH FRPSOH[
relationship to an internalised object. Indeed, as noted earlier, with the latter work a further 
PHGLDWLQJÀJXUHLVUHVHUYHGIRUWKH%HQHGLFWLQHVLQWKHFKRLUZKHUH6DLQW-RKQÀJ
WKHLUSDWURQVDLQWLVUHYHDOHGDVWKHRULJLQDOUHFLSLHQWRIWKHYLVLRQ6KHDUPDQSS
186). Unlike the direct address from the nave to a lay viewer, here it is Saint John who is the 
original witness, and the Benedictines see the work through his eyes: a spectatorship that ‘is 
PRUHGHWDFKHGPRUHLQWHOOHFWXDODVEHÀWVWKHLUYRFDWLRQDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVDQGSDUWLFXODUO\
their attention span’ (Shearman 1992, p. 184). Here, the timelessness of consciousness is 
mediated by more mature secondary processes.10 
By contrast to the physical distancing inherent with ceiling paintings, works such as 
Masaccio’s Trinity, Mantegna’s Assumption and Piero’s Resurrection construct a rational 
SLFWRULDOVSDFHZKHUHWKHEHKROGHULVEURXJKWLQWRZKDWPXVWKDYHVHHPHGLQWKHÀIWHHQWK
century like an astonishingly intense continuity and proximity with the work’s subject. 
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Nevertheless, strict limits are placed on any suggestion of the beholder’s omnipotent 
control. Firstly, a strict metaphysical distinction is retained between those parts of the 
pictorial space implied as being in front of or behind the picture surface. Secondly, a gap 
LVRSHQHGXSWKURXJKDVHFRQGDU\YLHZSRLQWDGLVSODFHPHQWWKDWLVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKH
more mature depressive form. To adapt Segal’s argument with respect to Freud’s views 
on sublimation, such spaces ‘entail the renunciation of the possession of an object’, with a 
resulting ‘internalisation’ that ‘makes the object part of psychic reality’ (1991, p. 89). 
As Segal notes, it is the depressive position where true symbolism emerges (p. 
35), providing an ‘experience of separateness, separation and loss’ where ‘symbolic 
representation comes into play’ (p. 38). Moreover:
It is also in the depressive position only that gradually repression replaces the more primitive defences 
of splitting, idealization, and projection. The infant becomes more separate and differentiated from 
his object and capable of feeling guilty about his impulses and phantasies. He therefore represses 
them. And it is when repression functions that repressed impulses and phantasies can give rise to 
VXEOLPDWLRQSS
And following Klein’s claim that ‘symbolism is the foundation of all sublimation’ (1986, p. 
97) for Segal, it is the ‘symbol proper’ that is made available for sublimation (1991, p. 42).
No object of representation is perhaps more poignant in terms of mediating reality 
WKDQWKDWRIWKH*RGUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ+HUHVLJQLÀFDQWO\ZHZLWQHVVWKHSURMHFWLRQRIWKH
ZKROHORYHGREMHFWDQGDQ¶LGHQWLÀFDWLRQZLWKWKHUHSDLUHGLQWHUQDOREMHFW·)RUVWHUDQG
&DUYHWK 6LJQLÀFDQWO\ZHDUHKHUHFRQVLGHULQJZRUNVRIUHSDUDWLRQ WKDWKDYHDV
their subject matter, the Trinity, Christ’s Resurrection, or the bodily Assumption of Mary. 
As Forster and Carveth  note:
Both the Kleinian and Christian paradigms understand the individual as originally estranged from 
her primary object. Through a process of reparation or repentance, initiated by a feeling of guilt, she 
LVJUDGXDOO\UHFRQFLOHGWRKHUREMHFW<HWUHFRQFLOLDWLRQLVQHYHUSHUPDQHQWLWUHTXLUHVDFRQWLQXDO
renewal of the reparative cycle that brings the subject ever closer to her object. (1999)
This renewal is precisely what these works attempt. In Christianity, the ultimate reparative 
DFWLRQLVWKH,QFDUQDWLRQ&KULVWLQKXPDQIRUPZKRXQGHUJRHVEHWUD\DODQGFUXFLÀ[LRQ
EXW LV XOWLPDWHO\ UHVXUUHFWHG ULVLQJ IURP WKH GHDG $QG LW LV DQ LGHQWLÀFDWLRQ ZLWK WKH
repaired object, fully human and yet fully divine, that seems central to the impact of the 
Trinity, the Resurrection, or Mary’s Bodily Assumption (1999). If such works intimate a 
history of projection and introjection, they also intimate a history of sublimation.
Now of course sublimation is not only a feature of religious works. We have already 
noted how the empty room beyond in Vermeer’s Girl Asleep ÀJ  IXQFWLRQV DV D
sublimatory device, a displacement of the libido that addresses both the woman and the 
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YLHZHU·VVXEOLPDWHGGHVLUH6XFKVSDFHVVXJJHVWDUHFLSURFLW\EHWZHHQDÀJXUHLQWKHZRUN
and the beholder through a shared reverie. One might also note that the space of the mirror 
in Vermeer’s The Music Lesson ÀJSOD\VPXFKWKHVDPHUROH
In Form in Art (1955) Adrian Stokes contrasts artworks which draw on the enveloping 
experience of ‘oneness’ characteristic of early undifferentiated states with those that draw 
on the more mature experience of ‘otherness’ associated with the ‘depressive’ stage. 
Stokes’s notion is developed by Anton Ehrenzweig (2000) into the suggestion of a work 
which both envelops and repulses. Ehrenzweig argues: 
Pictorial space and musical space have the same capacity for compression and simultaneous 
expansion, stability within constant change, envelopment and repulsion. The pictorial space of great 
SDLQWLQJUHSHOVDQGHQYHORSVXV:HPD\IHHOWUDSSHGDQGORVWLQWKHLQÀQLWHDWWKHVDPHWLPHS
94)
While I have reservations about the generality of Ehrenzweig’s notion of an artwork as a 
‘receiving “womb”’ (p. 104), the idea of ‘an inner space that both contains and repels the 
VSHFWDWRU·SVHHPVWRPHDGHÀQLQJIHDWXUHRIWKHGLVSODFHPHQWGHYLFHV,KDYHEHHQ
considering. The fact that the subject of such works is so often that of death and bodily 
resurrection is clearly not coincidental; Ehrenzweig claims that ‘death and rebirth’ mirrors 
themes of ‘trapping and liberation’, a rhythm that ‘can be seen as an interaction between 
EDVLFOLIHDQGGHDWKLQVWLQFWVDFWLYHZLWKLQWKHFUHDWLYHHJR·SS
Is this a fanciful and anachronous projection of twentieth century psychoanalytical 
notions onto the early Renaissance? There is certainly a danger of overstating the case. 
Nevertheless, such reparative material accurately mirrors concerns central to Caroline 
Walker Bynum’s Fragmentation and Redemption (1992), a compellingly argued book that 
investigates bodies, and particularly ‘the relationship of part to whole’ (p. 13), in the late 
Middle Ages. As Bynum demonstrates, the medieval discussion of bodily resurrection 
was dominated by issues of ‘bodily continuity (of how identity lasts through corruption 
and reassemblage)’ (p. 254). It is perhaps not so fanciful to consider the space opened up 
by works such as Mantegna’s AssumptionÀJDVUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIDVSDFHZKHUHWKH
scattered and fragmented body might be made whole again; after all, as Bynum notes, it is 
the ‘whole’ body that is the ‘mediator between earth and heaven’ (p. 13). She writes:
[F]rom the ninth to the sixteenth centuries, the resurrection of the dead was also depicted explicitly 
as the triumph of whole over part: the gathering together of bones, the reclothing of skeletons, the 
restoring of exactly those bits of matter scattered at death to the four winds. (p. 184)
7KH VLJQLÀFDQFH RI WKH UHLQWHJUDWLRQ RI WKH ZKROH ERG\ LQ WHUPV RI ERWK LGHQWLW\ DQG
eternal bliss, is pivotal to Mary’s Bodily Assumption and her intercessory role. Indeed, as 
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Bynum notes, the concern here ‘to bridge the gap between material and spiritual’ is not 
VXUSULVLQJJLYHQ¶DUHOLJLRQZKRVHFHQWUDOWHQHWZDVWKHLQFDUQDWLRQ²WKHHQÁHVKLQJ²RI
its God’ (p. 223). Equally, it is perhaps not surprising that religious artworks metaphorize 
deeply ingrained psychic processes.
5.
7RFRQFOXGHWKHFKDSWHU,EULHÁ\UHIHUWRDUHOLJLRXVDUWZRUNE\&DUDYDJJLR8QOLNHZRUNV
considered earlier,11 this work does not maintain the necessary distance normally demanded 
of religious works, but nonetheless matches content to structure. This work constitutes an 
alternative way of activating the spectator’s space that while ‘illusionistic’ is certainly not 
trivial. As Puttfarken has shown, Caravaggio’s strategy of reducing his ‘pictorial world’ 
WRGDUNQHVVZKHUHWKHERXQGLQJIUDPHLVORVW¶DFWVDVDIRLODJDLQVWZKLFKWKHÀJXUHV«
DUHSLFNHGRXWE\DUHDOLVWLFDOO\LQH[SOLFDEOHEULJKWOLJKW·S:KLOHÀJXULQJD
presence, this threatens to disrupt religious decorum, precisely because (as is the case with 
an internal spectator) the imaginative engagement renders the surface transparent; the 
GLVTXLHWWKLVFDXVHGDWWKHWLPHLVZHOOGRFXPHQWHGE\3XWWIDUNHQSS+RZHYHU
he notes of Caravaggio’s The EntombmentÀJ
[T]he position of the man carrying [Christ’s] feet, in particular his gaze downward and out of the 
picture, leave us in no doubt as to where they intend to deposit Him: they are about to lower Him out 
of the picture and on to the altar. Here Caravaggio’s radical use of rilievo DQGOLIHVL]HVFDOHWRUHODWH
KLVÀJXUHVWRWKHUHDOZRUOGRIWKHYLHZHULVVXVWDLQHGDQGMXVWLÀHGE\&KULVWLDQGRJPDWKHDOWDU
represents the tomb of Christ on which the priest during mass prepares the Host, i.e. the bread and 
wine that are transformed into (or represent, depending on the denomination) the body and blood 
of Christ. (p. 152)
7KLV FRXQWHUH[DPSOH LV XVHIXO IRU P\ DUJXPHQW SUHFLVHO\ EHFDXVH RI 3XWWIDUNHQ·V
observation that the structuring of an implied continuity is, in the context of the Eucharist, 
consistent with religious dogma. Moreover, in terms of a Kleinian understanding of 
religious practice, this also correlates – quite literally – with earlier stages of introjection, 
an incorporative phantasy of taking another’s body through the mouth which Freud refers 
to as ‘psychic cannibalism’. 
In psychoanalytical terms, the Eucharist is the internalisation of the good object that 
is Christ. And it was seen as such in the Middle Ages, particularly in terms of women 
mystics. As Bynum notes:
7RWKLUWHHQWKFHQWXU\ZRPHQWKHPDVVDQGWKHUHFHSWLRQRUDGRUDWLRQRIWKHHXFKDULVWZHUHFORVHO\
connected with union or ecstasy, which was frequently accompanied by paramystical phenomena. 
To some extent, reception of Christ’s body and blood was a substitute for ecstasy – a union that 
anyone, properly prepared by confession or contrition, could achieve. To receive was to become 
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Christ – by eating, by devouring and being devoured. (1991, p. 126)
But as Bynum goes on to note:
The eucharist was, however, more than an occasion for ecstasy. It was also a moment of encounter 
with that humanitas ChristiZKLFKZDVVXFKDSURPLQHQWWKHPHRIZRPHQ·VVSLULWXDOLW\)RUWKLUWHHQWK
FHQWXU\ZRPHQWKLVKXPDQLW\ZDVDERYHDOO&KULVW·VSK\VLFDOLW\KLVFRUSRUDOLW\KLVEHLQJLQWKH
ERG\QHVV&KULVW·VKXPDQLW\ZDV&KULVW·VERG\DQGEORRGS
For the medieval believer, the Eucharist is Christ – ‘one becomes &KULVW·VFUXFLÀHGERG\
in eating &KULVW·VFUXFLÀHGERG\·S$QGLW LVWKHSHUVLVWHQFHLQWRWKHVHYHQWHHQWK
FHQWXU\RIVXFKDYLVFHUDOLGHQWLÀFDWLRQZLWK&KULVW·VKXPDQLW\WKDW&DUDYDJJLR·VSDLQWLQJ
represents to such startling effect, a representation (like Holbein’s Dead Christ) that is prior 
to the resurrected but separated and distanced Christ. No distancing device is here required, 
in that Christ is here presented as humanitas Christi. As Puttfarken notes, ‘Caravaggio’s 
FRPSRVLWLRQFRXOGWKXVEHVHHQDVUHHQIRUFLQJWKHUHDOLW\RIWKH+RVWDVWKHSULHVWUDLVHV
WKH+RVWGXULQJ0DVVWKHÀJXUHVDERYHWKHDOWDUZRXOGEHVHHQDVRIIHULQJKLPWKHERG\
of Christ’ (2000, p. 152). It is an image of introjection rather than the sublimation typical 
of works utilizing displacement devices in the representation of the supernatural. And its 
spatial structure directly mirrors this distinction.     
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1.  
In this thesis, I have put forward a theory of the role imagination plays in an ‘expanded’ 
account of the representational seeing of painting. Ancillary to an experienced resemblance, 
I have argued that seeing-with describes a particular use of paintings. We see according 
to the work, in a way that registers our presence, or absence, as an implied beholder. 
This use of the artwork as prop is dependent upon the viewer’s sanction. As such, what 
I have proposed is not an account of depiction itself; rather it describes a supplementary 
HQJDJHPHQWVXEMHFWWRWKHZLOOZKLFKLVSDUWLFXODUWRDOLPLWHGWKRXJKQRWLQVLJQLÀFDQW
range of works. I argue that with perspectival painting, the intense experience of pictorial 
space that is provided by imagination structures an implied spatial and psychological 
relationship. It structures a work’s conditions of access: an implied spatial relation that 
includes the space between viewer and artwork, whether conceived as internal to the virtual 
world of the painting, or drawing upon the beholder’s experience of the real architectural 
space in which she stands. 
While all representational paintings present a point of view, by no means all paintings 
call for, or, indeed, support such an engagement. Moreover, with many works such an 
imaginative experience offers little more than an enhanced sense of pictorial depth. These 
scenes are complete in themselves, requiring no particular thought as to whether the 
work’s depiction point is occupied or not. ‘Every image can have a viewer, but this does 
not mean that the viewer is called upon or challenged to intervene’ (Spinicci 2008). But with 
works implying what Riegl terms an external coherence, it is through such an imaginative 
engagement that our presence (or absence) can be said to contribute to the work’s semantic 
content: to ‘complete’ the work. Such a transitive engagement is made possible by a shared 
IUDPHRIUHIHUHQFHEHWZHHQRUGLQDU\YLVLRQVHHLQJLQDQGYLVXDOL]DWLRQDERGLO\IUDPHRI
reference that I argue has the potential to draw upon nonconceptual content.
Using relevant art historical examples, I have attempted to demonstrate how such an 
engagement facilitates the complex reciprocity implied by certain paintings, where an 
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implicit beholder enters into the work’s meaning through an encounter structured by the 
painting and its framing. Spinicci refers to the ‘dialogic’ nature of such images (2008). But a 
dialogic situationFDQEHFRQFHLYHGDVLQWHUQDORUH[WHUQDOWRWKHÀJXUDWLYHVSDFH:ROOKHLP·V
spectator in WKHSLFWXUHRYHUFRPHVWKHIXQGDPHQWDOVSOLWEHWZHHQÀJXUDWLYHDQGREMHFWLYH
VSDFH WKURXJK DQ LGHQWLÀFDWLRQ ZLWK D EHKROGHU LQWHUQDO WR WKH ÀFWLRQDO ZRUOG RI WKH
painting. Here the picture surface (in terms, of course, of the imaginative engagement) is 
transparent. But I have also argued that with some works, integrated into their architectural 
FRQWH[WVWKHSUREOHPDWLFUHODWLRQEHWZHHQÀJXUDWLYHDQGUHDOVSDFHLVXWLOL]HGE\WKHDUWLVW
in a way that reinforces the work’s content: here structure is aligned to content so that 
‘we are invited both to attend to and to imagine away the distinction between real and 
ÀFWLYHWKHYHU\GLVWLQFWLRQSUHVXSSRVHGLQVHHLQJWKHSDLQWLQJDVDUHSUHVHQWDWLRQLQWKH
ÀUVWSODFH·3RGURS3DUWRIWKHYLUWXDOZRUOGHQFRPSDVVHVDQGLQÁHFWVWKHUHDO
space of the spectator, in a way that the inherent uncertainty about ‘where the painting is’ 
is replicated by an equivalent uncertainty about our location in real space. And it is this 
uncertainty, dependent upon the viewer’s imaginative consent, that allows us to believe 
LQWKHYHU\ÀFWLRQDOVFHQHZKLFKFRQIURQWVXVDVFHQHZKHUHZHDUHEURXJKWLQWRDGLUHFW
encounter with the deity. The conceptual content is not so much ‘read’, as structures an 
imaginative (rather than illusory) engagement providing an unprecedented reciprocity, 
ZKLOHPDLQWDLQLQJDQHFHVVDU\GLVWDQFHEHÀWWLQJRILWVVXEMHFW
2.
Does such an engagement have relevance beyond representational painting? Can it inform 
the reception of contemporary artworks, such as installations or video installations? More 
pertinently, can we usefully distinguish between an implicit spectator and the literal 
SUHVHQFH VXFK ZRUNV E\ GHÀQLWLRQ HQJDJH" , GR QRW DWWHPSW FDWHJRULF DQVZHUV WR VXFK
questions, or to imply that the experiences are somehow equivalent; rather, I conclude the 
thesis by raising a number of issues that I hope to engage in future research. 
Of course, my own sculptural installations hopefully demonstrate the potential for 
drawing some parallels between the reception of perspectival painting and a contemporary 
art practice: albeit a practice distinguished by its concern with projective geometry. The 
works presented in this thesis problematize the relation between the spectator’s implied 
and literal presence in a number of ways, that include: (i) the structuring of contrasting 
modes of viewing, by juxtaposing spaces that can or cannot be entered; (ii) the duplication, 
or juxtaposition, of real and projected space, video projection and materially present object; 
LLLGUDZLQJDWWHQWLRQWRWKHSHUVSHFWLYDOVWUXFWXUHRIÀOPWRLQWLPDWHLPSOLFLWYLHZSRLQWV
LYWKHXVHRIVFDOHRUDEUXSWVKLIWVLQVFDOHWRVXJJHVWÀJXUDOSUHVHQFHand/or distance; 
(v) drawing attention to the screen as both ‘tactile’ surface and threshold condition; (vi) 
integrating the work’s framing into both its inner and outer reality; (vii) juxtaposing ‘real 
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time’ video footage with loops that extend temporality.1 But are these themes particular to 
a practice that explicitly alludes to painting? Or are they indicative of wider concerns with 
respect to a work’s reception?
It is with the development of a ‘situational’ art in the 1960s that the literal presence 
RI D EHKROGHU LV WKHRUL]HG DV ERWK GHÀQLWLYH RI WKH QHZ DUW and inherently problematic. 
7KH GHYHORSPHQW RI VRFDOOHG 0LQLPDOLVW DUW2 opened up new possibilities for drawing 
a spectator into experiences that now included the gallery space as spatial container. 
This was a reaction against the kind of painting championed by Clement Greenberg and 
Michael Fried. Greenberg writes in his polemical 1965 essay ‘Modernist Painting’: ‘Where 
the Old Masters created an illusion of space into which one could imagine oneself walking, 
the illusion created by a Modernist is one into which one can only look, can travel through 
only with the eye’ (1982, p. 8). For Greenberg, this drive towards opticality (contrasted 
with tactility) and ÁDWQHVV distinguishes painting from sculpture.3 Greenberg and Fried 
condemned Minimalist artists’ blurring of the boundary between painting and sculpture, 
WKHLULQFOXVLRQRI¶UHDO·REMHFWVVXFKDV)ODYLQ·VÁXRUHVFHQWOLJKWVRU&DUO$QGUH·VEULFNV
and their direct address to an ‘audience’. As Claire Bishop notes, ‘Minimalism’s call to the 
beholder threatened two of the paradigms that Fried, like many of the critics at the time, 
KHOGGHDUÀUVWO\WKHDXWRQRP\RIWKHDUWREMHFWLQRWKHUZRUGVLWVVHOIVXIÀFLHQF\DQG
independence from context) and secondly, the purity of each artistic medium’ (2005, p. 
53). 
1RZDOORIWKLVLVZHOOWURGGHQJURXQG1RQHWKHOHVVWKHSRLQW,ZDQWWRVWUHVVLVWKDW
)ULHG·VHVVD\¶$UWDQG2EMHFWKRRG·SSPDNHVLWFOHDUWKDWKHFRQVLGHUV
that the Minimalist Art he characterises as literalist ‘is not an isolated episode but the 
expression of a general and persuasive condition’ (p. 149) – a condition of theatricality that 
)ULHGPDNHVGLUHFWSDUDOOHOVWRLQKLVFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIHLJKWHHQWKFHQWXU\)UHQFKSDLQWLQJ
in Absorption and Theatricality (1988).4 Indeed, it is arguably only with this later work that 
Fried’s designation of emotionally mute Minimalist works as ‘theatrical’ really makes sense. 
Committed to the notion of the absorptive art we noted earlier, an art that presents ‘the 
image’s absorption in itself’ (p. 50), Fried writes disparagingly of the notion that ‘someone 
has merely to enter the room in which a literalist work has been placed to become that 
beholder, that audience of one – almost as though the work in question has been waiting for 
KLP·S$QGRIFRXUVH)ULHGLVULJKWWRUHJLVWHUWKLVDVSHFWDVDGHÀQLQJIHDWXUH
of the new art he so opposed, to the extent that Bishop can claim that ‘an insistence on the 
literal presence of the viewer is arguably the key characteristic of installation art’ (2005, p. 6). 
Fried thus, albeit from a highly critical perspective, anticipates the move to an art practice 
that privileges the experience of ‘a situation ² RQH WKDW YLUWXDOO\ E\ GHÀQLWLRQ includes 
the beholder· )ULHGS7KLVFKDOOHQJHGPRGHUQLVWVFXOSWXUH·VVHOIFRQWDLQPHQW
by opening up a situation that includes the ‘beholder’s body’ (p. 155), and threatened an 
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autonomy conceived as both spatial and temporal. As Rosalind Krauss notes: 
With regard to sculpture, the point on which the distinction between itself and theater turns is, for 
Fried, the concept of time. It is an extended temporality, a merging of the temporal experience of 
sculpture with real time, that pushes the plastic arts into the modality of theater. While it is through 
the concepts of ‘presentness and instantaneousness that modernist painting and sculpture defeat 
WKHDWHU·>)ULHGS@.UDXVVSS
)ULHG·VFKDPSLRQLQJRIDQDQWLWKHDWULFDODUWUHWXUQVXVWRHDUOLHUGLVWLQFWLRQVEHWZHHQ
LQWHUQDODQGH[WHUQDOFRKHUHQFHPDGHE\5LHJO8QOLNH)ULHG·VDQWLWKHDWULFDORQHVLGHGQHVV
Riegl recognizes that a ‘mature’ external coherence rests not upon an antagonistic relation 
between the two notions, but upon a fully resolved internal coherence. Moreover, the 
development of means for a spectator’s exclusion is intimately tied to means for her 
inclusion, an inclusion no longer reliant upon a direct address to the beholder. Riegl had in 
many ways predicted the subjectivism underlying Fried and Greenberg’s positions; even 
by 1902, Riegl is claiming ‘the dominant tendency nowadays is to let the work of art vanish 
as a physical object and become absorbed into the inner subjective experience of the viewer’ 
S$V,YHUVHQQRWHVWKLVÀWVZLWKKLVLQWULJXLQJWKRXJKTXHVWLRQDEOH¶KLVWRULFDO
scheme that sees the history of art as a continuous development leading from an extremely 
“haptic” or objective view of things in the world to an extremely “optic” or subjective 
FRQFHSWLRQRIWKLQJV·S%XWLIGHÀQLWLRQVRILQVWDOODWLRQDUWZKLFKIRFXVRQWKH
spectator ‘completing’ the work sound very much like Riegl’s characterization of external 
coherence, then how does the completion of the work differ when the spectator is now a 
literal rather than the implied presence of painting? As I have attempted to show, even 
when the external spectator enters a painting’s content, this presence is still implicit to the 
work. By contrast, if the ‘completion’ of installation art is to be more than a mere tautology, 
a consequence of an art we necessarily move through, then is there an equivalent dialogic 
character to the reciprocity a transitive engagement implies for painting? 
These questions are pertinent, in that much recent writing on installation and/or video 
LQVWDOODWLRQDUWIDLOVWRGHÀQHZKDWLVPHDQWE\WKH¶SDUWLFLSDWRU\·DQG¶DFWLYDWHG·QDWXUHRI
an art that ‘immerses’ the viewer within ‘spectacles’ of sight and sound. John Ravenal, for 
instance, argues:
Many video installations … draw attention to the viewer as being external to the imagery, thereby 
UDLVLQJ LVVXHV RI SHUFHSWLRQ REVHUYDWLRQ DQG VSHFWDWRUVKLS 8QOLNH ÀOP·V VWDWLRQDU\ DXGLHQFH
viewers of projected video installations are often active participants who move through the 
surrounding space. The heightened awareness of the conditions of spectatorship often becomes, in 
some ways, the subject of the work. (Ravenal 2002, p. 2)
And yet the examples that Ravenal employs of practices that make ‘the conditions of 
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spectatorship’ a central aspect of the work (Pipilotti Rist’s Sip My Ocean, Shirin Neshat’s 
Rapture, Jane and Louise Wilson’s Stasi City) are bound by cinematic notions of narrative 
VSDFH 2XU H[WHUQDO VWDWXV LV FRXQWHUEDODQFHG E\ WKH SXOO RI WKH ÀFWLRQDO UHDOP ZKLFK
Ravenal rightly states is so typical of the cinematic experience; indeed, it is just such a 
WRLQJ DQG IURLQJ EHWZHHQ D SRVLWLRQ RI H[WHULRULW\ DQG WKH ÀFWLRQDO SXOO UHVXOWLQJ IURP
the transparency of the medium which ‘heightens’ the conditions of spectatorship in such 
work. Thus, in Neshat’s RaptureÀJWKHYLHZHULVLPSOLFDWHGLQDYHU\SDUWLFXODU
sense: we are caught up in the narrative space between two cinematic projections, a space 
between the segregated worlds of men and women, where we are acutely aware that we 
do not belong. If this psychological interplay between exteriority and cinematic pull did not 
exist, Rapture would be a spatial video practice only in the sense that anyPXOWLSOHVFUHHQHG
cinematic experience that immerses the spectator in ‘enveloping spectacles of moving sight 
DQGVRXQG·5DYHQDOSEHFRPHVE\GHÀQLWLRQVSDWLDO
Ravenal acknowledges that ‘the viewer’s relationship to the performers in Rapture … 
LVVRPHZKDWPRUHRSHQHQGHG·WKDQLQHDUO\YLGHR·VXVHRIWKH¶GLUHFWDGGUHVV·S
1HVKDW·VZRUNLVQRWDVLQ9LWR$FFRQFL·VD¶RQHWRRQHFRQIURQWDWLRQZLWKWKHDUWLVW·
UDWKHU ¶WKH H[SHULHQFH RI EHLQJ FDXJKW LQ WKH FURVVÀUH RI JD]HV « VXJJHVWV DQ DIÀQLW\
with works whose primary focus is on space and attention rather than viewer and artist 
G\QDPLFV·  S  <HW WKH VSDFH RI UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ LV GLVORFDWHG IURP WKH VSDFH RI
UHFHSWLRQ:KDWLVORVWLVSUHFLVHO\WKHGLVWLQFWLRQIURPFLQHPDWLFÀOPWKDW'DQ*UDKDP
makes for early video art: 
9LGHRIHHGVEDFNLQGLJHQRXVGDWDLQWKHLPPHGLDWHSUHVHQWWLPHHQYLURQPHQW)LOPLVFRQWHPSODWLYH
Fig. 61 Shirin Neshat: Rapture (1999).
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and “distanced”; it detaches the viewer from present reality and makes him a spectator. (Cited in 
Rush 1999, p. 84)
3.
Immersive narrative based video ultimately owes more to cinema than it does the kind of 
situated relationship I have proposed in this thesis. However, early ‘situational’ practices 
utilize structuring devices that might legitimately be considered as analogous to those of 
situated painting. I conclude the thesis by proposing three such devices. The last two are 
SDUWLFXODU WR ZRUNV FRPELQLQJ YLGHR RU ÀOP ZLWK LQVWDOODWLRQ 7KH ÀUVW LV V\PSWRPDWLF
of work that Bishop categorizes as ‘organised around a phenomenological model of the 
viewing subject’ (2005, p. 10).5 
As artists began to question the relationship between artwork and the space of the 
JDOOHU\0HUOHDX3RQW\·Vspatiality of situation (2001, p. 115) offered a theoretical framework 
IRUWKHLUSUDFWLFH,IODQJXDJHRULHQWDWHGFRQFHSWXDODUWLVWVW\SLFDOO\UHIHUHQFHGWKHODQJXDJH
games of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations 0HUOHDX3RQW\RIIHUHGDZD\WR
theorize a situation where ‘our relationship to space is not that of a pure disembodied 
VXEMHFWWRDGLVWDQWREMHFWEXWUDWKHUWKDWRIDEHLQJZKLFKGZHOOVLQVSDFH·0HUOHDX3RQW\
S0HUOHDX3RQW\·VLQÁXHQFHLVH[SOLFLWLQDUWLVWV·VWDWHPHQWVIURPWKLVSHULRG,Q
a letter to Benjamin H. D. Buchloh, Dan Graham writes of a Sol LeWitt exhibit: 
As the viewer moves from point to point about the art object the physical continuity of the walk is 
WUDQVODWHGLQWRLOOXVLYHVHOIUHSUHVHQWLQJGHSWKWKHYLVXDOFRPSOLFDWLRQRIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQV¶GHYHORSV·
DGLVFUHWHQRQSURJUHVVLYH VSDFHDQG WLPH7KHUH LVQRGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQVXEMHFWDQGREMHFW«
2EMHFWDQGVXEMHFWDUHQRWGLDOHFWLFDORSSRVLWLRQVEXWRQHVHOIFRQWDLQHGLGHQWLW\UHYHUVLEOHLQWHULRU
and exterior termini. All frames of reference read simultaneously: object/subject. (Cited in Buchloh 
2000, p. 384)
If Minimalist sculpture, such as that by Judd, Andre, Flavin, LeWitt and Morris, drew 
attention to ‘the contingencies of site and the variability of perspective’ (Batchelor 1997), 
Postminimalist artists, such as Asher, Irwin, Nauman, Nordman and Wheeler, created 
spaces devoid of all objects, further blurring the boundary between artwork, architectural 
container and beholder. Here the work’s architectural ‘frame’ is integrated into its 
inner apparatus, to the extent that it becomes the work of art.6 Michael Asher describes 
KLV LQWHUYHQWLRQ DW WKH 3RPRQD &ROOHJH $UW *DOOHU\  ÀJ  LQ WHUPV WKXV ¶7KH
installation shifted formal control from a singular object to a seemingly neutral given 
architectural structure previously containing that object. The induced and forced neutrality 
of the object [in Minimalist sculpture] had been dependent upon the false neutrality of the 
container’ (Asher 1983, p. 38).7 Comprising two neutral triangular spaces connected by 
DQDUURZSDVVDJHWKLVZDVDZRUNRSHQWRWKHRXWVLGHHQWHUDEOHIRUWZHQW\IRXUKRXUV
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a day: ‘exterior light, sound, and air became a permanent part of the exhibition’ (Asher 
1983, p. 34). While during the day the front triangle was ‘saturated’ with daylight, the 
light dispersed unevenly in the unlit second space: ‘Entering and moving through the 
installation, the viewer became increasingly removed from the exterior reality, at the 
same time perceiving gradual abstractions of the reality within a formally determined and 
FRQWUROOHGVSDFH·$VKHUSS
This manipulation of the juncture between a tightly controlled environment and the 
contingencies of the outside world juxtaposes different levels of reality, in which the 
short connecting passage plays a vital role as threshold condition. In the more overtly 
phenomenologically driven work of James Turrell this mediation of realities directly 
references the metaphysical divide of painting and beholder. Turrell’s Skyspaces ÀJ
are enclosed spaces open to the sky, with steeply slanted edges that conceal any apparent 
depth to the reveals of the opening. As Turrell notes: ‘These pieces deal with the juncture of 
the interior space and the space outside by bringing the space of the sky down to the plane 
Fig. 62 Michael Asher: Installation (1970), Pomona College Art Gallery, California.
Fig. 63 James Turrell: Skyspace 'HHU6KHOWHU<RUNVKLUH6FXOSWXUH3DUN<RUNVKLUH
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RIWKHFHLOLQJ«7KHVHQVHRIFORVXUHDWWKHMXQFWXUHDSSHDUVWREHDJODVV\ÀOPVWUHWFKHG
DFURVVWKHRSHQLQJZLWKDQLQGHÀQDEOHVSDFHEH\RQGWKLVWUDQVSDUHQF\WKDWFKDQJHVZLWK
sky conditions and sun angles’ (2002, p. 96). Again, perception (sight, sound and touch) 
is heightened in a work conceived as a framing device, rather than as an object in space. If 
Masaccio’s Trinity utilizes its frame and perspective in order to align structure to content, 
here the structuring role of the framing container becomes the work’s content. And if with 
an imaginative engagement with painting we imagine away the surface, with Turrell we 
perceive a nonexistent surface.
Other installations by Turrell manipulate reality in a more directly physiological way 
that confounds our perceptual faculties.8 Abstracted from the real world into ‘dark spaces’, 
%LVKRSGHÀQHVWKHVHZRUNVDVLQGXFLQJDNLQGRImimetic engulfment, in that such installations 
‘undermineWKHVHOIUHÁH[LYLW\RISKHQRPHQRORJLFDOSHUFHSWLRQ·SDanae (1983) 
ÀJDQGTrace Elements (1993) are part of a series of ‘space division constructions’ that 
reference painting,9 and use the same framing device of the Skyspaces to create a vertical 
rectangular opening without visible sides. An interior space is divided in two, so that ‘from 
a distance, the junction between the two spaces is seen as surface and resembles a rectangle 
painted on the wall’ (Turrell 2002, p. 104). The solidity of this coloured rectangle dissipates 
as we approach the supporting wall. The far space is lit from concealed lights in such a 
way that even as the viewer perceives a space beyond the opening, ‘the transparent surface 
holds in its strength, so that even on approach there seems to be a glassy, transparent skin 
that is looked through’ (p. 104). The tangibility of this seemingly physical surface is both 
Fig. 64 James Turrell: Danae (1983), Mattress Factory, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
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beautiful and disquieting. 
The physiological impact of these spatial juxtapositions is replicated in some of Flavin’s 
installations from the 1970s, where architectural situations are created for his lighting 
constructs. These works represent a shift towards works that exploit ‘an optical shift and 
retinal reaction’ (Flavin; cited in Govan and Bell 2004, p. 195). Flavin developed a series 
of ‘barrier’ works that obstruct the viewer, while allowing a restricted view into a space 
beyond. In works such as Untitled (to Jan and Ron GreenbergÀJDQDUURZ
JDS LV OHIWDWRQHHQGRIDEDFNWREDFNYHUWLFDO OLQHRIDEXWWHGÁXRUHVFHQW OLJKWVJUHHQ
on one side, yellow on the other. The juncture between adjacent spaces again takes on a 
tangible physical presence. 
Conclusion
Fig. 65 Dan Flavin: Untitled (to Jan and Ron Greenberg'LD$UW)RXQGDWLRQ1HZ<RUN
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While such works by Flavin and Turrell structure a perceptual rather than imaginative 
engagement, it seems to me that these pieces construct a gap in perception that is comparable 
to the painting devices discussed in Chapter Six. Not in terms of their structuring of religious 
or spiritual content; Flavin, in particular, had ‘no time for contemplation, psychology, 
symbolism, or mystery’ (Flavin; cited in Batchelor 1997, p. 57). But in pushing perception to 
its limits, these works address metaphysical junctures between spaces that question where 
WKHZRUNLVDQGWKLVGRHVVHHPWRLQYRNHDNLQGRISURMHFWLYHLGHQWLÀFDWLRQWKDWGUDZVXSRQ
XQFRQVFLRXVPHFKDQLVPV,QGHHG7XUUHOOXQOLNH)ODYLQVSHFLÀFDOO\VHWVRXWWR¶DGGUHVV
the light that we see in dreams and the spaces that seem to come from those dreams and 
which are familiar to those who inhabit those places’ (Turrell; cited in Birnbaum 2002, p. 
230). As Bishop notes, Turrell ‘structures a subsuming RYHULGHQWLÀFDWLRQZLWKWKHYRLGOLNH
FRORXUHGVSDFHWKDWHQJXOIVDQGSHQHWUDWHVXV·S7KLVLGHQWLÀFDWLRQGUDZVWKH
viewer into the work’s content, in a work that (to refer back to Ehrenzweig) both envelops 
and repulses (2000, p. 94).
Fig. 66 Bruce Nauman: Green Light Corridor7KH6RORPRQ5*XJJHQKHLP)RXQGDWLRQ
3DQ]D*LIW1HZ<RUN
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4.
If Turrell’s work makes the ambiguity of where the artwork is central to its concern, then 
RWKHU3RVWPLQLPDOLVWZRUNXVHVPLUURUVDQGYLGHRÀOPWRGUDZWKHYLHZHULQWRWKHZRUN·V
content as an implicit, not just a literal, presence. This is achieved through devices that are 
IUHTXHQWO\FRPELQHGLIIHUHQWOHYHOVRIUHDOLW\WKHXVHRIYLGHRRUÀOPORRSVWRRYHUOD\WLPH
frames, and/or the duplication of space on monitor/screen and the space of reception.10 
Nauman’s Green Light CorridorÀJDSSOLHV)ODYLQ·V¶DEXVLYH·XVHRIJUHHQ
light to a corridor so narrow that it has to be entered sideways. Nauman’s corridor pieces 
PDQLSXODWHRXUSHUFHSWLRQRIUHDOLW\EXWLQDFRQÀQLQJDQGFRQWUROOLQJHQYLURQPHQWWKDW
in contrast to Turrell’s metaphysics sets out to ‘jolt’ the viewer (Schimmel 2003, p. 69). 
Nauman describes such corridor pieces thus: ‘It’s another way of limiting the situation so 
that someone else can be a performer, but he can do only what I want him to do. I mistrust 
audience participation. That’s why I try to make these works as limiting as possible’ 
(Nauman 2003, p. 113; originally cited in Sharp 1970, p. 23). Here the works are completed 
in ways where the viewer’s participation as ‘implicit’ spectator is tightly constrained by the 
VKHHUSK\VLFDOLW\RIWKHZRUNV7KHHIIHFWLVGHVWDELOL]LQJSK\VLRORJLFDOand psychological 
ZLWKRXWFDWKDUWLFUHOHDVH
1DXPDQ·V XVH RI PLUURUV DQG FORVHGFLUFXLW YLGHR LQWURGXFHV D PRUH LQWHUDFWLYH
relationship with the engaged, but decentred viewer. In Double Wedge Corridor (With Mirror) 
Conclusion
Fig. 67 Bruce Nauman: Double Wedge Corridor (With 
Mirror) 7KH6RORPRQ5*XJJHQKHLP
)RXQGDWLRQ3DQ]D*LIW1HZ<RUN
Fig. 68 Bruce Nauman: Live/Taped Video Corridor 
7KH6RORPRQ5*XJJHQKHLP)RXQGDWLRQ
3DQ]D*LIW1HZ<RUN
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ÀJDPLUURUSODFHGVRPHZKDWVKRUWRIWKHDSH[RIWKHZHGJHVXJJHVWVD
continuity of the narrowing corridor space negated by the height of the mirror and the 
UHÁHFWLRQRIDQRWKHUÀJXUHHQWHULQJWKHRWKHUFRUULGRUZLQJ2IWKHXVHRIYLGHRPRQLWRUV
in Live/Taped Video CorridorÀJ1DXPDQVWDWHV
When you realized that you were on the screen, being in the corridor was like stepping off a cliff or 
GRZQLQWRDKROH,WZDVOLNHWKHERWWRPVWHSWKLQJ²LWZDVUHDOO\DYHU\VWURQJH[SHULHQFH<RXNQHZ
what happened because you could see all the equipment and what was going on, yet you had the 
same experience every time you walked in. There was no way to avoid having it. (Nauman 2003, pp. 
RULJLQDOO\FLWHGLQ6KDUSS
Dan Graham uses mirrors and video to create a more dialogic, reciprocal situation, 
where the viewer interacts with both themselves and others. Again, Graham blurs the 
boundaries between implied and external viewers by overlaying different spatiotemporal 
realms. In Present Continuous Past(s)ÀJDWLPHGHOD\RIVHFRQGVEHWZHHQD
ZDOOPRXQWHGFDPHUDDQGPRQLWRUPHDQVWKDWDYLHZHUVHHVKHUVHOILQWKHPRQLWRUDVVKH
DSSHDUHGVHFRQGVHDUOLHUSOXVDUHÁHFWLRQLQWKHUHDUPLUURURIWKHPRQLWRUUHFRUGLQJ
KHUDIXUWKHUVHFRQGVEDFNLQWLPHDUHÁHFWLYHVHTXHQFHZKLFKUHJUHVVHVEDFNZDUGVLQ
time at 8 second intervals. As Graham notes:
:KHQ WKH REVHUYHU·V UHVSRQVHV DUH SDUW RI DQG LQÁXHQFLQJ KLV RU KHU SHUFHSWLRQ WKH GLIIHUHQFH
EHWZHHQLQWHQWLRQDQGDFWXDOEHKDYLRUDVVHHQRQWKHPRQLWRULPPHGLDWHO\LQÁXHQFHVWKHREVHUYHU·V
Fig. 69 Dan Graham: Present Continuous Past(s) (1974), Centre Georges Pompidou, Paris. 
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future intentions and behavior. Two models of time are contrasted in Present Continuous Past(s), 
WKHWUDGLWLRQDO5HQDLVVDQFHSHUVSHFWLYHVWDWLFSUHVHQWWLPHZKLFKLVVHHQLQWKLVZRUNDVWKHVHOI
image(s) in the mirror(s), and the time of the video feedback loop. (1993)
One might question Graham’s contention that Renaissance perspective presents only static 
SUHVHQWWLPH11 And yet Dan Graham undoubtedly conceptualizes the viewer’s position 
here in a way that problematizes the relation between implied and literal spectatorship by 
overlaying complex levels of mediated reality. 
,Q%ULWDLQVXFKOD\HULQJRIWLPHDQGVSDFHZDVLQKHUHQWWRPDQ\ÀOPPDNHUVHQJDJHG
in expanded cinema. Anthony McCall’s Line Describing a Cone ÀJLVDÀOPWKDW
‘exists only in the present: the moment of projection. It refers to nothing beyond this real 
WLPH ,QFRQWUDVWPRVWÀOPVDOOXGH WRSDVW WLPH· 0F&DOOSFLWHG LQ -RVHSK
S,QZKDWKHUHIHUVWRDVKLV¶VROLGOLJKWÀOPV·0F&DOOWUDQVIRUPVSURMHFWHGOLJKW
LQWRVFXOSWXUDOIRUP0F&DOOFODLPVWKHSLHFHWREH¶WKHÀUVWÀOPWRH[LVWVROHO\LQUHDOWKUHH
dimensional space … It contains no illusion. It is a primary experience, not secondary: 
i.e. the space is real, not referential; the time is real, not referential’ (McCall, 1978, p. 250; 
FLWHGLQ-RVHSKS<HWZKLOHWKHZRUNUHIHUVWRQRWKLQJRWKHUWKDQLWVHOILWGUDZV
VSHFWDWRUVLQWRLWVFRQWHQWDVWKH\LQWHUDFWZLWKWKHWKUHHGLPHQVLRQDOOLJKWIRUP12
If McCall work insists only upon real time and real space, other works of expanded 
cinema build layers of past time into a work’s present reality. The audience is directly 
implicated by William Raban’s 2’45”  ÀJ  D ÀOP DQG VXEVHTXHQW SURMHFWLRQ
RI D EODQN VFUHHQ WKH SURMHFWLRQ ZLWK DXGLHQFH UHFRUGHG DQG UHSHDWHGO\ UHÀOPHG
the overlapping of successive projections drawing successive audience members, and 
ÀOPPDNHULQWRWKHZRUN·VFRQWHQW5DEDQVWDWHV
An important aspect of 2’45”LVWKDWLWUHFRUGVWKHKLVWRU\RILWVPDNLQJ,WLVD¶WLPHODSVH·ÀOPLQWKH
VHQVHWKDWZLWKLQLWVPLQXWHVVHFRQGVGXUDWLRQLWUHYHDOVDOOLWVSDVWSUHVHQWDWLRQVDVDÀOPRID
ÀOPRIDÀOPHWF
An equivalent overlaying of time and space is intrinsic to Tony Sinden’s Another Aspect/ 
Fig. 70 Anthony McCall: Line Describing a Cone (1973). Fig. 71 William Raban: 2’45” (1973).
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Another Time (1979). A. L. Rees describes how the embodied integration of the spectator into 
the work is achieved through having the viewer moving through a space which overlays 
¶UHDOWKLQJV²DODGGHUDFKDLU²SOXVWKHLUVKDGRZUHÁHFWLRQVRUSURMHFWHGLPDJHV·
SS6LQGHQ·VPRUHUHFHQWCool Room (2002) similarly duplicates projected and ‘real’ 
VSDFHFUHDWLQJDGLDORJXHEHWZHHQREMHFWVWKDW6LQGHQLVVHHQPRYLQJLQWKHÀOPDQGWKHLU
counterparts in the real space of the gallery.
Appropriately enough, Cool Room was installed adjacent to my own work Intersection 
at the 2006 exhibition Angles of ProjectionDW&KHOVHD&ROOHJHRI$UWDQG'HVLJQÀJ
Intersection is a work that likewise overlays video footage of a framed object onto the object 
itself. This duplication structures different levels of reality. The work references Minimalist 
sculpture, Postminimalist environments and expanded cinema practices. But it also 
structures two viewpoints, suspended in space, from which projected reality and physical 
object coincide. It thus juxtaposes situational concerns that activate the beholder’s space 
with explicit references to perspectival painting: a type of painting that is too often described 
as necessarily producing a disembodied spectator. I have hoped to prove otherwise in this 
thesis, and in so doing I have appropriated a rich source of inspiration for a situational art 
SUDFWLFH WKDW SUREOHPDWL]HV WKH WKUHVKROG EHWZHHQ WZR DQG WKUHHGLPHQVLRQV $V VXFK
my artwork draws upon a lack of assuredness about the whereness of the virtual and of 
the beholder’s positioning relative to the virtual, drawing this uncertainty into the work’s 
content.
Fig. 72 Tony Sinden: Cool Room (2002); Ken Wilder: Intersection (2006). 
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Preface
1 I am very grateful for the interest shown by Professor Spinicci in my work, following the publication of 
my paper ‘The Case for the External Spectator’ (2008). It emerges that we share a very similar position 
on the role that we assign the imagination in representational seeing. While I was unfamiliar with 
Professor Spinicci’s work, which is published in Italian, he was kind enough to send me an unpublished 
manuscript (Spinicci 2008) from which I have quoted at various points in the thesis.
2 This is not to underplay nuances in the interaction between recognition, attention to surface and seeing-
with:LWK WKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOVHHLQJRISDLQWLQJ LW LVRIWHQGLIÀFXOW WRGLVHQWDQJOHSHUFHSWXDODQG
imaginative engagements with the work.
3 Fried notes that Judd champions ‘artists whose paintings are on the verge of becoming objects’ (Fried 
1998, p. 312).
4 There is, for instance, an undivulged private iconography of architectural elements that I have become 
increasingly aware derive from childhood experiences, and corresponding recurrent dreams. 
Introduction
1 While the thesis will concentrate on representational paintings, many aspects of the general argument  
may also be taken to also apply to drawings or prints (and, indeed, some aspects also apply to 
SKRWRJUDSKVDQGÀOPDOWKRXJKWKHVHSUHVHQWWKHLURZQGLVWLQFWLVVXHVRIVSHFWDWRUVKLS%\WKHLUYHU\
scale, however, drawings and prints (unlike many Renaissance paintings) do not tend to establish 
concrete ties to their place of reception; this aspect of my argument is therefore focused on painting, 
WKRXJKLWHTXDOO\DSSOLHVWR¶VLWXDWHG·ÀOPSUDFWLFHV
2  This includes ‘the contextual and institutional circumstances in which the work of art appears’ (Kemp 
1994, p. 366).
3 Rezeptionsästhetik (reception aesthetics) is to be differentiated from Rezeptionsgeschichte (reception 
history). While the former sees the work of art as the appropriate object of attention, positing the notion 
of an implicit or ideal beholder, the latter (in its various competing guises) focuses on actual beholders, 
RQWKHKLVWRU\RIDZRUN·VUHFHSWLRQ²VHH.HPSSS
4 Hegel argues: ‘[T]he separation in the work of art between its subject and the spectator must emerge 
and yet must immediately be dissipated because, by displaying what is subjective, the work, in its 
whole mode of representation, reveals its purpose by existing not independently on its own account 
but for subjective apprehension, for the spectator. The spectator is at it were in it from the beginning, 
LVFRXQWHGLQZLWKLWDQGWKHZRUNH[LVWVRQO\IRUWKLVÀ[HGSRLQWLHIRUWKHLQGLYLGXDODSSUHKHQGLQJ
it’ (Hegel 1975, vol. 2, p. 806). Commenting on Hegel’s position, Christiane Hertel claims that ‘this idea 
RIWKHLPSOLHGVSHFWDWRUQRWRQO\UHODWHVWRWKHDUWLVW·VSUDFWLFHLWDOVRGHÀQHVWKHEHKROGHU·VDXWKRUVKLS
as an authorship that goes beyond the reconstruction of something already complete prior to is 
apprehension. In other words, in being dialogical and dialectical from the outset, artistic practice lacks 
FORVXUH·S<HWRQHPLJKWDFFHSW+HJHO·VQRWLRQRIDGLDORJLFUROHIRUWKHVSHFWDWRUZLWKRXW
falling into a position that explicitly proposes a work’s reception as a ‘construction of meaning’ on the 
part of the viewer. As we shall see, I believe imagination can provide just such a dialogic dimension.
5 Charles S. Pierce famously distinguishes between an icon, ‘a sign which would possess the character 
ZKLFKUHQGHUVLWVLJQLÀFDQWHYHQWKRXJKLWVREMHFWKDGQRH[LVWHQFH·DQindex, ‘a sign which would, 
at once, lose the character which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not lose that 
character if there were no interpretant’, and a symbol, ‘a sign which would lose the character which 
UHQGHUVLWDVLJQLIWKHUHZHUHQRLQWHUSUHWDQW·3LHUFHSS
 )RUDGLVFXVVLRQRI'XWFKJHQUHXVHRIGUDSHDQGFXUWDLQVHH0DUWKD+ROODQGHUSS
7 The distinction between reception aesthetics and reception theory was not clear at the time of Iser’s 
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work. That it is reception history that Iser’s criticisms are primarily aimed is evident when he states 
‘a theory of response has its roots in the text; a theory of reception arises from a history of reader’s 
judgements’ (1978, p. x). Nevertheless, Iser’s phenomenological position is still distinct from that of 
Kemp’s.
8 Iser here references Wimsatt (1967).
9 For an account of iconicity, see Wollheim’s The Thread of Life  SS  :ROOKHLP RIIHUV D
linguistic clue to iconic states: ‘What is the clue? The clue is a matter of whether the report of the 
mental state is of the form “I/you/he/she Vb’ed + that + embedded sentence” or of the form “I/you/
he/she Vb’ed + direct object” (where the direct object is likeliest to be a nominalization). It is the 
ODWWHUIRUPWKDWLVWKHIDYRXUHGIRUP6RLI,LPDJLQHVRPHWKLQJDQGLPDJLQHLWQRQLFRQLFDOO\,VKDOO
characteristically report this by saying something like, “I imagined that the horse fell down in the 
street”. But if I imagine that same thing iconically, I shall be able to say, “I imagined the horse’s falling 
down in the street”’ (p. 64).
10  Following common practice, I use Wollheim’s term seeing-in (see Wollheim 1980b) throughout the 
thesis, without taking on Wollheim’s theoretical position on twofoldness.
11  See, for instance, Peacocke (1987), Budd (2004) and Hopkins (1998).
12 Paul Crowther would no doubt see this as an example of a major shortcoming in ‘the existing 
literature’s tendency to separate sharply the problem of what is distinctive to pictorial representation 
from the features which enable pictures to become art’ (2008, p. 176). However, I am less convinced of 
WKHSRVVLELOLW\RID¶XQLÀHGWKHRU\·WKHIRFXVRIZKLFKLV¶WKHQRWLRQRIpictorial space’ (p. 176). While 
P\ IRFXV LV DOVR GHÀQLWHO\ RQ SLFWRULDO VSDFH , GR QRW VHH WKDW VXFK D QRWLRQ GHSHQGHQW XSRQ WKH
imagination, can explain the basic pictorial recognition that underlies depiction.
 :KLOHGLVDJUHHLQJZLWKDVSHFWVRI&URZWKHU·VDFFRXQW ,VKDUHKLVUHJUHW WKDWZLWK0HUOHDX3RQW\·V
death in 1961, structuralist and nascent poststructuralist ideas in the 1960s overshadowed the impact of 
his phenomenology on art, with a corresponding shift away from perceptual and experiential concerns 
towards language based work (see Crowther 1993b, p. xi).
14 One might readily think of works by Bal, Barthes, Bryson, Claudel, Damisch, Deleuze, Derrida, 
Foucault, Gandelman, Grootenboer, Holly, Iversen, Krauss, Kristeva, Marin and Stoichita. Within the 
analytic tradition, the most prominent semiotic account of depiction is proposed by Nelson Goodman 
Languages of Art (1969). There exist a number of detailed critiques of Goodman’s account, including 
WKRVHRIIHUHGE\:ROOKHLPSS:DOWRQFKVHFWLRQ&URZWKHU
appendix), Peacocke (1987), Schier (1986, ch. 1, section 6) and Hopkins (1998, ch. 1, section 3). A number 
of ‘salvageable’ aspects of Goodman’s account has been defended by Dominic Lopes, who integrates 
both a perceptualist and conventionalist approach (1996, ch. 3). 
15 Wollheim acknowledges that while some semiotic theories drop this ‘commitment to pictorial 
structure’, they deny a perceptual experience beyond mere recognition in that ‘all the spectator has to 
do is to apply the rules of the surface, and the rules will take him, without  any help from perception, 
to the thought of what is presented, which is his destination’ (2001a, p. 15).
16 Grootenboer distinguishes Damisch’s and Erwin Panofsky’s positions thus: 
 
 If perspective can make a statement, then it must be a signifying system, indeed a network that gives 
meaning rather than a sign that means something. For Panofsky, perspective means something; it is 
an expression of a worldview by means of a symbol that stands for something else. For Damisch, 
perspective gives meaning; it is not a symbol but a structure, a paradigm (2005, 122).
 'DPLVFKKHUHUHIHUHQFHV(PLOH%HQYHQLVWH·V,\RXSRODULW\LQProblems in General Linguistics (1971, p. 
218). As Margaret Iversen notes, the book contains a very useful distinction for structuralist critical 
thought ‘between two planes of utterance, histoire and discours’, whereby: ‘The “historical” plane is used 
for the narration of past events. It is marked by the use of certain tenses and also by the exclusive use 
of the third person and the avoidance of locutions like “here” and “now” … “Discourse”, in contrast, 
LQFOXGHV´HYHU\XWWHUDQFHDVVXPLQJDVSHDNHUDQGDKHDUHUµ«,WXVHVWKHÀUVWDQGVHFRQGSHUVRQV´,µ
DQGDFRPSOHPHQWDU\´<RXµ·,YHUVHQS,YHUVHQFLWHV%HQYHQLVWHS
18  Elaborating on Damisch’s notion of ‘the thought of painting’, Grootenboer observes that: ‘The subject 
inscribed in the system is interpellated by the painting as much as s/he interpellates it, since s/he can 
only engage with the painting by becoming lost in it. Once one takes a position within this system, 
there is no escape from the symbolic order, or from language’ (2005, 122). Grootenboer here references 
Damisch (1994, 389). For an earlier argument against aspects of Grootenboer’s development of 
Damisch’s position, see my essay ‘Negotiating Painting’s Two Perspectives: A Role for the Imagination’ 
(2007).
As Iversen points out: ‘Damisch’s attention to the linguistic or structural or symbolic modality of 
perspective means that he tends to suppress the other two modalities of Lacan’s psychoanalysis. The 
three registers of the symbolic, imaginary, and real intersect and overlap. I suggest that perspective can, 
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so to speak, “appear” in all three registers’ (2005, p. 201).
19  Although as Crowther motes elsewhere, ‘there is no necessity that [pictures] should be created with [a] 
denotative end in view’ (2008, p. 179).
20 Bryson’s argument is a development of Barthes’s use of denotation and connotation to achieve the 
¶HIIHFWRIWKHUHDO·LQ%DUWKHV·VHVVD\¶7KH5HDOLW\(IIHFW·SS%U\VRQDUJXHVWKDWZKDW
Barthes fails to register, at least in terms of painting, is that ‘once installed, connotation then serves to 
eclipse denotation’ (1983, p. 65): unlike the univocal codes of denotation which transcend social context, 
the codes of connotation always appear in material practice (p. 72). For Bryson, it is this supposed 
excess of connotation that allows Western painting ‘to conceal its status as sign’ (p. xiii). It does so by 
H[FHHGLQJWKH¶À[LWLHVRIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ·ZLWKUHVSHFWWRUHDOLVWSDLQWLQJKHSURSRVHVWKDW¶WKH´ HIIHFWRI
the real” consists in a specialised relationship between denotation and connotation, where connotation 
VRFRQÀUPVDQGVXEVWDQWLDWHVGHQRWDWLRQWKDWWKHODWWHUDSSHDUVWRULVHWRDOHYHORIWUXWK’ (p. 62).
 $UJXLQJDJDLQVWVFUXWLQ\WKHRULHVZKHUHFULWLFLVPFRQÀQLQJLWVHOIVROHO\WRWKHZRUNRIDUW:ROOKHLP
maintains that this ‘ignores the interlock between perception and cognition’ (1993, p. 134). He proposes 
that perception is highly permeable to thought. The viewer’s ‘cognitive stock’ (i.e. knowledge, belief, 
and conceptual holding), whether gained through perception or from factors external to the work, 
affects how we see the painting. While it is unwarranted to demand that any item of cognitive stock 
¶VKRXOG DFWXDOO\ KDYH EHHQ JDLQHG LQ SHUFHSWLRQ· S  OLNH VRPH ¶HYLGHQFHJDWKHULQJ DFWLYLW\·
perception is, ‘in favoured circumstances, or when all the relevant information is in use, the process of 
understanding the work of art’ (p.142).
22  Jerrold Levinson makes a similar argument in ‘Intention and Interpretation in literature’, where he 
distinguishes ‘hypothetical intentionalism’ from both ‘actual intentionalism’ and antiLQWHQWLRQDOLVP·
(2004, p. 200). Levinson argues for an intention that is hypothesized, ‘given all the resources available to 
us in the work’s internal structure and the relevant surrounding context of creation, in all its legitimately 
LQYRNHGVSHFLÀFLW\·S
23  Of course, Hopkins accepts that some sculpture, such as in low relief, ‘may indeed incorporate a 
depiction point’, but argues that such works are ‘essentially pictorial’, and focuses his argument on 
VFXOSWXUHLQWKHURXQGS
24 One might think of a Juan Muñoz sculptural group.
25  As such, my methodological approach echoes that of Iser in The Act of Reading (1978, p. xi).
Chapter One
1 Hopkins argues convincingly for the notion of two perspectives, noting that a picture is ‘on the one 
KDQGLVDPDWHULDOREMHFWRQWKHRWKHUDUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ·S6HHDOVR%XGGSS
As Patrick Maynard points out, however, not all drawings and paintings ‘depict’, and are therefore 
‘absent’ (1994, p. 164 and 155). While acknowledging this important point, my primary concern in this 
thesis is with works that do depict an absent scene. 
2 Maynard also refers to this feature as Richard Gregory’s paradox. While critical of some of its 
terminology, Maynard (1994, p. 155) quotes Gregory’s discussion of ‘The Peculiarity of Pictures’, from 
Gregory’s 1970 Faraday lectures: 
Pictures have a double reality. Drawings, paintings, and photographs are objects in their own right 
²SDWWHUQVRQDÁDWVKHHW²DQGDWWKHVDPHWLPHHQWLUHO\GLIIHUHQWREMHFWVWRWKHH\H:HVHHERWKD
SDWWHUQRIPDUNVRQSDSHUZLWKVKDGLQJEUXVKVWURNHV«DQGDWWKHVDPHWLPHZHVHHWKDWWKHVH
compose a face, a house … Pictures are unique among objects; for they are seen both as themselves 
and as some other thing, entirely different from the paper or canvas. … Pictures are paradoxes. No 
object FDQEHLQWZRSODFHVDWWKHVDPHWLPHQRREMHFWFDQOLHLQERWKWZRDQGWKUHHGLPHQVLRQDO
VSDFH<HWSLFWXUHVDUHERWKYLVLEO\ÁDWDQGWKUHHGLPHQVLRQDOS
David Summers has likewise argued: ‘Images on surfaces entail a double distance; they necessarily place 
what is shown in the context of relations (planar or virtual) only possible by means of surface itself, at 
the same time that they inevitably present image and relations in the real, social space of the observer/
viewer’ (2003, p. 338).
3 The term ‘bounded image’, which is utilised by Thomas Puttfarken (2000), is taken from Meyer 
6FKDSLUR·VHVVD\¶)LHOGDQG9HKLFOHLQ,PDJH6LJQV·6FKDSLURDUJXHVWKDW¶7KHVWXGHQWRI
SUHKLVWRULFDUWNQRZVWKDWWKHUHJXODUÀHOGLVDQDGYDQFHGDUWLIDFWSUHVXSSRVLQJDORQJGHYHORSPHQWRI
art’ (p. 209).
4  Like John Hyman, I dispute Wollheim’s notion that trompe l’oeil SDLQWLQJV DUH QRQUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDO
(Wollheim 1987, p. 62). As Hyman notes, the claim that they ‘repel’ attention to the marked surface 
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‘distorts the aim and the effect of trompe l’oeil painting. The play element would be lost and the 
enjoyment of skill and virtuosity, which trompe l’oeil cultivates and caters to, would be frustrated if it 
were true’ (2006, p. 132). It is rare that trompe l’oeil ZRUNV¶EDIÁHRXUDWWHQWLRQ·IRUORQJDQGWKRVHWKDW
do suppress any implied depth. They do not therefore pose a real problem to a theory of depiction. 
Nevertheless, I will go on to argue that there is a difference between works that play on illusion and 
WKRVHWKDWHQJDJHWKHLPDJLQDWLRQGHVSLWHGLIÀFXOWLHVLQGHPDUFDWLQJDOLQHEHWZHHQWKHWZR
 $V &URZWKHU QRWHV WKH ¶FODULÀHG SUHVHQWDWLRQ RI D ÀJXUHJURXQG UHODWLRQ· LV EDVLF WR RUGLQDU\
perception (2008, p. 183). As will become clear, I disagree with Crowther’s conclusions with regard to 
this observation.
6  Of course, as Gilbert Ryle points out, the question as to ‘”Where do the things and happenings exist 
which people imagine existing?”’ is a ‘spurious question’, as ‘they do not exist anywhere’ (2000, p. 232). 
1HYHUWKHOHVVLQDGRSWLQJ0HUOHDX3RQW\·VLWDOLFLVHGWHUPwhere whenever the question is raised in this 
thesis I seek to register that what is at issue is an implied rather than actual location.
7 As Budd notes: 
A spectator experiences a picture that accurately depicts the spatial relations obtaining in a state of 
affairs as naturalistic in its depiction of distance not only to the degree that there is an experienced 
match of distance cues, but also (or alternatively) in so far as it encourages him to imagine the 
represented distances in the state of affairs depicted: the more vividly the spectator imagines the 
PLVVLQJWKLUGGLPHQVLRQWKHPRUHLQWHQVHO\QDWXUDOLVWLFKHÀQGVWKHSLFWXUH·VGHSLFWLRQRIGLVWDQFH
(2004, p. 392)
8  Crowther makes very similar points in his ‘Pictorial Space and the Possibility of Art’ (2008). He argues 
that picturing: ‘goes beyond the ordinary – highly mobile – conditions of perception, and sets pictorial 
space apart from that of reality. It offers a cognitively enhanced visual presentation of the subject, 
through a rendering which suspends (in virtual terms) that subject’s necessary positioning in time. 
Suspension of this kind enhances the separateness of pictorial space from the practical world’ (p. 191). 
 Now, while my position echoes that of Crowther in terms of the importance of pictorial space, it differs 
in two important respects: (i) at least with some works, I contest aspects of Crowther’s ‘separating off’ of 
WKHSLFWRULDOIURPWKHVSDFHRIWKHYLHZHUDQGLL,GLIIHUHQWLDWHEHWZHHQQHJRWLDWLQJDZRUN·VÀJXUDWLYH
content and the intense experience of depth when we use a picture to imagine its pictorial space relative 
to a point of view. It is the role of perspective in augmenting such an experience that provides ‘the 
V\VWHPDWLF YLVXDO SUHVHQWDWLRQ RI SRVVLEOH SRVLWLRQV LQ WKUHHGLPHQVLRQDO VSDFH· &URZWKHU  S
188). While I agree with Crowther that relational foreshortening and linear perspective ‘invests spatial 
systematicity itself with the character of visual presentness’, I do not believe that ‘its potential for creative 
use’ (p. 189) needs to be built into the unadorned account of depiction.
9 Although, this position can be indirectly represented, through devices such as the convex mirror on the 
rear wall of Jan van Eyck’s $UQROÀQL:HGGLQJÀJZKLFKUHYHDOVWZRZLWQHVVHVIUDPHGE\WKHRSHQ
doorway. 
10  Brendan Prendeville’s contribution has been invaluable in helping me to clarify this aspect of the 
argument. While Summers does not share my notion of the role of imagination in such a relation, there 
are certain parallels in how he conceives of the relation between real space GHÀQHG E\ WKH ¶cardinal 
structure of the human body’ to virtual space SS+HDUJXHV
Whatever illusionistic force they may have, virtual spaces show what is always at an unbridgeable 
remove, at a distance in space and time, another present, a past or future. Again, however, this is 
not a limitation. The same conditions under which virtual spaces cannot fully represent what they 
VKRZPHDQWKDWWKH\PD\EHVSHFLÀFDOO\ERXQGHGDQGTXDOLÀHGDSSDUHQWUHJLRQVRIVSDFHDQGWLPH
for an observer, within which things seem to exist in certain ways. That is, virtual spaces are always 
positively not real spaces, even though they seem to refer to spaces that are real, or might be real. 
(p. 44)
 2FFOXVLRQVKDSHUHIHUVWRWKH¶WZRGLPHQVLRQDODVSHFWVRUDSSHDUDQFHV·RID¶WKUHHGLPHQVLRQDOERG\·
(Hyman 2006, p. 75).
12  For a discussion on such a relationship between beholder and internal viewer see Michael Podro on 
5HPEUDQGWSS
13 I do not believe that all frames, as Crowther suggests, separate off pictorial space from their viewer 
(2008, p. 191), although it is true that they act as organizational factors accentuating perspectival means 
of structuring pictorial space.
14 Such an absence is consistent with Wolfgang Kemp’s notion of painting’s ‘constitutive blanks’, which 
as he suggests, can be transformed into ‘important links or causes for constituting meaning’ (1998, p. 
188). I will return to this argument in Chapter Four, when I take up Fried’s antitheatricality argument 
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– the Diderotian notion of works that deny the presence of a beholder before the painting. For Kemp’s 
general argument on constitutive blanks, see ‘Death at Work: A Case Study of Constituent Blanks in 
19th Century Painting’ (Kemp 1985). Here Kemp argues that such blanks ‘principal function, like the 
aids to reception (i.e. what is determinate), is to link the communication between the picture and the 
beholder with the communication within the picture’ (p. 109). Kemp’s argument is a development of 
Iser’s notion of the blank in literature (1978), which in turn references (and critiques) Roman Ingarden’s 
use of indeterminacy (1973).
15 As Maynard notes, Panofsky himself admits problems with the ‘window’ simile in relation to such 
works as Jan van Eyck’s Virgin in the Church; Maynard quotes Panofsky’s recognition that ‘the picture 
plane cuts through the middle of the space. Space thus seems to extend forward across the picture plane; 
indeed … it appears to include the beholder standing before the panel’ (Panofsky 1991, p. 60; cited in 
Maynard 1996, p. 37, n. 12). Nevertheless, Maynard observes that Panofsky ‘still there distinguishes 
“imagined” space before from “represented” space behind’ (p. 37, n. 12). I will argue that the imagination 
plays a role in both what lies in front of and behind the supporting surface. 
In The Poetics of Perspective, James Elkins also cautions against Panofsky’s excessive emphasis on 
Alberti’s reference to the intersection as being like an open window, arguing that ‘the window is one 
RIDFODVVRISHGDJRJLFDOÀJXUHVWKDWJLYHWKHWH[WVJUHDWHUFODULW\·S²DVZLWK/HRUQDGR·V
reference to a transparent pane of glass, this is ‘a way of imagining perspective, not of learning its rules 
or drawing it’ (p. 48). As for the mechanical devices appearing in Dürer’s much reproduced prints 
ÀJ(ONLQVDUJXHVWKDW¶:HKDYHYLUWXDOO\QRHYLGHQFHWKDWWKH\ZHUHXVHGIRUVHULRXVSDLQWLQJ
… it is plausible to think that they were used principally as teaching aids rather than as substitutes for 
perspective proper’ (p. 52).
16 The projection surface is what Alberti refers to as a cross section of a visual pyramid (1966, p. 52), and 
WRZKLFKKHXVHVWKHDQDORJ\RIDÀQHO\ZRYHQYHLOSS%\QRPHDQVDOOSHUVSHFWLYDOZRUNV
DUHFRQVWUXFWHGXVLQJVXFKDGHÀQHGLQWHUVHFWLRQSODQHLQWKHPDQQHUVXJJHVWHGE\'UHU·VZRRGFXW
ÀJ0RUHRYHUWKHWHUPLQRORJ\RISURMHFWLRQSODQHVLVVOLSSHU\,WDNH0D\QDUG·VWUDQVPLVVLRQ
projection plane to refer to the purely hypothetical plane from which scaled measurements for forward 
RUEDFNZDUGSURMHFWLRQVFDQEHPDGH<HWWZRSRLQWVDUHZRUWKQRWLQJKHUHLDZRUNPLJKWHPSOR\
QRVXFKWUDQVPLVVLRQSODQHVXFKDVZLWKVRFDOOHGWZRSRLQWRUREOLTXHSHUVSHFWLYHLLDZRUNPLJKW
HPSOR\PXOWLSOHSODQHVDVP\RZQH[SHULHQFHLQFRQVWUXFWLQJDUFKLWHFWXUDOSHUVSHFWLYHVFRQÀUPV
For a pluralist notion of the Renaissance conceiving of many  compatible perspectives, rather than a 
single perspective, see Elkins (1994). 
17  Partly because of limitations of space, and partly out of a reluctance to paraphrase arguments that are 
already comprehensively presented elsewhere.
 7KHVLPLODULWLHVGRQRWVWRS+\PDQODEHOOLQJDOOWKUHHDFFRXQWV¶VXEMHFWLYLVW·QSS
Lopes’s account (1996) is also sceptical about experiential accounts of depiction, focusing upon what he 
terms aspectual information: pictures are conceived as providing informational and perceptual links 
WRWKLQJVRUSURSHUWLHVSS)RUDFRQYLQFLQJDUJXPHQWDJDLQVW/RSHV·VSRVLWLRQVHH+RSNLQV
(1997). 
 7ZRIROGQHVV LV D WHUP FRLQHG E\ :ROOKHLP DQG LV FHQWUDO WR KLV LQÁXHQWLDO EXW ÁDZHG WKHRU\ RI
¶VHHLQJLQ·:ROOKHLPDUJXHVWKDWVHHLQJLQLVDVSHFLDODQGGLVWLQFWSHUFHSWXDOVNLOOZKLFKLV¶SULRU
Fig. 73    Jan van Eyck: $UQROÀQL:HGGLQJ(detail; 1434), National Gallery, London. 
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both logically and historically, to representation’ (2001a, p. 19). It is a skill which allows us to see, 
IRULQVWDQFHWKHÀJXUHRIDKRUVHLQVRPHWKLQJZKLFKLVFOHDUO\QRWDUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVXFKDVDGDPS
stained wall or a cloud formation. For Wollheim ‘if a picture represents something, then there will be 
a visual experience of that picture that determines that it does so’, an experience that he terms ‘the 
´DSSURSULDWHH[SHULHQFHµRIWKHSLFWXUH·S6HHLQJLQSURYLGHVVXFKDQ¶DSSURSULDWHH[SHULHQFH·
for pictorial representation, an experience which – unlike perception generally – involves ‘a standard 
RIFRUUHFWQHVV·ZKLFKLVVHWE\WKHDUWLVW·VIXOÀOOHGLQWHQWLRQES
.H\WR:ROOKHLP·VDFFRXQWRIVHHLQJLQLVWKHQRWLRQRIWZRIROGQHVV
:KDWLVGLVWLQFWLYHRIVHHLQJLQDQGWKXVRIP\WKHRU\RIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQLVWKHSKHQRPHQRORJ\RI
the experiences in which it manifests itself. Looking at a suitably marked surface, we are visually 
aware at once of the marked surface and of something in front or behind something else. I call this 
feature of the phenomenology ‘twofoldness’. (2001a, p. 19)
Contrary to Gombrich’s assertion in Art and Illusion (1977), twofoldness requires the simultaneous 
perception of both the pictorial surface (the features of the medium, such as paint applied to canvas) 
and the thing being represented (what is seen). Wollheim’s later versions of the concept conceive of 
WZRIROGQHVVDV¶DVLQJOHH[SHULHQFH·KDYLQJWZRDVSHFWVFRQÀJXUDWLRQDODQGUHFRJQLWLRQDOZKLFKKH
claims are ‘phenomenologically incommensurate with the experiences or perceptions … from which 
they derive’ (2001a, p. 20). Wollheim argues that these are not two experiences, but a single experience 
(1987, p. 46). With respect to painting, Wollheim acknowledges that one aspect of the experience can 
¶FRPHWRWKHIRUH·WRWKHH[WHQWWKDW¶WZRIROGQHVVLVORVWDQGWKHQVHHLQJLQVXFFXPEVWRDQDOWRJHWKHU
GLIIHUHQWNLQGRIH[SHULHQFH·EXWKHDUJXHVWKDWLQVXFKFLUFXPVWDQFHVWKHSXOORIVHHLQJLQZLOOLQDOO
SUREDELOLW\UHDVVHUWLWVHOIS%XWGRHV:ROOKHLP·VQRWLRQRIVHHLQJLQVROYHWKHSUREOHPRIKRZWKH
thought of an absent object enters the experience?
,Q¶2Q/RRNLQJDWD3LFWXUH·%XGGFODLPVWKDWZKLOHVHHLQJLQPLJKWSHUPLW¶VLPXOWDQHRXV
visual awareness of a surface and what is seen in it’, Wollheim has not demonstrated that seeing what 
a picture depicts requires such simultaneous visual awareness (p. 267). Much of the problem stems 
IURP:ROOKHLP·VLQVLVWHQFHWKDWWKHH[SHULHQFHRIVHHLQJLQLVQRWMXVWGLVWLQFWEXWSKHQRPHQRORJLFDOO\
LQFRPPHQVXUDWH ZLWK VHHLQJ IDFHWRIDFH $V %XGG QRWHV LQ :ROOKHLP·V ODWHU YHUVLRQ RI WKH WKHRU\
Wollheim renders it ‘illegitimate to enquire about the experienced resemblance between either aspect 
RIWKHFRPSOH[H[SHULHQFH>LHWKHUHFRJQLWLRQDODQGFRQÀJXUDWLRQDODVSHFWV@DQGWKHVLPSOHIDFHWR
face experience after which it is described’ (p. 270). This poses a real problem. Budd maintains:
Fig. 74    Albrecht Dürer: woodcut from The Painter’s Manual (1525), National Gallery of Victoria, 
Melbourne. 
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7KH LQVLVWHQFH WKDW WKH UHFRJQLWLRQDO DVSHFW DQG WKH FRUUHVSRQGLQJ IDFHWRIDFH H[SHULHQFH DUH
experientially incomparable undermines the force of the idea that for any recognitional aspect there 
LV DQ DQDORJRXV IDFHWRIDFH H[SHULHQFH DIWHU ZKLFK LW FDQ EH GHVFULEHG 7KH UHFRJQLWLRQDO DVSHFW
cannot properly derive the only description it can be given from an experience with an incomparable 
phenomenology: the alleged experiential incommensurability prevents the description of the one 
from being modelled on the description of the other – or, if it is so modelled, makes it inappropriate, 
LQGHHGPLVWDNHQ+HQFHWKHVRFDOOHGUHFRJQLWLRQDODVSHFWRIVHHLQJLQPHUHO\PDVTXHUDGHVDVDQ
DQDORJXHRIDIDFHWRIDFHH[SHULHQFHDQGZKHQWKHGHVFULSWLRQLWKDVZURQJO\ERUURZHGLVVWULSSHG
from it, it not only has no other description to clothe itself in, but is revealed as having no nature of 
its own. (p. 271)
7KLV LVXQGRXEWHGO\D VHULRXVÁDZ LQ:ROOKHLP·VSRVLWLRQ LQ WKDW:ROOKHLP IDLOV WRH[SODLQZK\D
picture of a horse ‘sustains an experience permeated by the thought of a horse’ (Hopkins 1998, pp. 
7KHSHUFHSWXDOPHFKDQLVPVWKDWUHODWHSLFWXUHDQGDEVHQWREMHFWDUHXQH[SODLQHG
But can we at least claim that what Levinson terms ‘pictorial seeing proper’ (2001, p. 31) – the 
twofoldness implicated in the appreciating of a picture aesthetically – requires simultaneous visual 
awareness? This is a weaker claim than that made by Wollheim, as it does not establish twofoldness 
as a necessary condition for depiction. But even this claim is susceptible to Budd’s contention that ‘an 
DOWHUDWLRQLQWKHVSHFWDWRU·VYLVXDODZDUHQHVVZRXOGVHHPWREHVXIÀFLHQWIRUWKHUHFRJQLWLRQRIDQG
consequent admiration of the artist’s artistry’ (1992, p. 267). 
What, therefore, is left of Wollheim’s twofoldness? Certainly, I would argue that all pictures retain 
an awareness of the marked surface, if not necessarily an aesthetic awareness. Moreover, some kind 
of twofoldness in Wollheim’s sense is generally implied in the richer experience of how something is 
represented by the medium of paint. But is twofoldness, in any case, a matter or all or nothing? Lopes 
argues for a spectrum of possible engagements:
Pictures may be thought of as arranged along a spectrum, at one end of which lie trompe l’oeil 
pictures, experiences of which are experiences of their subjects, but which generally preclude, or 
at least suppress, experiences of decorated, marked, and painted surfaces. At some intermediate 
point on the spectrum lie pictures which afford one kind of experience or the other, but not both 
simultaneously. Gombrich’s conception of depiction, taking Kenneth Clark’s experiences stalking 
an illusion in a Velázquez painting as its model, gravitates towards this middle ground. At the other 
extreme lie pictures typical experiences of which are simultaneously experience of their subjects 
DQGH[SHULHQFHVRIÁDWSLJPHQWHGVXUIDFHV9DQ*RJK·VZKHDWÀHOGVGH.RRQLQJ·V:RPDQVHULHV
DQG/LFKWHQVWHLQ·V%HQ'D\GRWWHGSDLQWLQJVFRQJUHJDWHDWWKLVSROHZKLFKPD\EHGHVFULEHGYHU\
loosely, as ‘painterly’. Experiences of these pictures may properly be described as twofold. (1996, p. 
50)
Now, such a notion of a sliding scale is not in itself without merit. However, I would dispute Lopes’s 
juxtaposition of trompe l’oeil with twofoldness. A more convincing scale would surely juxtapose trompe 
l’oeil (which suppresses but certainly does not ‘preclude’ attention to the surface) with works that 
emphasize qualities of the marked surface over and above any residual concern with subject (an extreme 
that might well include de Kooning, but not Van Gogh). Moreover, I would argue that it is precisely 
the middle ground where twofoldness is most apparent, or rather where there is a switching between 
alternating and simultaneous attention of surface and subject. This is the real lesson of Velázquez’s Las 
Meninas.
20 Wollheim gives the following example: ‘The spectator who is made aware that in the relevant panel of 
the S. Francesco altarpiece Sassetta uses to paint the cloak that the Saint discards, thereby renouncing 
KLVLQKHULWDQFHWKHPRVWH[SHQVLYHDQGPRVWGLIÀFXOWSLJPHQWDYDLODEOHZLOOFRPHWRUHFRJQL]HDGUDPD
ÀUVWLQWKHJHVWXUHWKHQLQWKHSLFWXUHDVDZKROHRIZKLFKKHKDGEHHQSUHYLRXVO\LJQRUDQW·FS
193).
21  This repeats a point made by Lawrence Gowing, who notes of this hand the ‘fortuitous bulbousness 
which has few parallels anywhere in art’ (1997, p. 23). Gowing writes of Vermeer’s vocabulary of 
representation: 
+LVGHWDFKPHQWLVVRFRPSOHWHKLVREVHUYDWLRQRIWRQHVRLPSHUVRQDO\HWVRHIÀFLHQW7KHGHVFULSWLRQ
is always exactly adequate, always completely and effortlessly in terms of light. Vermeer seems 
almost not to care, or even to know, what it is that he is painting. What do men call this wedge 
RIOLJKW"$QRVH"$ÀQJHU":KDWGRZHNQRZRILWVVKDSH"7R9HUPHHUQRQHRIWKLVPDWWHUV WKH
conceptual world of names and knowledge is forgotten, nothing concerns him but what is visible, 
the tone, the wedge of light. (p. 19)  
Notes to Pages 43-46
190 Projective Space
22  Walton proposes that on seeing a horse in a marked surface the viewer ‘imagines her actual perceiving 
of the canvas to be an act of perceiving a horse’ (1992, p. 285), whereby ‘the phenomenal character of 
the perception is inseparable from the imagining which takes it as an object’, bound together as ‘a single 
phenomenological whole’ (1990, p. 295). In a complex intertwining, ‘the imagining partially constitutive 
RIWKHUHFRJQLWLRQDODVSHFWKDVDVLWVREMHFWWKHSHUFHSWLRQWKDWFRQVWLWXWHVWKHFRQÀJXUDWLRQDODVSHFW·S
286). The experience is thus claimed as a perceptual experience where pictorial ‘conventions’ or ‘rules’ 
²SDUWRIRXU¶FRJQLWLYHVWRFN·DUHLQWHUQDOLVHGS
Moreover, with regard to the twofold awareness of surface and pictorial content, ‘the sense in 
which these are inseparable aspects of a single experience is given by the mutual interpenetration 
of the seeing and the imagining’ (p. 301). Walton is therefore effectively proposing his own distinct 
version of Wollheim’s twofoldness, and builds recognition into his model of depiction founded upon 
imagination.
However, as Hopkins has noted in relation to the viewer of a picture of a horse, ‘Why should it be 
any more help, in the case of the picture, for her to imagine seeing the marks to be her seeing of the 
KRUVH"·SS,PDJLQDWLRQDQGWKHVHHLQJRIPDUNVKDYHWKHLURZQGLVWLQFWSKHQRPHQRORJLHV
unless the seeing of the marks and the imagining ‘are transformed in their union, what is their 
phenomenology once changed?’ (p. 21) Walton offers no adequate explanation, and his account is thus 
VHULRXVO\ÁDZHG
23  Wittgenstein’s position is thus very different to that of Gombrich, who in Art and Illusion also notes of 
WKHGXFNUDEELWÀJXUHWKDW¶ZHFDQQRWH[SHULHQFHDOWHUQDWLYHUHDGLQJVDWWKHVDPHWLPH·S
8QOLNH:LWWJHQVWHLQ*RPEULFKWDNHVWKHDPELJXLW\LQKHUHQWZLWKLQVXFKDSLFWXUHSX]]OHDV¶FOHDUO\
the key to the whole problem of image reading’ (p. 198): we test hypotheses through the ‘guided 
projection’ onto an image of alternative readings as a ‘test of consistency’ (p. 200). It is a position of 
‘perceptual trial and error’, that reveals Gombrich’s indebtedness to Karl Popper (p. ix).
Gombrich famously emphasizes ‘the beholder’s share in the readings of images, his capacity, that 
is, to collaborate with the artist and to transform a piece of coloured canvas into a likeness of the 
visible world’ (p. 246). It is an unapologetically illusionistic account, which stresses the subjective 
K\SRWKHVLVLQJRIWKHYLHZHU7KHSURMHFWLRQRQWRWKHPDUNHGVXUIDFHLVDQDORJRXVWRVHHLQJIDFHWRIDFH
WKXVGLVUHJDUGLQJWKHQRQV\PPHWULFDOQDWXUHRISLFWRULDOUHVHPEODQFHWKDWDSLFWXUHPLJKWUHVHPEOH
DQREMHFWLQUHVSHFWRIFHUWDLQSDUWLFXODULWLHVEXWWKHWKUHHGLPHQVLRQDOREMHFWGRHVQRWUHVHPEOHWKH
SLFWXUH7KHGXFNUDEELWDQDORJ\LVXVHGQRWLQUHODWLRQWRWKHV\PPHWULFDOVLWXDWLRQRIWZRFRPSHWLQJ
perceptions of subject matter, but to suggest the impossibility of simultaneously attending to both the 
painted surface (the physical painting) and to what is represented in the illusion of painting (its subject 
matter or content) (p. 5): perceiving of the medium is separated out from the perception of the object 
of representation.
*RPEULFK·V LOOXVLRQLVW SRVLWLRQ LV FRPSUHKHQVLYHO\ DUJXHG DJDLQVW LQ :ROOKHLP·V ¶6HHLQJDV
6HHLQJLQDQG3LFWRULDO5HSUHVHQWDWLRQ·EZKHUH:ROOKHLPDUJXHVWKDW¶LWLV*RPEULFK·VIDLOXUH
to assign to the seeing appropriate to representations a distinctive phenomenology that impels him 
towards the view that there is nothing distinctive about the seeing of representations’ (p. 215).
Chapter Two
1 Hopkins’s argument, with respect to sculpture, references Susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form (1953). 
For an earlier discussion of this theme, see Hopkins’s ‘Sculpture and Space’ (2003).
 +RSNLQV,EHOLHYHFRUUHFWO\DOORZVIRUPRUHRSHQHQGHGLQWHQWLRQVE\WKHDUWLVWLQWKHLPDJLQLQJRI
such a spectator, particularly with regard to the viewer imagining herself HQJDJLQJ ZLWK WKH ÀFWLYH
scene rather than necessarily centrally imagining the protagonist from the inside. See Hopkins, ‘The 
6SHFWDWRULQWKH3LFWXUH·SS
3 Echoing the central theme of this thesis, in ‘Painting, Beholder and the Self’ Savile also asks whether ‘it 
is not at least conceivable that … we may come to understand paintings as depicting scenes that stretch 
right up to and even enclose their own beholders. Might not, on occasion, the external beholder and 
the internal beholder merge, or fuse?’ (1992, p. 299) Savile applies these arguments to Fried’s claim, 
DIWHU'LGHURWWKDW)UHQFKSDLQWLQJEHWZHHQWKHVDQGVGHPDQGHG¶WKHVXSUHPHÀFWLRQWKDW
the beholder did not exist’ (Fried, 1980, p. 103). As I go on to describe in Chapter Four, there is a 
distinction between works where the internal and external fuse, and works where the external beholder 
is addressed as a purely external presence.
 , KDYH UHÀQHG WKLV DVSHFW RI P\ DUJXPHQW VLQFH LW ÀUVW DSSHDUHG LQ P\ ¶7KH &DVH IRU DQ ([WHUQDO
Spectator’ (2008).
5 In Shearman’s terms, the works are transitive, in that they are ‘completed only by the presence of 
the spectator in the narrative’ – see John Shearman, Only Connect: Art and the Spectacle in the Italian 
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Renaissance (1992, p. 33). These are works that engage a beholder as a participant or witness: ‘the viewer 
is located in the event, and the described action is transitive, completed outside itself in another focus in 
a shared space’ (p. 39). In comparing Shearman’s ‘implied spectator’ to Wollheim’s internal spectator, 
Caroline van Eck argues that Shearman fails to distinguish between internal and external spectators; 
while I agree with this, I believe she exaggerates the distinction between the compositional devices of 
works with ‘implied spectators’ and the essentially psychological engagement typical of Wollheim’s 
‘internal spectator’, thus separating out the spatial and psychological attributes of such imaginative 
HQJDJHPHQWV6HH¶7KH&DVHIRUWKH,QWHUQDO6SHFWDWRU$HVWKHWLFVRU$UW+LVWRU\"·SS
6  For all his invaluable insights into the parallel developments of early Renaissance architecture and 
painting, Wittkower, for instance, claims that Trinity obliterates ‘the borderline between real and 
painted architecture: the beholder looks, as it were, into a real chapel’ (1978, p. 134).
7 Despite offering us the means to do so, Sandström can be inconsistent in distinguishing between those 
works that serve illusionist ends, and those where the differentiation serves the picture’s content. 
 *RIIHQDUJXHVWKDWWKLVLV$GDP·VÀFWLYHWRPE²VHH5RQD*RIIHQDS
9 For Alois Riegl, works described as having a ‘closed internal coherence’ are founded on the reciprocity 
of pictorial elements contained within the picture, whereas works having an ‘external coherence’ are 
completed only by the presence of a spectator, and establish a rapport with the viewer. As we shall see, 
5LHJOEHOLHYHV WKDW FHUWDLQSDLQWHUV FRPELQHERWK8QIRUWXQDWHO\ LQGHÀQLQJDQH[WHUQDO FRKHUHQFH
Riegl (like Shearman) fails to distinguish between internal and external spectators. See Riegl, The Group 
Portraiture of Holland (1999). 
 
Chapter Three
1 References to viewers tend to occur in relation to perspective, such as in The World of Perception, where 
0HUOHDX3RQW\DUJXHVWKDWZRUNVRI¶FODVVLFDODUW·RIZKLFKKHRIIHUVQRH[DPSOHV¶UHPDLQDWDGLVWDQFH
DQGGRQRWLQYROYHWKHYLHZHU·UDWKHUWKH\LPSO\D¶JD]HÀ[HGDWLQÀQLW\·S
 :HKDYHVHHQKRZWKLVÀQGVHFKRHVLQWKHZRUNRI0HUOHDX3RQW\·VRQHWLPHVWXGHQW'DPLVFK
 7KLVDQRPDO\DWWKHKHDUWRI0HUOHDX3RQW\·V ODWHUZULWLQJLVUHSOLFDWHGE\&URZWKHU&URZWKHUIRU
his part, ends up arguing a position that is reminiscent of Fried’s criticism of the ‘theatricality’ of 
minimalist sculpture in Art and Objecthood (1998). Critical of many aspects of Fried and Greenberg’s 
DKLVWRULFDOIRUPDOLVP&URZWKHUQHYHUWKHOHVVUHSOLFDWHVWKHLUDUJXPHQWVIRUWKHVHOIFRQWDLQHGQDWXUH
RIÀFWLYHVSDFHDVD¶V\PEROLFH[WHQVLRQRISHUFHSWLRQ· Thus we recognize pictorial space ‘as one that is 
symbolic and thence not continuous with the real network of spatiotemporal relations which our body 
inhabits’ (2002, p. 19). For all Crowther’s emphasis on reciprocity of object and subject, the ontological 
UHFLSURFLW\LVKHOGZLWKLQWKHV\PEROLFZRUOGRIWKHYLUWXDORUÀFWLYHVSDFHWKLVRQWRORJLFDOUHFLSURFLW\
is not replicated by the relationship between an artwork and spectator. Thus, while Riegl’s notion 
RI H[WHUQDO FRKHUHQFH LV EULHÁ\ LQWURGXFHG LQ The Transhistorical Image (2002), as one of Crowther’s 
FRPSRVLWLRQDOFDWHJRULHVSSLWLVWUHDWHGDVPDUJLQDOWR&URZWKHU·VRYHUDOODUJXPHQW6LPLODUO\
the issue of spectatorship is barely addressed in Crowther’s Art and Embodiment (1993a), despite the 
subject of the book. So while the artwork ‘UHÁHFWV our mode of embodied inherence in the world’ (p. 
7), it does not replicate it. Crowther’s position here reveals his commitment to a Kantian notion of 
both a ‘logical and psychological sense of disinterestedness’ (p. 20). So, a work’s formal qualities are 
‘ontologically neutral, that is, the grounds of their appreciation do not logically presuppose any belief 
in (as Kant might put it) the “real existence” of the object sustaining the appearance’ (p. 21). While 
such an approach is entirely appropriate to some works of art, for others it severely limits the degree 
to which the spectator’s reality (her situatedness) might be incorporated within the work, through an 
imaginative engagement.
4 Of course, this a radical empiricism which substantially departs from both the classical empiricism of 
Berkely and Hume, and that of the Logical Positivists. As Baldwin argues in his introduction to The World 
of Perception0HUOHDX3RQW\¶IROORZV+XVVHUOLQWDNLQJLWWKDWWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQSHUFHSWLRQDQG
all other modes of thought, including science, is one of “Fundierung”’ (foundation), which involves a 
kind of rootedness that does not restrict the capacity for more sophisticated articulations of experience 
in the light of deeper understandings of the world. So he consistently rejects those forms of empiricism 
which aim to restrict or reduce the contents of thought to possible contents of experience’ (2004, p. 8). 
0RUHRYHU%DOGZLQDUJXHVWKDW0HUOHDX3RQW\JLYHVDGLVWLQFWLYHWZLVWWRWKH.DQWLDQQRWLRQWKDWZKLOH
‘the empiricists were largely right about empirical concepts, the rationalists were largely right about a 
priori concepts’, by maintaining that ‘our embodiment is integral to the role of a priori concepts in sense 
experience’ (p. 9).
5  In Chapter One I questioned the subjectivity of such a position, in that clearly properties such as 
occlusion shape are objective properties of the object perceived.
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6  The weakness of this view, as Kelly points out, is that ‘the real object is never seen’ (2005, p. 99).
 0HUOHDX3RQW\GHYHORSVWKLVDFFRXQWRIKRZIRULQVWDQFHWKHKDQGSUHSDUHVLWVHOIWRJUDVSDQREMHFW
in the chapter on ‘The Spatiality of One’s Own Body and Motility’, in the Phenomenology of Perception 
(2002, Part 1, ch. 3).
8  As Husserl argues, where we ‘hypothesize the side’s existence, not because we perceive it’ (Kelly 2005, p. 
96).
9  Sartre is certainly amongst the most insightful writers on the imagination, devoting over a decade’s work 
RQWKHVXEMHFW,WLVWKHUHIRUHQRVXUSULVHWKDW0HUOHDX3RQW\·VUHIHUHQFHVWRLPDJLQDWLRQFRQVLVWHQWO\
cite his fellow philosopher. This is particularly true of the Phenomenology of Perception (2002), where 
6DUWUH·VDFFRXQWRIWKHSKHQRPHQRORJ\RILPDJLQDWLRQLVODUJHO\WDNHQWREHGHÀQLWLYH
10  There is a parallel here with Podro’s notion of alternative orientations: ‘We may see the compositional 
device of intimating the viewer’s counterpart within the image as a special case of a more general way 
in which Rembrandt’s compositions form themselves round their subject, suggesting the spectator’s 
view is one of several possibilities; the effect is that the subject in not felt to be absorbed or summated 
in the way it is represented, in the particular view’ (1998, p. 65).
11 Crowther is a rare example of someone who combines aspects of analytic philosophy with the ‘corporeal 
SKHQRPHQRORJ\· RI 0HUOHDX3RQW\ &URZWKHU  S  :KLOH QRWLQJ ¶LWV DGPLUDEOH RULHQWDWLRQ
towards conceptual distinctions’, Crowther argues that analytic philosophy ‘often overlooks key 
questions of ontology, and, in particular, that reciprocity between subject and object which is deeply 
LQYROYHGLQDHVWKHWLFH[SHULHQFH·SS
 ,QKROGLQJWKDWVXFKSHUFHSWXDOH[SHULHQFHVDUHEHOLHILQGHSHQGHQW3HDFRFNH·VSRVLWLRQFRUUHVSRQGV
with that of Gareth Evans, in The Varieties of Reference6HHDOVR6HDQ'.HOO\¶7KH1RQFRQFHSWXDO
Content of Perceptual Experience’ (2001).
 :HPLJKWFRPSDUH3HDFRFNH·VQRWLRQRIDVFHQDULRODEHOOHGZLWKERGLO\D[HVD ¶GLVWLQFWLYHNLQGRI
knowledge’ which like ‘the location of a limb is given egocentrically, in relation to the subject’s body’ 
SZLWK0HUOHDX3RQW\·VDUJXPHQWWKDW ¶0\ZKROHERG\IRUPHLVQRWDQDVVHPEODJHRI
organs juxtaposed in space. I am in undivided possession of it and I know where each of my limbs is 
through a body image in which all are included’ (2002, p. 113).
14  For a defence of this argument, see Kelly (2001).
15  In ‘Imagination and the Self’ (1973, ch. 3), Bernard Williams introduces an imagining ‘in which I 
visualise a world in which I am acting, moving around, seeing things, and so forth – a form of imagery 
involving, very often, kinaesthetic imagery of various sorts’ (p. 38). Williams acknowledges that in 
imagining being a champion racing driver ‘this could involve kinaesthetic imagery of tension, hands 
FODVSHGRQWKHVWHHULQJZKHHO·S:KDW,DPDUJXLQJIRULVDIRUPRIYLVXDOL]LQJZKHUHVRPHRIWKLV
kinaesthetic imagery is not so much acted out in space, as experienced as a potentiality.
Chapter Four
1  This is not to argue that extrinsic conditions cannot impact upon a work’s reception: i.e. its placement 
upon the wall, or in relation to other works within a gallery, its background colour or lighting 
conditions.
 $VLPLODULW\ZLWK:|OIÁLQ·VDUJXPHQWLQWKHPrinciples of Art History (1950) was noted in Chapter Two. 
7RUHSHDWWKHHDUOLHUSRLQW:|OIÁLQGLVWLQJXLVKHVEHWZHHQWKHWHFWRQLFDQGDWHFWRQLFZKHUHWKHZRUN
LVFRQVWUXFWHGMXVW¶IRUWKLVIUDPH·DVD¶VHOIFRQWDLQHGHQWLW\·DSSURSULDWHIRUWKHFHUHPRQLDODJDLQVW
WKHQRWLRQRIWKH¶RSHQ·FRPSRVLWLRQZKHUH¶WKHÀOOLQJKDVORVWWRXFKZLWKWKHIUDPH·S:|OIÁLQ
would classify a painting such as Trinity as ‘closed’ or ‘tectonic’: such works are predominantly ‘stable’, 
RUJDQLVHGDURXQGDFHQWUDOD[LVSDQGFUXFLDOO\¶WKHÀOOLQJUHODWHVWRWKHJLYHQVSDFH«WKDWLVWKH
ZKROHLVPDGHWRORRNDVLIWKLVÀOOLQJZHUHMXVWPDGHIRUWKLVIUDPH·S%\FRQWUDVWDQ¶RSHQ·RU
¶DWHFWRQLF·FRPSRVLWLRQLVRQHZKHUH¶WKHJHQHUDOWHQGHQF\LVWRSURGXFHWKHSLFWXUHQRORQJHUDVDVHOI
existing piece of the world, but as a passing show, which the spectator may enjoy only for a moment’ 
(p.126).
:KLOHUHMHFWLQJ:|OIÁLQ·VVW\OLVWLFDSSURDFK$OSHUVVLPLODUO\PDLQWDLQVDJHRJUDSKLFDOGLVWLQFWLRQ
between what she terms the ‘art of describing’ typical of the northern tradition, and the narrative art of 
Italy (1989, p. xx). She distinguishes between Italian works employing an Albertian frame, conforming 
to a notion of a ‘prior viewer’ (p. 43), where the spectator is peculiarly privileged in being in a situation 
prior to the world and ‘commanding its presence’ (p. 70), and Dutch painting where there is ‘a prior 
ZRUOGVHHQ·SS
By contrast, Puttfarken has argued that many of these perceived differences in pictorial ordering 
between the North and South are in fact questions of scale – see Thomas Puttfarken (2000, p. 167). In 
broadly agreeing with Puttfarken approach, I have been arguing that with certain works such differences 
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might also be couched in terms of the nature of a work’s implied spectator (a factor intimately tied to 
the question of scale). And here it is worth noting that while it is undoubtedly true that the notion of 
situated painting might be applied to Italian altarpieces, a painting such as Rembrandt’s The Syndics 
ÀJPLJKWDOVROHJLWLPDWHO\EHVHHQDVHQJDJLQJDQH[WHUQDOVSHFWDWRUDVZHVKDOOVHH
Nonetheless, we should also acknowledge real distinctions in the relation between painting and 
architecture that emerges in Italian and Dutch art. As Rudolf Wittkower observes, one consequence 
of Italian Renaissance architects such as Brunelleschi wanting their buildings ‘to be looked at as if 
they were projected on to an intersection’ is that ‘the difference between architecture and painting 
becomes one of artistic medium rather than of kind’ (1978, p. 134). If architecture was to be viewed 
as painting, paintings such as Trinity were also to be viewed as architecture (without ever negating 
WKH UROH WKH WZRGLPHQVLRQDO VXUIDFH RI WKH ZDOO SOD\V LQ GLIIHUHQWLDWLQJ UHDOPV $V VXFK ZKLOH
Masaccio’s illusory painted chapel (a work inspired, at the very least, by Brunelleschi’s architectural 
LGHDVZDVKXJHO\LQÁXHQWLDOLQWHUPVRISHUVSHFWLYDOSDLQWLQJLWVLPSDFWZDVHTXDOO\IHOWLQFKXUFK
architecture. Shearman provides one such example in the Cardini Chapel (Pescia, San Francesco) by 
$QGUHD&DYDOFDQWL NQRZQDV%XJJLDQRDQG%UXQHOOHVFKLSS7KDWDQLOOXVRU\painted 
architecture should inspire such an important new architectural type is systematic of a more general 
Renaissance questioning of the boundaries between architecture and painting. One aspect of this was 
the development of a metrical architecture to be viewed as though it were a painting. As Wittkower notes 
RI%UXQHOOHVFKL·VFKXUFKRI6DQ/RUHQ]RLWLVGHVLJQHGZLWKWKHVTXDUHJULGRILWVÁRRULWVGHOLQHDWHG
central axis and the regular rhythm of its columns) as if to be seen through a perspective screen, its 
SDUDOOHOOLQHVUHWUHDWLQJWRDVLQJOHYDQLVKLQJSRLQWS,WYLVXDOO\DVVHUWVWKHVLJQLÀFDQFHRI
linear perspective not only for painters but also for early Renaissance architects. Linear perspective 
RIIHUVWKHRUHWLFDOMXVWLÀFDWLRQIRUWKHXVHRIDEVROXWHSURSRUWLRQVLQDUFKLWHFWV·HOHYDWLRQVLWJXDUDQWHHV
that absolute measurements can be perceived from ‘subjective’ viewpoints as they recede in space (see 
:LWWNRZHUSS
3  As Goffen notes, the ‘altarpiece has been removed from its frame and perhaps from its original site 
in the church’ (1989, p. 171). Nevertheless, the work’s current frame replicates the original intent, and 
therefore still might serve by way of example. 
 $OWKRXJKVRPHWLPHVDVLQWKH%HOOLQLWKHZRUNRIIHUVDJOLPSVHLQWRDÀFWLRQDOODQGVFDSHEH\RQGWKH
FRQÀQHVRIWKHSDLQWHGFKDSHO
 ,QFHUWDLQLQVWDQFHVVXFKÀJXUHV¶EHFRPHYHKLFOHVRILGHQWLÀFDWLRQÀJXUDWLRQVRIWKHEHKROGHULQWKH
painting, representatives of a personal perspective’ (Kemp 1998, p. 187).
6 The centric point is Alberti’s term for what by the seventeenth century becomes known as the vanishing 
point. For the importance of registering the distinction see Elkins (1994, p. 8), but for convenience sake 
I generally use the later term. In fact, the San Zaccaria Altarpiece’s vanishing point is somewhat higher 
than eye level, but see note above about the repositioning of this work.
7  This unhistorical association of early Renaissance perspective with seventeenth century Cartesian 
rationalism, where analytic geometry is taken by Descartes as a model for his dualistic philosophy, 
is repeated by historians like Martin Jay, who take their notion of Cartesian perspectivalism directly 
IURPÀJXUHV OLNH%U\VRQ. Thus Jay writes: ‘The abstract coldness of the perspectival gaze meant the 
withdrawal of the painter’s emotional entanglement with the objects depicted in geometricalized 
space. The participatory involvement of more absorptive visual modes was diminished, if not entirely 
suppressed, as the gap between spectator and spectacle widened. The moment of erotic projection in 
vision … was lost as the bodies of the painter and viewer were forgotten in the name of an allegedly 
disincarnated, absolute eye’ (1988, p. 8).
8   Bryson’s assertion is based on Alberti’s description of a picture as a cross section of a visual pyramid 
(1966, p. 52), the apex of which is ‘located within the eye’ (p. 48).  That the vanishing point curiously 
‘incarnates the viewer, renders him tangible and corporeal’ (1983, p. 106) is for Bryson the outcome of 
WKHIDLOXUHRIHYHQWKHPRVW ¶$OEHUWLDQ·SDLQWHUVWRUHVROYH¶WKHUHODWLRQEHWZHHQWKHSXUHO\ÀFWLRQDO
vanishing point, and the position physicallyWREHRFFXSLHGE\WKHYLHZHU·S<HWWKHS\UDPLGRU
cone of vision is not Alberti’s invention, but is taken from the medieval study of optics, a theory of vision 
known as perspectiva. Alberti devotes much of Book 1 of De pictura/Della pittura to a consideration of 
optics (perspectiva naturalis -DPHV $FNHUPDQ QRWHV LQ ¶$OEHUWL·V /LJKW· D SS  WKDW WKHUH
is a tendency for modern readers to ignore this section, and to focus almost exclusively on Alberti’s 
perspective construction (SHUVSHFWLYDDUWLÀFLDOOLV). Alberti relies on theories of vision that extend back to 
Euclid, Ptolemy and Galen. As Ackerman notes: ‘These writers, all of whom were known throughout 
the Middle Ages, and most other ancient students of optics, proceeded on the hypothesis that vision is 
made possible by rays of light emanating from the eye to reach the objects of vision’ (p. 62). Alberti’s 
GHVFULSWLRQRIWKHYLVXDOS\UDPLGZLWKLWVUD\VRI OLJKWFODVVLÀHGLQWRExtrinsic rays (which describe 
outline), median rays (which describe surfaces and colour) and a single centric ray (the most active 
and strong, and which enters the eye at a right angle), is directly derived from such optical theories, 
DQG$OEHUWLDGGVQRWKLQJQHZ$OEHUWLSS+HVLPSO\DGDSWVLWDVDSHGDJRJLFDOWRROIRU
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visualising his perspective construction and for demonstrating its proof based on simple Euclidean 
JHRPHWU\,QDVVHUWLQJWKHSUHHPLQHQFHRIWKHFHQWULFUD\¶$OEHUWLLVVLPSO\WUDQVPLWWLQJDSULQFLSOHRI
medieval optics’ (Ackerman 1991a, p. 67). 
Far from aiming at a ‘dimensionless punctuality’, in locating the ‘cuspid’ (the apex of the pyramid) in 
the eye, Alberti is therefore grounding his system of perspective construction in an already established 
theory of vision. His real theoretical breakthrough, what Ackerman rightly refers to as ‘his most 
LQÁXHQWLDODQGUHYROXWLRQDU\FRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHKLVWRU\RIDUW·SLVWRFRQFHLYHRIDSLFWXUHDVDQ
LQWHUVHFWLRQRIWKHYLVXDOS\UDPLGIRUZKLFK$OEHUWLXVHVWKHDQDORJ\RIDÀQHO\ZRYHQYHLO$OEHUWL
SS$OEHUWL·VFRQFHUQLVWRHVWDEOLVKDV\VWHPRISURSRUWLRQDOWULDQJOHVVRWKDW¶HYHU\FURVV
section of the visual pyramid which is equidistant to the plane of the thing seen will be proportional 
WRWKDWREVHUYHGSODQH·SS$OEHUWLXVHVWKHVLPLOHRIDVPDOOPDQEHLQJSURSRUWLRQDOWRDODUJH
man in terms of relative sizes of ‘palm’ and ‘foot’ as a way of explaining proportionality (p. 53). This is 
a clue as to his real intention. 
:LWWNRZHU·VHVVD\¶%UXQHOOHVFKLDQG´3URSRUWLRQLQ3HUVSHFWLYHµ·FKDSWHUSSVHWV
out with admirable clarity the importance of the ‘proportionality of similar triangles’ to Alberti’s system 
of constructing perspective. Crucially, this offers Alberti a ‘proof of representational correctness’ (p. 
127). In a revealing passage Wittkower argues: 
:HPD\QRZUHWXUQWRWKHH[DPSOHRIWKHWDOODQGOLWWOHÀJXUHDQGVWDWHZKDW$OEHUWLRQO\LPSOLHG
:HFDQLPDJLQHWKHWULDQJOHVIRUPHGE\WKHÀJXUHVDVYLVXDOS\UDPLGVZLWKWKHDSH[DWWKHYDQLVKLQJ
SRLQW7KHQLQVWHDGRIVHHLQJWZRÀJXUHVREMHFWLYHO\GLIIHULQJLQVL]HZHVHHPWRORRNDWÀJXUHVRI
equal size placed at different distances in space from the eye of the observer. If on the other hand, we 
LPDJLQHWKHH\HDWWKHDSH[RIWKHWULDQJOHWKHVPDOOHUÀJXUHZLOOEHWKHSURMHFWLRQRIWKHODUJHURQ
WKHLQWHUVHFWLRQRIWKHS\UDPLGRIVLJKW$VORQJDVWKHWZRÀJXUHVFDQEHGHÀQHGE\VLPLODUWULDQJOHV
they will be proportional to each other. It appears that the same theorems of plane geometry unite 
proportion and perspective (p. 127). 
This correlation of ‘vanishing point’ and eye position is critical to understanding the construction 
of Alberti’s system and its grounding in Euclidean geometry. The theoretical repercussion of such a 
FRUUHODWLRQLVQRWWKHUHGXFWLRQRIDQHPERGLHGYLHZHUWRDGLVLQFDUQDWHGDEVROXWHDQGÀ[HGH\Hin front 
of the painting, but the establishing of a common foundation for both proportion and perspective.
9 Puttfarken argues:  
7KHYLVXDOSURMHFWLRQRIDFRKHUHQWSLFWRULDOZRUOGDVVXPHVDÀ[HGVWDQGSRLQW IURPZKLFK LWFDQ
take place. Again, this is not necessarily our real standpoint in front of the picture (since we can 
FKDQJHWKLVZLWKRXWFKDQJLQJWKHSLFWXUH,QSHUVSHFWLYDOSLFWXUHVWKLVVWDQGSRLQWLVGHÀQHGE\WKH
point occupied by the viewer’s eye and its distance from the picture. All the necessary information 
DERXWH\HSRLQWDQGLWVGLVWDQFHLVHPEHGGHGZLWKLQWKHLQIRUPDWLRQSURYLGHGIRUXVLQWKHSLFWXUH
plane. Projection is a reciprocal process: as we project the objects of the pictorial world into their 
appropriate place and distance, they in toto project us, as the viewer, into the place from which they 
are seen. WeÀQG our appropriate position vis-à-vis the pictorial world by constituting that world in 
SURMHFWLYHYLVLRQ,WLVSRVVLEOHWKDWZHPD\ÀQGWKHVWDQGSRLQWSUHVFULEHGE\WKHSLFWXUHFRLQFLGLQJ
ZLWKRXUUHDOSRVLWLRQLQIURQWRILW«,QPRVWFDVHVWKDWGRHVQRWKDSSHQSS
While Puttfarken is right to note that in most cases this correlation does not happen, in works implying 
external beholders it frequently does.
10 Sandström believes the consideration of such functional devices to be genuinely a problem of aesthetics 
as well as art history, and indeed he sets out a position that has repercussions for both a theory of 
representational seeing and for an aesthetics of reception. In his own version of painting’s double 
DVSHFW6DQGVWU|PEULQJVWRJHWKHULWKHUHDOLW\HIIHFWRISDLQWLQJWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHSLFWXUH
as surface and the picture as implied space, and (ii) the questioning of the boundary between the virtual 
VSDFHRISDLQWLQJDQGWKHSK\VLFDOVSDFHRIDUFKLWHFWXUHSS
11   Wolfgang Kemp argues that Shearman fails to distinguish between the two variations of reception 
theory: Rezeptionsästhetik (reception aesthetics) and Rezeptionsgeschichte (reception history) (1994, p. 
.HPSDUJXHVWKDWLILQWKHHDUO\FKDSWHUV6KHDUPDQZRUNVUHFHSWLRQaesthetically, in that the topic 
LV¶5HQDLVVDQFHDUW·VLQWHQVLÀHGDGGUHVVRIWKHYLHZHU·FRUUHVSRQGLQJWRQRWLRQVRIDQLPSOLFLWYLHZHU
ZLWKWKHODWWHUFKDSWHUVKHVZLWFKHVWRUHFHSWLRQhistorical observations, in that ‘the topic is no longer 
the activation of the link between viewer and work, but rather the competence of the viewer, and the 
question of how spectators make meaning based on their contemporaneity, their previous knowledge, 
WKHLUVRFLDORUVSLULWXDOVWDWXVRUWKHLUJHQGHU·SS
12   Shearman uses the term ‘liminal’ to ‘describe that zone of the real space which lies at the threshold of 
the painted space, but is not part of the painted space’ (1992, p. 59).
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13   As Wolfgang Kemp notes, the notion of the spectator’s ‘natural experience of the space’ needs some 
FODULÀFDWLRQ:KDWLVQRWGLVSXWHGLVWKDW'RPHQLFR/HQ]LDQGKLVZLIHWKHOLNHO\SDWURQVDUH¶LQWHUUHG
in the pavement before the fresco’ (Goffen 1998a, p. 13). Goffen argues that the proximity of the now 
destroyed tomb suggests that Trinity was commissioned as a mural for the Lenzi family funeral chapel, 
and indeed ‘the fresco’s funerary function is visualized in a most dramatic way’ by the illusionistic 
sarcophagus, on which ‘a skeleton is laid to rest’ (p. 13). What is subject to dispute is the presence 
of a real altar; Goffen surmises that if such an altar had been installed, then ‘the Trinity would have 
EHFRPHYLVLEOHLQLWVHQWLUHW\RQO\ZKHQWKHEHKROGHUNQHOWDWWKHDOWDUWKDWLVRQO\NQHHOLQJFRXOGRQH
VHHWKHVNHOHWRQ·SS.HPSPDNHVDQDQDORJRXVVXJJHVWLRQZKHQKHSURSRVHVWKDW¶ZHPXVW
assume two different types of recipients’: ‘close recipients, who include the priest and the churchgoers 
participating in the Mass with him, or praying before the altarpiece’, and a more distant group, ‘those 
who perceive the work at a greater distance, standing or walking under the arcade or in the nave’, and 
to whom constitute ‘the focus of the fresco’s deployment of central perspective, as well as the total 
HIIHFWRIWKHÀFWLYHVSDFHRIWKHSVHXGRFKDSHO·S%\FRQWUDVW6KHDUPDQIRUUHDVRQVWKDW
escape Kemp) ‘rejects the functional determination of the fresco as altarpiece’ (Kemp 1994, p. 367). 
6KHDUPDQGRXEWVZKHWKHUWKHUHLVVXIÀFLHQWHYLGHQFHIRUDUHDODOWDUDQGDUJXHVWKDW¶DUHDODOWDUVHHPV
UHQGHUHGUHGXQGDQWE\WKHÀFWLRQ·DQG¶ÀFWLRQDODOWDUVFDQQRWEHFRQVHFUDWHG·S6KHDUPDQ·V
position here is supported by John Spike (1996, p. 174). What is not in doubt is the role played by the 
SDLQWHGDUFKLWHFWXUH$V*RIIHQQRWHV¶ÀFWLYHDUFKLWHFWXUHEHFRPHVDSURWDJRQLVWSOD\LQJDUROHQHDUO\
DVLPSRUWDQWDVWKDWRIWKHÀJXUHVWKHPVHOYHVDQGIXOO\FRQVRQDQWZLWKWKHLUV·DS
14   That the work incorporates donors into the picture is in itself somewhat unusual for a Venetian 
DOWDUSLHFH)RUDGLVFXVVLRQRIWKLVSRLQWVHH3XWWIDUNHQ
15  Interestingly, Puttfarken argues that as such the Pesaro Altarpiece still represents the dominance of 
WKUHHGLPHQVLRQDOVSDWLDOGLVSRVLWLRQRYHUWZRGLPHQVLRQDOFRPSRVLWLRQFRQWUDGLFWLQJWKHHPSKDVLV
frequently placed on its diagonal compositional thrust.
 3XWWIDUNHQKHUHUHIHUHQFHV6WDDOH6LQGLQJ/DUVHQ·VDFFRXQWRIWKHHDUOLHUYHUVLRQRIWKHZRUNÀJ
²VHH3XWWIDUNHQSÀJ
17  Something impossible to capture in photographs.
18  While some earlier Italian and Netherlandish works might arguably be said to imply internal spectators, 
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Fig. 75    Titian: Pesaro Altarpiece, earlier 
VWDJHDFFRUGLQJWR6LQGLQJ/DUVHQGUDZQ
by Puttfarken).
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such as Jan van Eyck’s $UQROÀQL:HGGLQJÀJDQG3LHURGHOOD)UDQFHVFD·VMadonna di Senigallia 
ÀJLWLVRQO\ZLWKWKHVHYHQWHHQWKFHQWXU\ZRUNVRI5HPEUDQGW9HUPHHUDQG9HOi]TXH]WKDWVXFK
DQRWLRQLVÀUVWV\VWHPDWL]HGDQGWKHFRPSOH[LWLHVRIWKHQRWLRQSOD\HGRXW
 )RUDQDFFRXQWRIWKHDUJXPHQWVXQGHUO\LQJWKHZRUN·VUHFHSWLRQVHH3XWWIDUNHQSS
20  I take this suggestion from Georgina Cole’s essay ‘”Wavering Between Two Worlds”: The Doorway in 
6HYHQWHHQWK&HQWXU\'XWFK*HQUH3DLQWLQJ·
21 A rather ingenious adaptation of a trompe l’oeil curtain is provided by Pieter de Hooch’s The Interior of 
the Burgomasters’ Council Chamber in the Amsterdam Town Hall with Visitors ÀJ+HUHWKHFXUWDLQD
ODWHUDGGLWLRQDFFRUGLQJWRUDGLRJUDSKV*DVNHOOSSFDWLVERWKDQ¶LOOXVRU\·FRYHUWR
the work we look at as an external beholder, but can also, ambiguously, read as the pulled back cover 
to another unrepresented painting. This lies above ‘our’ heads, if we imagine ourselves as an implied 
internal beholder (our presence engaged by the young girl). Indeed, the surface on which this work 
rests might intriguingly be interpreted as the reverse of de Hooch’s work. Peter C. Sutton reveals the 
DEVHQWSDLQWLQJDIWHU ,YDQ*DVNHOO SS FDWDVDZRUNE\*RYDHUW)OLQFN 6XWWRQ
SS6XWWRQVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHUHDUZDOOOLHVWRRXUEDFNVDOPRVWWRWKHSRLQWZKHUHZHVWDQG
ZLWKLQWKHURRP·VÀUHSODFHDQGWKHZRUNKHQFH¶SOD\VRQWKHYLHZHU·VVSHFLDONQRZOHGJHRIWKHURRP·
(p. 158). He further notes how the curtain plays another crucial role in preventing a ‘conspicuous 
distortion’ by covering ‘the spring line of the ceiling and much of the back left corner of the room’ (p. 
158). Nevertheless, the notion we stand, as it were, behind the picture plane of the unrepresented work 
²DZRUNWKDWWKHYLHZHULQWKHZRUNORRNVXSDWVRLQWHQWO\LVFHUWDLQO\LQWULJXLQJDQGLVERUQHRXW
by my own experience of the work. And indeed Podro, with respect to Rembrandt, also talks about 
the suggestion ‘of the viewer’s position being mirrored on the other side of the dominant plane of the 
surface’ (1998, p. 65). Regardless, as Sutton notes, the work ‘cunningly serves to engage us in the scene 
by not only reminding us of unseen aspects of the chamber, thus subsuming us in the imaginary space, 
but also by calling attention to our own act of viewing a painting’ (1984, p. 158). 
22  In an earlier work, Vermeer also adopts a trompe l’oeil curtain in A Woman Reading at the Window ÀJ
78). Here the clash between two contrasting barriers to our participation is revealing. Unlike the playful 
tension of Maes’s EavesdropperWKHZRUNODFNVUHVROXWLRQWKHVWDWXVRIWKHFXUWDLQZKLFK;UD\VUHYHDO
as a later addition, is inconsistent with the role played by the disturbed table. While the former excludes 
the external spectator, the latter suggests, while simultaneously denying, an internal presence. The work 
perhaps marks a crucial, if not entirely successful, problematization of the presence of the beholder in 
Vermeer’s oeuvre. 
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Fig. 76    Jan van Eyck: $UQROÀQL:HGGLQJ(1434), 
National Gallery, London. 
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Fig. 77    Pieter de Hooch: The Interior of the Burgomasters’ Council Chamber in the 
Amsterdam Town Hall with Visitors F0XVHR7K\VVHQ%RUQHPLV]D0DGULG
Notes
Fig. 78    Johannes Vermeer: A Woman Reading at the Window (c. 1657), Staatliche 
*HPlOGHJDOHULH'UHVGHQ
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23  While I have found Alpers’s distinction between two modes of representation extremely useful, it is 
clear from this discussion that it is not the case that all Dutch works necessarily renounce the assumption 
behind the Albertian mode of ‘the existence of viewers prior to and external to’ the picture (1983, p. 
37).
24 Podro notes a parallel case with Rembrandt’s Women in Bed (Sarah, Wife of Tobias) ÀJEXWRQH
where our presence is not so much ignored as negated. Podro observes: ‘We are aware of the woman 
observing an event we cannot see … [which] continues beyond the frame, in the space in which we 
VWDQGDQGEHFDXVHRIWKHDSSUR[LPDWLRQRIWKHÀFWLYHVHWWLQJWRWKHUHDOIUDPHDQGWKHSURSRUWLRQRI
WKHVXUIDFHRFFXSLHGE\WKHÀJXUHZHLPDJLQHKHUDVVHHQIURPYHU\FORVH:KDWLVDUUHVWLQJKHUHLV
that despite the sense of closeness and imagining the scene thus extending into our space, we have no 
role and can imagine no position for ourselves in relation to her’ (1998, p. 79). There are also parallels 
with aspects of Wollheim’s account of internal spectatorship with respect to Manet, in Painting as an Art 
SS
25  This latter relationship introduces additional complexities, which I do not have space to discuss. For a 
particularly illuminating account of just such a relationship, see Alpers’s ‘Viewing Making Painting’ 
 $OSHUV LQYHVWLJDWHV WKH G\QDPLF EHWZHHQ 5HPEUDQGW DQG KLV FRPPRQODZ ZLIH +HQGULFNMH
Stoffels in Rembrandt’s painting Bathsheba, where Rembrandt ‘depicts her as resisting the roles 
assigned: The painting represents not his successful projection on to her, but someone who resists 
projection, someone he acknowledges as separate from himself’ (p. 176).
 6WHDGPDQ·VUHFRQVWUXFWLRQVDOVRFRQÀUP6QRZ·VDUJXPHQWWKDW9HUPHHUPDQLSXODWHVWKHVXEWOHWZLVW
RIWKHUHÁHFWLRQWRZDUGVWKHPDQ
Chapter Five
1  In a cautionary note, Elkins suggests that before Foucault the painting ‘had to do with the Spanish 
court, with decorum and etiquette, and with transcendental technique: now, it has to do with cat’s 
cradles of inferred lines, relative positions, possible viewers, and the many logical forms that follow 
from them’ (1999, p. 42).
2  A point made by Iversen (1993, p. 131).
3  Given its apparent size, Searle rather unconvincingly claims this canvas to be none other than Velázquez’s 
Las Meninas UDWKHUWKDQWKHÀFWLYHSRUWUDLWRIWKHUR\DOFRXSOHS0RIÀWWHIIHFWLYHO\GLVSXWHV
WKLVFODLPRQWKHJURXQGVWKDWWKHGLPHQVLRQVGRQRWPDWFKSS
4  With reference to the inscription above the mirror, which reads Johannes Van Eyck fuit hic ÀJ 
Damisch notes: ‘Hic means here LQ WKHVSRW IURPZKLFK , VHH LW DV UHÁHFWHGDQGQRW there, where I 
see it to be by means of the mirror, in the position of the witness facing this man and woman whose 
portrait was executed by Van Eyck, if we are to accept Panofsky’s classic reading, as a kind of marriage 
FHUWLÀFDWH·  SS  'DPLVFK DOVR SRLQWV RXW SRVVLEOH LPSOLFDWLRQV RI WKH IDFW WKDW WKHUH
are two witnesses, in that we identify with two vanishing points – ‘we must seriously consider the 
possibility that the multiplicity of vanishing points, all situated in the same area of the painting, held to 
be characteristic of early Flemish painting might indicate not a problematic lack of systematic coherence 
EXWDGHOLEHUDWHFKRLFHDQDFNQRZOHGJHPHQWRUDIÀUPDWLRQRIWKHGLIIHUHQWSHUVSHFWLYHVRIGLIIHUHQW
VXEMHFWVÀUVWRIDOORIGLIIHUHQWVSHFWDWRUVVLPXOWDQHRXVO\ORRNLQJDWWKHVDPHSDLQWLQJ·S,WLVDQ
intriguing, if not altogether convincing, proposition.
 7KHVL]HVRIWKHUHÁHFWHGÀJXUHVDUHWRRODUJHJLYHQWKHGLPHQVLRQVRIWKHURRPWREHDGLUHFWUHÁHFWLRQ
of the living royal couple. With Snyder and Cohen’s argument, the problem is somewhat alleviated as 
the viewing distance is reduced. George Kubler (1985) claims that the mirror is in fact ‘a painted image 
RIWKH.LQJDQG4XHHQSDLQWHGRQDVPDOOFDQYDVDVLIVHHQLQDPLUURU·S7KLVKRZHYHUZRXOG
not explain its strange ‘glow’ relative to the other paintings on the rear wall. That Velázquez is not 
DYHUVHWRPDQLSXODWLQJDUHÁHFWLRQLVERUQHRXWE\9HOi]TXH]·VVenus and CupidWKHVRFDOOHG¶Rokeby 
Venus’ – a work that manipulates the angle of the mirror in order to engage the viewer and the size of 
WKHUHÁHFWHGLPDJH
Snyder and Cohen’s version is consistent with the earliest account of the painting, by Antonio 
Palomino in Part Three of El museo pictórico y escala óptica, published in Madrid in 1724 (see Jonathan 
%URZQSS$V%URZQQRWHV ¶3DORPLQRLVFRQÀGHQWWKDWWKHPLUURULPDJHUHÁHFWVWKH
large canvas on which the artist is working’ (p. 257).
6 This error is repeated by Steinberg (1981, p. 51), although Steinberg’s own position actually predates all 
the accounts thus far referenced, though it was published later.
7  The reconstruction was in fact undertaken for Snyder by Elkins (Snyder 1985, p. 565). 
8  The room in question is the Pieza Príncipal in the Cuarto Bajo del PrincipeRQ WKHJURXQGÁRRURI WKH
$OFi]DU²VHH0RIÀWWSS6HHDOVR-RQDWKRQ%URZQSSVelázquez 
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KLPVHOIZDVH[WHQVLYHO\LQYROYHGLQWKHUHFRQÀJXUDWLRQRIWKHVHURRPV0DUWLQ.HPS·VUHFRQVWUXFWLRQ
in The Science of Art SÀJVEDVHGRQD¶SURFHGXUHRIZRUNLQJfrom the picture’ (p. 
350, n. 27), arrives at a plan that differs from the historic chamber in that it has one window too few. 
,WLVGLIÀFXOWWRVHHMXVWKRZ.HPSDUULYHVDWWKLVSDUWLFXODUVROXWLRQDVWKHSRVLWLRQRIWKH:HVWZDOO
FDQQRWEHGHWHUPLQHGIURPWKHGHSLFWLRQDVVXFK0RUHRYHU.HPS·VSHUVSHFWLYDODQDO\VLVSÀJ
SURYLGHVDYLHZLQJGLVWDQFHWKDWH[FHHGVWKDWRIKLVGLDJUDPPDWLFSODQSÀJDQGLV
LQIDFWPRUHFRQVLVWHQWZLWK0RIÀWW·VSRVLWLRQLQJRIWKH¶5R\DO6SRW·SÀJ,DPLQFOLQHG
WRDFFHSW0RIÀWW·VUHFRQVWUXFWLRQUHJDUGOHVVRIDQ\YDOLGLW\WRWKHFODLPWKDW¶LW LVKLJKO\OLNHO\WKDW
Velázquez utilized a camera obscura in the construction of the picture’ (p. 287).
9  From a room we know as the Pieza de la Torre Dorada.
10  Iversen argues that, in contrast to an ‘allegory of classical episteme’ what Steinberg’s reciprocity 
suggests, in Riegl’s terminology, ‘is the diminishment of internal coherence and the compensating shift 
toward connection with those in the imagined space in front of the picture’ (1993, p. 145). Echoing, but 
differing from Alpers, Iversen goes on to suggest that if Foucault and Steinberg’s ‘radically incompatible 
interpretations … face off on either side of the divide we have been calling internal and external 
coherence, or histoire and discours, or “in itself” and “for others”’, then ‘the fact that both sides of the 
opposition can be made to adhere to the same painting suggests that they might be false distinctions’ 
(p. 146).
Fig. 79    Rembrandt: Woman in Bed (Sarah, Wife of Tobias) (c. 1645), National Gallery of Scotland, 
Edinburgh.
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Chapter Six
1 Damisch attributes this work to Giotto. Given the lack of corroborating evidence, the attribution of 
works in the Upper Church at Assisi is, to say the very least, problematic. The argument remains:, 
however, regardless of the accuracy of any attribution. 
2  The notion of perspectival construction as ‘a systematic abstraction from the structure of this 
psychophysiological space’ is put forward by Panofsky in Perspective as Symbolic Form (1991, p. 30). 
Challenging Panofsky’s position, Elkins contends that ‘all Panofsky’s descriptive terms for artistic spaces 
from ancient to Renaissance art are themselves modern’ (1994, p. 22). Elkins argues: ‘The Renaissance 
KDGWKLQJVWKHRWKHUZD\DURXQGLQUHJDUGWRVSDFHDQGWKDWDUWLVWVDQGZULWHUVWKRXJKWÀUVWRIREMHFWV
DQGVHFRQGRIZKDWZHFDOOSHUVSHFWLYHVSDFHRUÀFWLYHVSDFH,QDSKUDVHWKH5HQDLVVDQFHQRWLRQLV
“object oriented” and the modern concept “space oriented”’ (p. 15). One might accept Elkins corrective 
to Panofsky while acknowledging that while Alberti does not talk about space in a contemporary way, 
he is nevertheless undoubtedly aware of the movement of bodies in space relative to an observer. Thus 
$OEHUWLDUJXHV¶,QWKHÀUVWSODFHZKHQZHORRNDWDWKLQJZHVHHLWDVDQREMHFWZKLFKRFFXSLHVDVSDFH·
(1972, p. 67). Even if Renaissance painters lacked a ‘concept’ of systematic space, pictorial space arises 
from the depiction of a foreshortened architecture conceived as a container for bodies in space.
3  Podro, for instance, has pointed out the subtle registering of the direction of our arrival by Giotto’s St 
Francis Appearing to the Brethren at ArlesÀJDFKLHYHGWKURXJKWKHVKLIWLQJRIV\PPHWU\WRFUHDWHWKH
HIIHFWRIDQREOLTXHYLHZSS  Podro does not comment upon the corresponding ambiguity 
LQ6W)UDQFLV·VSRVLWLRQLQJLQVSDFHZKHUHE\KH¶ÁRDWV·IRUZDUGLQDZD\WKDWKHDSSHDUVWRDGGUHVVus 
as well as the Brethren. For a consideration of a similar ambiguity in the relationship between implied 
space and painted surface, see Laura Jacobus on Giotto’s Annunciation in the Arena Chapel (1999, 2008) 
ÀJ
4  These clouds are the source of the miraculous summer snowfall, whereby Pope Liberius is able to 
RXWOLQHWKHJURXQGSODQRIWKHFKXUFKVHH)UHGHULFN+DUWWS
5  John White notes how the ‘relative size [of Christ and the Virgin], the absolute circular glory which 
surround them, and the horizontal bar of cloud that closes in the spatial box below, all emphasize the 
ÁDWQHVVRIWKHSDQHOZKLFKLVVRIRUFHIXOO\DWWDFNHGLQLWVORZHUKDOI·S
6 The comparison with a genuinely trompe l’oeil ceiling painting is telling. Andrea Pozzo’s Transmission 
of the Divine SpiritÀJXWLOL]HVDPDUEOHGLVFLQVHWLQWRWKHÁRRUWRGHVLJQDWHWKHH[DFWVSRWIRUWKH
beholder to stand in order for the illusion to fully cohere. Unlike the Correggio, the illusory impact, 
dependent upon such a precise determining of the viewer position, comes to the fore. The interstitial 
space between realms has become far more elaborate, the perspectival architectural frame extending 
upwards into the celestial space. Here, the illusory architecture and heavenly realm, a fanciful 
H[WHQVLRQ RI WKH UHDO DUFKLWHFWXUH LV ÀUVW DQG IRUHPRVWD GHFRUDWLYHHOHPHQW ,I &RUUHJJLR DOOLHV WKH
metaphysical distinction between painted space and real architecture to the work’s religious content, 
Pozzo obliterates such a separation in a virtuoso display of trompe l’oeilSDLQWLQJWKHVSHFWDFOHRIIHUHG
taking precedence over the work’s integration into the religious life of the church. 
,Q WHUPV RI FRQYLQFLQJ LOOXVLRQV FHLOLQJ SDLQWLQJV EHQHÀW IURP WKHLU GLVWDQFH IURP WKH YLHZHU
Puttfarken quotes the German physicist Helmholtz, who notes that ‘Compared with a large picture at 
a greater distance, all those elements which depend on binocular vision and on the movement of the 
body are less operative, because in very distant objects the differences between the images of the two 
H\HVRUEHWZHHQWKHDVSHFWIURPDGMDFHQWSRLQWVRIYLHZVHHPOHVV·+HOPKROW]SSFLWHG
in Puttfarken 2000, p. 22).
7  Although, as Damisch notes, ‘it must be said that in some compositions the banks of cloud are forcefully 
drawn and take on an altogether solid, material appearance’ (2002, p. 15).
 &RUUHJJLR·V FHLOLQJ SDLQWLQJV KDYH PXFK LQ FRPPRQ ZLWK PDQ\ RI WKH GHÀQLQJ IHDWXUHV RI VXFK D
UHODWLRQVKLSDVOLVWHGLQ&KDSWHU)RXUSS7KHSUHFXUVRUWR&RUUHJJLR·VVROXWLRQRI¶RSHQLQJ·
up the very fabric of a building is Mantegna’s Camera degli Sposi ÀJ$V6KHDUPDQLQVLVWVXSRQWKLV
HDUOLHUPRGHOLVLQIDFWQRWDGRPHEXWDÀFWLWLRXVRFXOXVSDLQWHGRQWKHYLUWXDOO\ÁDWFHQWUDOVHFWLRQ
of the vaulted ceiling (1992, p. 168). It is primarily an illusory device, playful in intent: a spectacle, 
rather than a work that allies its solution to any religious content. And yet the association of domes 
and vaulted spaces with the celestial has a much longer tradition, and it is not at all surprising that 
0DQWHJQD·VPRGHOLVODWHUDGDSWHGWRVSHFLÀFDOO\UHOLJLRXVXVH6HHIRULQVWDQFH6KHDUPDQFK
IV). Ceiling paintings, in their emphasis on verticality, have the obvious advantage in that the pictorial 
GHSWKIDFLOLWDWHGE\SHUVSHFWLYHFDQRSHQXSWRWKHKHDYHQVWKHLQÀQLWHDQGXQGHÀQHG
 , DP GXELRXV DERXW %U\VRQ·V FODLP WR À[ WKLV SRVLWLRQ DW URXJKO\ ¶WKH KHLJKW LQGLFDWHG E\ WKH
Madonna’s extended right hand’ (1983, p. 108). While clearly painted from a higher viewpoint, the 
lack of orthogonals prevents us from locating this second ‘vanishing point’ (if such a term is, indeed, 
appropriate) with any accuracy.
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Fig. 80    Giotto: St Francis Appearing to the Brethren at Arles %DUGL&KDSHO6&URFH)ORUHQFH
Figs. 81, 82    Giotto: Annunciation F$UHQD&KDSHO3DGXD
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 $SRLQWIRUFHIXOO\PDGHE\(ONLQVSS,QIDFW-DQH$QGUHZV$LNHQSURSRVHVWKDW
UDWKHUWKDQXVLQJ$OEHUWL·V¶SDYHPHQWEDVHG·V\VWHPFRPSXWHUJHQHUDWHGPHDVXUHPHQWVRI0DVDFFLR·V
fresco ‘are strongly suggestive of the probability that Masaccio and Brunelleschi constructed the 
apparent diminution of the vault ribs using a relatively simple projection technique dependent on 
the surface grid and directly derived from the astrolabe’ (p. 100). J.V. Field has also established that 
LQ0DVDFFLR·VIUHVFR¶WKHFRPSDVVVZHHSVWKDWGHÀQHWKHHGJHVRIWKHULEVGRQRWUHDFKDVIDUDVWKH
mouldings’ (2005, p. 48); echoing Aiken, Field suggests that the absence of end points to these arcs ‘is 
DFOHDULQGLFDWLRQWKDWWKHSRVLWLRQVRIWKHULEVZHUHQRWIRXQGE\PDNLQJDSVHXGRSDYHPHQWRQWKH
level of the base of the vault’ (p. 48). This does not, however, negate the argument about the occlusion 
of the horizon.
 :KLOH WKLVFHQWULFSRLQW LVGLIÀFXOW WR ORFDWH LQUHSURGXFWLRQVSULPDULO\EHFDXVHRI WKHFRPSDUDWLYH
shortness of the orthogonals), it can clearly be established in the space of the church, despite the 
considerable damage the fresco suffered during the Second World War bombing of the church.
 )RUDIDVFLQDWLQJGLVFXVVLRQRI WKHWKHPHRI WKH9LUJLQ·V$VVXPSWLRQVHH*RIIHQSS
*RIIHQQRWHVWKDW¶IRXUWHHQWKFHQWXU\WH[WVSXWFRQVLGHUDEOHHPSKDVLVRQWKHH[DOWDWLRQLQKHDYHQRI
0DU\·VERG\·ZKLOH¶DÀIWHHQWKFHQWXU\9HQHWLDQOLIHRIWKH9LUJLQGHVFULEHVWKHSK\VLFDOUHDOLW\RIWKH
DVVXPSWLRQRIKHULQFRUUXSWLEOH LPPDFXODWHERG\LQWRKHDYHQ·S7KLVKDVVLJQLÀFDQFHIRUKHU
intercessory role, as Mary’s ‘bodily presence in heaven assures a more valid mediation for the faithful’ 
(p. 98).
13  There is some doubt about the work’s original height, as the painting has been moved – see J. V. Field 
(2005, p. 225). From my own observations (admittedly at a distance from the work, and hence also 
reliant on reproductions) I disagree with White’s contention that the column capitals conform to a 
higher position than those of the base – see White (1972, p. 196). However, if this were to be the case, it 
would merely support the argument made with respect to Mantegna’s Assumption.
14  One might most readily think of the anamorphic skull in Holbein’s The Ambassadors; however, for 
OHVVZHOONQRZQDQGOHVVH[WUHPHH[DPSOHVVHH&KULVWLDQ0OOHU·V¶,W,VWKH9LHZSRLQW7KDW0DWWHUV
Observations on the Illusionistic Effect of Early Works by Hans Holbein’ (2001) 
15  The startling impact that the painting had on Fyodor Dostoyevsky is well recorded. This is a painting 
that could make one lose one’s faith. The painting’s role in Dostoyevsky’s The Idiot is discussed in Erika 
Michael’s ‘The Legacy of Holbein’s Gedankenreichtum’ (2001) and Julia Kristeva’s ‘Holbein’s Dead 
Christ’ (1989).
 .ULVWHYDQRWHVWKDW ¶WKHWZRZRPHQZKRDSSHDULQWKHWRSOHIWKDQGFRUQHURI0DQWHJQD·VSDLQWLQJ
introduce the grief and compassion that Holbein precisely puts aside by banishing them from sight or 
HOVHFUHDWLQJWKHPZLWKQRRWKHUPHGLDWRUWKDQWKHLQYLVLEOHDSSHDOWRRXUDOOWRRKXPDQLGHQWLÀFDWLRQ
with the dead Son’ (1989, p. 117).
Fig. 83    Andrea Pozzo: Transmission of the Divine Spirit6,JQD]LR5RPH
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17  See, for instance, Müller (2001). The effect is somewhat lessened by the work’s frame, which is not 
original.
18  The oblique viewpoint is consistent with the possibility that the work once occupied a side chapel, and 
was thus approached from the left. Kristeva notes that: ‘Among the various interpretations given by 
critics, one stands out and seems today the most plausible one. The painting would have been done 
for a predella that remained independent and was to occupy a raised position with respect to visitors 
ÀOLQJGRZQIURQWDOO\IURPWKHVLGHDQGWKHOHIWIRULQVWDQFHIURPWKHFKXUFK·VFHQWUDOQDYHWRZDUGV
the southern aisle). In the Upper Rhine region there are churches that contain funerary recesses where 
sculptured Christly bodies are displayed. Might Holbein’s work be a painterly transportation of such 
recumbent statues?’ (1989, p. 111)
19  John Lechte has argued that Kristeva’s realism is one that allows the symbolic to emerge: ‘it is only a 
ÀFWLRQ²DQG\HWLWSODFHVXVLQWRXFKZLWKWKHUHDO·S+HQRWHVWKDWWKHVHPLRWLF¶FULWLTXH
of realism had often been made according to a hermeneutics which placed emphasis on the very idea 
that every framework or medium was the basis of an interpretation. Reality would never be reached, 
in short, because it would always be mediated’ (p. 348). He contrasts this with Kristeva’s approach ‘of 
pointing out that a vision of reality (call it the original object) is an integral part of a viable subjectivity, 
one which keeps extreme melancholia at bay. The vision of reality constitutes the basis of the capacity 
RI LGHQWLÀFDWLRQ DV VXFK· S  :LWK +ROEHLQ WKLV LQFOXGHV DQ LQYLWDWLRQ ¶WR EHFRPH RQH ZLWK
&KULVW·VVXIIHULQJ·S,ZRXOGDUJXHWKDWVXFKDQLGHQWLÀFDWLRQLVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHUROH,DVVLJQ
imagination.
20  Although this does not in itself explain the missing section of the tomb’s frame, which is also absent 
from the top of the recess.
21  Piero’s The Flagellation of ChristÀJLVDQRWKHUZRUNWKDWGLYLGHVLQWRWZR]RQHVDOWKRXJKKHUHWKH
perspective is famously consistent, evidenced by the numerous reconstructions. Despite the unusually 
consistent perspective, the painted architecture structures the same separation of temporal and spatial 
realms we have noted in relation to the depiction of the supernatural, a separation that has led to 
FRQVLGHUDEOHVSHFXODWLRQDVWRWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHWKUHHIRUHJURXQGÀJXUHVDQGWKHVFHQHRI
the Flagellation itself. Christ’s body is unmarked, and the painting depicts the moment just prior to the 
ÀUVWVWURNH%RWKÁDJHOODWRUVDUHSRLVHGUHDG\WRVWULNH²DVXVSHQGHGPRPHQWFDSWXUHGIRUSHUSHWXLW\
The mystical light gives the Flagellation scene a dreamlike quality, removed from time, as if (perhaps) 
VHHQWKURXJKWKHH\HVRIWKHDQJHOLFORRNLQJIRUHJURXQGÀJXUH
22  Architectural thresholds are a recurrent theme of paintings depicting the Annunciation (scenes which, 
E\GHÀQLWLRQexclude the presence of an onlooker). Echoing a distinction made by Wollheim (1987, ch. 
VI), I want to contrast the metaphoric content of such works with the metaphorizing of part of the work 
I have described with respect to Vermeer’s Girl Asleep$QLQWLPDWHVFDOLQJRIDUFKLWHFWXUHWRÀJXUHLV
Fig. 84    Piero della Francesca: The Flagellation of Christ (c. 1460), Galleria Nazionale delle Marche, 
Urbino.
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Fig. 85    Lorenzo Monaco: Annunciation F
Santa Trinita Church, Florence. 
Fig. 86    Petrus Christus: Annunciation (c. 1450), 
7KH0HWURSROLWDQ0XVHXPRI$UW1HZ<RUN
Fig. 87    Domenico Veneziano: Annunciation F)LW]ZLOOLDP0XVHXP&DPEULGJH
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apparent in works such as Lorenzo Monaco’s Annunciation ÀJPDNLQJ$QQXQFLDWLRQVSDUWLFXODUO\
suitable works for representing metaphoric content. As Blum notes: ‘Mary’s womb, the fabulous 
vessel that was able to carry “the One whom the heavens cannot contain”, had long been an object of 
veneration in song, exegesis, and prayer. Her body was likened to all forms of enclosed architecture – a 
WHPSOHDWHQWDFKXUFKDFDVWOHWRQDPHRQO\DIHZ²DQGSUHÀJXUHGLQDQ\QXPEHURILPDJHVIURP
WKH2OG7HVWDPHQW·S3HWUXV&KULVWXV·V1HZ<RUNAnnunciation ÀJLVDQH[DPSOHRID
work that paints just such a metaphor. Domenico Veneziano’s Annunciation, painted for the predella 
RI KLV 6DLQW /XF\ $OWDUSLHFH ÀJ  XVHV SHUVSHFWLYDO PHDQV WR GUDZ RXU DWWHQWLRQ WR WKH GRRU DW
the rear of the hortus conclusus. Both locked door and garden are symbolic of Mary’s virginity. Here 
the ‘strong pull of linear perspective’ is allied to the metaphoric content; Veneziano emphasizes this 
pull by aligning Gabriel’s posture with the orthogonals, the path ‘ingeniously aligned with the angel’s 
back, raised arm and lily’ (Penny 1990, p. 34). Again, architecture dramatizes metaphoric content, but 
primarily through symbolic means. 
23 Dogs and children were a common domestic feature of Dutch genre painting, noticeably absent in 
Vermeer’s work. De Hooch uses similar devices in a number of paintings. In A Woman Delousing a 
Child’s Hair ÀJDGRJVLWVDWDQLQWHUQDOWKUHVKROGWUDQVÀ[HGE\WKHOLJKWZKLFKVWUHDPVLQIURP
DKDOIGRRUZKLFKRSHQVRQWRDJDUGHQ7KHGRJPHGLDWHVEHWZHHQWKHGRPHVWLFZRUOGRIWKHZRPDQ
and child and the external world represented by the penetrating sunlight. The intimacy of the former 
is enhanced by its inherent tactility, revealed in the tender act of grooming and the softness of the 
contained cupboard bed. The dog belongs to this realm, but also craves the outside world to which it is 
denied by the closed lower section of the door. Woman Lacing her Bodice Beside a Cradle ÀJUHIHUUHG
WRHDUOLHUIXUWKHUH[SORUHVWKHWKHPH7KHVPLOLQJZRPDQKDV MXVWÀQLVKHGEUHDVWIHHGLQJWKHEDE\
while a small dog – whose body is directed towards an open doorway – glances back at the cradle. The 
dog’s posture reveals its dualistic role within the spatial arrangement. The device is reinforced by a 
\RXQJFKLOGZKRVWDQGVLQWKHEULJKWO\OLWIR\HUVLOKRXHWWHGDJDLQVWDQRSHQKDOIGRRUWKURXJKZKLFK
she stares at the world beyond.
In Soldier and Laughing Girl ÀJ  9HUPHHU FOHDUO\ GHSLFWV WZR RSSRVHG VSKHUHV FRQFHLYHG LQ
terms of the interior and exterior realms of the woman and man. The man has his back to us, and 
is pushed hard up against the implied picture plane. He is clearly an outsider: he still wears his hat, 
which is silhouetted against an open window. His body language reveals his awkwardness within the 
Fig. 88    Pieter de Hooch: A Woman Delousing a Child’s Hair F5LMNVPXVHXP$PVWHUGDP
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domestic realm of the woman, who, in contrast, appears totally at ease. Edward Snow remarks upon 
the metaphor of the closed and concealed hand of the man, and the open and revealed hand of the 
woman (1994, p. 84).
24  While some of these scenes are deliberately ambiguous, others – such as Woman Drinking with Soldiers 
ÀJ²FOHDUO\GHSLFWEURWKHOVFHQHV,IDV3HWHU&6XWWRQVXJJHVWV¶WKHVXSSRVLWLRQWKDWPRUHWKDQ
a glass of wine will be shared … stems partly from the importuning old woman, reminiscent of the 
procuress types in earlier works’ (1984, p. 217), then it also arguably stems from the invitation of the 
open door, which offers a view through a lobby toward a room which the merry makers will no doubt 
retire to.
 2QHPLJKWQRWHD VLPLODUG\QDPLF LQ WZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\ZRUNVE\9LOKHOP+DPPHUVK¡L ÀJRU
(GZDUG+RSSHUÀJ)RUDGLVFXVVLRQRI¶+RSSHUV·V0HODQFKROLF*D]H·VHH,YHUVHQ:LWK
Hammershøi’s works, his wife, Ida, is repeatedly painted with her back facing the implied viewer, 
MX[WDSRVHGZLWKDYLHZWKURXJKDQRSHQGRRUZD\ LQWRDQHPSW\VSDFH$V)HOL[.UlPHUQRWHVZH
are thus ‘denied the clues to a sitter’s emotional state’ (2008, p. 19), or whether our presence has been 
UHJLVWHUHGS(FKRLQJ.UlPHU,EHOLHYHZHDUHLQYLWHGWRSURMHFWRQWRVXFKRGGO\XQVHWWOLQJVSDFHV
in a way that is analogous to the shared reverie of Vermeer’s Girl Asleep.
Chapter Seven
1   In other words, it is not necessary to hold a ‘concept’ of the notion of projection in order to experience 
or construct such a space; given that projection is an unconscious and primitive mental functioning, an 
H[SXOVLYHGHIHQFHPHFKDQLVPRULJLQDWLQJIURPHDUO\FKLOGKRRGWKLVVKRXOGKRSHIXOO\EHVHOIHYLGHQW
See, for instance, Melanie Klein (1997). 
 :ROOKHLP·VWKHRU\LVPDSSHGRXWLQ¶7KH6KHHSDQGWKH&HUHPRQ\·SSDQGGHYHORSHGLQ 
Painting as an ArtSSDQG¶&RUUHVSRQGHQFH3URMHFWLYH3URSHUWLHVDQG([SUHVVLRQ·
SS
3  Wollheim was rare amongst analytic philosophers in regarding psychoanalytic theory as having 
something positive to contribute to both the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of art. Wollheim’s 
commitment to psychoanalysis underpins much of his theoretical writing on art.
4 As Wollheim notes in Painting as an Art, this is not to suggest that ‘expressive perception just is the 
metaphorical application of psychological predicates to the world’ (1987, p. 85).
5  Budd recalls that in a discussion that followed Budd’s paper at a conference on Wollheim’s aesthetics in 
Utrecht, 1997, ‘Wollheim – I believe rightly – dismissed this position as absurd, implying that (despite 
the appearances) he had never embraced it’ (2001, p. 110, n. 7).
6 Unlike the view of Ryle in The Concept of Mind (2000), Wollheim argues that mental dispositions have 
SV\FKRORJLFDOUHDOLW\SS
7  See also Wollheim’s On the Emotions (1999, p. 3).
8  As Wollheim argues, ‘the fact remains that projection itself must always remain less than perspicuous’ 
(1987, p. 85). Little more can be said.
 6HHIRULQVWDQFH¶1RWHVRQ6RPH6FKL]RLG0HFKDQLVPV·LQ.OHLQSS%LRQSS
10  See, for instance, Hans Leowald (1980) and Forster and Carveth (1999).
11  With the possible exception of Holbein’s Dead Christ.
Conclusion
1   I am certainly not the only artist to have been challenged by the sheer complexity of ideas in these earlier 
paintings, or to have found in such works a conceptual structuring with relevance to a contemporary 
VFXOSWXUDORUÀOPSUDFWLFH7KLVLVYHU\GLIIHUHQWWRWKHHVVHQWLDOO\¶SLFWRULDO·XVHRI5HQDLVVDQFHSDLQWLQJV
in some of Bill Viola’s recent video art. As has been widely reported, sculptor Richard Serra’s ‘big 
epiphany as an artist’ came with the viewing of Velázquez’s Las MeninasIRUWKHÀUVWWLPHZKLOHVWLOO
a young painter: ‘I looked at it for a long time before it hit me that I was an extension of the painting. 
This was incredible to me. A real revelation. I had not seen anything like it before and it made me think 
about art, and about what I was doing, in a radically different way’ (cited in O’Hagan 2008). For Serra, 
this was a work that broke through the closed frame of painting to directly implicate the spectator: a 
sense of presence that persisted despite the seemingly contradictory interpretations the work posited. 
According to Jennifer Roberts, Jacopo Pontormo’s The Descent from the Cross played an analogous role 
LQ6HUUD·VIULHQG5REHUW6PLWKVRQ·VHYROXWLRQDVDQDUWLVWDJDLQIURPSDLQWHUWRDUWLVWSURGXFLQJWKUHH
GLPHQVLRQDOZRUN5REHUWVSS5REHUWVVXJJHVWVWKDW6PLWKVRQZDVIDVFLQDWHGE\¶ZKDW
we might call the dispositional temporality RI3RQWRUPR·VSDLQWLQJ·SVWLPXODWLQJUHÁHFWLRQVRQWKH
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Fig. 89    Pieter de Hooch: Woman Drinking with Soldiers 
0XVpHGX/RXYUH3DULV
Fig. 90    Edward Hopper: Hotel Room (1931), 
0XVHR7K\VVHQ%RUQHPLV]D0DGULG
Fig. 91    Vilhelm Hammershøi: 
Strandgade 30 (1901), Private Collection.
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containment of time that culminated in a series of ‘gyrostatic’ structures which Smithson describes 
WKXV¶$OOURWDWLRQDOSURJUHVVLRQVDUHEURXJKWWRDVWDWLFVWDWH7KHURWDWLRQLVQRQG\QDPLFDOLQDFWLYH
and stopped. Movement is impossible. Temporal duration is excluded …’ (cited Roberts 2004, p. 39, 
IURPWKHSUHVVUHOHDVHIRUKLVVHFRQGRQHPDQH[KLELWLRQDWWKH'ZDQJDOOHU\LQ
2  For convenience, I use the term Minimalism despite the reluctance of such artists to be described thus. 
3 Fried distinguishes his position on opticality from Greenberg’s in ‘An Introduction to My Art Criticism’, 
in Art and Objecthood SS
4  In his introduction to Absorption and Theatricality Fried writes: 
[T]he concept of theatricality is crucial to my interpretation of French painting and criticism in the 
age of Diderot, and in general the reader who is familiar with my essays on abstract art will be struck 
by certain parallels between ideas developed in those essays and in this book. Here too I want to 
DVVXUHWKHUHDGHUWKDW,DPDZDUHRIWKRVHSDUDOOHOVZKLFKKDYHWKHLUMXVWLÀFDWLRQLQWKHIDFWWKDWWKH
issue of the relationship between painting (or sculpture) and beholder has remained a matter of vital 
if often submerged importance to the present day. (1980, p. 5)
More recently Fried has extended his scope to a consideration of Barthes’s Punctum (Fried 2005) and   
the contemporary photography of Jeff Wall (Fried 2007).
 %LVKRSGHÀQHV¶IRXUPRGDOLWLHVRIH[SHULHQFHWKDW>LQVWDOODWLRQ@DUWVWUXFWXUHVIRUWKHYLHZHU·S
(i) ‘Dream Space’ (ch. 1), which puts forward ‘a model of the subject as psychological, or more accurately 
psychoanalytical’ (p. 10), where the viewer is frequently conceived as an ‘actor’ or ‘protagonist’ in 
DSK\VLFDOO\ LPPHUVLYH ¶VFHQH· WKDW WUDQVSRUWVXV LQWRDGLIIHUHQWÀFWLRQDO UHDOLW\ SS LL
‘Heightened Perception’ (ch. 2), which describes phenomenologically orientated installations; (iii) 
‘Mimetic Engulfment’ (ch. 3), characterized by ‘libidinal withdrawal and subjective disintegration’ (p. 
10), a ‘dissolution’ of the self (p. 82); (iv) ‘Activated Spectatorship’ (ch. 4), a modality ‘that posits the 
activated viewer of installation art as a political subject’ (p. 10). Now, while one might quibble about 
aspects of such categorization, Bishop offers an account that while poststructuralist is distinguished by 
its emphasis on ‘experience’ rather than ‘interpretation’. This ‘experiential’ emphasis (often informed 
by notions of the performative) is echoed by other recent art criticism that questions conceptualism’s 
‘immutable antinomies of thought and experience’ – see Kraynak (2003, p. 14). While I agree with 
Bishop’s claim that much of the art from the late 1960s onwards proposed the notion of the ‘decentred 
subject’ (2005, p. 11), I am less convinced by her poststructuralist characterisation of the viewer of 
Renaissance perspective – see earlier comments with respect to Cartesian perspective.
6  As Bishop notes, ‘the phrase “light and space” was coined to characterise the predilection of these 
artists for empty interiors in which the viewer’s perception of contingent sensory phenomena (sunlight, 
sound, temperature) became the content of the work’ (2005, p. 56).
7 With Asher, this foregrounding of the phenomenology of the work’s perception is allied to a situational 
aesthetic Buchloh describes as insisting ‘on a critical refusal to provide an existing apparatus with 
legitimizing aesthetic information’ (editor’s note in Asher 1983, p. VII).
8   Turrell notes of the City of Arhirit installation at the Stedelijk that ‘people got down on their hands and 
knees and crawled through it because they experienced intense disequilibrium’ (2002, p. 124).
9  Some of Turrell’s more recent work, such a s Tall Glass (2007), makes this reference to painting, to my 
mind, rather too explicit.
10  Catherine Elwes argues that video monitors ‘problematize the spectator position’ in a way that much 
contemporary projected work fails to do (2005, p. 155). Elwes claims that the critical distance established 
by monitors is ‘replaced by the spectacular, immersive experience of cinema’ (p. 151). 
11   As we have seen, Masaccio’s Trinity implies three coexistent spatiotemporal realms.
12  This activation of the space of the viewer is taken even further in McCall’s Long Film for Four Projectors  
(1974), where the work directly engages its surrounding architecture. Four diagonal projections of a 
shifting tilted line are projected into the room’s corners, creating four wedges of light that cross over 
each other. 
Notes to Pages 171-181
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Performer: Chris Swain
Metalwork: Michael Sanders
Fabrication: Dieter Pietsch, Mick Stickland and Stef Willis (in    
  collaboration with artist)
Photography: Alex Madjitey
225
226 Projective Space
I W
A
S
 O
N
C
E
 A
S
 Y
O
U
 A
R
E
…
2
0
0
2
Materials:   Acrylic, steel, plywood, luorescent lights, 2 x dvd projections  
  (looped)
Installation:   Kingsgate Gallery, West Hampstead, London
Performer: Chris Swain
Metalwork: Michael Sanders
Fabrication: Mick Stickland and Stef Willis (in collaboration with artist)
Photography: Artist
CAD:  Artist
227
228 Projective Space
S
U
S
P
E
N
D
E
D
2
0
0
2 Materials:   Steel, acrylic, water, dvd projection (looped)
Installation:   gf2 Gallery, Soho, London
Performer: Chris Swain
Metalwork: Michael Sanders
Photography: Alex Madjitey
229
P
L
E
N
U
M
 #
1
2
0
0
3 Materials:   Steel, plywood, water, dvd projection (looped)
Installation:   97-99 Gallery, Spitalields, London
Performer: Chris Swain
Metalwork: Michael Sanders
Fabrication: Mick Stickland and Stef Willis (in collaboration with artist)
Photography: Artist
230 Projective Space
C
O
N
D
U
IT
2
0
0
3 Materials:   Steel, dvd on monitor (looped)
Installation:   M2 Gallery, Peckham, London
Performer: Chris Swain
Metalwork: Michael Sanders
Photography: Artist
CAD:  Ge Fei Dong
231
232 Projective Space
P
L
E
N
U
M
 #
2
2
0
0
4 Materials:   Steel, dvd projection (looped)
Installation:   Galerie Sebastianskapelle, Ulm, Germany;
  Triangle Space, Chelsea College of Art and Design, London
Performer: Artist
Metalwork: Michael Sanders
Photography: Artist
CAD:  Ge Fei Dong
233
234 Projective Space
M
IL
K
Y
 V
O
ID
S
2
0
0
4 Materials:   Milk, mdf trays, timber supports; 
  dvd (looped) + photographic series
Installation:   Botallack tin and copper mine, Cornwall
Exhibited: Galerie Sebastianskapelle, Ulm, Germany
  G12 Gallery, Hampstead, London
Fabrication: Mick Stickland and Stef Willis (in collaboration with artist)
Construction: Artist, Philip Harrison 
Photography: Philip Harrison (in collaboration with artist)
Filming: Artist
235
236 Projective Space
237
238 Projective Space
v
C
H
A
M
B
E
R
2
0
0
5 Materials:   Canvas, timber, plywood, dvd projection (looped)
Installation:   Triangle  Space, Chelsea College of Art and Design, London
Fabrication: Artist, Mick Stickland 
Photography: Artist
CAD:  Ge Fei Dong
239
240 Projective Space
241
242 Projective Space
P
A
S
S
A
G
E
2
0
0
6 Materials:   Plywood, emulsion paint, luorescent light
Installation:   M2 Gallery, Peckham, London
Fabrication: Artist 
Photography: Artist
243
244 Projective Space
IN
T
E
R
S
E
C
T
IO
N
2
0
0
6 Materials:   Steel, acrylic, plywood, 2 x dvd projections (looped)
Installation:   Triangle  Space, Chelsea College of Art and Design, London
Metalwork: Michael Sanders 
Photography: Artist
CAD:  Ge Fei Dong
245
246 Projective Space
M
O
N
O
C
H
R
O
M
E
 P
A
S
S
A
G
E
2
0
0
7
Materials:   Mdf, emulsion paint
Installation:   Lethaby Gallery, Central St Martins, London
Fabrication: Artist 
Photography: Artist
CAD:  Ge Fei Dong
247
248 Projective Space
249
250 Projective Space
M
A
N
T
L
E
2
0
0
8 Materials:   Plywood, steel, braided cord, emulsion paint
Installation:   Banqueting Hall, Chelsea College of Art and Design, London
Metalwork: Michael Sanders
Fabrication: Artist 
Photography: Artist
CAD:  Ge Fei Dong
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